JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Appellant and writ petitioner have questioned the judgment and award dated 23.3.2011, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shimla, H.P. in MAC Petition No. 17-S/2 of 2006, titled Sh. Prem Singh versus M/s Supper Pipe and others, for short “the Tribunal”, by the medium of FAO No. 339 of 2011 and Civil Writ Petition No.6687 of 2011, respectively, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.8,08,000/- came to be awarded in favour of the claimants alongwith interest @ 9% per annum, with Rs.5000/- as costs, and insurers, namely, National Insurance Company and Oriental Insurance Company, came to be saddled with the liability, hereinafter referred to as “the impugned award”, for short. 2. This judgment will govern both the appeal and the writ petition. 3. The claimant being the victim of the vehicular accident filed claim petition for the grant of compensation, as per the break-ups given in the claim petition, which was resisted by the respondents and following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal. (i) Whether the petitioner claimant has sustained injuries in question due to rash and negligent driving of vehicles No. PH-13-F-9976, PB-13-G- 9976 and HP-63-0698 by their respective drivers? OPP (ii) If issue No. 1 is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? OPP (iii) Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged? OPRs. (iv) Whether the respondents No.1,2 and 3 are not liable to pay any compensation in this petition as alleged? OPRs 1, 2 and 3. (v) Whether the insurance policy in question pertaining to vehicle No. PH-13F-9976 was obtained by the respondent No. 1 by nondisclosure of material facts, if so, its effect? OPR- 4. (vi) Whether respondent No. 2 was not holding valid and effective driving licence, if so, its effect? OPR- 4. (vii) Whether the respondent No. 1 was not possessing valid registration certificate at the time of accident, as alleged, if so, its effect? OPR-4. (viii) Whether the vehicle No. PB-13F-9976 was being driven at the time of accident in violation of Act? OPR-4. (ix) Whether the respondent No. 4 is not liable to pay any compensation, as alleged? OPR-4. (x) Whether the petition is bad for mis-joinder of parties, as alleged? OPRs. 3 and 8. (xi) Whether the petition is collusive as alleged? OPRs 4 and 7. OPR-4. (ix) Whether the respondent No. 4 is not liable to pay any compensation, as alleged? OPR-4. (x) Whether the petition is bad for mis-joinder of parties, as alleged? OPRs. 3 and 8. (xi) Whether the petition is collusive as alleged? OPRs 4 and 7. (xii) Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPR-7. (xiii) Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. PB-13F-9976 and PB-13G-9976, as alelged? OPR-7 (xiv) Whether the petitioner was not an unauthorized passenger in vehicle No. HP-63-0968, as alleged? OPR-7. (xv) Whether the driver of the vehicle No. HP-63-0698, was not having valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident? OPR-7. (xvi) Whether the driver of truck No. PB-13G-9976 was not having valid and effective driving licence? OPR-8. (xvii) Whether the truck No. PB-13-G-9976 was being driven in violation of the provisions of the Act, if so, its effect? OPR-8. (xviii) Relief. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant and the writ petitioner have argued that the Tribunal has fallen in an error in directing the insurers to satisfy the award. The drivers, namely, Major Singh, respondent No. 3 in the claim petition and Sant Ram respondent No. 6 in the claim petition had not driven the vehicles rashly and negligently and tried to carve out a case for their exoneration. The arguments advanced by both the learned counsel for the appellant and the writ petitioner are not tenable and devoid of any force for the following reasons. 5. The Tribunal, after scanning the pleadings and the evidence, held that the driver, namely, Jaspal Singh respondent No.2 had wrongly parked the offending vehicle No. PB-13F-9976 and driver Sant Ram respondent No.6, driver of the offending vehicle No. HP-63-0698 had driven the offending vehicle rashly and negligently. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 23 of the impugned award herein. “23…………..On the basis of evidence on record, I have no hesitation in treating the respondents No. 2 and 6 equally responsible for the accident. Issues No. 1, 3 and 13 are accordingly answered against the respondents No. 2 and 6.” 6. Neither respondents No. 2 and 6 nor the owner/insured have questioned the said findings. How the insurer who has to indemnify, can question the said findings. 7. Issues No. 1, 3 and 13 are accordingly answered against the respondents No. 2 and 6.” 6. Neither respondents No. 2 and 6 nor the owner/insured have questioned the said findings. How the insurer who has to indemnify, can question the said findings. 7. The learned counsel for the insurers have argued that the challan was presented against respondents No. 2 and 3 in the claim petition and not against respondent No. 6. Thus, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in holding that the accident was outcome of contributory negligence of respondents No. 2 and 6. This argument is not tenable for the following reasons. 8. In civil cases, proof of preponderance of probabilities is required, in criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required and in summary proceeding petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for short “the Act”, prima facie proof is required. 9. My this view is fortified by the judgment delivered by the apex court in Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 646 , and Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81. 