JUDGMENT : Mr. Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This application under Section 10 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by applicant-Trade Swift Developers Private Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, praying for appointment of Arbitral Tribunal for resolving its dispute with the non-applicants. 2. Dispute between the parties pertains to a piece of land measuring 11608 sq. yards comprising in Khasra no.330 of Revenue Village Barodia, Tehsil and District Jaipur situated at Station Road, Jaipur. This land was purchased by the respondents by three different sale deeds dated 2.6.1972. Parties executed unregistered Memorandum of Understanding (for short-’MoU’) dated 19.10.2007 where under the respondents agreed to sale part of the aforesaid land measuring 8883 sq. yards to the applicant with existing constructions, for a lumpsum sale consideration of Rs.47,25,00,000. Clause 18 of the said MoU pertains to arbitration, which inter alia provides that parties shall, subject to Kolkata jurisdiction, resort to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at Kolkata, for resolution of any dispute or difference between them on any of the issues relating to the terms and conditions of the said MoU. 3. Shri Devidutt Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the applicant paid a sum of Rs.4 crore in advance to the respondents and thereafter further paid a sum of Rs.2.20 crores. Thus a total of Rs.6.20 crores has been paid against the agreed sale consideration. However, despite repeated requests of the applicant, the respondents did not handover the original title deed of the said property for inspection. After about a year of execution of the MoU, the respondents came out with a concocted story that the documents have been misplaced/lost. The respondents deliberately did not perform their part of obligation in the MoU, whereas applicant was all along ready and willing to perform its part of obligation. It is contended that applicant issued letter dated 5.8.2008 to the respondents to provide the required documents and also expressed his readiness and willingness to pay the rest amount of sale consideration and get the sale deed registered. The representative of the applicant approached the respondents from time to time and insisted on execution of the sale deed after fulfilling all terms and conditions, as agreed, but the respondents did not comply. All of a sudden, the respondents by notice dated 24.2.2010 cancelled the MoU. The representative of the applicant approached the respondents from time to time and insisted on execution of the sale deed after fulfilling all terms and conditions, as agreed, but the respondents did not comply. All of a sudden, the respondents by notice dated 24.2.2010 cancelled the MoU. It is contended that the respondents have thus breached the terms and conditions of the signed agreement, which gave rise to dispute. Applicant therefore served a legal notice on the respondents by invoking clause 18 of the MoU relating to arbitration. 4. Shri Devidutt Sharma, learned counsel for he applicant, relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in Rajesh Verma v. Ashwani Kumar Khanna- AIR 2016 SC 1910 , argued that Supreme Court in that case has held that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11 of the Act is limited and confined to examining whether or not there is an arbitration agreement between the parties and if so, whether any dispute has arisen between them, which calls for appointment of arbitrator. Once that is so held, the Court has to merely make a reference of all such dispute to the arbitrator for decision. The objection raised by the respondents with regard to non-registration of MoU and non-payment of stamp duty, is therefore, liable to be rejected. 5. Learned counsel argued that the respondents are estopped from raising this objection because they themselves filed an application under Section 11(5) of the Act before the Calcutta High Court although that was dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction on 14.9.2012. There is thus implicit admission on the part of the respondents as to the existence of the dispute and also the justifiability of reference to the Arbitrator. The respondents, therefore, now cannot be allowed to raise the objection about insufficiency of stamp duty on MoU. Even if that be so, respondents may raise this objection before the Arbitrator, which he will have to consider the same on the basis of evidence and the law on the subject. 6. The respondents, therefore, now cannot be allowed to raise the objection about insufficiency of stamp duty on MoU. Even if that be so, respondents may raise this objection before the Arbitrator, which he will have to consider the same on the basis of evidence and the law on the subject. 6. Shri Devidutt Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant argued that reliance placed by the respondents on judgment of the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd.- (2011) 14 SCC 66 is wholly misconceived because what has been held in that case is that if the document is not properly stamped, court can act upon said document or enforce arbitration clause contained therein only after deficit stamp duty and penalty is paid and said defect is cured and then treat it fully stamped. There is thus no bar as such for appointment of Arbitrator even if the document is not properly stamped. Learned counsel for the applicant has also relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashapura Mine-chem Ltd. v. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation- (2015) 8 SCC 193 to argue that even if the MoU providing for arbitration is cancelled and does not fructify into agreement, it does not affect arbitration agreement because it is a stand alone agreement and would still survive. 