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2016 DIGILAW 1541 (RAJ)

BVM Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Ghanshyam Singhal S/o late. Sh. Surajmal Ji Kachehariwala

2016-10-21

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2016
ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. This application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') has been filed by the applicant, M/s. BVM Projects Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act, 1996 having its registered office at New Delhi, through its authorised representative Shri Ravinder Bakshi. 2. Facts as averred in the application are that an agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 was executed by Respondents No. 1 to 5 through their attorney Ghanshyam Singhal in favour of a company namely M/s. Hind Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. for sale of the land admeasuring 100 acres, i.e. 160 bigha falling in Village Mahala situated in Jaipur. Aforesaid land was agreed to be purchased @ Rs.4,00,000/- per bigha and total sale consideration was Rs.6,40,00,000/-. M/s. Hind Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. assigned all the rights, title and interest and due amount of money in respect of the aforesaid agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 to the applicant company. While a Memorandum of Understanding dated 30.01.2005 was signed between them, separate assignment deed dated 08.04.2005 was also prepared. Till the time of execution of agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004, which was signed by Respondent No. 1 for himself and as a constituted attorney on behalf of other respondents, i.e. respondents No. 2 to 5, total amount of Rs.65,00,000/- was paid to the respondents as per details given in the application. The respondents represented that aforesaid land was free from all encumbrances and they had all the rights to transfer and/or convey the rights, interest and title in the aforesaid property. In addition to amount of Rs.65,00,000/-, another amount of Rs.35,00,000/- was also paid to the respondents as per the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell. It was also agreed by the respondents that they would obtain NOC and all other permissions from the competent authorities requisite for the sale of the aforesaid land within 15 months w.e.f. 28.06.2004, i.e. on or before 28.08.2005. Clause 14 of the agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 provided that in case of any dispute or difference, the parties shall try to settle the same amicably, failing which the matter shall be referred to arbitration under Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and both the parties shall appoint one arbitrator on their behalf and if required a third arbitrator, to act as an umpire. Instead of obtaining NOC within the time, Respondent No. 1 met representative of the appellant on 30.01.2005 and explained that since the substantial inalienable right in ownership of the land by virtue of part performance of the agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 was vested in them, therefore, he proposed a viable business proposition by which both the parties could gain substantially as the price of the land had increased. 3. Mr. Shyam Kant Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in terms of representation given by Respondent No. 1, the parties entered into a fresh Memorandum of Understanding dated 30.01.2005 to resolve the issue amicably. It was agreed that all the rights/equitable rights out of the agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 stood released on agreeing that the amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/-, which was paid to the respondents shall be returned along with Rs.2,00,000/- per bigha for 160 bigha, i.e. Rs.3,20,00,000/-. Thus, total amount of Rs.4,20,00,000/- was to be paid by the respondents within seven months from the date of execution of the MoU. The respondents, however, paid only a sum of Rs.43,00,000/- against clear receipt and a sum of Rs.3,77,00,000/- was still required to be paid. It was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding that time was essence thereof and in case the respondents fail to pay the amount which was due within the specified time, the applicant would be at liberty to sell 62 bigha with frontage on the Main Highway 600 ft. from side nearer to Ajmer. The respondents paid a sum of Rs.57,00,000/- on 07.10.2005 and paid further amount of Rs.20,00,000/- on 17.10.2005 but they failed to adhere to their undertaking, timely and completely. When the applicant did not receive amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- within the stipulated time of 45 days and remaining amount of Rs.2,00,00,000/- within next 90 days from 07.10.2005, the representative of the applicant-company met Respondent No. 1 at Jaipur on 25.11.2005. 4. It is argued that in terms of MoU dated 30.01.2005, the applicant-company is in possession of the title deeds of Chandrakanta Choudhary and Dashrath Choudhary, as security for the performance of the agreement dated 03.08.2004 and MoU dated 31.01.2005. 