JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The legal representatives of Deceased Amit Bhatnagar stood engaged as a driver by respondent No.1. They stand in the manner delineated in the grounds of appeal aggrieved by the rendition of the Commissioner Workmen/s Compensation (hereinafter referred as the “Commissioner”), hence they therefrom have preferred the instant appeal before this Court. 2. During the course of the predecessor-in-interest of the claimants/petitioners/appellants herein rendering employment under respondent No.1, he met his end in a collision which occurred inter se the vehicle driven by him and the offending vehicle. The learned Commissioner while computing compensation assessable qua the successors-in-interest of the deceased workman had on a perusal of the evidence adduced before him culled therefrom the fact of his drawing a salary quantified in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1. 3. The culling of, by the learned Commissioner from his appraising the apposite evidence qua the earnings derived by the deceased workman from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1 standing constituted in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month stands canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/appellants herein to flow from his mis-appraising the testimony of the attorney of the employer who stepped into the witness box as RW-2. He contends that in his examination-in-chief RW-2 has not lent sustenance to the contention voiced in the reply furnished by the employer to the claim petition instituted by the dependents of the deceased workman qua the earnings drawn by the deceased workman from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1 standing constituted in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month. He thereupon makes an address before this Court of with respondent No.1 not proving the factum of hers defraying to the workman salary quantified in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month, it was inapt for the learned Commissioner to conclude of the earnings derived by the deceased workman from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1 standing constituted in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month. 4. The aforesaid submission does hold immense tenacity. Proof was enjoined to be adduced by respondent No.1 in tandem with the unfoldments occurring in her reply of hers defraying to the deceased workman, salary in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month. Proof qua the facet aforesaid stood enjoined to be testified by RW-2. 4. The aforesaid submission does hold immense tenacity. Proof was enjoined to be adduced by respondent No.1 in tandem with the unfoldments occurring in her reply of hers defraying to the deceased workman, salary in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month. Proof qua the facet aforesaid stood enjoined to be testified by RW-2. However, RW-2 in his examination-in-chief omits to voice the factum aforesaid. The apt sequel which ensues therefrom is of respondent No.1 failing to clinch the factum of hers defraying to the deceased workman, salary in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month also dehors the aforesaid omission of RW-2 to prove the factum of the aforesaid contention raised by respondent No.1 in her reply, he also during the course of his testifying before the learned Commissioner has not adduced thereat the relevant record pronouncing the factum of the employer of the deceased workman defraying to him salary in a sum of Rs.3000/- per month, effect whereof would stand alluded hereinafter. 5. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 herein contends that the aforesaid omission of the relevant adduction by RW-2 cannot adversely work against the employer as yet the claimants for proving the factum of their predecessor-in-interest drawing salary in a sum of Rs.6000/- per month from respondent No.1 could through the Court concert to elicit from her the relevant record in personification thereto. He contends of with the petitioners omitting to do so, they cannot acquire capitalization from the omission on the part of RW-2 to adduce the relevant record before the learned Commissioner pronouncing the factum of the deceased workman drawing salary of Rs.6000/- per month from respondent No.1. However, the aforesaid contention suffers its standing discountenanced given the factum of the counsel for respondent No.1 on holding PW-1, the claimant to cross-examination had concerted to put an apposite suggestion to her for shattering her testimony comprised in her examination-in-chief wherein she had echoed of the deceased workman drawing salary of Rs.6000/- per month from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1. The effect of the aforesaid suggestion put to PW-1 by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 while holding her to cross-examination is of respondent No.1 holding knowledge qua the facet of the contrariness of the espousal of the petitioner visa- vis her espousal qua the quantum of salary derived by the deceased workman from his employment as a driver under her wherefrom the concomitant derivative is with hers holding the best evidence to succor her espousal she was enjoined to produce it through her power of attorney before the learned Commissioner. However, she omitted to do so. Consequently, the relevant omission of RW-2 cannot foist in her any leverage to contend of yet the claimants holding the legal capacity to through the learned Commissioner make the apposite elicitations from him/her, elicitations whereof when stood not endeavoured cannot render the non adduction of the relevant record by RW-2 before the learned Commissioner to work adversely against her nor can hence reliance can be placed upon the testimony of PW-1 qua the deceased workman drawing a salary quantified in a sum of Rs.6000/- per month from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1, as any foisting thereof in her, would lead to an illegal consequence of even with the employer withholding the best evidence