10. This Court has also laid down the similar principles of law in FAO No. 692 of 2008 decided on 4.9.2015 titled Cholamandlan MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Smt. Jamna Devi and others, FAO No. 287 of 2014 along with connected matter, decided on 18.9.2015 titled Tulsi Ram versus Smt. Mena Devi and others, FAO No. 72 of 2008 along with connected matter decided on 10.7.2015 titled Anil Kumar versus Nitim Kumar and others and FAO No. 174 of 2013 decided on 5.9.2014 titled Kusum Kumari versus M.D. U.P. Roadways and others. 11. The learned counsels also argued that criminal case stands decided and accused/drivers have been acquitted, thus, prayed that claim petition be dismissed, is devoid of any force. 12. The apex Court in case titled NKV Bros. (P) Ltd vs. M. karumai Ammal and others reported in AIR 1980 SC 1354 held that in criminal case acquittal of the driver cannot be a ground to dismiss the claim petition. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the said judgment herein:- “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the said judgment herein:- “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other case, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasissing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their "neighbour". Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 13. I have scanned the evidence. The drivers of offending vehicle No. PB13-G-9976 and PB-13-F-9976 had parked their trucks illegally, that too, on wrong sides, had not taken due care and caution while parking the said trucks. Even parking lights of the trucks were not switched on and driver of one of the offending vehicle No. HP-63-0698 had also not taken due care and caution, and was also rash and negligent and hit the offending vehicle No. PB-13-F-9976, from its rear portion. Even parking lights of the trucks were not switched on and driver of one of the offending vehicle No. HP-63-0698 had also not taken due care and caution, and was also rash and negligent and hit the offending vehicle No. PB-13-F-9976, from its rear portion. It is apt to reproduce the discussions made by the Tribunal in para 22 of the impugned award herein. “22. I find no merit in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3. At the time of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3 had drawn site plan of the trucks No. PB-13-F-9976 and PB-13G-9977. First truck stood stopped on the extreme left side on kacha portion. Second truck stood stopped being the first truck. If the site plan as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3 had been correct, truck No. HP-63-0698 would have struck against rear portion of truck No. PB-13G-9976. This had not happened. The record revealed that truck NO. HP-63-0698 had struck against rear portion of Truck No. PB-13-F-9976. The evidence of petitioner and respondent No. 6 coupled with FIR, clearly pointed out that first truck No. PB-13G-9976 had been stopped somewhat on left side of NH-I. Since truck No. PB13-F-9976 was owned by the same owner, the respondent No. 2 had stopped this truck parallel to truck No. PB-13G-9976. The respondents No. 2 and 3 had been workmen of the same owner (respondent No.1) There was evidence on record that after having wrongly parked trucks No. PB-13-G-9976 and PB-13-G-9976, the drivers had started conversing with indifference to safety and well being of others. Parking lights of the trucks had not been switched on. It was in these circumstances that the truck No. HP-63-0698 had struck against rear portion of truck No. PB-13-F-9976.” 14. Having said so, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal has rightly held that the driver respondents No. 2 and 6 in the claim petitions have driven the vehicles rashly and negligently and the accident was outcome of contributory negligence of both the drivers. Accordingly, the findings returned on issue No. 1 are upheld. 15. The Tribunal has decided issues No. 1 and 2 in favour of the claimants and Issues No.3 to 17 against the respondents. 16. The learned counsel for the insurers Ms. Devyani Sharma, and Dr. Accordingly, the findings returned on issue No. 1 are upheld. 15. The Tribunal has decided issues No. 1 and 2 in favour of the claimants and Issues No.3 to 17 against the respondents. 16. The learned counsel for the insurers Ms. Devyani Sharma, and Dr. Lalit K. Sharma, Advocates, submitted that the insurers have not questioned the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 3 to 17, are accordingly, upheld. 17. It is beaten law of land that the compensation is to be awarded in an injury case under pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads by making guess work. 18. My this view is fortified by the judgments made by the Apex Court in the cases titled as R.D. Hattangadi versus M/s Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 755 , Arvind Kumar Mishra versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & another, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6085, Ramchandrappa versus The Manager, Royal Sundaram Aliance Insurance Company Limited, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 4787, and Kavita versus Deepak and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 4771. 19. This Court has also laid down the same principle in a series of cases. 20. Applying the test, prima facie, it appears that the Tribunal has rightly made the discussions in paras 26 to 32 of the impugned award. It is apt to record herein that the claimant and respondents in claim petition have not questioned the adequacy of the compensation, is accordingly upheld. 21. In the given circumstances, the impugned award merits to be upheld, appeal and writ petition merit to be dismissed. 22. The insurers are directed to deposit the amount within 6 weeks from today in the Registry, if not already deposited. On deposit, the Registry is directed to release the awarded amount in favour of the claimant, through payees’ cheque account or by depositing the same in his bank account, strictly in terms of the conditions contained in the impugned award. 23. Viewed thus, the impugned award is upheld, appeal and the writ petition are dismissed. 24. Send down the record forthwith, after placing a copy of this judgment.