4. It is argued that in terms of MoU dated 30.01.2005, the applicant-company is in possession of the title deeds of Chandrakanta Choudhary and Dashrath Choudhary, as security for the performance of the agreement dated 03.08.2004 and MoU dated 31.01.2005. The applicant was constrained to invoke Clause 14 of the sale agreement dated 03.08.2004 and appointed Shri Ashish Bhagat, Advocate as arbitrator on its behalf and called upon the respondents to appoint arbitrator on their behalf within 30 days from the receipt of the notice. The respondents instead of appointing arbitrator on their behalf sent a false and frivolous reply through their counsel Shri Sanjeev Arora that there was no subsisting arbitration clause between the parties. Since the respondents failed to pay a sum of Rs.3,00,00,000/- along with interest @ 15% p.a. in terms of MoU dated 30.01.2005 and 07.10.2005. a criminal complaint was also filed by the applicant with the Police Station Dudu, Jaipur upon which FIR No. 118/2008 was registered for offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120- B IPC. But the police is not making any effective steps in that FIR. 5. Mr. Shyam Kant Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant argued that question of limitation cannot be decided in the scope of application under Section 11 of the Act and has to be left open for the arbitrator to decide. Learned counsel for the applicant in support of his arguments has relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. SPS Engineering Ltd., AIR 2011 SC 987 and State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, AIR 2011 SC 3814 . It is contended that Chief Justice or his designate Judge under Section 11(6) of the Act is not required to identify the disputes and refer them to arbitrator. He is only required to appoint arbitrator. Reliance is also placed on judgments of the Supreme Court in Ashapura Mine-chem Ltd. v. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation, (2015) 8 SCC 193 and Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. v. Muktinath Airlines Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., (2015) 6 Arb.L.R. 100 (SC). It is, therefore, prayed that present application be allowed and an independent arbitrator may be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties. 6. Mr. It is, therefore, prayed that present application be allowed and an independent arbitrator may be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties. 6. Mr. Manish Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents has not disputed agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004, but argued that said agreement to sell is neither registered nor stamped and hence, is not admissible in evidence. It is submitted that since the applicant is relying on the said agreement to sell, he may be called upon and asked to produce the original thereof before this Court and the same be thereafter impounded under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998 (for short 'the Stamp Act') for adjudication of proper stamp duty and penalty thereon. If the applicant pays such amount, then he can rely on the said agreement to sell. It is contended that since the agreement relates to purchase and sell of immovable property, stamp duty @ 3% of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement is required to be paid as per Article 5(bb) of the Rajasthan Stamp Act. Article 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to Stamp Act would be attracted that if the agreement relates to purchase or sale of an immovable property and possession is neither given nor agreed to be given, particularly when there is no stipulation in the agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 with regard to handing over of the possession. It is also argued that if Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to the Stamp Act is not attracted, then explanation appended to Article 21 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act in any case would apply, according to which agreement to sell of an immovable property or an irrevocable power of attorney or any other instrument executed in the course of conveyance or lease, e.g. allotment letters, patta, licence etc. shall, in case of transfer of possession of such property before, at the time of or after the execution of any such instrument, be deemed to be conveyance and the stamp duty thereon shall be chargeable accordingly. It is argued that in either case where possession is given or agreed to be given or even when possession is neither given nor agreed to be given, requisite stamp duty is required to be paid as per provisions of either Article 5(bb) or Article 21 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act. It is argued that in either case where possession is given or agreed to be given or even when possession is neither given nor agreed to be given, requisite stamp duty is required to be paid as per provisions of either Article 5(bb) or Article 21 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act. If the agreement to sell is unstamped or not sufficiently stamped, the same cannot be relied even for the purpose of application under Section 11 of the Act praying for appointment of an independent arbitrator. Learned counsel for the respondents, in this connection, relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Chandmari Tea Co. Pvt. Limited, 2011 (5) Supreme 205 and judgments of this Court in M/s. Nakoda Granite and Marmo Pvt. Ltd. v. Yogendra Singh, 2014 AIR(Raj) 91 and Aeren R. Entertainment Pvt. Limited v. National Engineering Industries Limited, 2013 WLC (Raj.) UC 753. 