in personification of the salary defrayed by her to the deceased workman, its, withholding by her working against the workman also it would lean towards an unbefitting conclusion of yet the claimants holding the onerous responsibility qua theirs seeking through the learned Commissioner elicitations of the apposite record from her/him qua the preponderant facet. Even otherwise the onus always stands cast upon the employer to sustain her contention in her reply qua the quantum of salary defrayed by her to the deceased workman also concomitantly the said onus stands always enjoined to be discharged only by the employer. In asking the claimant to discharge the burden qua the quantum of wages drawn by the deceased from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1 would displace the aforesaid principle of onus qua it standing cast only upon the employer besides would undo the enjoined obligation of the employer qua its standing discharged by her. In asking the claimant to discharge the burden qua the quantum of wages drawn by the deceased from his employment as a driver under respondent No.1 would displace the aforesaid principle of onus qua it standing cast only upon the employer besides would undo the enjoined obligation of the employer qua its standing discharged by her. In sequel, it is held that with the employer withholding the best evidence qua the quantum of salary defrayed by her to the deceased workman an adverse inference is warranted to be drawn against her also it is to be concluded of the testimony of PW-1 qua respondent No.1 defraying to the deceased workman, salary in a sum of Rs.6000/- per month is to be accepted, it remaining unrebutted by adduction of best evidence aforesaid by the employer. 6. In aftermath, it is held that the quantum of compensation payable to the claimants would be 50% of Rs.6000/-=Rs.3000 X 218.47= Rs.6,55,410/-. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners contends of interest from the date of accident being levyable upon the aforesaid quantum of compensation. The aforesaid contention is well founded, its standing anvilled upon a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Siby George and Ors, AIR 2012 SC 3144 . Further more, the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/claimants finds support from the verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Saberabibi Yakubbhai Shaikh & Ors. vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors, 2014(1) Apex Court Judgments 382 (S.C.) the relevant paragraphs No.11 and 12, whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “11. Following the aforesaid judgments, this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Siby George and others (supra) reiterated the legal position and held as follows:- “11. The Court then referred to a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi and approved it insofar as it followed the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo. 12. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four-judge Bench and in Valsala K. by a three-judge Bench of this Court. Both the decision were, thus, fully, finding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two judges. 12. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four-judge Bench and in Valsala K. by a three-judge Bench of this Court. Both the decision were, thus, fully, finding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K. were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir. 13. In the light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K., it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. The decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K. do not express the correct view and do not make binding precedents.” 12. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appellants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the accident.” 8. In view of the aforestated settled proposition of law, it is held that the appellants/claimants are entitled to on the aforesaid amount of compensation interest thereon at the rate of 12% from the date of accident till its realization/deposit. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/claimants contends of since the employer/respondent No.1 failing to pay compensation to the claimants within one one month from the date it fell due, as such she is liable to pay penalty on the compensation amount. He also contends of the liability of respondent No.1 to pay compensation to the claimants arose from the date of accident. To give succor to his aforesaid contention the learned counsel appearing for the appellants places reliance upon a verdict of this Court reported in Khear Singh versus Stat of H.P. through the Secretary, PWD and another, 1989 ACJ 215, the relevant paragraph No.7 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “7. To give succor to his aforesaid contention the learned counsel appearing for the appellants places reliance upon a verdict of this Court reported in Khear Singh versus Stat of H.P. through the Secretary, PWD and another, 1989 ACJ 215, the relevant paragraph No.7 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “7. In Ram Dulari Kalia v. H.P. State Electricity Board, 1987, ACJ 258 (HP), this court had an occasion to consider the provisions of section 4-A of the Act which provides for the payment of compensation when due and the penalty for default. After noticing the provisions of sections 3, 4, 4-A, 8, 17 and 19 of the Act and the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), the following observations were made in that case:- “Against the background aforesaid, it is manifest that in the present case the duty to pay the compensation at the rate provided in section 4 arose under sub section (1) of section 4-A of the Act as soon as the accident resulting in the injury to the deceased workman and in his consequential death occurred and that the respondents being in default in paying the compensation due under the Act within one month from the said day, the discretion conferred on the Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 4-A to award interest on