ORDER : M. VENUGOPAL, J. 1. The Applicant/1st Respondent has focused the present Original Application praying for passing of an order by this Court to grant Leave to him to tender his evidence in the above Election Petition at a later stage after examination of other witnesses. The Learned Counsel for the Applicant/1st Respondent submits that Ex. P. 30 series (xerox true copies of Tamil Newspaper Murasoli - 22 numbers) marked through P.W. 1 and an objection raised on behalf of the Applicant/1st Respondent was overruled. 2. The Learned Counsel for the Applicant/1st Respondent contends that in order to provide an opportunity of a 'Fair Trial', it is just and necessary that a person, who certified Ex. P. 30 series (22 numbers) to be true documents, be summoned prior to the Applicant/1st Respondent's evidence as a Defense Witness. Therefore, the said person viz., Mr. Vignesh, being an Employee of the Corporation of Chennai, has to be first examined for the purpose of eliciting the circumstances surrounding the said document. 3. It is represented on behalf of the Applicant/1st Respondent that since the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner was at the relevant time and continuously to be the Mayor of the Chennai Corporation adducing of the evidence of the Applicant/1st Respondent prior to the evidence of said Vignesh and prior to the marking of documents relating to certification made by Mr. Vignesh would be imperative. Indeed, the said Vignesh, then Public Relation Officer of Chennai Corporation is, in fact, a signatory of Ex. P. 30 series marked on the side of the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner and therefore is connected with the evidence tendered by P.W. 1. 4. At this stage, the Learned Counsel for the Applicant/1st Respondent takes a stand that whenever permission is sought for to examine a witness at a later point of time before any witness is examined, then, a Court of Law is to record reasons as per Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code and to lend support to his contention, he seeks in aid of the decision of this Court in Marappa Gounder and others V. Sellappa Gounder and others reported in AIR 1985 Mad 183 . 5. 5. That apart, it is also represented on behalf of the Applicant/1st Respondent that there must be relevant strong circumstances for granting permission to a party to appear as a witness after other witness on his behalf has been examined. 6. Conversely, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner that since Ex. P. 30 series is not relevant because of the reason the original of Ex. P. 30 series was already marked as Ex. P. 46 in ELP. No. 1 of 2011 (on the side of the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner), the present Application is filed. Furthermore, Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. is a bar and in any event, the ingredients of Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service by the Applicant/1st Respondent. 7. Expatiating his contentions, the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner forcefully projects an argument that 'the issue of corrupt practice' is peculiarly within the knowledge of the Applicant/1st Respondent and that the Petitioner/Application under Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be filed as a matter of course. Also that, Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. is mandatory in character and it says that 'the party shall appear before any other witness'. Moreover, on the facts of this case, there is no exceptional reason and on the other hand, there is no reason at all mentioned in this Application. 8. Continuing further, it is the plea of the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner that the onus of proof is upon the Applicant/1st Respondent and he is to first enter the witness box before examining other witnesses. Besides this, Election 87 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 enjoins that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall apply to the trial of Election Petition. 9. At this juncture, the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner cites the decision in Ayyasami Gounder and others v. T.S. Palanisami Gounder, 1989-2-L.W. 60 : AIR 1990 Madras 237 wherein at paragraph 6, it is, inter alia, observed as follows: "6... Considering the object with which Order XVIII. R. 3-A of the Code has been introduced, it is clear that permission from the Court for the examination of a party at a later stage, should be sought for and obtained before the commencement of the examination of other witnesses on behalf of the party seeking such permission and not later. Considering the object with which Order XVIII. R. 3-A of the Code has been introduced, it is clear that permission from the Court for the examination of a party at a later stage, should be sought for and obtained before the commencement of the examination of other witnesses on behalf of the party seeking such permission and not later. Though the provision under O. XVIII, R. 3-A of the code does not in terms indicate the stage at which such an application should be made, in this case, such an application had not been made and permission obtained prior to the examination of the witnesses on behalf of the respondent and therefore, the respondent could not have been permitted to come in at a later stage as a party witness." Also, in the aforesaid decision in paragraph 7, it is, among other things, observed as follows: "7. Now, adverting to the reasons given by the Court below, it is even that it has proceeded only on the footing that the petitioners have not made out that by the respondent being permitted to be examined as a witness, he is likely to fill up the gaps or missing links in the evidence already tendered by the other witnesses on his side. What is relevant under O. XVIII, R. 3-A of the Code is that the court should be satisfied that the party, who should appear as a witness on his behalf before the other witnesses in support of his case are examined, is unable to appear and give evidence in support of his case. The reasons required to be recorded relate to his and if the court is satisfied with reference to the reasons given by the party as to why he should he permitted to appear as a witness at a later stage, then, the