7. Reliance is also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Muktinath Airlines Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.-2015 (6) Arb. L.R. 100 (SC). The Supreme Court in that case while dealing with an application under Section 11 of the Act has held that the question whether or not the petitioner is entitled to performance of terms of MoU, is liable to be referred to the arbitration. Besides, the ground on which the respondents are seeking to resist the reference to arbitration, are questions that cannot be gone into by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. 8. Learned counsel also relied on judgment of the Delhi High Court in Aspire Investments Private Ltd. v. Nexgen Edusolutions Pvt. Ltd.-2010 (Suppl.2) Arb.LR 484 (Delhi), wherein it was held that an arbitration clause contained in an agreement is a collateral transaction, which would survive, whether or not the main agreement is registered or properly stamped, since it would fall within the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Reliance for this purpose is placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court in Delhi Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Himgiri Realtors Pvt. Ltd.-2016 (1) Arb. LR 21 (Delhi). 9. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Usha Gupta v. Aerens Goldsouk International Ltd., Arbitration Case No.63 of 2012 decided on 11.02.2013 with other four connected matters to argue that an agreement for sale of immovable property is a non-testamentary instrument, which does not create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, in immovable property. Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act makes the position clear that a document not itself creating a right in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, but merely creates a right to obtain another document, which will, when executed, create any such right, need not be registered. It is therefore prayed that the application be allowed in terms of the prayers made above. 10. Shri Sudanshu Kasliwal, learned senior counsel and Shri Vivek Dangi, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the application and submitted that applicant failed to make payment of sale consideration despite several reminders sent by them between 4.10.2008 and 16.9.2009. The respondents finally gave notice of 15 days on 16.9.2009. Since the petitioner failed to pay the due amount within the period stipulated in the notice, the MoU stood terminated on 8.10.2009. The Calcutta High Court dismissed the application of the respondents filed under Section 11 of the Act due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The applicant filed application under Section 9 of the Act before the District and Sessions Court, Jaipur City, Jaipur, praying for injunction against the respondents for restraining them from selling/mortgaging/altering the nature or status of the disputed property. The respondents filed application under section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act of 1998 in the said proceedings praying that the purported arbitration clause is contained in the MoU being insufficiently stamped, hence cannot be relied upon for passing any directions under Section 9 of the Act of 1996. Therefore, the same need to be impounded under section 37 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 and sent to the Collector Stamp for assessment of deficit stamp duty, interest and penalty thereon. Therefore, the same need to be impounded under section 37 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 and sent to the Collector Stamp for assessment of deficit stamp duty, interest and penalty thereon. The MoU has been impounded by the Additional District Judge No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur vide order dated 21.11.2015, which order has been challenged by the applicant before this Court in a revision petition. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Indowind Energy Ltd. v. Wescare (India) Ltd. & Anr.- (2010) 5 SCC 306 and argued on the authority of that judgment that this court, while dealing with an application under section 11 of the Act, of 1996, is bound to decide at the outset whether there is an arbitration agreement valid in law or not. The validity of arbitration agreement should be decided in the terms whether applicable stamp duty is paid or not. Although the document in question is mentioned as MoU, but in fact it is an agreement to sale as it contains particulars of the sale consideration, certainty as to property, certainty as to parties & certainty as to other terms related to probable cost of conveyance, stamp duty etc. Reliance is also placed on the judgments of Ravinder Singh v. Shri Chuckles Kohli & Ors.-2011 (121) DRJ 208 and Tilak Raj Bhagat v. Ranjit Kaur & Ors.-2012 VAD (Delhi) 186. 12. Learned senior counsel relied on entry 5(bb) in the Schedule appended to the Act of 1998 and argued that stamp duty payable on an agreement to sell or a MoU regarding sale of an immovable property, possession not having being transferred, is 3% of the total value of the consideration, as mentioned in the said agreement to sale or MoU. The applicant was thus under obligation to pay the requisite stamp duty of 3% of the total sale consideration i.e. Rs. 50,51,000, which has not been paid by the applicant. The MoU dated 19.10.2007 has thus been insufficiently stamped. This Court in the scope of Section of 11 of the Act while acting upon the arbitration agreement has to ascertain whether the requisite stamp duty has been paid or not. 50,51,000, which has not been paid by the applicant. The MoU dated 19.10.2007 has thus been insufficiently stamped. This Court in the scope of Section of 11 of the Act while acting upon the arbitration agreement has to ascertain whether the requisite stamp duty has been paid or not. Since in the present case, the arbitration clause is incorporated under the agreement to sale or MoU, which was not duly stamped, this Court cannot act upon such agreement to sale even for the purpose of appointment of Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. 