JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. In view of the fact that the petitioner employer has brought under challenge almost similar awards with almost similar directions passed by the learned Labour Court at Valsad in backdrop of almost similar facts and almost identical allegations by both sides, this group of four petitions are decided by this common judgment. 2. In Special Civil Application No. 721 of 2014, the petitioner company has challenged award dated 19.8.2013 passed by the learned Labour Court at Valsad in Reference (LCV) No. 157 of 2000 whereby the learned Labour Court has directed present petitioner to reinstate the concerned workman with back-wages and continuity of service, whereas in Special Civil Application No. 722 of 2014, the petitioner company has challenged award dated 19.8.2013 passed by the learned Labour Court at Valsad in Reference (LCV) No. 159 of 2000 and Special Civil Application No. 724 of 2014, the petitioner company has challenged award dated 19.8.2013 passed by the learned Labour Court at Valsad in Reference (LCV) No. 534 of 2000 and Special Civil Application No. 731 of 2014, the petitioner company has challenged award dated 19.8.2013 passed by the learned Labour Court at Valsad in Reference (LCV) No. 534 of 2000. By virtue of the said awards, the learned Labour Court has passed similar directions as in Reference (LCV) No. 157 of 2000. 3. So far as the factual background is concerned, the claimants in the four reference cases raised industrial dispute with the allegation that the employer terminated their services illegally and without following procedure prescribed by law. The appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court at Valsad. In respect of the claimant Mr. D.U. Rai the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 157 of 2000, whereas in respect of the claimant Mr. Durgaprasad S. Sharma the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 158 of 2000 and in respect of the claimant Mr. Gudu Sharma the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 159 of 2000 and in respect of the claimant Mr. Uttam Harjibai Varali the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 534 of 2000. Gudu Sharma the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 159 of 2000 and in respect of the claimant Mr. Uttam Harjibai Varali the dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCV) No. 534 of 2000. 3.1 In their respective statements of claim, the claimants alleged that they had proceeded on leave to visit their home town and when they returned (on different dates) on completion of their leave period, they were not allowed to resume duty and their services were orally terminated. They also alleged that while terminating their services, the petitioner did not grant opportunity of hearing and terminated their services without following procedure prescribed by law and without any fault on their part. They also alleged that when they enquired what was their fault for being terminated the owner of the petitioner company told that they are not at fault but he does not need their service anymore therefore, they are terminated. With such allegation, the concerned claimants demanded that they should be reinstated with consequential benefits. 3.2 The petitioner company opposed the reference cases. The company filed written statements with similar and identical defence. The petitioner company also claimed that it had not terminated services of the claimants but actually the claimants had voluntarily stopped reporting for duty without assigning any reason or any explanation. The company further claimed that when any order terminating their services was not passed or any action to terminate their services was not taken, any question of following any procedure viz. conducting enquiry or payment of compensation did not arise. It was also claimed that when the company has not terminated their services, question of conducting domestic enquiry also did not arise. On the ground that the workmen themselves had stopped reporting for work, the petitioner company also opposed their claim for back-wages. 3.3 After the stage of pleadings was concluded, the learned Labour Court recorded evidence of the contesting parties. The claimants filed their respective affidavits in lieu of chief examination. Subsequently, the Director of the company filed his affidavit in lieu of his examination-in-chief. 3.4 Upon conclusion of stage of evidence, the learned Labour Court heard the submissions by the learned advocates for the contesting parties and after considering rival submissions and material on record, the learned Labour Court passed similar and almost identical awards in the reference cases. Subsequently, the Director of the company filed his affidavit in lieu of his examination-in-chief. 3.4 Upon conclusion of stage of evidence, the learned Labour Court heard the submissions by the learned advocates for the contesting parties and after considering rival submissions and material on record, the learned Labour Court passed similar and almost identical awards in the reference cases. The said awards and directions are under challenge in the captioned petitions. 