permission can be granted by the Court, subject to the recording to reason in that regard. In this case, as noticed earlier, prior to the commencement of the evidence on behalf of the respondent, no permission was sought from court for the examination of respondent: later as a witness, though he is a party to the suit. Even on the assumption that the respondent was entitled to file such an application seeking permission after the examination of the other witnesses, it is seen that the reasons given by the respondent are plainly unacceptable. Even on the assumption that the respondent was entitled to file such an application seeking permission after the examination of the other witnesses, it is seen that the reasons given by the respondent are plainly unacceptable. Nothing is mentioned in the affidavit as to why the respondent could not examine himself at the time of the commencement of the evidence on his behalf and why it became necessary for him to examine himself at a later stage. In the absence of any reasons in the affidavit filed by the respondent, the Court below was in error in granting such permission. The recording of the reasons contemplated under O. XVIIIR. 3-A of the Code must pertain to the circumstances, under which a party not appearing as a witness at the commencement of the evidence on his side, seeks permission to examine himself at later stage. The affidavit filed does not contain any acceptable or justifiable reason. Further, in the counter affidavit filed by the petitioners, they have categorically stated that the respondent had been present in court throughout the trial of the suit when the other witnesses on his side had been examined and had also instructed counsel to examine other witnesses on his side. It is obvious therefore that the respondent had deliberately kept himself away from the witness box at the time of the commencement of the evidence on his behalf, though present in court, and such a person cannot certainly seek the assistance of court under O. XVIII. R. 3-A of the Code in the form of a permission to examine himself as a witness at a later stage. The reason given by the Court below is that it had not been established by the petitioners that the respondent is likely, by his evidence, to plug the holes in the evidence of the other witnesses already examined on his side. As pointed out earlier, the court should concern itself at the time of considering the application under Order XVIII. R. 3-A of the Code, as to why the party to the suit is seeking to examine himself later and not whether, if permitted to be examined at a later stage, he would or he would not full up the gaps in the evidence of the other witnesses. R. 3-A of the Code, as to why the party to the suit is seeking to examine himself later and not whether, if permitted to be examined at a later stage, he would or he would not full up the gaps in the evidence of the other witnesses. The reason given by the court below in palpably wrong and its order passed on such reasoning cannot at all be sustained. Though in the course of the arguments a reference to a large number of decisions was made, in the view taken above regarding the scope of order XVIII. Rule 3-A of the Code and in the nature of the permission as well as the purpose for the statement of reasons to be recorded by the court while granting permission, it is unnecessary to refer to those cases. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order of the court below is set aside and I.A. No. 1130 of 1988 will stand dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs." 10. Apart from that, the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Saroi Sandesh Naik (Bhosale) reported in (1996) 1 Supreme Court Cases 384 & at special page 385, wherein it is observed as follows: "The pleading was supported by the evidence of S.I. Police on duty. In view of the nature of his duties during election period, he was a natural witness of the incident. The diary which he maintained for that period was produced by him in the court in which an entry of his visit to the temple that day was noted and nothing was elicited in cross-examination to detract from the merit of his version to this extent. This is the only direct evidence on the point to which there is no rebuttal by the appellant in as much as the appellant did not enter the witness box to deny this version. The explanation given by learned counsel for the appellant for the appellant's failure to enter the witness box even if true, does not relieve the appellant from the consequence of an adverse inference arising against him on this point. This is a fact of which the appellant had personal knowledge since this act was attributed to the appellant himself. The explanation given by learned counsel for the appellant for the appellant's failure to enter the witness box even if true, does not relieve the appellant from the consequence of an adverse inference arising against him on this point. This is a fact of which the appellant had personal knowledge since this act was attributed to the appellant himself. He was the best person to deny that assertion if he challenged the same and to offer himself for cross-examination by the other side. This he has failed to do. There being no inherent defect in the testimony of the S.I. Police and he being a natural witness of the incident on account of his official duty during the election period, the above statement made by him must be accepted. (Para 13) .... Thus according to the pleadings in the election petition the speech made by the appellant was clearly an appeal to the voters on the ground of his religion. The evidence which proves the speech made by the appellant in a Hindu temple during a religious festival addressed to Hindu devotees forming the religious gathering has to be understood in this context. The word "Hindutva" used in the speech of the appellant at that time, place and occasion has to be understood only as an appeal on the ground of Hindu religion, that is, by the candidate on the ground of his religion. As earlier stated, the word "Hindutva" in the abstract and in a different context addressed to a different gathering may have different meaning related to Indian culture and heritage unrelated to religion, but in the present context it has only one meaning as indicated. In the absence of any rebuttal by the appellant against whom an adverse inference also arises on account of his failure to enter the witness box to deny this allegation, no other conclusion is possible. (Paras 13 to 15)" 11. This Court has heard the Learned Counsel for the Applicant/1st Respondent and the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner and noticed their contentions. 