JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. Rule. Service of rule is waived by learned advocate Mr. Prabhav A. Mehta for respondent No. 2, learned advocate Mr. Tanmay B.Karia for respondent No. 4, learned advocate Mr. HN Sevak for respondent No. 6, learned APP Mr. Manan Mehta for respondent Nos. 1, 7 and 8. 2. Heard learned advocates for the parties for final disposal of revision petition. 3. The petitioner herein is original complainant; whereas respondent No. 1 is State and respondent Nos. 2 to 8 are persons against whom the petitioner has lodged a complaint before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate of Ahmedabad on 29/12/2015 alleging that they have forged several documents by making signatures in some affidavits in the year 2009 in the name of person who expired in the year 1993 and thereby they all have committed offence punishable under sections 406, 408, 409, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Such complaint is registered as Misc. Criminal Application No. 284 of 2015. Amongst the respondents, the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are private parties, whereas respondent No. 6 is Notary, respondent No. 7 is Surveyor of District Inspector of Land Records office, Ahmedabad City (DILR) and respondent No. 8 is Officer of DILR office. 4. On 29/12/2015 when the complaint was submitted before the Court, the Court has ordered to register it and to proceed further and complainant was ordered to remain present on 1/1/2016. On 1/1/2016 the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 9, Ahmedabad City has, after hearing the learned advocate for the complainant, passed the impugned order on the same day which is under challenge in this revision. The perusal of the said impugned order dated 1/1/2016 makes it clear that the Magistrate has heard the learned advocate, who has requested the Court to forward the complaint for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code'). The perusal of the said impugned order dated 1/1/2016 makes it clear that the Magistrate has heard the learned advocate, who has requested the Court to forward the complaint for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code'). However, considering the contents of the complaint, the Court has thought it proper to initially initiate an inquiry considering the fact that the allegation is regarding creation of forged documents by signing in the name of deceased mother of the complainant and relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in, AIR 2015 SC 1742 , so also decision in the case of Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. Reported in, AIR 2015 SC 1758 . Therefore, the trial Court has ordered to keep the complainant present before the Court for verification of the complaint, on 2/2/2016. 5. Therefore, prima-facie this order is only an interlocutory order, which does not decide the complaint finally either dismissing it or even proceeding against accused in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, on one hand, when such interlocutory orders are not subject to interference in such revisional jurisdiction considering the express provisions of section 397(2), there is no substance or reason in the revision petition to disturb such order. Whereas on other hand even if we may not be technical on such issue regarding interlocutory order, basically it is the prerogative of the trial Judge before whom complaint is filed, to decide that whether it should be immediately or directly forwarded to any investigating agency for investigation in accordance with law or to initiate primary inquiry initially before him and then to decide whether to issue summons or warrant or to refer it for further investigation to any authority that may be permissible considering the facts, circumstances and prima-facie evidence before it, though by and large Magistrate has to forward the complaint to the concerned local police station only. 6. To substantiate above argument, initially we have to recollect the provisions of section 397 (2) which specifically confirm that power of revision conferred by sub section (1) shall not be exercised in revision against any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. 6. To substantiate above argument, initially we have to recollect the provisions of section 397 (2) which specifically confirm that power of revision conferred by sub section (1) shall not be exercised in revision against any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. Though the term "interlocutory order" is not defined in definition clause of the Code, it is now well settled position of law that the order which otherwise does not decide the dispute or issue finally, is to be treated as interlocutory order and to that extent, it is quite clear that calling upon the complainant for verification of the complaint is not a final order in any manner whatsoever, but it is only procedural order to proceed further before taking next step in the proceedings. Thereby, such order can certainly be termed as interlocutory order and, therefore, cannot be made subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction as aforesaid. 