7. Mr. Manish Sharma, learned counsel further argued that agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 came to an end on execution of MoU dated 30.01.2005 due to novation of contract as per section 62 of the Indian Contract Act as the first party to the MoU, who was the second party in the agreement to sell waived, abandoned, released and withdrawn from all its rights, equitable rights of whatsoever nature that may be under or arising out of the agreement dated 03.08.2014 in favour of Ghanshyam Singhal. It is submitted that three cheques of Rs.15,00,000/- mentioned in Clause 2(iv) of the application were dishonoured on presentation. Payments made regarding MoU dated 30.01.2005 by the opposite party No. 1 to the applicant are denied. The respondents have neither received any amount nor paid any amount to the applicant. Moreover, present petition is time barred. Section 43 of the Act provides that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable. Even if the limitation is counted from 06.01.2006 when one Mukti Bodh and Company sent a legal notice on behalf of Hind Enterprises (P) Ltd. in terms of MoU dated 30.01.2005, limitation for the recovery of the amount as set out in para 4 of the application which is Rs.3 crore plus interest @ 15% p.a. in terms of agreement dated 30.01.2005 and 07.10.2005 has expired on 30.08.2008 itself. Said notice was replied by the respondents through their advocate Shri Sanjeev Arora. Said notice was replied by the respondents through their advocate Shri Sanjeev Arora. And if limitation is counted from 06.01.2006, limitation period of three years would come to an end on 05.01.2009. Learned counsel referring to Section 2(1)(h) of the Act which defines the word "a party" submitted that a party means who is a party to an arbitration agreement and since the applicant company was not party to the original agreement dated 03.08.2004, present application at its instance would not be maintainable. Alleged agreement is false and forged document. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his arguments, has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC 535 . Reliance is also placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar v. Annapurna Builders-(2013) 14 SCC 354. It is, therefore, prayed that present application may be dismissed. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 9. Before dwelling upon other arguments made by both the sides, this Court deems it appropriate to decide the question whether agreement to sell dated 03.08.2004 which contains the arbitration clause, being Clause No. 14 executed on a Non-Judicial Stamp Paper of Rs.100/-, can be looked into for the purpose of entertaining present application for appointment of an independent arbitrator. In order therefore to fully comprehend the issues involved, it would be appropriate to quote provisions of Article 5(bb) and Article 21 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act, which read as under: 5. Agreement or memorandum of an agreement,- (a) xxxxxxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (bb) if relating to purchase or sale of an immovable property, when possession is neither given nor agreed to be given. Three percent of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement or memorandum of agreement: Provided that the stamp duty paid on such agreement shall at the time of execution of conveyance in pursuance of such agreement subsequently be adjusted towards the total amount of duty chargeable on the conveyance if such conveyance deed is executed within three years from the date of agreement. 21. Conveyance as defined by Section 2(xi) (i) if relating to immovable property; Eleven percent of the market value of the property. 21. Conveyance as defined by Section 2(xi) (i) if relating to immovable property; Eleven percent of the market value of the property. (ii) if relating to movable property; Half (0.5) percent of the market value of the property. (iii) if relating to the order under Section 394 of the Companies Act 1956 (Act No. 1 of the 1956). if relating to the order under section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956(Central Act No. 1 of 1956) or section 44-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (Central Act No. 10 of 1049) Ten percent of the market value of the property Exemption: Assignment of copy right by entry made under the Indian Copy Right Act, 1957(Act No. 14 of 1957) Explanation: (I) For the purpose of this article an agreement to sell an immovable property or an irrevocable power of attorney or any other instrument executed in the course of conveyance or lease e.g. allotment letters, patta, licence etc. shall, in case of transfer of the possession of such property before, at the time of or after the execution of any such instrument, be deemed to be a conveyance and the stamp duty thereon shall be chargable accordingly: Provided that the provisions of section 51 shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to such agreement or power of attorney or instruments as are applicable to a conveyance. Provided further that the stamp duty already paid on such agreement or power of attorney or instrument shall at the time of the execution of a conveyance or lease in pursuance of such instruments subsequently, be adjusted towards the total amount of duty chargeable on the conveyance or lease. Explanation.- (ii) For the purposes of clause (iii), the market value of the property shall be deemed to be the amount of total value of shares issued or allotted by Transferee Company, either in exchange or otherwise, and the amount of consideration, if any, paid for such amalgamation. 10. Explanation.- (ii) For the purposes of clause (iii), the market value of the property shall be deemed to be the amount of total value of shares issued or allotted by Transferee Company, either in exchange or otherwise, and the amount of consideration, if any, paid for such amalgamation. 10. Entry 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 prescribes that requisite stamp duty for an agreement to sell or a MoU relating to purchase or sale of any immovable property, is 3% of the total value of the sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement or MoU, which is adjustable against execution of the sale deed for actual transfer of property, albeit the same is required to be done within three years from the date of execution of the MoU. Section 37 of the Act provides that every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence and every person in-charge of a public office, except an officer of a police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same. Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 provides that no instrument chargeable with duty under the said Act of 1998, unless being duly stamped, shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. 11. This question in the context of appointment of an Arbitrator under the scope of Section 11 of the Act of 1996 fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Private Ltd., supra. Therein, a lease deed was executed between the parties under which the respondent agreed to lease to the appellant two tea estates with all appurtenances for a term of 30 years. Clause 35 of the said lease deed provides for settlement of the dispute between the parties by arbitration. Prior to the execution of the lease deed, the respondent offered to sell the two tea estates to the appellant for a sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000. Clause 35 of the said lease deed provides for settlement of the dispute between the parties by arbitration. Prior to the execution of the lease deed, the respondent offered to sell the two tea estates to the appellant for a sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000. The appellant agreed to purchase them subject to detailed verification and invested huge sums of money for improving the tea estates in the expectation that it would either be purchasing the said estates or have a lease for 30 years. The respondent, however, abruptly and illegally evicted the appellant from the tea estates and took over their management. The appellant issued notice calling upon the respondent to refer the matter to arbitration under Clause 35 of the lease deed, which the respondent failed to comply. The appellant then approached the Gauhati High Court by filing the application under Section 11 of the Act for appointment of the Arbitrator. The respondent contended that the unregistered lease deed was invalid, unenforceable and not binding upon the parties having regard to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and that the said lease deed was also not duly stamped and therefore, having regard to Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, it was invalid, unenforceable and not binding and further that clause 35 providing for arbitration being part of the said lease deed, was also invalid and unenforceable. The High Court dismissed the application filed by the applicant holding that the lease deed was compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Registration Act and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as the lease deed was not registered, no term in the said lease deed could be relied for any purpose and, therefore, Clause 35 could not be relied for seeking reference to arbitration. The High Court also held that the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 35 could not be termed as a collateral transaction, and therefore, the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act would also not assist the appellant. The Supreme Court having regard to the facts aforesaid, formulated the following three questions: "(i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but compulsorily registrable) instrument is valid and enforceable? (ii) Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable? The Supreme Court having regard to the facts aforesaid, formulated the following three questions: "(i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but compulsorily registrable) instrument is valid and enforceable? (ii) Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable? (iii) Whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an Arbitrator should be appointed?" 12. On question no.(i), it was held that when a contract contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to the resolution of disputes, unrelated to the performance of the contract. It is as if two contracts - one in regard to the substantive terms of the main contract and the other relating to resolution of disputes - had been rolled into one, for purposes of convenience. An arbitration clause is therefore an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract or the instrument. Resultantly, even if the contract or its performance is terminated or comes to an end on account of repudiation, frustration or breach of contract, the arbitration agreement would survive for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising under or in connection with the contract. Similarly, when an instrument or deed of transfer (or a document affecting immovable property) contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to resolution of disputes, unrelated to the transfer or transaction affecting the immovable property. It is as if two documents - one affecting the immovable property requiring registration and the other relating to resolution of disputes which is not compulsorily registrable - are rolled into a single instrument. If a deed of transfer of immovable property is challenged as not valid or enforceable, the arbitration agreement would remain unaffected for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising with reference to the deed of transfer. Therefore having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration, held the Supreme Court in answer to question no.(i) posed. Therefore having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration, held the Supreme Court in answer to question no.(i) posed. Dealing with question no.