12. It is to be borne in mind that Rule 3-A of Order XVIII C.P.C. enjoins that the party is to be examined first before his witnesses unless Court's permission is sought for. This Court has heard the Learned Counsel for the Applicant/1st Respondent and the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Election Petitioner and noticed their contentions. 12. It is to be borne in mind that Rule 3-A of Order XVIII C.P.C. enjoins that the party is to be examined first before his witnesses unless Court's permission is sought for. In fact, it is worth to recall and recollect the decision of this Court in V. Jayakannan and others v. V.K. Sampath alias V.K. Sampathkumar reported in 1991 (2) MLJ 76 at page 77, whereby and whereunder, it is observed and held as under: "O. 18, Rule 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides that, if a party wishes to appear as a witness then he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined. If he wants to reserve himself as a witness and he proposes to examine himself after other witnesses are examined, that is undoubtedly permissible but he has to obtain previous permission of the Court and the Court has undoubtedly the discretion to grant such permission. But before that discretion is exercised in favour of the party, the Court must record reasons for permitting a party for examining himself after the other witnesses are examined. The very fact that permission has to be obtained by a party desiring to be examined as a witness after other witnesses are examined already indicates that such permission must be obtained before the evidence of the other witnesses is adduced. Therefore, a party examining himself before other witnesses are examined as the rule. A party examining himself after the other witnesses are examined is an exception. An exception can only be made for valid reasons. What those valid reasons are will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case." 13. Further, this Court significantly points out the decision in Samidurai and others v. Kanakayal reported in 1996-2-L.W. 690 : 1996 (2) MLJ 495 at page 496 wherein it is held as follows: "A plain reading of this Rule makes it clear that a party who wants to appear as a witness shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage. There is no stipulation of time as to when the permission has to be sought for. If a party wants to appear as a witness, he should do so prior to the examination of any witness on his behalf. Otherwise if he wants to appear at a later point of time if the court permits he can do so. [Para. 10] O. 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C. is only it is not necessary for the party to get permission of the court before the commencement of the proceedings to examine him/her as a witness at a later point of time. Even if the evidence on the other side is over, it is open to appear as witness, provided the court permits." 14. In this connection, this Court pertinently points out that a Court of Law cannot direct a party to the suit to follow a particular order of examination of witnesses. As a matter of fact, the ingredients of Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code is only directory and not mandatory. 15. Suffice it for this Court to point out that insistence of examination of a party as a first witness is not an inviolable rule and the ingredients of Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. provides exemption in this regard. In fact, the prime requisite under Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. is that a Court of Law is not an obligation to satisfy itself that there existed valid ground for a litigant in not deposing as a witness at the relevant point of time. 16. No wonder, the reasons assigned by a Court of Law under Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code should not be a moonshine or an irrational one. 17. One cannot remain in oblivion of a vital fact that the Law relating to the Election Disputes is indeed a technical one. As such, at every stage relating to the conduct of trial of Election Petition, there will be room for raising objections or counter objections as the case may be and the same cannot be ruled out. In short, the proceedings in Election Petitions are purely statutory in character. 18. As such, at every stage relating to the conduct of trial of Election Petition, there will be room for raising objections or counter objections as the case may be and the same cannot be ruled out. In short, the proceedings in Election Petitions are purely statutory in character. 18. It is to be remembered that a Court has no power to direct a party to the suit to give evidence and that a party has option to examine himself or any witness to prove a case, as per decision Lallita Tyagi V. M. Chandrakala and others, 2006 (6) ALD 740 at page 744. 19. Be that as it may, in the light of detailed discussions and this Court, taking note of the contentions advanced on either side and also bearing in mind the legal position that Order XVIII Rule 3-A C.P.C. is only directory in nature and not mandatory in character and further, a Court cannot direct a party to the Suit/Election Petition to follow a particular order of examination of witnesses, comes to a resultant conclusion that the Applicant/1st Respondent need not seek permission to examine himself at a later stage and also that, he has an option to examine himself or any witness to prove a case. Added further, a Court of Law has no power to direct a party to the suit/any given proceedings like a suit to tender evidence first on his behalf. Viewed in that perspective, the Original Application filed by the Applicant/1st Respondent seeking Leave of this Court is surplus-age, supernumerary, redundant and otiose one. Resultantly, the Application fails. With the aforesaid observations, the Original Application is dismissed. No costs.