7. So far as legality of the impugned order is concerned, one thing is quite clear that though there may be other factual details regarding the offence, so also history of dispute and litigation between the parties, at present we are concerned with the complaint filed by the present petitioner directly before the Magistrate. Therefore, provisions of Chapter XV of the Code, which deal with the complaints to the Magistrate, are applicable and need to be followed without any doubt or second thought and thereby, irrespective of whims and desire of the complainant to proceed further in the matter in accordance with his choice or desire for any other motive. In Chapter XV regarding complaints to Magistrate, the first Section 200 is regarding "Examination of Complainant" wherein it is specifically provided that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine on oath the complainant and witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced in writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate, except in a case of a complaint by public servant acting in discharge of his official duties or the Court has made the complaint or the complaint is made over to another Magistrate under section 192. Therefore, though the Magistrate is empowered under section 190 to forward any complaint to the Police Officers for investigation, it is only if and when cognizance of complaint is taken by such Magistrate and, therefore, if upon reading the contents of the complaint, when Magistrate thinks it proper to first examine the complainant on oath as provided under section 200, it cannot be said that he has committed any irregularity or illegality in any manner whatsoever, so as to interfere with such order in revisional jurisdiction. It is quite clear and obvious that after examining the complainant on oath, the Magistrate has ample power to pass appropriate orders either to issue the process or to order investigation through the police. But only because Magistrate has ordered to call upon the complainant to record his verification, it cannot be said that the Magistrate has not acted in accordance with law and rules so as to interfere with it in his order in such revisional jurisdiction. 8. In view of above legal position, practically there is no reason or substance to enter into factual details and allegations regarding commission of offence by the accused for the simple reason that any discussion on such factual aspects and determination thereof would unnecessarily prejudice the rights and defence of either sides so also the trial Court to take further steps in such proceedings, which are yet to be proceeded before the Magistrate in accordance with law. However, to avoid an agitation on the ground that the Court has not considered the submissions, it would be appropriate to recollect the basic submissions and facts in brief, though such facts and evidence have no weightage while deciding the present revision, so also why the Magistrate passed the impugned order and, therefore, basically those facts are not much material. However, in addition to above stated reason, the basic facts are recollected here because even the history of dispute between the parties makes it clear that probably the petitioner is trying to take disadvantage of judicial proceedings and wants the respondents to be harassed through police investigation because practically this is second round of litigation by the complainant after losing first round of litigation on the same facts and details though in previous round, the complaint was filed against some other persons. Moreover, persons against whom similar complaint was filed were in fact, acquitted after full-fledged trial in Criminal Case No. 14/1998 on 29/9/2001. 9. The sum and substance of the petitioner's complaint is to the effect that though her mother had expired in the year 1993, in the year 2009 an affidavit was filed before the revenue authority as if it is signed by her mother. It is further alleged that in such affidavit, present respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have also put their signatures and, therefore, it is alleged that they have forged such affidavit by making forged signatures of complainant's mother. It is further contended that thereafter, respondent No. 2 has admitted in a separate affidavit dated 18/9/2009 that mother of the complainant, namely Manekben, widow of Lalbhai Ranchhodbhai has expired on 15/7/1993, but anyhow he managed to mutate the property in question in his name. So far as present dispute is concerned, the dispute of property is not much material except to refer that there is a dispute regarding mutation of entries in some survey numbers from the name of complainant's mother to the present owners. However, it is undisputed fact that this is the third transaction inasmuch as the complainant's mother has entered into agreement to sell the property in favour of some persons, who in turn have purchased the property from the complainant's mother and thereafter, sold it to some other persons and this second set of purchasers have in turn sold it to present respondent No. 2. Therefore, mutation entry regarding change in the revenue record by deleting name of the petitioner's mother and entering name of the last purchaser is practically in terms of regular sale between the parties and as a routine transaction. However, it cannot be ignored that the complainant has initially filed a complaint against original purchasers, namely Rajeshbhai Ashabhai and others, but in that complaint, after full-fledged trial, it was held that there was no forgery in execution of sale-deeds in the name of petitioner's mother and thereby sale transaction was approved and confirmed by judicial pronouncement. Even the petitioner could not succeed in civil litigation on the same set of facts and allegations upto the High Court. Even the petitioner could not succeed in civil litigation on the same set of facts and allegations upto the High Court. All relevant documents are produced on record, but it would not be necessary in view of legal position discussed hereinabove to refer to all such documents and to make this judgment lengthy unnecessarily. It is also undisputed fact that the petitioner has challenged the mutation entry under the revenue laws, but there also she could not succeed and that the petitioner - complainant has never challenged the first and second sale in civil litigation. All such details are very well disclosed on record and, therefore, its reproduction is not material in the present judgment, when there is no substance in the revision on any ground. 