(ii) whether an arbitration agreement is a document compulsorily registered required to be stamped, which is unregistered and/or which is not duly stamped, is valid or enforceable, the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Private Ltd., supra analysed the provisions of Section 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, which are substantially in para materia with Section 37 and 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 respectively. The Supreme Court therefore held that when a lease deed or any other instrument is relied upon as containing the arbitration agreement, the court should consider at the outset, whether an objection in that behalf is raised or not, whether the document is properly stamped. If it comes to the conclusion that it is not properly stamped, it should be impounded and dealt with in the manner specified in Section 38 of the Stamp Act. The court cannot act upon such a document or the arbitration clause therein. But if the deficit duty and penalty is paid in the manner set out in Section 35 or Section 40 of the Stamp Act, the document can be acted upon or admitted in evidence. 13. While dealing with question no.(iii) whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an Arbitrator should be appointed, the Supreme Court held that since the lease deed was for a term of thirty years and was unregistered, the terms of such a deed cannot be relied upon to claim or enforce any right under or in respect of such lease. It can be relied upon for the limited purposes of showing that the possession of the lessee is lawful possession or as evidence of some collateral transaction. Even if an arbitrator is appointed, he cannot rely upon or enforce any term of the unregistered lease deed. It can be relied upon for the limited purposes of showing that the possession of the lessee is lawful possession or as evidence of some collateral transaction. Even if an arbitrator is appointed, he cannot rely upon or enforce any term of the unregistered lease deed. Where the arbitration agreement is not wide and does not provide for arbitration in regard to all and whatsoever disputes, but provides only for settlement of disputes and differences arising in relation to the lease deed, the arbitration clause though available in theory is of little practical assistance, as it cannot be used for deciding any dispute or difference with reference to the unregistered deed, held the Supreme Court. 14. This Court in Nakoda Granite and Marmo Pvt. Ltd., supra was dealing with a case where the lease deed was registered on non-judicial stamp of Rs.100 and was not sufficiently stamped for invoking arbitration clause. Relying on the judgement of Apex Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra, this Court dismissed the application under Section 11 of the Act seeking reference to the Arbitration, however, with liberty to the applicant to move afresh after getting the instruction in question duly stamped. 15. This Court in Aeren R. Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., supra was dealing with application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for appointment of the Arbitrator, an objection was raised by the non-applicant that the agreement to sale has been executed on a stamp of Rs.100 and, is therefore, insufficiently stamped and inadmissible in evidence as per Section 3 read with Article 5 of the Schedule appended to the Stamp Act, 1899. Such agreement, therefore, cannot be acted upon under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1889. Reliance was placed on Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, according to which stamp duty at the rate of 3% of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement was payable. Such agreement, therefore, cannot be acted upon under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1889. Reliance was placed on Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, according to which stamp duty at the rate of 3% of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement was payable. This Court relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar, supra on considering the provisions of Section definition of conveyance contained in Section 2(xi), 3, 18(1), 37 and 39 and Articles 5(bb), 5(c) and 21 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, it was held that conduct of the parties is to be seen and the Court is not to wait indefinitely for cure of defect of stamp duty and thus when the agreement to sale being not sufficiently stamped, the arbitration application is not maintainable under Section 11 of the Act. Although additionally in the aforesaid judgement, this Court held the arbitration clause itself in the agreement also illegal on account of pendency of civiling proceedings. The aforesaid judgement was challenged before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6977/2016. The Supreme Court on being informed that Collector (Stamps) has passed the order with regard to inadequate stamp on the agreement, which has been assailed in the revision. As far as proceedings under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agriculture Holdings Act, 1973 is concerned, separate litigation with regard thereof was pending. The Supreme Court therefore held that if the appellant stands cleared of those proceedings, it will be entitled to file a fresh application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996. The Supreme court further held that the High Court should not have declared the agreement void as it was subject to paying adequate stamp duty under the Stamp Act and also getting cleared of the proceedings initiated under the Ceiling Act. 16. In Naina Thakkar, supra, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where an application was filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 and while reiterating its earlier judgement