4. Mr. Karia, learned advocate for the petitioner company assailed the impugned awards and submitted that neither any details with regard to the written statement filed by the company nor any contentions raised by the company have been recorded by the learned Labour Court in the awards and the case of the petitioner company is not at all taken into account by the learned Labour Court. He also submitted that the company had not terminated the services of the claimants. He submitted that the claimants themselves had stopped reporting for work without offering any explanation or without any reason or justification. He also submitted that during the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the company invited the claimants to resume duties and had reinstated the claimants, however, after working for few days, the claimants on their own volition again stopped reporting for work. He submitted that in view of the fact that the company had not taken any action of terminating the services of the claimants, any question or occasion of following any procedure including the payment of compensation and/or conducting domestic enquiry did not arise and that, therefore, the learned Labour Court is not right or justified in holding that the company committed breach of statutory provision, i.e. Section 25F. Mr. Karia, learned advocate for Mr. R.D. Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner company submitted that the claimants were not dismissed for misconduct, therefore, domestic enquiry was not conducted. Since any action for termination was not taken, question of payment of compensation did not arise. 5. Per contra, Ms. Kamani, learned advocate, for Mr. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent claimant, submitted that services of the claimant were terminated orally and without assigning any reasons and without following any procedure prescribed by law. Since any action for termination was not taken, question of payment of compensation did not arise. 5. Per contra, Ms. Kamani, learned advocate, for Mr. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent claimant, submitted that services of the claimant were terminated orally and without assigning any reasons and without following any procedure prescribed by law. She submitted that for their personal reasons, the claimants had availed leave to visit their home town and when they returned from their home town, on expiry of leave period and had gone to resume their duties, they were not allowed to resume their duties and they were informed that their service is discontinued. She also alleged that at the time when the service was terminated, the petitioner did not pay retrenchment compensation or notice pay and any opportunity of hearing was not granted. According to the learned counsel for the claimants, their services were terminated illegally. With reference to the subsequent written statement, learned counsel for the claimants submitted that it is true that during the proceedings of the reference cases, the claimants were re-engaged but that was done for short period and the petitioner again terminated their services (after allowing the claimants to work for 15-17 days). In this context, she relied on the affidavit filed by each of the claimant in lieu of chief examination. According to the learned counsel for the claimants, the awards do not suffer from any infirmity. 6. I have considered the submissions by learned counsel for the contesting parties and I have also considered the material on record including the evidence of the claimants and director of the company as well as other documents on record and the impugned award. 7. At the outset, it is relevant to note and mention that it is not in dispute that each claimants had worked with the petitioner company (before alleged termination) for more than 12 months. It is also not in dispute that the claimants had worked for 240 days in each year, more particularly in preceding 12 months. Actually, any dispute on this count was never raised by the petitioner company before the learned Labour Court. 7.1 It is also not in dispute that at the time of alleged termination in 1999, the petitioner company had not paid notice pay or retrenchment compensation to the concerned claimants. Actually, any dispute on this count was never raised by the petitioner company before the learned Labour Court. 7.1 It is also not in dispute that at the time of alleged termination in 1999, the petitioner company had not paid notice pay or retrenchment compensation to the concerned claimants. 7.2 Similarly, it is also not in dispute that before the services of the claimants were terminated, the employer had not conducted domestic inquiry for any alleged misconduct and the services of the claimants were not terminated by way of any disciplinary action. 7.3 Above mentioned undisputed aspects involved in the matter bring out that all factors required to be established by workmen for invoking claim based on Section 25-F exist in present cases and were established by the claimants. 