13. It is contended that since the agreement relates to purchase and sell of immovable property, according to article 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, stamp duty @ 3% of the total sale consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement is required to be paid. Article 5(bb) of the Stamp Act provides that if the agreement relates to purchase or sale of an immovable property and possession is neither given nor agreed to be given, the same shall be rightly attracted because there is no stipulation in the agreement to sell with regard to handing over of the possession. It is argued that in either case, where possession is given or agreed to be given or even when possession is neither given nor agreed to be given, requisite stamp duty is required to be paid either as per provisions of Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to Stamp Act or Article 21 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act. If the agreement to sell is unstamped or not sufficiently stamped, the same cannot be relied even for the purpose of application under Section 11 of the Act praying for appointment of an independent arbitrator. 14. Shri Vivek Dangi, learned counsel further submitted that Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998 categorically provides that no instrument chargeable with duty under the said Act of 1998, unless duly stamped, shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated. Learned counsel relying on judgment of the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. supra argued that unless the stamp duty and penalty due in respect of the instrument is paid, the court cannot act upon the instrument, which means that it cannot act upon the arbitration agreement also, which is part of the instrument. 15. Learned counsel also cited the judgment of this Court in Nakoda Granite and Marmo Pvt. Ltd. v. Yogendra Singhvi- AIR 2014 Raj. 91 , in which this Court while relying on the judgment in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra held that if the instrument is not duly stamped, then it has to be treated non-operational even to invoke arbitration clause. Reliance for the same purpose is placed on the judgment of this Court in Aeren R. Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. National Engineering India Ltd.- 2014 (2) WLN 546 (Raj.). Kerala High Court has taken the similar view in Poddar Udyog Limited v. Lifetime Realty Pvt. Ltd.-2013 (2) KHC 710. Reliance is also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra- (2009) 2 SCC 532 and it was argued while ascertaining the meaning of words “for any purpose whatsoever” used in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, the Supreme Court held that “the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, in our opinion, is not correct.” 16. Shri Vivek Dangi, learned counsel for the respondents argued that contention of the applicant that since the respondents moved a similar application before the Calcutta High Court on the basis of the similar MoU, therefore, they are estopped from raising the objection with regard to non-payment of stamp duty is also liable to be rejected. It is trite that if a party takes a particular stand on account of mistake or wrong understanding of law, the principles of estoppel cannot be applied. Besides, there can be no estoppel against the Statute. Reliance in this connection is placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 667 . 17. Learned counsel argued that applicant cannot be allowed to contend that since the said agreement to sale is executed in Calcutta, the stamp duty shall be payable as per the West Bengal Stamps Act. (1996) 2 SCC 667 . 17. Learned counsel argued that applicant cannot be allowed to contend that since the said agreement to sale is executed in Calcutta, the stamp duty shall be payable as per the West Bengal Stamps Act. As per the Schedule appended to the West Bengal Stamp Act, the stamp duty payable on any agreement or MoU relating to sale of an immovable property, is equivalent to 6% of the market value in case the market value of the property exceeds Rs.40 lacs, which admittedly has not been paid. Notwithstanding this, as per the provisions of Section 21 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 where any instrument is executed in any part of India, other than the State of Rajasthan, and such instrument relates wholly or partly to any property situated in the State of Rajasthan, the copy of such instrument shall, when received in the State of Rajasthan, be liable to be charged with the difference of duty as on the original instrument. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar v. Annapurna Builders - (2013) 14 SCC 354. Learned counsel therefore prayed that the present application be dismissed. 18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 19. The MoU was executed between the non-applicants as sellers and the applicant as purchaser on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.100/-, with respect to 8883 sq. yards of land for a total agreed lumpsum sale consideration of Rs. 47,25,00,000/-, on the conditions mentioned therein, out of which amount of Rs.4,00,00,000/- was paid in advance and thereafter, a further amount of Rs.2,20,00,000/- was also paid in different installments. Both parties have made allegation against each other for not performing their part of obligation. The applicant in those facts invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11 of the Act praying for appointment of Arbitrator in terms of clause-18 of the MoU, which reads thus : “18. That the parties hereto have specifically agreed that any dispute or difference of opinion on any of the issues pertaining to the terms and conditions of the MoU to solve the same by resort to the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at Kolkata and also subject to Kolkata jurisdiction.” 