JUDGMENT : Deepak Maheshwari, J. This first appeal under Section 96 of CPC has been filed by plaintiff/appellant against the judgment and decree dated 11.07.1996 passed by learned District Judge, Balotara in Civil Original Suit No.29/1992 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant for recovery of money has been dismissed by learned trial Court. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the instant appeal are that the plaintiff/appellant Bank filed a suit for recovery of money against the defendants/respondents inter alia alleging that it had advanced a term loan of Rs.15,000/- and Rs.10,000/- as cash credit facility to defendant No.1 - Ramdeo Processing Works, Balotra on 28.1.1984 through its proprietor Ghewarchand. In this respect, defendant No.1 executed the requisite documents in favour of the plaintiff Bank. The said term loan was to be repaid in 30 equal instalments along with interest @ 14% per annum as agreed between the parties and interest @ 12% per annum was also agreed to be paid on cash credit facility. It was alleged in the plaint that on 28.1.1984, promissory note along with undertaking was also executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff bank in respect of cash credit facility of Rs.10,000/-. Defendant No. 2 Gebiram and defendant No.3 Veeramchand stood as sureties for the said loans and guarantee bonds were also executed by them. On 07.12.1990, defendant No.1 executed acknowledgment letters in favour of plaintiff Bank for Rs.24,289 and Rs.17,336.60 due against term loan and cash credit amount respectively. It was alleged that the suit is within limitation. Further, it was alleged in the plaint that since the acknowledgment letter dated 07.12.1990 was executed by the defendant No.1, therefore, defendants No.2 and 3 being the guarantors are also liable to be pay the outstanding amount of loan. Total amount of Rs.55,923/- is outstanding against the defendant No.1 in both the accounts, for which statement of account was also enclosed along with the suit. The plaintiff, thus, claimed total amount of Rs.55,923/- along with interest @ 14% per annum w.e.f. 10.5.1992 till the date of realization of the outstanding amount and prayed for passing the decree in its favour. 3. The defendants No.2 and 3 submitted the written statement and refused to have executed any guarantee bond and also pleaded that they have no knowledge about the execution of the acknowledgment letters by defendant No.1 on 7.12.1990. 3. The defendants No.2 and 3 submitted the written statement and refused to have executed any guarantee bond and also pleaded that they have no knowledge about the execution of the acknowledgment letters by defendant No.1 on 7.12.1990. Further, it was contended that writing dated 07.12.90 does not come in the definition of 'acknowledgment' and the guarantors are not bound by such acknowledgment and they have been wrongly impleaded as party. Further, it was also contended that the suit is beyond limitation. It was further contended by them that they have taken loan from the plaintiff bank for their firms, for which the plaintiff bank has obtained their signatures at various places on 25-30 forms and it appears that perhaps the plaintiff bank has obtained their signatures on the documents relating to bank guarantee while putting them in dark. It was further contended that it was the duty of the bank to recover the loan amount while selling the goods, which was hypothecated with the bank and in failure to do so, there is violation of the conditions of the agreement. 4. The defendant No.1 submitted his written statement and admitted to have applied for term loan of Rs.15,000/- and Rs.10,000/- and cash credit. He has also admitted to have signed upon 25-30 forms but contended that those forms were blank, which were filled in by the Bank Manager afterwards as per his requirement. He denied the liability of the guarantors viz. defendants No.2 and 3. He further pleaded that he did not sign on any acknowledgment on 7.12.1990 and the suit is barred by limitation since the loan is alleged to have been taken on 28.1.1984 and the acknowledgment is said to have been made on 7.12.1990. It was further pleaded that the hypothecated property was with the Bank and if any amount was due, then the same should have been taken into possession by the Bank for recovery of the outstanding amount and the suit was to be filed for the remaining amount. Thus, it was prayed that if any amount is found to be outstanding against him, he may be allowed to pay the same in instalment of Rs.400/- per month. 5. Thus, it was prayed that if any amount is found to be outstanding against him, he may be allowed to pay the same in instalment of Rs.400/- per month. 