JUDGMENT : R.R. Prasad, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This application has been filed for quashing of order dated 28.6.2016 passed by District Magistrate, Senapati, respondent No.2 whereby and whereunder, respondent No.2, in exercise of power conferred under sub Section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 passed order of detention in a case bearing No. Cril NSA/C/11/16 against the detenu, Nehkholen Lhouvum @ Helen, after being satisfied that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, it has become necessary to do so. 3. The grounds on which the order of detention was passed are that on 11.8.2015 the detenu and his associates, fourteen in numbers, led by one Lunminlen Haokip @ Helen @ Kokai @ Jalaithang, held a meeting at Gopibung forest and formed an armed underground organisation known as Thadou Peoples’ Liberation Army (TPLA), the aim and objective of which organisation is to create an independent autonomous State within or outside Manipur by assimilating all the Thadou inhabitants of Manipur and outside of the country. For the said purpose, the said organisation started procuring arms and ammunitions from foreign countries and recruited youngsters from Kuki communities. To achieve their objective the members of the organisation committed series of heinous crimes such as murder, dacoity, robbery, extortion, kidnapping for ransom etc. Further case is that after the organisation was formed the detenu started working as Chairman of the outfit. The detenu as well as others were imparted with basic military training in Gopibung forest. Thereupon, the detenu and others extorted monay from the inhabitants of sixteen different villages located within Senapati District. The money collected as house tax was handed over to one Mangcha Sitlhou. That apart, they also extorted money from the drivers of vehicles plying from Kangpokpi to Imphal. The detenu with his associates while indulging in such kind of activities had once put a Tata Truck on fire for which a case was registered as KPI PS Case No. 33 (9) 2015 under Section 436/400/34 IPC and also under Section 25(1-A) Arms Act. Further case is that on 2.6.2016 the detenu was arrested by 25th Assam Rifles. The detenu with his associates while indulging in such kind of activities had once put a Tata Truck on fire for which a case was registered as KPI PS Case No. 33 (9) 2015 under Section 436/400/34 IPC and also under Section 25(1-A) Arms Act. Further case is that on 2.6.2016 the detenu was arrested by 25th Assam Rifles. On search being made mobile handset, 9 mm pistol with five live cartridges and other articles were recovered, which was seized under seizure memo. On the next day, the detenu was handed over to O/C Imphal P.S with a written report and the seizure list, on the basis of which a case was registered as Imphal P.S Case No.142 (6) 2016 under Section 400 of IPC as well as 25 (1-C) of the Arms Act. However, since the place of occurrence was falling within the jurisdiction of other police station, the case was transferred to Sapormeina P.S where it was registered as Sapormeina P.S. Cast No.23(6) G under Section 400 of the IPC and also under Section 25(1-C) of the Arms Act and 6 WT Act. The detenu was first remanded to police custody and then to judicial custody. The respondent No.2, after recording that the detenu is acting in the manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, passed order of detention on 28.6.2016, while the detenu was in jail. The said order of detention was approved on 8.7.2016. Subsequently, it was confirmed on 13.7.016. The aforesaid order of detention, its approval and confirmation had been challenged on several grounds. 4. However, Mr. Sanajaoba, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only one point that the detaining authority while passing order of detention though has recorded that there the detenu is likely to be released on bail in near future, as in similar cases bail is being granted but reference of not a single case has been given and as such, order of detention cannot be sustained in law as it is based on ipse dixit ground. 5. As against this, Mr. 5. As against this, Mr. Vashum, learned counsel appearing for the State submits that from the order of detention, it would appear that the detaining authority, after having taken notice of the fact that the detenu, an accused is in custody, has passed the order of detention and that in the ground of detention it has been recorded clearly that there is every possibility of detenu being released on bail in near future and that possibility of indulging in prejudicial activities is there and therefore such detention order never warrants any interference by this Court. 6. It goes without saying that in a case of preventive detention no offence is proved and justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. There is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence; whereas Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by a law. In such situation machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of lawful detention with utmost promptitude. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to be released by the High Court and Supreme Court upon issuance of writ of habeas corpus. 7. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) & (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer and the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this deterrent law, the law of preventive detention is to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: “4... ... In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: “4... ... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.” In this context, we may refer to another decision rendered in the case of Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh Vs. B.K. Jha, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC(Cri) 244 wherein it has been held: “5.. . The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” 8. Keeping in view of the said principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently in the case of Union of India Vs. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC(Cri) 239 recorded requirements to be made by the Detaining Authority passing order of detention when the detenu is in custody, which reads as follows: “14... ..Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.” 9. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.” 9. Thus, at the cost of repetition, we may record that Detaining in a case of detenu being in custody, needs to observe Authority following safeguards meticulously: (i) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) If there is reason to believe on the basis of available materials placed before him – (a) that there is every possibility of being released; and (b) that on being so released he would be in all probability to indulge in prejudicial activities; (iii) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. 10. Thus, in the context of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have to examine as to whether aforesaid safeguards have been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority who did pass the order of detention when the detenu was in custody. 11. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that possibility is there of accused being released on bail. There has been no denial of the proposition of law that the order of detention can be passed even in respect of a person lodged in custody in respect of a criminal case. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur & Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 181 was pleased to hold that if such detention order is challenged, the detaining authority has to satisfy the court following facts: (i) the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody; (ii) there was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reason to believe that there was reliable possibility of his release on bail and further of being released, he would probably indulged in activities which are prejudicial to public order; (iii) in view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore detention order was necessary. Further, it has been observed that in case where these facts does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated. 12. Further, it has been observed that in case where these facts does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated. 12. In the light of the decision, if we examine the legality of the detention order we would find that the detaining authority though has recorded that there is likelihood of detenu being released as in similar cases bail is being granted but reference of not a single case has been given to find out as to in which kind of cases bail is being granted. Therefore the order of detention can be said to have been passed on mere ipse dixit statement spelt out in the grounds of detention which is not sustainable in the eye of law. 13. Thus, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority accused being released on bail being not based on any factual aspect, order of detention being bad, is hereby quashed. Consequently, the detenu, Mr. Nehkholen Lhouvum @ Helen, s/o (L) Sekhothang Lhouvum of Haibung village, PS Kangpokpi, District Senapati, Manipur is directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. Thus, this application is allowed.