10. It cannot be ignored that initially the petitioner has lodged similar complaint against present respondents before the police authority and when police authority has filed summary report contending that there is a civil dispute and that there is no evidence regarding commission of offence by present respondents, the petitioner has challenged such order of confirming summary upto the High Court, but though in an initial stage, the High Court has directed the police to register an FIR, ultimately by judgment and order dated 14/12/2015 in Special Criminal Application No. 7335/2015 held that after preliminary inquiry, when police has reached the conclusion that no case is made out for registration of FIR, it would not be proper to issue a mandamus, with observation that, however, it shall be open for the applicant herein to avail of legal remedy available under Chapter XV of the Code. Therefore, when complaint is filed on 29/12/2015 and when Magistrate has proceeded under Chapter XV of the Code, I do not find any irregularity or illegality so as to interfere with the impugned order. 11. Though the facts and details are quite clear as aforesaid, the learned advocate for the petitioner is relying upon the following few decisions: "(1) State of Gujarat v. Shah Lakhamshi Amarshi reported in, 1966 GLR 130 , wherein Full Bench of this High Court has, while dealing with the provisions of sections 156(3)and 190, observed that the Magistrate can disagree with the report and direct further investigation by virtue of provision of section 156(3). However, the same judgment also confirms that the Magistrate cannot call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet. However, the same judgment also confirms that the Magistrate cannot call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet. At the most he may record cognizance of offence to proceed further. However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, this judgment would not help the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. (2) Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in, 2009(2) G.L.H. 645 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, while dealing with sections 156 and 200 of the Code, observed that any person can set the criminal law in motion subject to the statutory interdicts and thereby the Magistrate can direct the police to investigate under section 156(3) for the reasons of refusal of lodging FIR by the police or for any reason. However, such judgment also do not confirm in any manner whatsoever that the Magistrate cannot proceed further in accordance with section 200 or he must refer private complaint lodged before it directly to the investigating agency. Thus, there is no compulsion upon the Magistrate to refer all the complaints to the police for investigation under section 156(3). However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, this judgment would also not help the petitioner in any manner." 12. As against that, learned advocate for the respondents has relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat reported in, AIR 2010 SC 1877 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, on the contrary, specifically held that the Magistrate can treat the complaint under section 200 of the Code and keep the matter with himself for an inquiry into the facts of the case. Thereby, it is not mandatory for the Magistrate to refer all the complaints to the police for investigation under section 156(3). Section 200 which falls under Chapter XV, indicates the manner in which the cognizance has to be taken and that the Magistrate may also inquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by police officer before issuing process. Therefore, if the Magistrate has chosen to adopt the specific course and has treated the complaint under section 200 of the Code and kept the matter with himself for an inquiry in the facts of the case, there is no irregularity or illegality in the manner in which the Magistrate has proceeded with the matter. 13. Therefore, if the Magistrate has chosen to adopt the specific course and has treated the complaint under section 200 of the Code and kept the matter with himself for an inquiry in the facts of the case, there is no irregularity or illegality in the manner in which the Magistrate has proceeded with the matter. 13. In the case of Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar reported in, (2006) 4 SCC 359 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that though the Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, it is open to him to act under section 200 or section 202 also in such cases. 14. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, there is no substance in the revision application and hence it is dismissed. Rule is discharged.