5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed as many as twelve issues as mentioned below : ^1- vk;k okn i= vf/kd`r izcU/kd }kjk izLrqr fd;k x;k\ 2- vk;k oknh ekfQd okn i= izfroknhx.k ls :i;s 55]923@& ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 3- vk;k izfroknh la- 2 o 3 us izfroknh la- 1 }kjk fn;s x, _.k dh xkjUVh nh\ 4- vk;k izfroknh la- 1 us ekfQd okn i= la- 5 ds jde cdk;k dk ,duksystesUV fd;k\ 5- vk;k xkjUVh lacaf/kr nLrkost izksijyh LvkEiM u gksus o uksVsjh ls izekf.kr u gksus ls lk{; esa xzkgzk ugha gS\ 6- vk;k oknh us dfFkr xkjUVh o _.k dk vUnj e;kn uohuhdj.k ;k ,duksyst ugha djok;k gS] vr% nkok e;kn ckgj gS\ 7- vk;k oknh us nkok ls iwoZ gkbZiksFksdsVsM vkbZVeksa ls jde olwyh dh dk;Zokgh ugha dh gS] ;fn gka rks mldk nkok ij D;k vlj gS\ 8- vk;k izksesljh uksV l'krZ ,oa vuLVkEiM gksus ls lk{; esa xkgzk ugha gS\ 9- vk;k oknh us nLrkostksa esa eSVsfj;y vkYVªs'ku fd;k gS\ 10- vk;k izfroknh Lis'ky dksLV ds :i;s 2000@& ikus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ 11- vk;k izfroknh ua- 1 fd'rsa djokus dk vf/kdkjh gS] ;fn gka rks fdl dnj\* 12- nknjlh\ 6. During trial, the plaintiff/appellant examined Radheshyam Sharma, Branch Manager as PW-1 and Chakravorthy Sharma as PW-2 and got 14 documents exhibited as Ex.1 to Ex.14. Defendants Ghewarchand and Veeramchand got themselves examined as DW/1 and DW/2 in defence and medical prescription of Ghewarchand was exhibited as Ex.A/1. 7. The learned trial Court after hearing both the parties and considering the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record decided the suit vide judgment and decree dated 11.07.1996 against the plaintiff/appellant as barred by limitation. 8. It is worth noting that initially the suit was filed under Order 37, Rule 2 CPC. The application filed by defendants for leave to defend was allowed vide order dated 18.3.1993 by learned trial Court and thereafter, the proceedings continued as a regular money suit. 9. Issue No.1 with regard to filing of the suit by the authorised Manager of the Bank was decided in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. 10. The application filed by defendants for leave to defend was allowed vide order dated 18.3.1993 by learned trial Court and thereafter, the proceedings continued as a regular money suit. 9. Issue No.1 with regard to filing of the suit by the authorised Manager of the Bank was decided in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. 10. As regards issues No.2 & 3, learned trial Court held that amount of Rs.55,923/- was due against the defendants but whether any amount is liable to be recovered shall depend upon the decision on the point of limitation. However, it is proved that amount of Rs.55,923/- was due against the defendants till filing of the suit. 11. As regards issue No.4, the trial Court held that balance confirmation letters dated 30.6.1986 (Ex.8) and 1.7.1986 (Ex.9) were executed for the accounts by the defendant No.1 and the same are proved on record. Further, it was held by learned trial Court that the grant of loan and execution of the balance confirmation letters on 30.6.1986 and 1.7.1986 and other balance confirmation letters dated 7.12.1990 Ex.12 and Ex.13 are proved on record. Further, the trial Court held that since both the acknowledgments of debt i.e. Ex.12 and Ex.13 were made after expiry of limitation, therefore, they are barred by limitation and thus, on these time barred acknowledgments, debt cannot be recovered. Ex.14 was proved to have been executed by defendant No.1 but the trial Court refused to rely upon this documents because there was no mention of this document in the plaint and since Ex.14 was refused to be looked into, the suit was held to be barred by limitation. 12. Though, rest of the issues No.5 to 11 were decided by the trial Court against the defendants/respondents but on ground of limitation, the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant was dismissed by the learned trial Court. 13. The plaintiff/appellant has challenged the impugned judgment by filing this appeal. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned trial Court has found the main issues proved in favour of the appellant but the suit has failed being barred by limitation. 13. The plaintiff/appellant has challenged the impugned judgment by filing this appeal. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned trial Court has found the main issues proved in favour of the appellant but the suit has failed being barred by limitation. He has argued that learned trial Court has erred in not considering the facts regarding the revival letters Ex.12 and 13 as also the letter Ex.14 written by defendants promising to pay the amount due along with the interest within a period of three months. He has also drawn attention of this Court to the provisions contained in Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act and submitted that letter Ex.14 is covered under this provision and thus, the suit cannot be considered as barred by limitation and the payment due is required to be decreed. 