JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. – Heard learned counsel for the appellants/applicants on disposal of delay condonation application in filing the memorandum of appeal within time. 2. Admittedly against the judgment of trial court, Civil Appeal no. 118/2012 was preferred which was allowed by judgment dated 2.1.2014 of Additional District Judge, Court No. 8 Azamgarh. Then aggrieved by the said judgment of first appellate court, respondent of the said appeal (present applicant/appellant) had moved review petition no. 12/2014 on 15.07.2014. After hearing, the lower appellate court had rejected the said review petition on 08.02.2016. Then present time barred appeal (Memorandum of Second Appeal) has been preferred by the respondent of first appeal along with delay condonation application. 3. The grounds of delay condonation application is mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the aforesaid affidavit supporting said application which is quoted as under: “2. That, against the judgment and decree dated 2.1.2014 passed in Civil appeal no. 118 of 2012, defendant/appellant under legal advise filed a Civil Misc. Review Application No. 12 of 2014 dated 15.7.2014, which was heard by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Azamgarh. 3. That Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Azamgarh heard the aforementioned review application no. 12 of 2014 on 8.2.2016 and same was rejected by Additional District Judge, Court No. 8 Azamgarh vide order dated 8.2.2016 on the ground of delay. 4. That, the delay has been caused due to the fact that appellants were advised to peruse the remedy of review application before the lower appellate Court, which was rejected on 8.2.2016, as such delay in filing the second appeal before this Hon'ble Court against the judgment and decree of lower appellate Court dated 2.1.2014 be condoned. 5. That, in view of the facts and circumstances stated in preceding paragraphs, it is expedient in the interest of justice that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present application and to condone the delay, if any in filing the present second appeal, otherwise the applicant/petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury.” 4. The only grounds taken in this affidavit is that appellants were advised to pursue remedy of review before lower appellate court, and when such review application was rejected on 8.2.2016, then they have filed memorandum of second appeal before this Court. The only grounds taken in this affidavit is that appellants were advised to pursue remedy of review before lower appellate court, and when such review application was rejected on 8.2.2016, then they have filed memorandum of second appeal before this Court. Learned counsel for the applicants-appellants submitted that litigant should not suffer due to acts of his counsel, and in present matter appellants were advised to prefer review petition instead of second appeal, therefore the delay in filing the memorandum of second appeal is for justifiable reasons and delay should be condoned. 5. Order 47 of CPC deals with procedure of review. Rule- 1 (a) of this Order provides that any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred may prefer review petition. In present matter, there is right of preferring second appeal against the judgment of first appellate court. In such case, review was maintainable only when appellant had opted not to prefer appeal. 6. A perusal of the facts made available before this Court make it clear that after judgment of first appeal on 2.1.2014, applicants-appellants had chosen not to prefer Second Appeal, therefore no second appeal was preferred within period of limitation. Even on the legal advice, he preferred review petition on 15.7.2014, which was beyond period of limitation for filing second appeal as well as beyond the period of limitation for filing review application. Review petition was also filed with application under Section 5 of Limitation Act that was rejected for insufficient ground. 7. From perusal of the record, in fact available before this Court, it appears that initially applicants-appellants had decided not to prefer second appeal, so he had not taken any step in that regard. Later on, on advice of his counsel or for any other reason, he had preferred review petition beyond period of limitation, along with application for condonation of delay in moving the same; and said application was rejected. Then present memorandum of second appeal was filed which is beyond more than two years after lapse of period of limitation. 8. Later on, on advice of his counsel or for any other reason, he had preferred review petition beyond period of limitation, along with application for condonation of delay in moving the same; and said application was rejected. Then present memorandum of second appeal was filed which is beyond more than two years after lapse of period of limitation. 8. So far as the contention of legal advice is concerned, this is a matter of privileged communication between applicant and his counsel that could not be seen or verified by the court; but it is apparent that there is no sufficient reason for accepting the explanations mentioned for condoning the delay, especially, when in the light of aforementioned provisions of Order 47 CPC, the applicant had deliberately opted not to prefer appeal and filed a review petition. 9. So far as contention of alleged prejudice of applicants appellants, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, is concerned, it is clarified that the Court is duty bound not only to consider the rights and prejudices of applicant side but also has to consider the rights and prejudices likely to be caused to respondent side. In present matter after finalisation of the decree of first appeal, the review petition was filed without any sufficient reason; and when rejection order of review petition has also become final, then the memorandum of second appeal was filed along with the said delay condonation application on grounds which have been held unsatisfactory, as above. 10. In Popat and Kotech Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 Hon'ble Apex Court held that: “7. The period of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken writ diligence and to prevent oppression. The statute i.e. the Limitation Act is founded on the most salutary principle of general and public policy and incorporates a principle of great benefit to the community. It has, with great propriety, been termed a statute of repose, peace and justice. The statute bar discourages litigation by burying in one common receptacle all the accumulations of past times which are unexplained and have not from lapse of time become inexplicable. It has, with great propriety, been termed a statute of repose, peace and justice. The statute bar discourages litigation by burying in one common receptacle all the accumulations of past times which are unexplained and have not from lapse of time become inexplicable. It has been said by John Voet, with singular felicity, that controversies are limited to a fixed period of time, lest they should be immortal while men are mortal. 9. - - - The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time (See N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 ).” 11. In Damodaran Pillai & others v. South Indian Bank Ltd., AIR 2005 S.C. 3460 Hon'ble Apex Court held that: “20. The principles underlying the provisions prescribing limitation are based on public policy aiming at justice, the principles of repose and peace and intended to induce claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. 21. Hardship or injustice may be a relevant consideration in applying the principles of interpretation of statute, but cannot be a ground for extending the period of limitation.” 12. The rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy within a time fixed by the Legislature. The time must, therefore, be deemed to run from the moment when there is knowledge and cannot be deferred for any such unsatisfactory ground that cannot be verified, especially those grinds which may adversely affect the rights accrued to respondent-opposite party. 13. In view of above, this Court finds that grounds mentioned in delay condonation application are not sufficient, therefore, said application for condonation of delay in filing memorandum of appeal is hereby dismissed. 13. In view of above, this Court finds that grounds mentioned in delay condonation application are not sufficient, therefore, said application for condonation of delay in filing memorandum of appeal is hereby dismissed. Accordingly the second appeal being time barred is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.