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2016 DIGILAW 1563 (HP)

Senior Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division Kullu v. Chet Ram

2016-08-02

SURESHWAR THAKUR

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JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal arises from the impugned order rendered by the Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation, HPSEB, Unit-II, Mandi, H.P. (for short the “Commissioner”), whereby he allowed the application preferred thereat under Section 10 of the Workmen Compensation Act (for short the “Act”) by the claimant/injured. 2. The learned Commissioner allowed the petition preferred therebefore by the claimant. The appellant herein/respondent standing aggrieved by the rendition of the learned Commissioner hence concert to assail it by preferring an appeal therefrom before this Court. 3. The brief facts of the case are that Shri Chet Ram, complainant was employed as T/Mate met with non fatal accident on 10.09.2001 while he was performing his duty. The claimant climbed on the L.T. line pole to hand over the rope to Sh. Tara Chand, Lineman, who had already climbed on the pole. While Shri Chet Ram, the claimant was coming down from the pole suddenly his foot slipped and fell down on the ground. With the help of staff and other villagers he was brought to the Government Hospital Jari and admitted in hospital for treatment. After first aid he was referred to Kullu Hospital and admitted there. He is alleged to have suffered 40% disability in the ill-fated incident. 4. The instant appeal stands admitted by this Court on 26.11.2007 on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation could have imposed a penalty on the appellant for such delay which is not attributable to the appellant and is caused by the respondent No.1 himself? 2. Whether the commissioner for Workmen's Compensation could have awarded an interest to respondent No.1 for a delay not attributable to the appellant? 3. Whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation could have entertained the claim filed after the period of limitation provided for the same without there being separate application for condonation of delay? 5. 2. Whether the commissioner for Workmen's Compensation could have awarded an interest to respondent No.1 for a delay not attributable to the appellant? 3. Whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation could have entertained the claim filed after the period of limitation provided for the same without there being separate application for condonation of delay? 5. Insofar as the answer to substantial question No.1 is concerned, given the mandate of Section 4A of the Act, which stand extracted hereafter foisting a peremptory liability upon an employer qua imposition of penalty upon it/him for any delay in defrayment of compensation to the workman from the date when it “fell due” to him, phrase whereof occurring in Section 4A of the Act holds a signification of the employer standing enjoined to defray compensation to the workman immediately or in prompt sequel to the ill-fated mishap taking place, whereas, with the employer/appellant herein not in prompt sequel to the occurrence of the relevant mishap defraying compensation to the workman renders it amenable for statutory penalty being fastenable upon it. The provisions of Section 4A of the Act read as under:- “4-A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default.- (1) Compensation under section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. (2) In cases where the employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed, he shall be bound to make provisional payment based on the extent of liability which he accepts, and such payment shall be deposited with the Commissioner or made to the workman, as the case may be, without prejudice to the right of the workman to make any further claim. (3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date of it fell due, the Commissioner shall- (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and (b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest thereon, pay a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent. Of such amount by way of penalty;” 6. In sequel, the statutory penalty as imposed upon the employer in the impugned rendition is within the ambit of sub-section (1) of Section 4-A of the Act read with clause (b) of sub-Section (3). Accordingly, substantial question No. 1 is answered in favour of the claimant/respondent and against the appellant. 7. In meteing an answer to substantial question No.2, likewise when the employer omitted to within the ambit of clause (a) of sub-section (3) to Section 4-A of the Act defray compensation amount to the workman, in sequel to his uncontrovertedly standing entailed with injuries during the course of his rendering employment under the employer/appellant herein, hence, rendered it amenable qua levy of interest at the rate of 12% per annum upon the compensation amount assessed in the impugned award by the Commissioner. Consequently, the levy of interest upon the compensation amount in the impugned award by the Commissioner is within the mandate of clause (a) to subsection (3) to Section 4-A of the Act. Accordingly, it does not merit any interference from this Court. In sequel, substantial question of law No.2 is answered in favour of the respondent/claimant and against the appellant/employer. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends qua given the statutory petition instituted by the claimant standing preferred after four years of occurrence of the relevant mishap, renders its preferment therebefore being beyond the period of limitation. He contends of the impugned rendition being liable to be quashed and set aside, it standing pronounced upon a petition which on score aforesaid was not maintainable before it. He contends of the impugned rendition being liable to be quashed and set aside, it standing pronounced upon a petition which on score aforesaid was not maintainable before it. However, the aforesaid contention merits its being rejected, on the short ground of the Act not stipulating any period of limitation wherewithin the aggrieved is enjoined to prefer a petition before the Commissioner. With sub-section (1) to Section 4-A holding a mandatory stipulation of the workman standing entitled to receive from the employer, compensation amount in prompt succession to the occurrence of the relevant mishap, whereas it stood not thereat defrayed to him. Consequently, when a statutory right to the workman to receive compensation from his employer accrued in prompt sequel to the occurrence of the relevant mishap, sequelling hence the bestowment upon him of an indefeasible inherent statutory right, statutory entitlement whereof of the workman stood defeated by the employer by its taking to inordinately procrastinate the defrayment of compensation to the workman also leading the workman to institute a petition to claim the awarding of compensation amount qua him from his employer, renders hence the institution therebefore of the apposite petition on four years elapsing since the occurrence of the relevant mishap to be wholly insignificant. The further reason for so concluding rests on the predominant fact of its institution therebefore being merely an assertion by the workman to stake a claim from his employer for the relevant compensation amount standing defrayed to him, right whereof for its defrayment to him by his employer stood at the stage contemporaneous to the occurrence of the relevant mishap statutorily invested in him, his statutorily entitlement whereof when stood not revered by his employer hence driven him to institute the statutory petition, if also stand unvindicated by this Court on the anvil of his claim being time barred would negate his statutory entitlement thereof. In sequel, substantial question of law No.3 is answered in favour of the claimant/respondent and against the appellant/employer. 9. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant appeal is dismissed and the order impugned before this Court is affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.