the compensation amount in accordance with law was required to be exercised reasonable and in a judicial manner after taking into consideration all the relevant factors and that if, in her considered opinion, there was no justification for the delay, the penalty was also required to be ordered to be recovered. The commissioner has held, as earlier pointed out that since the respondents had admitted the liability to pay the compensation 'whatever is to be awarded' and that they had also deposited the amount of compensation in the court, the claim with regard to the payment of interest was not justified. The question of imposition of penalty does not appear to have been considered at all presumably on the same ground.” As regards the holding of the Commissioner in that case to the effect that the amount of compensation was deposited in the court, it was clarified that the deposit was made nearly one year and three months after it was ordered to be deposited by the Commissioner. So far as the impact of the admission of the liability to pay compensation, on the award of interest and imposition of penalty is concerned, it was observed as follows; “.......mere admission, if any, of the claim, without the payment of the compensation as and when it fell due, or without making the provisional payment based on the extent of the liability accepted, would not justify the refusal of the award of interest. Section 4-A, sub section (3) vests the Commissioner with a judicial discretion to award such interest in the event of the employer making a default in payment the compensation due under the Act within a period of one month from the date of it fell due and such discretion, like another judicial discretion has to be exercised with vigilance and circumspection, according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment, and having known through law what is just. The discretion could not be regarded as having been reasonable and judicially exercised in a just and equitable manner, if the award of interest is denied solely on the ground that the employer had admitted the claim, when, in spite of such admission, he makes a default in making the provisional payment or payment of the compensation due in accordance with law within the statutory time limit. If such a view is held justified, the very purpose behind the enactment of section 4-A will be frustrated. Be it appreciated also that where enabling or discretionary power is conferred, the words which are permissive in character should be construed as involving a duty to exercise the power, if some legal right or entitlement is conferred, or enjoyed and for the purpose of effectuating such right or entitlement, the exercise of such power is essential...... For the self same reasons and considerations which have been set out above in the context of the failure on her part to award the interest, no conclusion other than that there was no justification for the delay in the payment of statutory compensation is possible in the present case. No person duly instructed in law could ever come to the conclusion that this was a case where there was the slightest justification for delaying the payment of compensation due under the Act. No person duly instructed in law could ever come to the conclusion that this was a case where there was the slightest justification for delaying the payment of compensation due under the Act. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner was not only under a statutory duty to consider the award of interest but also to award penalty in such sum as could be held just and proper in the circumstances of the case and her failure to do so has vitiated the award by an error of law.” The Court also made the following observations in that case, which have a direct bearing in the present case also, since the State Government is the respondent herein; “The respondents are not private employers but an agency or instrumentality of the State. They are a State enterprise which in a truly welfare State is charged with the social consciousness and responsibility towards the citizens and, more particularly, towards its employees..... The Act is a legislative enactment conformable to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Articles 39(a), 41, 42, 43 and 46 of the Constitution. They (respondents) are expected to be model employer. While dealing with their workman, it is their duty to implement the beneficent provisions of the Act in their true letter and spirit and to make payment of the compensation as soon as it falls due....... Both, the statutory provisions and the case law on the subject are clear and specific in regard to the precise point of time when the payment is required to be made.” ...(pp.216-218) 10. The case supra enshrines a mandate, of, in the employer not within the ambit of Section 4A(3)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), defraying compensation to the workman contemporaneous to the occurrence of the relevant mishap or accident, hence making it/him amenable to face the ill statutory consequence of penalty being leviabale on the amount of compensation. Since, uncontrovertedly, the employer omitted to within the ambit of Sub section (1) of Section 4A of the Act defray to the claimants/successors-in-interest of the deceased workman compensation in prompt succession to the misfortune of their predecessor-in-interest suffering death during the course of his rendering employment under his employer, constrains this Court to levy upon respondent No.1 a penalty quantified in a sum of Rs.25,000/-. The said amount of penalty leviable upon respondent No.1 appears to be just and fair given the factum of this Court while interfering with the impugned rendition of the learned Commissioner it enhancing the amount of compensation assessable qua the petitioners/claimants/appellants. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents contends of with the provisions of Section 4A of the Act holding contemplation qua forbearance by courts of law in imposing penalty upon the amount of compensation assessed qua the workman unless its imposition besides levy stands preceded by a show cause notice issued upon the employer whereas when evidently no show cause notice stands issued upon the employer, trammels the jurisdiction of this Court to impose penalty upon the amount of compensation assessed by it vis-a-vis the claimants. However, the aforesaid submission holds no vigour given respondent No.1 evidently holding knowledge qua the claim for statutory penalty by the claimants preeminently when the said statutory demand stood embodied in the claim petition. In sequel, with respondent No.1 holding knowledge qua the facet aforesaid since the inception of the institution of the claim petition by the claimants before the Commissioner renders the holding of the apposite knowledge by her to constitute statutory notice upon her within the ambit of the proviso to Section 4A of the Act wherefrom the apt sequel stands begotten of their being no enjoined necessity for this Court to before levying penalty upon respondent No.1 issue a show cause notice upon her. Furthermore the inference of want of necessity qua serving of a show cause notice upon respondent No.1 prior to this Court levying penalty on the amount of compensation assessed by it qua the claimants/appellants is aroused by the factum of respondent No.1 standing served besides duly represented before this Court. Consequently, repetitiveness of service of show cause notice upon respondent No.1 is unwarranted. Consequently, repetitiveness of service of show cause notice upon respondent No.1 is unwarranted. Also it can be concluded of given the representation of respondent No.1 before the learned Commissioner besides before this Court, preeminently when she had knowledge qua the facet aforesaid also hence stood heard thereat besides before this Court would not render the recording by this Court of an order qua levying/imposing of penalty vis-a-vis the amount of compensation assessed by this Court qua the successors-in-interest of the deceased workman to be amenable to a construction of hers standing condemned unheard, besides would not detract from the principle of audi alterm partem whereupon the statutory proviso aforesaid stands founded. When the solemn aforesaid principle of natural justice ingraining the proviso stands hence satiated, this Court holds of there being no necessity to serve a cause notice upon respondent No.1 preceding this Court levying penalty of Rs.25000/- upon her on the compensation amount aforesaid assessed qua the claimants. 12. However, the penalty of Rs.25000/- as stand imposed upon the amount of compensation assessed by this Court qua the successors-in-interest of the deceased workman, would not be indemnifiable by respondent No.2 to respondent No.1 given the expostulations in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Ved Prakash Garg versus Premi Devi and others, (1997)8 SCC 1 , the relevant portion whereof extracted hereinafter:- “14. On a conjoint operation of the relevant schemes of the aforesaid twin Acts, in our view, there is no escape from the conclusion that the insurance companies will be liable to make good not only the principal amounts of compensation payable by insured employers but also interest thereon, if ordered by the Commissioner to be paid by the insured employers. Reason for this conclusion is obvious. As we have noted earlier the liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act gets foisted on the employer provided it is shown that the workman concerned suffered from personal injury, fatal or otherwise, by any motor accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Reason for this conclusion is obvious. As we have noted earlier the liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act gets foisted on the employer provided it is shown that the workman concerned suffered from personal injury, fatal or otherwise, by any motor accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Such an accident is also covered by the statutory coverage contemplated by Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the identical provisions under the very contracts of insurance reflected by the Policy which would make the insurance company liable to cover all such claims for compensation for which statutory liability is imposed on the employer under Section 3 read with Section 4A of the Compensation Act. All these provisions represent a well-knit scheme for computing the statutory liability of the employers in cases of such accidents to their workmen. As we have seen earlier while discussing the scheme of Section 4A of the Compensation Act the legislative intent is clearly discernible that once compensation falls due and within one month it is not paid by the employer then as per Section 4A(3)(a) interest at the permissible rate gets added to the said principal amount of compensation as the claimants would stand deprived of their legally due compensation for a period beyond one month which is statutorily granted to the employer concerned to make good his liability for the benefit of the claimants whose breadwinner might have either been seriously injured or might have lost his life. Thus so far as interest is concerned it is almost automatic once default, on the part of the employer in paying the compensation due, takes place beyond the permissible limit of one month. No element of penalty is involved therein. It is a statutory elongation of the liability of the employer to make good the principal amount of compensation within permissible time limit during which interest may not run not otherwise liability of paying interest on delayed compensation will ipso facto follows. Even though the Commissioner under these circumstances can impose a further liability on the employer under circumstances and within limits contemplated by Section 4A(3)(a) still the liability to pay interest on the principal amount under the said provision remains a part and parcel of the statutory liability which is legally liable to be discharged by the insured employer. Even though the Commissioner under these circumstances can impose a further liability on the employer under circumstances