20. It has been clarified by the sellers that out of 11608 sq. yds., land measuring 11495 sq. It has been clarified by the sellers that out of 11608 sq. yds., land measuring 11495 sq. yds. is comprised in Khasra No.330 out if which 18 Biswas (approx. 2725 sq yds) has been acquired by JDA. In respect of the remaining 113 sq. yds. of land, the Khasra number is not identified. It was also specifically clarified between the sellers and the purchaser that out of the 8883 sq. yds. agreed to be sold, 8770 sq. yds. comprise in Khasra No.330 and balance 113 sq. yds. is not identifiable in any Khasra. Hence the actual area for measurement purposes will be more or less 8770 sq. yds. and the sellers agreed to get the mutation of the balance 1613 sq. yds. land in their (sellers) favour before the sale deed is registered in favour of the purchaser. 21. While the applicant allege that the respondents failed to produce the original title deed in respect of said property, case of the respondents is that it was the applicant, who was obliged to complete the sale transaction within six months of the execution of the MoU. Despite continuous and repeated representations by them, the applicant did not make payment of the remaining sale consideration for execution of the sale deed. 22. In order to appreciate the objection regarding nonpayment of adequate stamp duty, it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained in Article 5(bb) of the Stamp Act, which reads as under : 5. Agreement or memorandum of an agreement,- (a)xxxxxxxxxxxxx (b)xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (bb) if relating to purchase or sale of an immovable property, when possession is neither given nor agreed to be given. Three percent of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement or memorandum of agreement : Provided that the stamp duty paid on such agreement shall at the time of execution of conveyance in pursuance of such agreement subsequently be adjusted towards the total amount of duty chargeable on the conveyance if such conveyance deed is executed within three years from the date of agreement. 23. As would be seen from above, Entry 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 prescribes the requisite stamp duty for an agreement to sell or a MoU relating to purchase or sale of any immovable property. 23. As would be seen from above, Entry 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 prescribes the requisite stamp duty for an agreement to sell or a MoU relating to purchase or sale of any immovable property. Requisite stamp duty is 3% of the total sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement or MoU, which is adjustable against execution of the sale deed for actual transfer of property, albeit the same is required to be done within three years from the date of execution of the MoU. 24. Section 37 of the Act provides that every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence and every person incharge of a public office, except an officer of a police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same. Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 provides that no instrument chargeable with duty under the said Act of 1998, unless being duly stamped, shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. 25. This question in the context of appointment of an Arbitrator under the scope of Section 11 of the Act of 1996 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Private Ltd., supra. Therein, a lease deed was executed between the parties under which the respondent agreed to lease to the appellant two tea estates with all appurtenances for a term of 30 years. Clause 35 of the said lease deed provided for settlement of the dispute between the parties by arbitration. Prior to the execution of the lease deed, the respondent offered to sell tea estates to the appellant for a sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000/-. The appellant agreed to purchase them subject to detailed verification and invested huge sums of money for improving the tea estates in the expectation that it would either be purchasing the said estates or have a lease for 30 years. The respondent, however, abruptly and illegally, evicted the appellant from the two estates and took over their management. The appellant agreed to purchase them subject to detailed verification and invested huge sums of money for improving the tea estates in the expectation that it would either be purchasing the said estates or have a lease for 30 years. The respondent, however, abruptly and illegally, evicted the appellant from the two estates and took over their management. The appellant issued notice calling upon the respondent to refer the matter to arbitration under Clause 35 of the lease deed, which the respondent failed to comply. The appellant then approached the Gauhati High Court by filing the application under Section 11 of the Act for appointment of the Arbitrator. The respondent contended that the unregistered lease deed was invalid, unenforceable and not binding upon the parties having regard to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and that the said lease deed was also not duly stamped and therefore having regard to Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, it was invalid, unenfoceable and not binding and further that clause 