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2016 DIGILAW 154 (RAJ)

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Rent Tribunal, Udaipur

2016-01-25

ARUN BHANSALI

body2016
JUDGMENT : Arun Bhansali, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners aggrieved against the order dated 03.09.2015 passed by the Rent Tribunal, whereby the application filed by the petitioners under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC has been rejected. 2. The respondents filed original application seeking eviction of the petitioners from the premises in question based on termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('the Act of 1882') as the petitioners do not have protection under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 2001 ('the Act of 2001'). Along with the original application, affidavits of six persons as AW-1 to AW-6 were filed; the petitioners filed their reply on 03.04.2014 along with affidavits as examination-in-chief of DW-1 to DW-3; the respondents filed their replication on 03.05.2014; the issues were framed on 10.02.2015 by the Rent Tribunal and on the same day applications were filed by the petitioners as well as the respondents seeking permission to cross-examine the deponents of the affidavits, which were filed along with the original application and the reply, which applications were granted on the same day i.e. 10.02.2015 and the matter was fixed for evidence of the respondents-landlord on 16.04.2015. 3. On 16.04.2015, the petitioners filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC seeking to amend the reply. The petitioners wanted to amend the reply with a view to take further objections regarding notice issued by the respondents being illegal as the same was not issued jointly with the co-lessor and further objections were raised regarding the fact that mesne profit were not claimed in the notice issued under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. 4. The application was opposed by the respondents and after hearing the parties by order dated 03.09.2015, the Rent Tribunal came to the conclusion that the petitioners were aware of both the aspects and the said objections should have been included in the reply; the Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the said aspect, which was sought to be introduced by way of amended should have been included in the original reply and, consequently, dismissed the application. 5. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Rent Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners, inasmuch as, the issues sought to be raised by way of amendment were legal only and that the same in no manner change the defence of the petitioners. It is submitted that the stage of the proceedings are not such that the same would cause any prejudice to the respondents, therefore, the Rent Tribunal should have granted the amendment. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. It was submitted that the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC restricts the application of the said provision unless the petitioners are able to make out a case of due diligence, not a word in this regard has been averred in the application as to why the said aspect could not be raised before the commencement of the trial and, therefore, the Rent Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application. 7. Reliance was placed on Meera Ben (Smt.) v. Amritlal and Anr., 2015(3) WLN 187 (Raj.) and Smt. Saroj & Ors. v. Prabhu Narain Mathur & Anr., 2014(2) WLC (Raj.) 459. 8. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 9. A bare look at the application filed by the petitioners Annex.-5, reveals that following two paragraphs have been averred in the application regarding the need for amendment:- ^^5- fd foi{kh }kjk tks tokc U;k;ky; esa vkius izLrqr fd;k vkSj tokcqy tokc tks fjdkMZ ij vk;k mlds ckn dbZ u;s rF; U;k;ky; ds le{k mRiUu gq, gSa vkSj blds fy, vc foi{kh ds ikl vius tokc esa la'kks/ku djus ds vykok vkSj dksbZ pkjk 'ks"k ugha jgk gS D;ksafd la'kks/ku ds }kjk gh os rF; dks tks dkuwuu gSa U;k;ky; ds le{k j[ks tk ldrs gSa vkSj os eqdnesa dh tM+ esa tkrs gSaA 13- fd mDr la'kks/ku tks izLrkfor fd;s x;s gSa os dkuwu ds vuqlkj gksdj nLrkostksa ij fuHkZj gS vksj bl eqdnesa dh tM+ esa tkrs gSa ftlds dkj.k la'kks/ku dks Lohdkj fd;k tkuk vko';d gS rkfd lgh fLFkfr U;k;ky; ds le{k vk ldsA** 10. Nowhere in the application, the petitioners have made any averment whatsoever complying with the requirements of the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, where the petitioners are required to indicate that in spite of due diligence, the issues could not be raised before the commencement of trial. 11. As to whether in the present case, the trial has commenced or not, as noticed hereinbefore, the affidavits of witnesses as examination-in-chief by the respondents-landlord were filed along with the application itself and after reply was filed along with affidavits as examination-in-chief, the issues were framed on 10.02.2015 and the permission to cross-examination was granted on the same date. 12. The issue that the averment pertaining to the proviso is a jurisdictional fact and that the trial commences with the framing of issues and filing of affidavits is no more res integra, as this Court in the case of Meera Ben (supra) relying on judgment in Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 409 , held as under:- "13. Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly laid down that the proviso was mandatory; the jurisdiction to allow amendment is taken away unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial; the proviso restricts the power of the Court and unless the jurisdictional fact i.e. the aspect pertaining to due diligence is found to be existing, the Court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint. It was further laid down with reference to various judgments that filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief of the witness would amount to commencement of proceeding and the trial is deemed to commence when the issues are famed and the case is set down for recording of evidence. 14. As to what is meant by due diligence, the same has been explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Samuel & Ors v. Gatuu Mahesh & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 300 as under:- "19. Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. An advocate representing someone must engage in due diligence to determine that the representations made are factually accurate and sufficient. The term "due diligence" is specifically used in the Code so as to provide a text for determining whether to exercise the discretion in situations of requested amendment after the commencement of trial. 20. A party requesting a relief stemming out of a claim is required to exercise due diligence and it is a requirement which cannot be dispensed with. The term "due diligence" determines the scope of a party's constructive knowledge, claim and is very critical to the outcome of the suit." 15. From the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Vidyabai (supra) and J. Samuel (supra), it is apparent that in the present case the trial has already commenced and, therefore, it was incumbent on the petitioner to make out a case that in spite of due diligence the matter could not be raised before the commencement of trial; as already noticed hereinbefore, not a word has been indicated in the application in this regard and, therefore, jurisdictional fact for invoking provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC have not been alleged in the application and, therefore, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner." Similarly in case of Smt. Saroj (supra), it was held as under:- "By amendment in the year 2002, the proviso was introduced restricting the general power of amendment, if the application was made after the trial had commenced, unless the court came to the conclusion that 'in spite of due diligence', the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial, no application for amendment can be allowed. The question as to when the trial commences in the context of the proviso, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1433 held that trial commences on the date issues are framed and filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief of the witness would amount to commencement of proceedings. The question as to when the trial commences in the context of the proviso, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1433 held that trial commences on the date issues are framed and filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief of the witness would amount to commencement of proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that unless the jurisdictional fact as envisaged in the proviso is found to be existing, the Court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint." 13. As noticed hereinbefore, the petitioners have failed to even aver a single word indicating any compliance with provisions of proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC and the fact that trial has already been commenced, the application filed by the petitioners irrespective of the nature of amendment sought was not maintainable and the same was rightly rejected by the Rent Tribunal. 14. In view therefore, no interference is called for in the order impugned. There is no substance in the writ petition, the same is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.