JUDGMENT : B.R. Gavai, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved by the charge-sheet dated 21.04.2016 thereby informing the petitioner about the charges levelled against him. 3. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was in employment of the respondents. The petitioner was issued with a show cause notice on 8.3.2016. The petitioner replied to the same on 22.3.2016. However, a communication was addressed to the petitioner on 31.03.2016 informing him that since he would stand retired on 31.03.2016, the provisions of sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Clause 45 of Vidarbha Konkan Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Regulations") are invoked against him. Subsequently a charge-sheet came to be issued to the petitioner on 21.04.2016. It could thus be clearly seen that though the show cause was issued to the petitioner prior to the date on which he was superannuated i.e. on 31.03.2016, a charge-sheet was issued to him only on 21.04.2016. 4. Mr. Anand Parchure, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that since the petitioner stood retired on 31.03.2016 and since the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 21.04.2016, in view of sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Clause 45 of the said Regulations the departmental proceedings are not permissible in law. 5. It is the contention of the respondent-Bank that since the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner prior to the date on which he was superannuated and since on the date on which he was superannuated the provisions of sub-clause (3) of Clause 45 of the said Regulations were already invoked, the departmental proceedings are very much permissible in law. 6. We find that the issue is no more res integra. In the case of UCO Bank and another vs. Rajinder Lal Capoor, reported in AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2129 (1), Their Lordships of the Apex Court had an occasion to consider a clause which is analogous to Clause 45(3) of Vidarbha Konkan Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2013. 7. In the case of UCO Bank and another vs. Rajinder Lal Capoor, reported in AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2129 (1), Their Lordships of the Apex Court had an occasion to consider a clause which is analogous to Clause 45(3) of Vidarbha Konkan Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2013. 7. It will be relevant to refer to the clause which fell for consideration before Their Lordships i.e. Regulation 20(3) (iii) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' Service Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "UCO Bank Regulations") which reads thus:- "The Officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceeding will continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till the proceedings are completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contributions to CPF." It will also be relevant to refer to the provision which is sought to be made applicable to the present petitioner by the respondent- Bank. The relevant provision of the said Regulations which could be found at Annexure-D i.e. communication addressed by the respondent-Bank to the petitioner reads thus:- "Section 45(3):- The officer or employee against whom disciplinary proceeding has been initiated shall cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings shall continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order passed in respect thereof." 8. It could thus be seen that both the provisions are almost analogous. In both the provisions, it is stated that an employee against whom the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated, will cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceeding shall continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. 9. The second part of Regulation 20(3) of UCO Bank Regulations could be found in sub-clause (4) of Regulation No.45 which reads thus:- "(4). 9. The second part of Regulation 20(3) of UCO Bank Regulations could be found in sub-clause (4) of Regulation No.45 which reads thus:- "(4). The officer or employee against whom disciplinary proceeding has been initiated shall not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation and also not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till the proceeding is completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contribution to Contributory Provident Fund (CPF)." 10. It could thus be seen that identical provisions are contained in both the regulations, the one which fell for consideration before Their Lordships of the Apex Court and the one which falls for consideration before us. Their Lordships while considering the case before them insofar as the UCO Bank Regulations is concerned have held thus:- "21. The aforementioned Regulation, however, could be invoked only when the Disciplinary Proceedings had clearly been initiated prior to the respondent's ceases to be in service. The terminologies used therein are of seminal importance. Only when a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against an officer of the bank despite his attaining the age of superannuation, can the disciplinary proceeding be allowed on the basis of the legal fiction created there under, i.e., continue "as if he was in service". Thus, only when a valid departmental proceeding is initiated by reason of the legal fiction raised in terms of the said provision, the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service although he has reached his age of superannuation. The departmental proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of a show cause notice. It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued (See Union of India etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc. reported in AIR 1991 SC 2010 ). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by this Court recently in Coal India Limited & others v. Saroj Kumar Mishra, [2007 (5) SCALE 724] wherein it was held that date of application of mind on the allegations levelled against an officer by the Competent Authority as a result whereof a Charge-sheet is issued would be the date on which the disciplinary proceedings said to have been initiated and not prior thereto. Pendency of a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20 of the Regulations. Pendency of a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20 of the Regulations. Albeit in a different fact situation but involving a similar question of law in Coal India Ltd. (supra) this Court held: "13. It is not the case of the appellants that pursuant to or in furtherance of the complaint received by the vigilance department, the competent authority had arrived at a satisfaction as is required in terms of the said circulars that a charge-sheet was likely to be issued on the basis of a preliminary enquiry held in that behalf or otherwise. 14. The circular letters issued by the appellants put restrictions on a valuable right of an employee. They, therefore, are required to be construed strictly. So construed there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the conditions precedent contained therein must be satisfied before any action can be taken in that regard." It was further more observed that: "20. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued." (See also Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak, 2007 (6) SCALE 348) 22. Respondent, therefore, having been allowed to superannuate, only a proceeding, inter alia, for withholding of his pension under the Pension Regulations could have been initiated against the respondent. Discipline and Appeal Regulations were, thus not attracted. Consequently the charge-sheet, the enquiry report and the orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. 23. An order of dismissal or removal from service can be passed only when an employee is in service. If a person is not in employment, the question of terminating his services ordinarily would not arise unless there exists a specific rule in that behalf. As Regulation 20 is not applicable in the case of the respondent, we have no other option but to hold that the entire proceeding initiated against the respondent became vitiated in law." 11. It could thus be seen that Their Lordships have specifically rejected the contention of the Bank that the departmental proceedings stand initiated upon issuance of the show cause notice. It could thus be seen that Their Lordships have specifically rejected the contention of the Bank that the departmental proceedings stand initiated upon issuance of the show cause notice. It has been categorically held by relying upon the earlier pronouncements of the Apex Court that date of application of mind on the allegations levelled against an officer by the competent authority as a result whereof a charge-sheet is issued, would be the date on which the disciplinary proceedings are said to have been initiated and not prior thereto. It has been categorically held that the pendency of a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20 of the Regulations. 12. It could be clearly seen from the aforesaid pronouncement of Their Lordships that an order of dismissal or removal from service can be passed only when an employee is in service. If a person is not in employment, the question of terminating his services ordinarily would not arise unless there exists a specific rule in that behalf. The respondents have not been in a position to point out any rule which permits them to do so. 13. It appears that UCO Bank applied for the review of the said judgment. While considering the review application of the UCO Bank, in a judgment reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1831, Their Lordships observed thus:- "22. Drawing up of a charge sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. We have noticed in paragraph 15 of our judgment that ordinarily no disciplinary proceedings can be continued in absence of any rule after an employee reaches his age of superannuation. A rule which would enable the disciplinary authority to continue a disciplinary proceedings despite the officers reaching the age of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A' fortiori it must be a rule applicable to a disciplinary proceedings. 23. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the employer may take resort to a preliminary inquiry, but it will bear repetition to state that the same has a limited role to play. But, in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding has been initiated. 24. Initiation of a disciplinary proceeding may lead to an evil or civil consequence. But, in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding has been initiated. 24. Initiation of a disciplinary proceeding may lead to an evil or civil consequence. Thus, in absence of clear words, the court must lean in favour of an interpretation which has been applied by this Court in the main judgment." 14. It could thus be seen that Their Lordships have reiterated that drawing up of a charge sheet is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. It has been further held that in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding has been initiated. 15. In that view of the matter, when the case is squarely covered by the two pronouncements of the Apex Court, we have no other option but to allow the petition. 16. Rule is, therefore, made absolute by quashing and setting aside the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner including the charge-sheet dated 21.04.2016. Needless to state that the terminal benefits of the petitioner including pension etc. shall be released to the petitioner within a period of one month from today. In the facts and circumstance of the case, no order as to costs.