JUDGMENT : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. By order dated 8th September, 2015; the Additional District Judge, Kotputli, District Jaipur, while allowing Appeal No.9/2007 (Umrao and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar), reversed the order dated 23rd March, 2007, made by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kotputli, District Jaipur, wherein the defence of the defendants/non-petitioners was struck off; of which the plaintiff/petitioner is aggrieved of. 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the essential skeletal material facts are that the plaintiff/petitioner rented out a shop situated in Mohalla Bachari, Town Kotputli, to the defendants/non-petitioners @ Rs.65/- per month. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that the rent was enhanced from time to time. In the year 1997, the enhanced rent was Rs.300/- per month. The defendants/non-petitioners committed default in payment of rent since 5th July, 1996, and therefore, the plaintiff/petitioner terminated the tenancy on 5th March, 1999 and instituted the suit proceedings on 5th April, 1999, for eviction and recovery of outstanding amount of rent due to the tune of Rs.8,220/-. The plaintiff/petitioner also prayed for rent @ Rs.300/- per month till vacant possession of the shop was handed-over to him and for a restraint order for any material alteration as well as sub-letting of the shop in dispute pending suit proceedings. The Trial Court determined interim rent @ Rs.75/- per month for the period with effect from 5th July, 1996 to 31st March, 2002, as would be reflected from the order dated 21st March, 2002. The defendants/tenants were directed to deposit the rent @ Rs.75/- per month by 15th of every month in future while the plaintiff/petitioner was also directed to furnish his bank account number. On an appeal, the Appellate Court confirmed the order made by the Trial Court and determined the amount of rent due for 69 months @ Rs.75/- per month (with effect from 5th July, 1996 to 31st March, 2002), to the tune of Rs.5,175/- and an interest of Rs.892.53 thereon, which totalled to Rs.6,067.53/-, which was to be deposited on or before 8th April, 2002. The defendants/tenants deposited a sum of Rs.6,143/-, which included rent upto 30th April, 2002. The rent for the month of May, 2002, was deposited on 18th June, 2002, that was required to be deposited on or before 5th June, 2002. The defendants/tenants deposited a sum of Rs.6,143/-, which included rent upto 30th April, 2002. The rent for the month of May, 2002, was deposited on 18th June, 2002, that was required to be deposited on or before 5th June, 2002. On an application under Section 13(4-A) and (5) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 (for short "the Act of 1950"), the defence of the defendants/non-petitioners was struck off vide order dated 23rd March, 2007. 3. The Additional District Judge, Kotputli, on an appeal quashed and set aside the order dated 23rd March, 2007, made by the Trial Court while condoning the delay in deposit the rent, as would be evident from the impugned order dated 8th September, 2015. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, asserted that the impugned order made by the Appellate Court dated 8th September, 2015, is absolutely illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1950 so also the law declared by the Apex Court of the land. 4. According to the learned counsel, the Appellate Court though took note of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal: (2003) 2 SCC 577 , but did not deal with the opinion and recorded no reason while making the impugned order dated 8th September, 2015. Thus, the impugned order is also against the judicial discipline and needs to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. A reference has also been made to the opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jai Singh v. Leela Saraf: 2013(5) WLC (Raj.) 223; wherein on a survey of several opinions of this Court in the backdrop of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. (supra), the Coordinate Bench held that delay in deposit the rent determined by the Court could not be condoned even if it was a delay of one day and the proceedings must result into eviction because Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has no application. 5. At the motion stage, while issuing notice on the writ application on 3rd November, 2015, this Court made an interim order, which reads thus: "Issue notice to the respondents. 5. At the motion stage, while issuing notice on the writ application on 3rd November, 2015, this Court made an interim order, which reads thus: "Issue notice to the respondents. Notices be given 'dasti' to the counsel for the petitioner. Two sets of notices be filed. One be served through the process server of the jurisdictional court and the other through the trial court on counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants. Put up on 03.12.2015, as prayed. Till then the impugned order dated 08.09.2015, passed by the Additional District Judge, Kotputli, District Jaipur shall remain stayed." 6. Even after service of notice, the defendants/non-petitioners have not put in appearance. While the matter came up on a miscellaneous application number 14909/2016, for early listing of the of the writ application; this Court on 18th April, 2016, made the following order: "The matter comes up for orders upon application for early listing of the writ petition, upon which learned counsel for the petitioner was heard. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notices upon respondents No.1 and 2 in the writ petition have been duly served and despite the notices, none is present on behalf of them. He got the Court through annexed documents and vehemently argued that learned Addl. District Judge, Kotputli, vide its order dated 08.09.2015 has illegally set aside the order of the trial Court passed on 23.3.2007. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, reported in 2003 (1) WLC (SC) 293 as well as the judgment rendered by this Court in case of Jai Singh v. Leela Saraf, reported in 2013 (5) WLC (Raj.) 223 and argued that provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to condone the delay caused in depositing the rent. Having perused the relevant documents as well as the judgments cited above, it appears logical that the writ petition filed by the petitioner be listed at an early date for final disposal at admission stage. Since the matter was listed today in the Court for orders upon application for early listing, the Court is not inclined to pass any order on the merit of the writ petition. It will be appropriate to list the matter for final disposal at admission stage. Since the matter was listed today in the Court for orders upon application for early listing, the Court is not inclined to pass any order on the merit of the writ petition. It will be appropriate to list the matter for final disposal at admission stage. Accordingly, let the matter be fixed for final disposal at admission stage on 4.5.2016. The application for early hearing stands disposed of." 7. Thereafter, the matter has come upon the Board on 9th August, 2016, 6th September, 2016, 19th September, 2016 and 2nd November, 2016, but none has put in appearance on behalf of the defendants/non-petitioners. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and carefully considered the impugned order dated 8th September, 2015, made by the Appellate Court. 9. Indisputably, the plaintiff/petitioner while terminating the tenancy of the defendants/non-petitioners on 5th March, 1999, instituted the suit proceedings on 5th April, 1999. The Trial Court determined interim rent @ Rs.75/- per month and made an order on 21st March, 2002, for payment of arrears of rent with effect from 5th July, 1996 to 31st March, 2002, @ Rs.75/- per month. A further direction was also made to make payment @ Rs.75/- per month on or before 15th of every month that was to be deposited in the bank account of the plaintiff/petitioner. 10. On an appeal, the Appellate Court while confirming the order made by the Trial Court on 21st March, 2002, determined the total amount of rent due for 69 months along with interest totalling to Rs.6,067.53/-, which was to be deposited on or before 8th April, 2002. 11. The defendants/non-petitioners deposited the rent to the tune of Rs.6,143/-, which included rent upto 30th April, 2002. The rent for the month of May, 2002, was paid on 18th June, 2002, instead of 15th June, 2002. The Trial Court on an application under Section 13(4-A) and (5) of the Act of 1950, struck off the defence of the defendants/non-petitioners in the backdrop of the contemplation under Section 13 of the Act of 1950 and law declared by this Court vide order dated 23rd March, 2007. 12. The Appellate Court while entertaining the appeal against the order made by the Trial Court dated 23rd March, 2007, condoned the delay and recorded reasons contrary to the materials available on record. 13. 12. The Appellate Court while entertaining the appeal against the order made by the Trial Court dated 23rd March, 2007, condoned the delay and recorded reasons contrary to the materials available on record. 13. From a glance of the impugned order dated 8th September, 2015, it is reflected that the Appellate Court did take note of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. (supra), which finds place in the list of citations referred to and relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff/petitioner, but has not discussed the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. (supra). 14. A glance of Section 6, 7 and 13 of the Act of 1950, would reveal that the Court has no power to extend the time limit for payment of rent determined under Section 13(3) of the Act of 1950, hence, the contemplation under Section 13(3) and 13(4) are mandatory and needs to be strictly adhered to. 15. In the case of Shyam Mahatma v. Shri Babu Khan: 2009 (2) RLW 1495 (Raj.), referring to the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court held thus: "7. Here it may be stated that all these three judgments were rendered by respective learned Single Judges of this Court prior to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court In the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agrawal: (2003) 1 SCR 634 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the provisions of Rajasthan Rent Control Act 1950 held that the Court has no power to extend the time limit for payment of rent determined under Sec. 13(3) of the Act and, therefore, the provisions of Section 13(3) and 13 (4) were mandatory and the strict compliance therewith was necessary. It will be appropriate here to quote para No. 36, 37 and 41 to 48 of the aforesaid judgment as under: 36. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the Court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors.: AIR 2003 SC 4464 , a Division Bench of this Court observed: ...The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors.: AIR 2003 SC 4464 , a Division Bench of this Court observed: ...The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters.... 37. It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is a welfare legislation not entirely beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit of landlord. See : Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum (Suit.) and Ors.: (1994) 2 SCC 671 . In that view of the matter, balance has to be struck while interpreting the provisions of the Rent Act. 8. Then in para 41 to 47 the Hon'ble Apex Court dealing with the provisions of Rajasthan Act itself held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply for extension of time under Sec. 13(4) of the Act, therefore, no such extension was possible beyond the period prescribed under the Act. 41. Thus, on analysis of the aforesaid two decisions we find that wherever the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation of default, the Court possesses the power therefor, but where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the Court does not have the power to do so. 42. In that view of the matter it must be held that in absence of such provisions in the present Act the Court did not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the default in depositing the rent. 43. Coming to the second question, we are of the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable where there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant Under Section 13(4) of the Act. 44. It is true that Rajasthan Act does not expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. 45. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads under: 5. 44. It is true that Rajasthan Act does not expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. 45. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads under: 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 46. On perusal of the said Section it is evident that the question of application of Section 5 would arise where any appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court hat he had sufficient cause for not making the appeal or application within such period. Section 13 (4) provides that in a suit for eviction of the ground set forth in Clause (a) of Subsection (1) the tenant shall on the first date of hearing or on or before such date, the Court may on the application fixed in this behalf or within such time the tenant shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord in Court as determined under Sub-Section (3) from the date of such determination or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the Court. Thus, Subsection (4) itself provides for limitation of a specified period within which the deposit has to be made, which cannot be exceeding three months as extended by this Court. 47. The matter may be examined from another angle. The deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes place in complying with an order under Subsection (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 9. The deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes place in complying with an order under Subsection (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 9. About the need to comply with the order passed by the Court of Law, Apex Court observed in para 48 of the judgment that compliance of the order passed by the Court of Law in terms of statutory provisions does not give rise to cause of action and the failure to comply with the order, the consequences have to follow. Relevant part of para 48 is as under: 48. ...Compliance of an order passed by a Court of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences are provided for under the Statute. The Court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the instant case. 10. In view of the aforesaid legal position now obtaining, the judgments relied upon by the learned, Counsel for the appellant defendant are of no avail to the defendant. There is no question, of waiver on the part of landlord on the delayed deposit of rent in question and withdrawal thereof by the landlord. Once the delay has occurred even the Court does not have power to extend the time limit, therefore, act of withdrawal of such rent belatedly deposited by the tenant cannot enure to the benefit of defendant tenant." 16. From the facts and materials available on record, it is evident that the defendants/non-petitioners did not comply with the mandate of Section 13(3) & (4) of the Act of 1950, and therefore, the delay in deposit of the rent in terms of the order made by the Trial Court could not be condoned. The natural consequences for violation thereof would definitely follow. The Trial Court committed no illegality or error in striking off defence of the defendants/non-petitioners. 17. The natural consequences for violation thereof would definitely follow. The Trial Court committed no illegality or error in striking off defence of the defendants/non-petitioners. 17. Accordingly, the impugned order made by the Appellate court dated 8th September, 2015, suffers with manifest error and illegality, and therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Ordered accordingly. 18. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 8th September, 2015, passed by the Appellate Court, is hereby quashed and set aside. Stay application also stands closed. 19. The Trial Court shall proceed and conclude the trial, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented. Writ Petition allowed - Trial court directed to conclude trial.