8. However, the employer would submit that the said provision is not attracted in present cases because the company never terminated the service of the claimants. The employer put-up a defence before the learned Labour Court that the claimants had stopped reporting for duty for their own reasons and the company had not terminated their services and that therefore, the company was not required to conduct domestic inquiry and/or to pay notice pay and retrenchment compensation. According to the company, the occasion to comply the said procedure had not arisen at all because it had not terminated the service of the claimants. 8.1 Here lies the controversy and starting point of the dispute and difference. 8.2 According to the claimants, they had availed leave and visited their home town. One of the claimants claimed that he had gone to attend marriage. Others gave different reasons for visiting their home town. It was also claimed that as a practice, the workmen who belong to/come from other State have been allowed to visit their respective home town twice or thrice in a year and as part of such routine practice, they had availed leave and visited their home town, but when they returned on expiry of leave period, they were not allowed to resume duty. However, the employer has denied such allegations. 8.3 Oral evidence of both sides are available on record and both sides have tried to support their respective case by oral evidence. 8.4 Apparently, supporting witnesses are not examined by the workmen. 9. However, the employer has denied such allegations. 8.3 Oral evidence of both sides are available on record and both sides have tried to support their respective case by oral evidence. 8.4 Apparently, supporting witnesses are not examined by the workmen. 9. The striking feature of this case is that any step by the employer-petitioner company was not taken after the claimants allegedly stopped reporting for duty. If the case of the petitioner company is assumed to be true, for the sake of testing the veracity and if it is assumed that the workmen had stopped reporting for duty, then, any employer would, more particularly, when suddenly five workmen jointly stop reporting for duty and suddenly five workmen are not coming for work take steps to verify as to why the workmen are not reporting for duty. In ordinary course, intimation would be sent asking the workmen to report for duty or notice would be issued informing the workmen that if they do not report for duty, then, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken. 9.1 However, in present case, the employer remained completely silent, passive and inaction and did not take any steps even to find out the reason as to why suddenly five workmen had stopped reporting for duty. The conduct of the employer is out of ordinary conduct of an employer. 9.2 This aspect is fortified by the fact that when the employer-petitioner company filed its reply in the learned Labour Court, it did not make a whisper in the written statement to the effect that if the workmen so desire and if they are willing, they may report for duty and the petitioner company has no objection if they resume duty because the company has not terminated their services. Not a whisper is found in the written statement filed by the petitioner company in the reference cases. 9.3 Even the witness examined by the petitioner company i.e. Director did not say anything in his deposition about reengaging the workmen or about the company's readiness to permit the claimants to resume duties if they so desire. Not a whisper is found in the written statement filed by the petitioner company in the reference cases. 9.3 Even the witness examined by the petitioner company i.e. Director did not say anything in his deposition about reengaging the workmen or about the company's readiness to permit the claimants to resume duties if they so desire. 9.4 When these aspects are conjointly considered and examined in light of the fact that suddenly five workmen stopped reporting for duty from the same month and at the same time with gap of one or two days, it emerges that the events are too intertwined and closely connected so as to brush aside or to brand them as co-incidence. It is too much of co-incidence to occur so closely and subsequent event followed by identical reply by employer, gives sufficient reason to be skeptical in accepting petitioner's reply. He plays same tune too often and too frequently. 9.5 In this background, the employer has chosen to take shelter behind the contention that though not in the written statement and/or at the time of deposition, but subsequently i.e. in 2004 it had shown its readiness to allow the claimants to resume their duties and it had even declared before the learned Labour Court that the company would allow the concerned claimants to resume their duties. 9.6 Even the claimants have, in their affidavit, mentioned that pursuant to an agreement, they were re-engaged. Undisputedly, this event took place in October 2004, to be more precise on and from 30.10.2004. 10. What is relevant and interesting is what happened thereafter, inasmuch as the service of the claimant again came to be allegedly discontinued w.e.f. 31.10.2004. 10.1 At this stage also, the history repeated itself, inasmuch as the claimants alleged that on 31.10.2004 the employer told them to stop reporting for duty until the pending cases are withdrawn and that they were informed by the owner that only after they withdrew their cases, they will be allowed to report for duty and with such instructions their services were again discontinued. 