in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra has held in the context of application under Section 8 filed before the Civil Court that the lease deed in that case entered into between the parties was an unregistered and stamp paper prepared on a non-judicial stamp of Rs.100. It was required to be registered and also suffered from deficit stamp duty. While pressing the application under Section 8 of the Act, the petitioner did not show any inclination to pay the deficit stamp duty, nor to pay the penalty as may be imposed by the Collector if the document was impounded and stamp duty payable thereon was determined. The order of the trial court rejecting the application under Section 8 of the Act was held to be valid. The Supreme Court in that case has held that the Court while dealing with Section 11 of the Act cannot wait endlessly for the applicant to comply with its obligations to pay the stamp duty. According to Section 32 of the Stamp Act, 1998, it is purchaser's liability to pay stamp duty and registration charges on sale of an immovable property. In view of Section 37 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act of 1998, an arbitrator cannot be appointed under Section 11 of the Act on the basis of a document/MoU, which stands impounded. The Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar, supra has reiterated the law propounded in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra and held in para 6 as under: "6. In the light of above legal position, when we look at the facts of the present case, we find that while pressing the application under Section 8 of the Act, the petitioner did not show any inclination to pay the deficit stamp duty on the lease deed dated 19.12.2005 nor expressed her desire that she was willing to pay the penalty as may be imposed by the Collector if the document was impounded and stamp duty payable thereon was determined." 17. The application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 for seeking reference to the Arbitrator/appointment of the Arbitrator was held to be not maintainable if the agreement /MoU containing the arbitration clause was unstamped or duly stamped following the dictum of Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra and Karnataka High Court in Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. v. Patel Realty India Ltd. and Bellona Estate Developers Ltd.- 2013 (4) AKR 432, Madras High Court in Karismaa MEP Services Pvt. Ltd. v. KGS Milestone Constructions Ltd.- 2015 (7) MLJ 15 . Similar view has been taken by Delhi High Court in Avantha Holding Limited v. M/s. Osian's Connoisseurs of ART (P) Ltd. & Anr., O.M.P. No. 266/2011 decided on 11.04.2012 and Bombay High Court in Jayraj Devidas v. Nilesh Shantilal Tank, Arbitration Appeal No. 45/2013 decided on 22.8.2014 in regard to maintainability of application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996. 18. Contention that even though the agreement/MoU may be unstamped or insufficiently stamped, but the arbitration clause contained therein can still be acted upon for the collateral purpose to make reference to the arbitration is noted to be rejected. In taking that view, I am fortified from the authority of Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra (2009) 2 SCC 532 where the Supreme Court interpreted the phraseology "for any purpose" relying on the judgement of Privy Council in Ram Ratan v. Parma Nand- AIR 1946 PC 51 . It was held by the Supreme Court in para 25 and 26 of the judgement as under: "25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. 26. The view we have taken finds support from the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan v. Parmananad, [ AIR 1946 PC 51 ] wherein it was held :- "That the words 'for any purpose' in Section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms." 19. The said decision has been followed in a large number of decisions by the said Court." 20. The judgement of Supreme Court in Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd., supra relied on behalf of the applicant does not throw any light on the question with which we are concerned in the present case. The said decision has been followed in a large number of decisions by the said Court." 20. The judgement of Supreme Court in Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd., supra relied on behalf of the applicant does not throw any light on the question with which we are concerned in the present case. Another judgement of Supreme Court in Sanghi Brothers, supra also does not deal with the question whether any unstamped or insufficiently stamped agreement/MoU for sale containing arbitration clause can be acted upon for appointment of the Arbitrator inasmuch as this judgement was rendered by a single Judge of the Supreme Court as nominee of the Chief Justice and has not noticed the division bench decision of Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra. 21. Contention that the question as to insufficiency of stamp duty in view of Section 16 of the Act should be left to be decided by the Arbitrator cannot be countenanced and has to be rejected in view of clear law laid down by the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra which mandates that such a issue has to be decided in the application under Section 11 of the Act itself. The Supreme Court in Javer Chand & Ors. v. Pukhraj Surana-1965 AIR (SC) 1655 observed that where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. 22. In view of the analysis of the law made above, this application is liable to be dismissed however with liberty to the applicant to file a fresh application for appointment of Arbitrator as and when it makes payment of stamp duty payable as per law. The arbitration application is accordingly dismissed.