JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral) This petition has been filed against Order dated 28.2.2013 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una, HP in Criminal Revision No. 12-X/2011. 2. ?Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present petition are that the respondent filed a complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioners. According to the averments made in the complaint, respondent is an agriculturist by profession. He produces wheat substantially every year and also supplies the same on demand. Accused manufactures food products and has been among the complainant's regular local customers for the purchase of wheat for the last few years. Complainant supplied wheat to the to petitioner No.1 on 5.11.2009, 10.12.2009 and 10.1.2010. Sole proprietor i.e. petitioner No.2 issued cheques No. 742130, 742131 and 742132 dated 10.12.2009, 10.1.2010 and 10.2.2010, respectively, all drawn on Account No. 30599533691, in State Bank of India, Mehatpur for Rs.50,000/- Rs.50,000/- and Rs.25,000/-(total Rs.1,25,000/-), respectively. The cheques were dishonoured on 27.1.2010 (Cheuqes No. 742130 and 742131) and on 8.3.2010 (Cheque No. 742132) by the banker of the petitioners with the remarks, ?exceeds arrangements?. Complainant issued notice on 4.2.2010 (qua Cheques No. 742130 and 742131). Petitioner No.2 sought time to repay the amount on or before 15.4.2010. Respondent waited in good faith till 20.4.2010 and filed the complaint on 26.4.2010, i.e. after the expiry of period of limitation to file complaint. However, regarding Cheque No. 742132, which was dishonoured on 8.3.2010, notice was issued on 9.3.2010. The case was listed before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class for consideration for condonation of delay in filing the complaint beyond prescribed limitation. Notice was issued to the petitioners. application was allowed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class on 20.11.2011. Petitioners filed criminal revision petition No. 12- X/2011 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Una. He dismissed the same on 28.2.2013. Hence, this petition. 3. Mr. Y.P. Sood, Advocate, has vehemently argued that the learned Court below has wrongly entertained a time barred complaint. 4. Mr. Subhash Sharma, Advocate, has supported Order dated 28.2.2013. 5. Cheques were issued on 5.11.2009, 10.12.2009 and 10.1.2010. Same were dishonoured with the remarks, ?exceeds arrangements?, on 10.12.2009, 10.1.2010 and 10.2.2010, respectively. Demand notice qua cheques No. 742130 and 742131 was issued on 4.2.2010. Proprietor i.e. petitioner No.2 has agreed to pay the amount on or before 15.4.2010. 4. Mr. Subhash Sharma, Advocate, has supported Order dated 28.2.2013. 5. Cheques were issued on 5.11.2009, 10.12.2009 and 10.1.2010. Same were dishonoured with the remarks, ?exceeds arrangements?, on 10.12.2009, 10.1.2010 and 10.2.2010, respectively. Demand notice qua cheques No. 742130 and 742131 was issued on 4.2.2010. Proprietor i.e. petitioner No.2 has agreed to pay the amount on or before 15.4.2010. This averment has not been denied by the petitioners that they have given an assurance to the complainant to pay the amount on or before 15.4.2010. It was only when petitioner No.2 did not pay the amount despite assurance that the complaint was filed. Respondent was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the complaint within the stipulated time. 6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan reported in (2013) 1 SCC 177 , have held that absolution is, at any rate, a theological concept which implies an act of forgiving the sinner of his sins upon confession. The use of expression, ?absolution? in Sadanandan, (1998) 6 SCC 514 , at any rate came at a time when the proviso to Section 142(b) had not found a place on the statute book. Section 142(b) proviso (w.e.f. 6-2-2003) now permits the payee to institute prosecution proceedings against a defaulting drawer even after the expiry of the period of one month upon showing sufficient cause. Their lordships have held as under: ?26. Absolution is, at any rate, a theological concept which implies an act of forgiving the sinner of his sins upon confession. the expression has no doubt been used in some judicial pronouncements, but the same stop short of recognizing absolution as a juristic concept. It has always been used or understood in common parlance to convey ?setting free from guilt? or ?release from a penalty?. The use of the expression ?absolution? in Sadanandan case at any rate came at a time when the proviso to Section 142(b) had not found a place on the statute book. That prevision was added by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 which read as under: ?Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.? 28. That prevision was added by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 which read as under: ?Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.? 28. The proviso referred to above now permits the payee to institute prosecution proceedings against a defaulting drawer even after the expiry of the period of one month. If a failure of the payee to file a complaint within a period of one month from the date of expiry of the period of 15 days allowed for this purpose was result in ?absolution?, the proviso would not have been added to negate that consequence. The statute as it exists today, therefore, does not provide for ?absolution? simply because the period of 30 days has expired or the payee has for some other reasons deferred the filing of the complaint against the defaulter.? 7. A learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in P.S. Aithala v. Ganapathy N. Hegde reported in 2008(3) Crimes 55(Kar), has held as under: ?