35 providing for arbitration being part of the said lease deed, was also invalid and unenforceable. The High Court dismissed the application filed by the applicant holding that the lease deed was compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Registration Act and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as the lease deed was not registered, no term in the said lease deed could be relied for any purpose and, therefore, Clause 35 could not be relied for seeking reference to arbitration. The High Court also held that the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 35 could not be termed as a collateral transaction, and therefore, the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act would also not assist the appellant. The Supreme Court having regard to the facts aforesaid, formulated the following three questions : “(i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but compulsorily registrable) instrument is valid and enforceable ? (ii) Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable ? (iii) Whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an Arbitrator should be appointed ?” 26. (ii) Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable ? (iii) Whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an Arbitrator should be appointed ?” 26. On question no.(i), it was held that when a contract contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to the resolution of disputes, unrelated to the performance of the contract. It is as if two contracts - one in regard to the substantive terms of the main contract and the other relating to resolution of disputes - had been rolled into one, for purposes of convenience. An arbitration clause is therefore an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract or the instrument. Resultantly, even if the contract or its performance is terminated or comes to an end on account of repudiation, frustration or breach of contract, the arbitration agreement would survive for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising under or in connection with the contract. Similarly, when an instrument or deed of transfer (or a document affecting immovable property) contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to resolution of disputes, unrelated to the transfer or transaction affecting the immovable property. It is as if two documents - one affecting the immovable property requiring registration and the other relating to resolution of disputes which is not compulsorily registrable - are rolled into a single instrument. If a deed of transfer of immovable property is challenged as not valid or enforceable, the arbitration agreement would remain unaffected for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising with reference to the deed of transfer. Therefore, having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration, held the Supreme Court in answer to question no.(i) so posed. 27. Therefore, having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration, held the Supreme Court in answer to question no.(i) so posed. 27. Dealing with question no.(ii) whether an arbitration agreement is a document compulsorily registered required to be stamped, which is unregistered and/or which is not duly stamped, is valid or enforceable, the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra analysed the provisions of Section 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 (which are substantially in para materia with Section 37 and 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 respectively) held that when a lease deed or any other instrument is relied upon as containing the arbitration agreement, the court should consider at the outset, whether an objection in that behalf is raised or not, whether the document is properly stamped. If it comes to the conclusion that it is not properly stamped, it should be impounded and dealt with in the manner specified in Section 38 of the Stamp Act. The court cannot act upon such a document or the arbitration clause therein. But if the deficit duty and penalty is paid in the manner set out in Section 35 or Section 40 of the Stamp Act, the document can be acted upon or admitted in evidence. 28. While dealing with question no. (iii) whether there is an arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an Arbitrator should be appointed, the Supreme Court held that since the lease deed was for a term of thirty years and was unregistered, the terms of such a deed cannot be relied upon to claim or enforce any right under or in respect of such lease. It can be relied upon for the limited purposes of showing that the possession of the lessee is lawful possession or as evidence of some collateral transaction. Even if an arbitrator is appointed, he cannot rely upon or enforce any term of the unregistered lease deed. It can be relied upon for the limited purposes of showing that the possession of the lessee is lawful possession or as evidence of some collateral transaction. Even if an arbitrator is appointed, he cannot rely upon or enforce any term of the unregistered lease deed. Where the arbitration agreement is not wide and does not provide for arbitration in regard to all and whatsoever disputes, but provides only for settlement of disputes and differences arising in relation to the lease deed, the arbitration clause though available in theory is of little practical assistance, as it cannot be used for deciding any dispute or difference with reference to the unregistered deed, held the Supreme Court. 