14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents has supported the judgment impugned contending that learned trial Court has taken all the relevant facts into consideration and has rightly concluded that revival letters Ex.12 and 13 cannot extend the limitation period, which has already expired. There is no such legal provisions, which can extend the limitation, which has already expired. Learned trial Court has also ignored the letter Ex.14 very correctly because there is no mention of this letter in the pleadings of the appellant. It is settled proposition that variance between pleadings and proof cannot entitle the appellant to place reliance upon such proof. He has, thus, prayed that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 15. Having considering the arguments advanced by both the learned counsels and having going through the evidence, oral as well as documentary, available on record, my conclusion in respect of this appeal is as under :- 16. Issue No.1 and 5 to 11 have been decided by the learned trial Court in favour of the appellant plaintiff, to which no challenge has been made by the opposite side. Issue No.2 and 3 have also been decided in favour of plaintiff to the extent that the amount of Rs.55,923/- was outstanding from the defendant respondent to the appellant Bank but learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that the suit fails being barred by limitation. Issue No.2 and 3 have also been decided in favour of plaintiff to the extent that the amount of Rs.55,923/- was outstanding from the defendant respondent to the appellant Bank but learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that the suit fails being barred by limitation. So by way of this appeal, only this point remains to be examined as to whether the conclusion arrived at by learned trial Court on the point of limitation is correct or not. 17. It is established by way of oral and documentary evidence that a term loan of Rs.15,000/- and cash credit loan of Rs.10,000/- was sanctioned on 28.01.1984 by the appellant Bank to the respondent defendant No.1. Defendant No.2 and 3 stood guarantor in respect of said loan. The revival letter Ex.8 was executed by the defendant on 30.6.1986 in respect of the cash credit limit and Ex.9 was executed on 1.7.1986 regarding term loan. It has also been stated by PW-1 Radheyshyam Sharma that defendant No.1 deposited Rs.500/- on 5.10.1986 towards the cash credit account, which was the last payment made by him. Similarly, last payment towards term loan account was made on 21.10.1986. PW- 1 had admitted in his cross examination that thereafter neither any payment was made nor the amount due was acknowledged by the defendant within the period of three years thereafter. It has come on record by way of plaintiff evidence that both revival letters Ex.12 and 13 were written by defendant No.1 on 7.12.1990 for Rs.24,289/- and Rs.17,336.60 towards term loan account and cash credit limit respectively. Learned trial Court found these facts proved on the basis of the evidence available on record but has come to the conclusion that since neither any acknowledgment was made nor any payment was deposited towards the loan accounts within a period of three years from the earlier revival letters dated 30.6.1986 and 1.7.1986. The limitation period had already expired when subsequent revival letters Ex.12 and 13 were written on 7.12.1990 i.e. after more than three years. It has been concluded by trial Court that once the claim has become time barred, it cannot be revived by any subsequent acknowledgment. 18. When the aforesaid conclusion is examined on the touch stone of the provisions contained in Section 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the same appears to be legally correct. It has been concluded by trial Court that once the claim has become time barred, it cannot be revived by any subsequent acknowledgment. 18. When the aforesaid conclusion is examined on the touch stone of the provisions contained in Section 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the same appears to be legally correct. As per Section 18 of the Limitation Act, if an acknowledgment of any liability is made before expiration of the prescribed period for the suit, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when such acknowledgment was made. Similarly, as per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein payment on account of debt or of interest is made before the expiration of the prescribed period, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the date when the payment was made. As has been discussed above, the last payment made by the defendant towards the term loan and the cash credit limit was