[9] A specific provision has been inserted during 2002 under Section 142 of the N.I. Act which enables the Courts to exercise its discretion and to entertain the complaint by condoning the delay and take cognizance of the offence. The explanation of the complainant is that he had been to his native place and also that his mother was sick. Even assuming that there is 13 days delay in filing the complaint whether such a delay was with a view to harass the accused or with any other deliberate cause has not been considered by the Trial Court. Only on the technical ground stating that the delay has not been satisfactory explained, it has rejected the petitions. Although the application for limitation was considered at the time of final disposal but the matter was not considered on merits on the ground that the complaint itself is not maintainable. When a huge amount is involved and also contentions are raised by the respondent that there is a material alteration, it is the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court at the time of disposal of the matter on merits and the very delay of 13 days would not be of much consequence. When a huge amount is involved and also contentions are raised by the respondent that there is a material alteration, it is the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court at the time of disposal of the matter on merits and the very delay of 13 days would not be of much consequence. In the ratio laid down by the Orissa High Court in the judgment in 1993 Crimes 3485 (Ori.), the Orissa High Court in the similar situation referring to the decision of the Apex Court was of the view that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be maintained. When there is hardly 13 days delay and by a supporting affidavit the complainant had filed such an application, the Trial Court ought to have taken reasonable view in the matter in condoning the delay. Despite the fact that due to some exigencies the complainant could not file the complaint in time, when a specific provision is provided under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act to condone the delay, the said delay could be condoned in the interest of justice having regard to the nature of transaction and the amount involved and also having regard to the difficulties expressed. The filing of the civil case by itself will not take away the right accrued to the complainant when it is otherwise could be considered. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent in A. Bhoosanrao's case referred to above, is of no help to him at this stage and he can very well cite this judgment at the time of consideration of the matter on merits.? 8. A learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court(Gwalior Bench) in Tulsiram Narwariya v. Mahesh Chandra reported in 2011(4) Crimes (HC) 217 has held that Section 142(b) of the Act empowers the Court before which complaint under section 138 of the Act is filed to entertain the complaint even after expiry of the limitation period of thirty days, in case the complainant shows sufficient cause for such delay. The learned Single Judge has held as under: v?[3] Section 142(b) of the Act empowers the Court before which complaint under section 138 of the Act is filed to entertain the complaint even after expiry of limitation period of thirty days, in case the complainant shows sufficient cause for such delay. The learned Single Judge has held as under: v?[3] Section 142(b) of the Act empowers the Court before which complaint under section 138 of the Act is filed to entertain the complaint even after expiry of limitation period of thirty days, in case the complainant shows sufficient cause for such delay. [4] In the case of Vedabai vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil, 2001 9 SCC 106 , it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in exercising the discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, Courts should take a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of only few days; where in the former case consideration of prejudice to either side will be relevant factor and the case calls for more cautious approach, in the later case no such consideration may arise and such case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down and the Court should exercise discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind and construing the expression "sufficient cause" and principle that advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. [5] However, while dealing with the application seeking condonation of delay, it is always desirable to take a liberal and not a rigid or too technical view and the Court has to keep in mind that discretion in the case has to be exercised to advance substantial justice.' [6] Considering the above legal position coupled with the fact that there was delay of only 28 days, that too had occasioned on account of fracture of father of the petitioner/complainant, I am inclined to condone the delay caused in filing of the complaint by the petitioner against the respondent. Needless to mention that since nobody has appeared for the respondent despite service, this Court was deprived of the advantage of hearing the views of his counsel. [7] In view of the foregoing and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 3rd February, 2007 passed by the Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 325/06 as well as order dated 6th October, 2010 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior are hereby set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed further in the case as per law.? 9. The trial Court is directed to proceed further in the case as per law.? 9. There is neither any perversity nor any illegality in the order passed by the learned Courts below. 10. Accordingly, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.