and within limits contemplated by Section 4A(3)(a) still the liability to pay interest on the principal amount under the said provision remains a part and parcel of the statutory liability which is legally liable to be discharged by the insured employer. Consequently such imposition of interest on the principal amount would certainly partake the character of the legal liability of the insured employer to pay the compensation amount with due interest as imposed upon him under the Compensation Act. Thus the principal amount as well as the interest made payable thereon would remain part and parcel of the legal liability of the insured to be discharged under the Compensation Act and not de hors it. It, therefore, cannot be said by the insurance company that when it is statutorily and even contractually liable to reimburse the employer qua his statutory liability to pay compensation to the claimants in case of such motor accidents to his workmen, the interest on the principal amount which almost automatically gets foisted upon him once the compensation amount is not paid within one month from the date it fell due, would not be a part of the insured liability of the employer. No question of justification by the insured employer for the delay in such circumstances would arise for consideration. It is of course true that one month's period as contemplated under Section 4A(3) may start running for the purpose of attracting interest under sub-clause (a) thereof in case where provisional payment has to be made by the insured employer as per Section 4A(2) of the Compensation Act from the date such provisional payment becomes due. But when the employer does not accept his liability as a whole under circumstances enumerated by us earlier then Section 4A(2) would not get attracted and one month's period would start running from the date on which due compensation payable by the employer is adjudicated upon by the Commissioner and in either case the Commissioner would be justified in directing payment of interest in such contingencies not only from the date of the award but also from the date of the accident concerned. Such an order passed by the Commissioner would remain perfectly justified on the scheme of Section 4A(3)(a) of the Compensation Act. Such an order passed by the Commissioner would remain perfectly justified on the scheme of Section 4A(3)(a) of the Compensation Act. But similar consequence will not follow in case where additional amount is added to the principal amount of compensation by way of penalty to be levied on the employer under circumstances contemplated by Section 4A(3)(b) of the Compensation Act after issuing show cause notice to the employer concerned who will have reasonable opportunity to show cause why on account of some justification on his part for the delay in payment of the compensation amount he is not liable for this penalty. However, if ultimately the Commissioner after giving reasonable opportunity to the employer to show cause takes the view that there is no justification for such delay on the part of the insured employer and because of his unjustified delay and due to his own personal fault he is held responsible for the delay, then the penalty would get imposed on him. That would add a further sum up to 50% on the principal amount by way of penalty to be made good by the defaulting employer. So far as his penalty amount is concerned it cannot be said that it automatically flows from the main liability incurred by the insured employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act. To that extent such penalty amount as imposed upon the insured employer would get out of the sweep of the term 'liability incurred' by the insured employer as contemplated by the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as by the terms of the Insurance Policy found in provisos (b) and (c) to subsection (1) of Section II thereof. On the aforesaid interpretation of these two statutory schemes, therefore, the conclusion becomes inevitable that when an employee suffers from a motor accident injury while on duty on the motor vehicle belonging to the insured employer, the claim for compensation payable under the Compensation Act along with interest thereon, if any, as imposed by the Commissioner Sections 3 and 4A(3)(a) of the Compensation Act will have to be made good by the insurance company jointly with the insured employer. But so far as the amount of penalty imposed on the insured employer under contingencies contemplated by Section 4A(3)(b) is concerned as that is on account of personal fault of the insured not backed up by any justifiable cause, the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse that part of the penalty amount imposed on the employer. The latter because of his own fault and negligence will have to bear the entire burden of the said penalty amount with proportionate interest thereon if imposed by the Workmen's Commissioner.” (pp.15-17) Verdict whereof holds a peremptory mandate of the insured holding no indefeasible right qua the amount of penalty imposed upon her on the amount of compensation assessed by this Court qua the claimants being indemnifiable by the insurer. Consequently, the amount of penalty as assessed by this Court qua the amount of compensation assessed vis-a-vis the claimants shall be paid within one month by respondent No.1. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the instant appeal is allowed and the order impugned before this Court is quashed and set aside. The claimants/petitioners/appellants herein are held entitled to compensation of Rs. 6,55,410/- from respondent No.1, compensation amount whereof shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of accident till its realization/deposit. The aforesaid amount shall be indemnified by the Insurance company i.e. respondent No.2 herein to respondent No.1. In addition to the aforesaid amount of compensation, the appellants/claimants are also held entitled to a penalty of Rs.25000/- which shall be deposited by respondent No.1 within one month from today. All pending applications also stand disposed of.