10.2 The employer, obviously, disputed and denied the said allegations and repeated the same tune i.e. that the workmen voluntarily and for the reasons known to them stopped reporting for duty. 10.3 As mentioned earlier, there are too many coincidences and that too frequent. Obviously one of the parties is not truthful. There are words against words. 10.2 The employer, obviously, disputed and denied the said allegations and repeated the same tune i.e. that the workmen voluntarily and for the reasons known to them stopped reporting for duty. 10.3 As mentioned earlier, there are too many coincidences and that too frequent. Obviously one of the parties is not truthful. There are words against words. Neither side has put forward any corroborating evidence. 10.4 Now, in light of rival contentions and allegation, there are two phases/parts of alleged termination viz. in 1999 and in October, 2004. The dividing line or hiatus is about 15-17 days when the workmen were re-engaged. 10.5 So far as alleged termination from 1999 is concerned, it is necessary to recall that neither the employer had taken any step to intimate the workmen to resume duties nor had the employer shown readiness and willingness to re-engage the workmen at the first available opportunity i.e. during conciliation and/or by making such assertion in its written statement and during the deposition of the Director also such offer was not made. It was for the first in or around October 2004 that the employer expressed his willingness to re-engage the workmen in 2004 i.e. after 5 yeas and they were even allowed to resume their duties. It could be a genuine gesture or it could a ploy to reduce the liability of back-wages. Nonetheless fact remains that the claimants were allowed to resume their duties from 13.10.2004. 10.6 Now, the claimants are again out of employment from 31.10.2004. 10.7 So as to address the said subsequent event, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the order dated 27.1.2015 passed by the Court in this group of petitions. The learned advocate for the petitioner also relied on the affidavits which the petitioner company had filed in Civil Applications filed by the workmen claiming payment of last drawn wages (wherein the employer claimed that according to available information, the claimants/ respondent are gainfully engaged in other establishments). On the strength of such claims, the employer claims that in light of the fact that even after the award when this Court passed order dated 27.1.2015 and the company declared that the workmen shall be reinstated within one week, the claimants have not reported for duty and that therefore, the presumption should be drawn against the claimants. 11. On the strength of such claims, the employer claims that in light of the fact that even after the award when this Court passed order dated 27.1.2015 and the company declared that the workmen shall be reinstated within one week, the claimants have not reported for duty and that therefore, the presumption should be drawn against the claimants. 11. When above discussed aspects are taken into account, the Court is inclined to believe that for the period from 2002 to 2004, there should be appropriation of the responsibility as regards the back-wages and for the period post 31.10.2004, there would not be justification to uphold the direction for payment of back-wages. 12. As mentioned at the outset, the petitioner company has challenged the awards on the ground that the awards do not deal with the contentions raised by the employer. Any facts pleaded by the employer or any contention raised by the employer are not considered and are not taken into account and there is no reference or observation with regard to the company's contention in the award and the learned Labour Court has mechanically relied on the affidavit filed by the workmen without referring to the affidavit filed by the director of the company. To some extent, the said contention or objection by the petitioner company against the impugned award is justified, inasmuch as the award does not contain any reference about the company's contention or facts pleaded by the company. The awards also do not contain any discussion and final conclusion with regard to the company's contention and the factual details stated by it in the written statement and the affidavit of its director. Any reason as to why the company's contention are not believed are not coming out very clearly. 13. However, for such defects in the award, it would not be proper to remand the case for fresh decision after about 15 years of litigation. Therefore, the Court considers it appropriate to decide the matters finally at this stage itself. 14. As mentioned earlier, entire period i.e. from the date of termination until the date of award can be divided in two parts i.e. from the date of termination until 13.10.2004 when the claimants were reengaged and the period from 31.10.2004 to the date of award i.e. August 2013. 14. As mentioned earlier, entire period i.e. from the date of termination until the date of award can be divided in two parts i.e. from the date of termination until 13.10.2004 when the claimants were reengaged and the period from 31.10.2004 to the date of award i.e. August 2013. 