29. This Court in Nakoda Granite and Marmo Pvt. Ltd., supra dealt with a case in which application under section 11 of the Act was filed for appointment of arbitrator. Application was founded on lease deed executed on nonjudicial stamp of Rs.100/-. Lease deed was held to be not sufficiently stamped for invoking arbitration clause. Relying on the judgment of Apex Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra, this Court dismissed the application, however, with liberty to the applicant to move afresh after getting the instrument in question duly stamped. 30. This Court in Aeren R. Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., supra was dealing with application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for appointment of the Arbitrator. An objection was raised by the non-applicant that the agreement to sale has been executed on a stamp of Rs.100/- only and, is therefore, insufficiently stamped and inadmissible in evidence as per Section 3 read with Article 5 of the Schedule appended to the Stamp Act, 1899. Such agreement, therefore, cannot be acted upon as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1889. Reliance was placed on Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, according to which stamp duty at the rate of 3% of the total sale consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement was payable. Such agreement, therefore, cannot be acted upon as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1889. Reliance was placed on Article 5(bb) of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, according to which stamp duty at the rate of 3% of the total sale consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement was payable. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar, supra and on considering provisions of Sections-2(xi), 3, 18(1), 37 and 39 and Articles 5(bb), 5(c) and 21 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Stamp Act, it was observed that conduct of the parties is to be seen and the Court is not required to wait indefinitely for cure of defect of stamp duty. When the agreement to sale being not sufficiently stamped, the arbitration application is not maintainable under Section 11 of the Act. Although additionally, this Court in the aforesaid judgment held the arbitration clause in the agreement also illegal on account of pendency of land ceiling proceedings. The aforesaid judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6977/2016. The Supreme Court was informed that Collector (Stamps) has passed the order with regard to inadequate stamp duty on the agreement, which has been assailed in the revision petition. As far as proceedings under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agriculture Holdings Act, 1973 is concerned, it was informed that separate litigation with regard thereof was pending. The Supreme Court therefore held that if the appellant stands cleared of those proceedings, it will be entitled to file a fresh application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996. The Supreme court further held that the High Court should not have declared the agreement void as it was subject to paying adequate stamp duty under the Stamp Act and also getting cleared of the proceedings initiated under the Ceiling Act. 31. In Naina Thakkar, supra, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where an application was filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. While reiterating its earlier judgment in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra, the Supreme Court in the context of application under Section 8 filed before the Civil Court held that the lease deed in that case entered into between the parties was an unregistered and prepared on a non-judicial stamp of Rs.100/-. While reiterating its earlier judgment in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra, the Supreme Court in the context of application under Section 8 filed before the Civil Court held that the lease deed in that case entered into between the parties was an unregistered and prepared on a non-judicial stamp of Rs.100/-. It was required to be registered and also suffered from deficit stamp duty. While pressing the application under Section 8 of the Act, the petitioner did not show any inclination to pay the deficit stamp duty, nor to pay the penalty as may be imposed by the Collector if the document was impounded and stamp duty payable thereon was determined. The order of the trial court rejecting the application under Section 8 of the Act was held to be valid. The Supreme Court in that case held that the Court while dealing with Section 11 of the Act cannot wait endlessly for the applicant to comply with its obligations to pay the stamp duty. According to Section 32 of the Stamp Act, 1998, it is purchaser’s liability to pay stamp duty and registration charges on sale of an immovable property. The Supreme Court in Naina Thakkar, supra has reiterated the law propounded in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra and held in para 6 as under : “6. In the light of above legal position, when we look at the facts of the present case, we find that while pressing the application under Section 8 of the Act, the petitioner did not show any inclination to pay the deficit stamp duty on the lease deed dated 19.12.2005 nor expressed her desire that she was willing to pay the penalty as may be imposed by the Collector if the document was impounded and stamp duty payable thereon was determined.” 