on 5.10.1986 and 21.10.1986 and the revival letters Ex.8 and 9 were made on 30.6.1986 and 1.7.1986, so, there was a gap of more than three years for executing next revival letters Ex.12 and 13 on 7.12.1990. Thus, when computed in both the manner, more than three years have lapsed from the date of last payment made or from the date of last revival letters. Had the revival letters Ex.12 and 13 been made within a period of three years i.e. Upto 20.10.1989, that could have revived the limitation period. But after expiration of the said period, execution of these revival letters Ex. 12 and 13 on 7.12.1990 cannot be said to be of any help to the appellant plaintiff. In this view of the matter, the conclusion drawn by learned trial Court appears to be correct. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgment in case of M/s. R. Sureshchandra & Co. v. M/s. Vadnere Chemical Works & Ors., reported in AIR 1991 Bom. 44 wherein promise to pay time barred debt is considered to be a compromise within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. He has also placed reliance on the judgments passed in case of Hiralal & Ors. v. Badkulal & Ors., reported in AIR 1953 (SC) 225 and Jeevraj & Anr. v. Lalchand & Ors., reported in AIR 1969 Raj. 192 . He has also placed reliance on the judgments passed in case of Hiralal & Ors. v. Badkulal & Ors., reported in AIR 1953 (SC) 225 and Jeevraj & Anr. v. Lalchand & Ors., reported in AIR 1969 Raj. 192 . On the strength of these judgments, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that letter Ex.-14 written by defendant Ghewarchand can be considered as an agreement to pay wholly or in part a debt, of which creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suit, as contained in Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent has refuted this argument saying that no reliance can be placed upon letter Ex.14 as the said letter has never been mentioned by the appellant Bank in its pleadings. On perusal of the plaint, it is clear that though, reference has been made to the revival letters dated 13.06.1990 and 7.12.1990 in para 3 and 5 of the plaint, but nowhere any mention has been made regarding the said letter Ex.14 dated 21.4.1992 to make the suit within the period of limitation. 21. This factual aspect has also been considered by the learned trial Court and, therefore, letter Ex.14 has not been relied upon by it. The reasons assigned by learned trial Court in this respect appear to be sound and logical. When there is a variance between pleadings and proof, such proof cannot be taken into account, which has not at all been referred in the pleadings. More over, if the cross-examination of defendant Ghewarchand in respect of letter Ex.14 is considered, he has expressed his ignorance as to whether Ex.14 has been written by the Manager or by somebody else. In any case, he has not admitted to have written this letter Ex.14, therefore, this cannot be considered as a document on the basis of which, suit can be considered within limitation. Thus, when the letter Ex.14 is not found to be a reliable document in the absence of any pleadings having been made about it, the argument in the light of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act cannot sustain. 22. Similarly when viewed in the light of the judgment given in case of Jeevraj (supra), this document appears to be of no help to the appellant Bank because it is not a document in the nature of bilateral act. 22. Similarly when viewed in the light of the judgment given in case of Jeevraj (supra), this document appears to be of no help to the appellant Bank because it is not a document in the nature of bilateral act. Relevant part of the said judgment is reproduced as under :- "... An acknowledgment under Section 19 may be a unilateral transaction. It may be an act on the part of the defendant to which the plaintiff had not signified his assent. Such a unilateral act may be good acknowledgment if conditions of Section 19 are satisfied. But such acts do not amount to an agreement and on the basis of such a document no suit can be filed. But a document may be bilateral in nature under which the defendant acknowledges his liability to pay a certain amount to the creditor. If such a document contains an express promise to pay, there will be little room for the contention that it cannot form the basis of the suit. In order that an acknowledgment should form the basis of the suit there must be bilateral acts which give rise to an agreement enforceable at law." 23. In view of above discussions, I am of the view that the judgment and decree dated 11.7.1996 passed by learned trial Court is found to be legally correct and no interference is called for in the said judgment at this appellate stage. Thus, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court is upheld.