ORDER : Alleging breach of statutory rules under Resolution dated 8th May, 2012, the petitioner raises a grievance against his transfer vide notification dated 29th June, 2016. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that order dated 29.06.2016 has been issued not only in breach of Resolution dated 8th May, 2012 and prematurely, the said order is actuated with malice inasmuch as, the petitioner has been transferred to accommodate respondent no. 4 to the post of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP. Referring to various documents, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, who is 5 years senior to respondent no. 4 and has been granted pay scale in Grade Pay of Rs. 7600/- is eligible to hold the post of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP whereas, the respondent no. 4 is, in fact, ineligible. Learned counsel has relied on decisions in “Uttam Kujur Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in (2008) 2 JCR 306 (Jhr.) and “Suraj Deo Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in (2008) 2 JCR 83 (Jhr.) [ : 2008 (1) JLJR 223 ]. 4. Learned counsel for the State and Respondent no. 4 have appeared through counsels. 5. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned Senior counsel for the respondent no. 4 referring to Notification dated 15th October, 2014 vide Annexure-1, submits that the petitioner, who has raised a grievance of premature transfer, was, in fact, posted on the post of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP only till further orders. Contending that there is no illegality in order dated 29th June, 2016, learned Senior counsel submits that the petitioner cannot claim a right over a particular post or posting to a particular place. 6. Learned State counsel has also opposed the prayer made in the writ petition. 7. Briefly stated, the petitioner, who was appointed on 1st November, 1990 in the State Co-operative Service, was posted as Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP vide notification dated 15th October, 2014. At that time, he was holding the post of Principal, Co-operative Training Center at Ranchi. The said notification indicates that he was holding the additional charge of Managing Director, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Ranchi also. At that time, he was holding the post of Principal, Co-operative Training Center at Ranchi. The said notification indicates that he was holding the additional charge of Managing Director, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Ranchi also. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Resolution dated 8th May, 2012, which allegedly has been held to be statutory, to contend that usual tenure of a post shall be three years and only in special circumstances the incumbent can be transferred. 8. Contention that the petitioner has been transferred only to accommodate respondent no. 4 is misconceived. The petitioner, who was previously given additional charge, cannot object to the order by which respondent no. 4 has been given additional charge of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP. Notification dated 29th June, 2016 discloses the respondent no. 4 has been posted to the post of District Co-operative Officer, Ranchi. Since, he has also been given additional charge of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP, an inference cannot be drawn that the petitioner has been transferred to accommodate respondent no. 4. Moreover, order whereby the respondent no. 4 has been given additional charge of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP is not the final order. Such arrangements are obviously adhoc arrangements. 9. It is contended that in the present proceeding the Respondent-State has not pleaded that transfer of the petitioner was under special circumstances. This contention is apparently misconceived. Notification dated 29th June, 2016 is not an order in isolation, transferring the petitioner alone. It contains order of transfer/posting of as many as 16 persons. It has been issued in the month of June, which in terms of Resolution dated 8th May, 2012 shall be the month for effecting transfer. Stipulation that the normal tenure shall be 3 years is merely a guideline and it is necessary to disclose special circumstance only if an individual has been picked-up for transfer. In my opinion, nothing more is required to be shown by the respondents, for justifying the order of transfer dated 29.06.2016. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent has not replied to the plea taken by the petitioner that without approval of the Establishment Committee, the aforesaid transfer order has been issued. In my opinion, such issues cannot be decided merely on the basis of affidavits. No person in his individual capacity against whom the petitioner can allege malafide, has been made a party in the present proceeding. In my opinion, such issues cannot be decided merely on the basis of affidavits. No person in his individual capacity against whom the petitioner can allege malafide, has been made a party in the present proceeding. I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to show that Notification dated 29th June, 2016, whereby he has been transferred, has been issued in breach of Resolution dated 8th May, 2012. The petitioner has also failed to plead and prove malafide. It is wellsettled that normally courts do not interfere with the administrative decisions taken by the executive. In “Kendriya Vidyalay Sangathan vs. Damodar Prasad Panday and others” reported in (2004) 12 SCC 299 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus; “4. Transfer which is an incidence of service is not to be interfered with by courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or visited by mala fide or infraction of any prescribed norms of principles governing the transfer (see Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa [1995 Supp (4) SCC 169]. Unless the order of transfer is visited by mala fide or is made in violation of operative guidelines, the court cannot interfere with it (see Union of India v. S.L. Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ]). Who should be transferred and posted where is a matter for the administrative authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any operative guidelines or rules the courts should not ordinarily interfere with it. In Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath [ (2004) 4 SCC 245 ] it was observed as follows: 'No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to another is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ]'.” 11. Considering the aforesaid discussions, I find no merit in the writ petition and accordingly, it is dismissed. However, in view of the fact that since 2014, no regular appointment to the post of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP has been made, the Respondent-Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Animal Husbandary and Co-operative, Government of Jharkhand is directed to initiate and conclude the exercise for regular appointment to the post of Managing Director, JHASCOLAMP, within 3 months.