32. Indisputably, in the present case, on application under Section 9 filed by the applicant before the Additional District Judge No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur praying for injunction against the non-applicant. On objection of the non-applicant under Section 37 read with Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, that MoU has been impounded and sent to Collector by order dated 21.11.2015. But that order has not been accepted by the applicant, who has challenged the same in separate proceeding. On objection of the non-applicant under Section 37 read with Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, that MoU has been impounded and sent to Collector by order dated 21.11.2015. But that order has not been accepted by the applicant, who has challenged the same in separate proceeding. In view of Section 37 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act of 1998, an arbitrator cannot be appointed under Section 11 of the Act on the basis of a document/MoU, which stands impounded. The application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 for seeking reference to the Arbitrator/appointment of the Arbitrator should therefore be held to be not maintainable in view of the dictum of Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra because the agreement/MoU containing the arbitration clause was not duly stamped. Similar view has been taken by Karnataka High Court in Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. v. Patel Realty India Ltd. and Bellona Estate Developers Ltd.-2013 (4) AKR 432, Madras High Court in Karismaa MEP Services Pvt. Ltd. v. KGS Milestone Constructions Ltd.- 2015 (7) MLJ 15 . Similarly same view has been taken by Delhi High Court in Avantha Holding Limited v. M/s. Osian’s Connoisseurs of ART (P) Ltd. & Anr., O.M.P. No.266 of 2011 decided on 11.04.2012 and Bombay High Court in Jayraj Devidas v. Nilesh Shantilal Tank, Arbitration Appeal No.45 of 2013 decided on 22.8.2014 in regard to maintainability of application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996. 33. Contention that even though the agreement/MoU may be unstamped or insufficiently stamped, but the arbitration clause contained therein can still be acted upon for collateral purpose to make reference to the arbitration, is noted to be rejected. In taking that view, I am fortified from the authority of Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan, supra where the Supreme Court relying on the judgment of Privy Council in Ram Ratan v. Parma Nand- AIR 1946 PC 51 interpreted the phraseology “for any purpose”. It was held by the Supreme Court in para 25 and 26 of the judgment as under : “25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. It was held by the Supreme Court in para 25 and 26 of the judgment as under : “25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. 26. The view we have taken finds support from the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan v. Parmananad, [ AIR 1946 PC 51 ] wherein it was held :- “That the words ‘for any purpose’ in Section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms.” The said decision has been followed in a large number of decisions by the said Court.” 34. Argument that the non-applicants are estopped from raising objection with regard to insufficiency of the stamp duty because they themselves filed application under Section 11 of the Act for reference to the Arbitration before the Calcutta High Court cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that there can be no estoppel against the Statute. In U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., supra the argument before the Supreme Court was that the appellant having submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and nominated the arbitrator, are estopped to go back upon it. Rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court held that mere acceptance or acquiescence to jurisdiction of the arbitrators for adjudication of the disputes as to the extent of the arbitration agreement or arbitrability of the dispute does not confer jurisdiction and does not dis-entitle the appellant to have the remedy under Section 33 through the Court. In Groupe Chimique Tunisien SA v. Southern Petrochemicals Industries Corpn. Ltd.- (2006) 5 SCC 275 , the Supreme Court held that if on account of mistake or wrong understanding of law, a party takes a particular stand, he is not barred from changing his stand subsequently or estopped from seeking arbitration. 35. In Groupe Chimique Tunisien SA v. Southern Petrochemicals Industries Corpn. Ltd.- (2006) 5 SCC 275 , the Supreme Court held that if on account of mistake or wrong understanding of law, a party takes a particular stand, he is not barred from changing his stand subsequently or estopped from seeking arbitration. 35. The judgment of Supreme Court in Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd., supra relied on behalf of the applicant does not throw any light on the question with which we are concerned in the present case. Another judgment of Supreme Court in Sanghi Brothers, supra also does not deal with the question whether any unstamped or insufficiently stamped agreement/MoU for sale containing arbitration clause can be acted upon for appointment of the Arbitrator inasmuch as this judgment was rendered by a single Judge of the Supreme Court as nominee of the Chief Justice of India and has not noticed the division bench decision of Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra. 36. Contention that the question as to insufficiency of stamp duty in view of Section 16 of the Act should be left to be decided by the Arbitrator cannot be countenanced and has to be rejected in view of authoritative pronunciation of law by the Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd., supra which mandates that such an issue has to be decided in the application under Section 11 of the Act itself. The Supreme Court in Javer Chand & Ors. v. Pukhraj Surana-1965 AIR (SC) 1655 observed that where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. 37. In view of the analysis of the law made above, this application is liable to be dismissed with liberty however to the applicant to file a fresh application for appointment of Arbitrator as and when it makes payment of stamp duty payable as per law. 38. The arbitration application is accordingly dismissed.