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2016 DIGILAW 1565 (GUJ)

Dy. Executive Engineer v. Balubha Ashabha Manek

2016-07-29

A.J.SHASTRI

body2016
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. Both these petitions came to be filed by the petitioner - Board challenging the legality and validity of the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamnagar dated 24.06.2004. While bringing these petitions before this Court, the petitioner - Board has submitted that the respondent - workmen have been appointed purely as causal labourer as Linemen-cum-Chowkidar on daily rated basis and as and when the work was in demand, they were being called for employment. It is the case of the petitioner - Board that none of the respondent - workmen have completed 240 days in a year and when the work was not in demand, the respondent - workmen were not in need and, therefore with effect from 01.05.1994, their services were no longer required. This discontinuance of the respondent - workmen was the subject matter of the industrial dispute, which ultimately, came to be resolved before the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamnagar which was numbered as Reference (LCJ) No. 60 of 1995 and with respect to the another workman, cognate reference was registered as Reference (LCJ) No. 61 of 1995. During the course of adjudication, the respondent - workmen submitted claim of statement vide Exhibit-27 and submitted that the work is of permanent nature. The respondent - workmen have been discontinued without any valid reason. It was submitted that by engaging the respondent - workmen on the basis of 29 days requirement, the petitioner - Board has executed unfair labour practice against them and with a view to avoid permanency to the respondent - workmen, this device of 29 days appointment came to be executed. It is the case of the respondent - workmen that each of the workman had completed 240 days. In addition to the aforesaid claim of statement, evidence was led before the learned Presiding Officer, by examining themselves. The respondent - workmen in Reference (LCJ) No. 60 of 1995 has deposed before the Labour Court vide Exhibit-20 and contended that for continuous period of 17 years, work has been taken from the workmen. To oppose the same, the petitioner - Board has examined the Deputy Engineer - Mr. Prabhulal Jagjivan Waghela at Exhibit-40 and has also submitted that the workmen had not completed 240 days. To oppose the same, the petitioner - Board has examined the Deputy Engineer - Mr. Prabhulal Jagjivan Waghela at Exhibit-40 and has also submitted that the workmen had not completed 240 days. It was also submitted in the deposition that the work of Chowkidar was not of a permanent nature and, therefore, submitted that they have rightly been discontinued. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence led before the learned Presiding Officer, Reference came up for consideration before the Labour Court, Jamnagar and by its award dated 24.06.2004 passed an order whereby the respondent - workmen came to be reinstated to the original post, of course on the basis of the material, the learned Presiding Officer found not to grant back-wages. It is against this award of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamnagar dated 24.06.2004, the petitioner - Board has approached this Court by way of the aforesaid petitions. 2. Mr. Gade, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner - Board submitted that the respondent - workmen were engaged merely on daily rated wages. It was also submitted that the work upon which the respondent - workmen were discharging services was not of permanent nature and it was also submitted that the respondent - workmen have not completed 240 days and, thereby contended that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court is not just and proper. It was also brought to the notice of this Court that the there are decisions to the effect that against the award of reinstatement, in the background of the present factual situation, in lieu of reinstatement order, the Court may award lump sum compensation and for that purpose, the learned counsel for the petitioner - Board has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal & Ors., reported in (2010) 6 SCC pg. 773, as well as the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 5066-5067 of 2014 and thereby contended that ultimately, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the award is not to be interfered then, in lieu of reinstatement, lump sum compensation may be awarded. The learned counsel for the petitioner - Board on the background of this fact, requested the Court to set aside the impugned award or to modify to the aforesaid extent. The learned counsel for the petitioner - Board on the background of this fact, requested the Court to set aside the impugned award or to modify to the aforesaid extent. No other submissions have been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner - Board. 3. To oppose this petition, Mr. Mishra, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent - workmen has drawn attention of the Court to the findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, and contended that the learned Presiding Officer based upon the evidence and material on record, it has specified that there is clear violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and there is also finding with respect to violation of Sections 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act and based upon these findings, the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen submitted not to interfere with the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer. While submitting this, the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen has drawn attention of the Court to the reasons which are assigned by the learned Presiding Officer, more particularly reflected in para 18 of the award and thereby submitted that since there is a clear violation found by the learned Presiding Officer and the findings specified on the terms is arrived at in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, no interference be called for. By submitting this, the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen has drawn attention of this Court on some of the reported decisions of the Apex Court, we well as this Court which the Court would like to deal with at the later point of time. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen has requested the Court not to interfere with the impugned award and the petitions be dismissed. 4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties and having perused the material on record and the findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, it prima facie emerges that there is a specific finding with respect to the violation of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act as also violation of provisions of Sections 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also emerging from the deposition of the Deputy Engineer at Exhibit-40, a witness of the petitioner - Board who has specifically admitted in his deposition that no formality is required under the statue to comply with before discontinuing the respondent - workmen. On the basis of the aforesaid material, it prima facie appears that that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is just and proper. To substantiate this, one of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors., v. Ramchander & Anr., reported in (2007) 1 SCC (L & S) pg.439, wherein it has been propounded that the moment the workmen has completed 240 days, right is conferred upon him to discontinue after following procedure under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Here in the present case, vide Exhibit-40, the witness of the petitioner - Board himself has admitted in cross-examination that this mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act is not complied with and, therefore, the case on hand is clearly covered by the decision of the Apex Court stated herein above. Another decision also deals with almost similar issue with respect to violation of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The another decision in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in (2010) 3 SCC pg. 192, the Apex Court has categorically come to the conclusion that if there is a violation of provisions of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, the natural consequence is to award reinstatement and in paragraph 16 of the said decision, the said proposition is spelt-out, which is reproduced herein below:- "16. 