14.1 So far as the period from 31.10.2004 is concerned, actually, the alleged termination on 31.10.2004 should be treated as new or fresh cause of action, inasmuch as the workmen were undisputedly reinstated/re-engaged by the petitioner on and from 13.10.2004. Under the circumstances, when the subsequent alleged termination took place on 31.10.2004, then, it should have been taken as a new cause of action. However, since the reference cases were not concluded when the claimants were reengaged on 13.10.2004, it appears that the Court and the parties treated the subsequent alleged termination as continuous cause of action. There is nothing on record on the side of the claimants as well to demonstrate that after 31.10.2004 they had taken any action or steps after 31.10.2004 to demand reinstatement. The claimants do not appear to have addressed any demand notice after 31.10.2004 asking the petitioner to reinstate them. The employer, on the other hand, seems to have informed the Government Labour Officer about the alleged abandonment of service by the claimants. In that view of the matter coupled with the fact that the workmen do not appear to have shown any readiness to join the service even after the award, more particularly after the order dated 27.1.2015 passed by this Court, the Court is not inclined to uphold and sustain the direction for payment of back-wages for the period after 13.10.2004 or 31.10.2004 till August 2013. The order directing the company to pay back-wages for the period from 13.10.2004 till the date of award i.e. August 2013 does not deserve to be sustained and the said direction deserves to be set aside. Therefore, the said order and direction are hereby set aside. 15. Now, so far as the period prior to 13.10.2004 is concerned, it has emerged from the record that according to the claimants, their service was discontinued w.e.f. June 1999 and the appropriate government referred the dispute in April 2000. In the interregnum, the conciliation proceeding must have been conducted. Therefore, the said order and direction are hereby set aside. 15. Now, so far as the period prior to 13.10.2004 is concerned, it has emerged from the record that according to the claimants, their service was discontinued w.e.f. June 1999 and the appropriate government referred the dispute in April 2000. In the interregnum, the conciliation proceeding must have been conducted. From the record, it does not come out that the employer i.e. the petitioner company had made any offer during the conciliation proceedings asking the workmen to resume their duties. Under the circumstances and on over all consideration of facts involved in present case and for the purpose of apportionment of fault and consequences, it appears that if the employer is directed to pay 30% back-wages for the period from 1.1.2000 to 12.10.2004, then, equity would be balanced and interest of justice would be served. 16. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that so far as the order directing the petitioner company to reinstate the claimants is concerned, the said order and direction does not warrant any interference in view of the fact that the petitioner company has repeatedly contended that it did not terminate the service of the claimants and that it is still ready and willing to reengage the workmen and in past also it was ready to reengage the workmen. In that view of the matter, the company has no justification and/or any ground to oppose the direction to reinstate the concerned claimants. Therefore, in light of the defence of the petitioner company which is repeatedly put forward by the learned advocate for the petitioner, there is no justification to interfere with the said direction. Consequently, the order directing the petitioner company to reinstate the concerned claimants is not disturbed and it is hereby confirmed. 17. In the result, present petitions are disposed of with following order. 17.1 The direction to reinstate the claimants is not disturbed. For the reasons recorded above, the order directing the petitioner to reinstate the claimants is confirmed. So far as the order directing the petitioner to pay back-wages for entire period is concerned, the direction to pay back-wages for the period from 13.10.2004 until the date of award is hereby set aside. For the reasons recorded above, the order directing the petitioner to reinstate the claimants is confirmed. So far as the order directing the petitioner to pay back-wages for entire period is concerned, the direction to pay back-wages for the period from 13.10.2004 until the date of award is hereby set aside. 17.2 Since it is not in dispute that the workmen have been paid wages for the period from 13.10.2004 to 31.10.2004, any direction with regard to the said period is not passed. 17.3 So far as the period from alleged date of termination i.e. June 1999 to 12.10.2004 is concerned, the petitioner is directed to pay 30% back-wages for the period from 1.1.2000 to 12.10.2004. With aforesaid directions, the impugned awards are partly modified and the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.