192, the Apex Court has categorically come to the conclusion that if there is a violation of provisions of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, the natural consequence is to award reinstatement and in paragraph 16 of the said decision, the said proposition is spelt-out, which is reproduced herein below:- "16. It is true that in the writ petition filed by it, the Corporation did plead that the dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute because he had not worked continuously for a period of 240 days, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to entertain the same because no such argument was advanced before him and also because that plea is falsified by the averments contained in para 2 of the reply filed on behalf of the Corporation to the statement of claim wherein it was admitted that the appellant was engaged as work-charge Motor Mate for construction work on 5.3.1986 and he worked in that capacity and also as Work Munshi from 5.3.1986 to 3.10.1987 and, as mentioned above, even after expiry of the period of three months specified in order dated 5.2.1987, the appellant continued to work till 5.7.1988 when first notice of retrenchment was issued by the Managing Director of the corporation. Therefore, it was not open for the corporation to contend that the appellant had not completed 240 days' service. Moreover, it is settled law that for attracting the applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of 'last come first go' without any tangible reason." 4.1. In the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 12519 of 2010 and allied matters dated 25.11.2014, this Court relied upon several decisions of the Apex Court as well as decisions of the different High Courts, have thereby ordered that the moment there appears to be violation of the provisions of Section25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, natural consequence is to set-right the illegality which has been committed by the Board and dealing with that kind of situation, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has disposed of the petitions by not quashing with the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer. Based upon the aforesaid situation prevailing, prima facie it appears that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court on the basis of the evidence on record as well as the deposition led before it has specifically come to the conclusion that there is a violation of provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is this finding, which appears to be just and proper. There is no perversity to arrive at such finding if we look to the deposition at Exhibit-40 of the witness of the petitioner - Board. Once the fact is emerged that the respondent - workmen had completed 240 days, the petitioner - Board has no legal obligation to comply with the statutory requirement of proceedings contemplated under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and here in this case, to meet with that, the respondent - workmen have not completed 240 days, there is no material cogent led before the learned Presiding Officer to dislodge the finding and, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is just and proper. It also appears that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, has discharge its functions well within the authority vested in the statute and in absence of any material, irregularity, in exercise of jurisdiction or any perversity in arriving at the findings, this Court is of the opinion not to interfere with in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. It also appears that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, has discharge its functions well within the authority vested in the statute and in absence of any material, irregularity, in exercise of jurisdiction or any perversity in arriving at the findings, this Court is of the opinion not to interfere with in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. In above view of the matter, though these petitions as stated above are filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, but basically appears that there may not be any distinction looking to the material on record because in extraordinary jurisdiction what is to be seen is that whether the authority below has acted within the bound of their jurisdiction or not. Only the decision making process can be looked into and, therefore, keeping this principle in mind, the Court is of the opinion not to interfere with the well reasoned award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamnagar. The scope of extraordinary jurisdiction either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court time and again has propounded the proposition that what is to be seen is that the decision making process and it is not open for the High Court to substitute the conclusion arrived at by the Court below or the Tribunal as the case may be, unless such finding or conclusion is mainly perverse resulting into miscarriage of justice. In a decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr., v. Johri Mal reported in AIR 2004 SC pg. 3800, in para 30, the Apex Court has propounded that what is to be seen by the High Court in extraordinary jurisdiction is the decision making process and, therefore, to appreciate such position, para 30 of the said decision is worth to be taken note of and hence reproduced herein after:- "30. It is well-settled that while exercising the power of judicial review the Court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself. It is well-settled that while exercising the power of judicial review the Court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself. In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of an impugned decision that the Court is not competent to exercise its power when there are serious disputed questions of facts; when the decision of the Tribunal or the decision of the fact finding body or the arbitrator is given finality by the statute which governs a given situation or which, by nature of the activity the decision maker's opinion on facts is final. But while examining and scrutinizing the decision making process it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the Court of judicial review can re-appreciate the findings of facts depends on the ground of judicial review. For example, if a decision is challenged as irrational, it would be well-nigh impossible to record a finding whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to a plausible conclusion and then testing the decision of the authority on the touch-stone of the tests laid down by the Court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in Indian Administrative Law. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinizing the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker. " 4.2. Even in the case under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, of supervisory jurisdiction wherein also time and again, the Apex Court has propounded a proposition of law on that issue and for that also relevant decisions are taken to be note of. In the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC pg 374, the Apex Court has prescribed parameters to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract contained in para 6 and 7 is worth to be taken note of and hence reproduced hereinafter. "6. In the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC pg 374, the Apex Court has prescribed parameters to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract contained in para 6 and 7 is worth to be taken note of and hence reproduced hereinafter. "6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: "(1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned hereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in super-session or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, and it was held : (SCC pp. 347-49, para 49) "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Court under Article 227and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases, where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles of Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its powers of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Courts' power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (i) The High Courts' power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedural Code (Amendment Act, 1999) does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the foundation of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest his extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 4.3. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest his extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 4.3. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Sugar & Oil Mills Ltd., & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC pg. 509, it has been curled out by the Apex Court that in extraordinary jurisdiction the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the authority below and, therefore, cannot exercise powers in routine manner. In the said decision, the Apex Court has observed as under:- "20. The order passed by the District Consolidation Director/Collector. Hardoi also concurred with the view taken by the officers below and held that there was no evidence on record to show that the subject land was ever held or occupied for agricultural purposes or that any agricultural activity was ever carried out on the same. These concurrent findings of fact, in our opinion, could not have been reversed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court obviously failed to appreciate that it was not sitting in appeal over the findings recorded by the authorities below. It could not reappraise the material and hold that the land was held or occupied for cultivation and substitute its own finding for that of the authorities. Inasmuch as the High Court did so, it committed an error. It is noteworthy that the revenue record clearly belied the assertion of the respondent Company and described the land as "parti kadim tilla" which meant that the land has not been cultivated for a long time and is in the form of hillock." 4.4. Even in a decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.J. Ebenezer v. Velayudhan & Ors., reported on AIR 1998 SC pg.746 in para 16, it has been specifically held that even if another view is possible it is not open for the High Court to substitute the view. That being so, it is in this background of fact, the Court is of the opinion that such finding arrived at on the basis of material on record, does not call for any interference. 4.5. That being so, it is in this background of fact, the Court is of the opinion that such finding arrived at on the basis of material on record, does not call for any interference. 4.5. In addition to the aforesaid decisions, the Apex Court in case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors., reported in AIR 1984 SC pg.38, it is held in Para.7 as under: "7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts udder Art. 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority", and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art.227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 4.6. In another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Haryana v. Manoj Kumar, reported in 2010 Law Suit (SC) 120, it is held in Para.22 to 29 as under: "22. The appellants urged that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is very limited and the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227, has to ensure that the courts below work within the bounds of their authority. 23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction. 24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895 . 24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895 . The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. 25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566 . The court observed as under:- "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576 . The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 27. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it. 28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits. 29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit." 5. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction looking to the evidence on record, and looking to the material considered by the Labour Court and, therefore, since the back wages have not been awarded, mere reinstatement has been ordered, the Court is not of the opinion to entertain the petitions. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction looking to the evidence on record, and looking to the material considered by the Labour Court and, therefore, since the back wages have not been awarded, mere reinstatement has been ordered, the Court is not of the opinion to entertain the petitions. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that instead of reinstatement, since the Apex Court has held in some of the cases that in lieu of reinstatement, lump sum compensation is to be awarded by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction and to consider and meet with the same, the Court has enquired from the learned counsel representing the respondent - workmen and the information is passed upon instructions that the respondent - workmen is eagerly waiting since long to get the job instead of taking some idle money without any work and, therefore, since the respondent - workmen have specifically instructed the learned counsel not to accept the said proposal place by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to examine that issue as specifically resisted by the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen. Since the reinstatement is to be affected on the basis of the same conditions on which the respondent - workmen was employed prior to discontinuance, as per the award passed by the learned Labour Court, and since to accept that position, the learned counsel for the respondent - workmen has submitted not to accept the proposal of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to dwell into that aspect especially the overwhelming finding is in favour of the respondent - workmen. It is in the background of this fact and in light of the aforesaid proposition, the petitions are required to be disposed of. 6. In view of the above, the petitions are devoid of any merit and the same are required to be dismissed. Hence, both the petitions stand dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief if any, stands vacated.