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2016 DIGILAW 1604 (SC)

M. Sanjeeva Shetty v. Hilary Mascarenhas (D) By Lrs.

2016-11-22

A.K.SIKRI, A.M.SAPRE

body2016
ORDER : Leave granted. 2. As nobody appears on behalf of the respondents, we have no option but to hear Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, and decide the matter. 3. The appellant is the landlord who had filed Eviction Petition against the respondents herein under Section 21 (1)(a)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 for eviction of the respondents stating that the respondents were tenants under him and he was entitled to evict the respondents under the aforesaid provisions. This petition was allowed in part and eviction orders were passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Puttur on 20th April, 1991. This eviction order was challenged by the respondents by preferring Revision (Rent) Petition before the IInd Additional District Judge. The said Revision Petition was dismissed by the IInd Additional District Judge on 20th February, 2001 thereby affirming the order passed in favour of the appellant herein. The respondents carried the matter further by filing a Writ Appeal before the High Court. Before the High Court, the contention raised by the respondents is that the appellant was not the landlord of the 'premises' in question as defined in Section 3(n) of the Rent Control Act. This issue was decided in favour of the respondents and on that basis orders of the Courts below were set aside by holding that since the appellant was not the landlord he was not allowed to maintain the Eviction Petition. It was now the turn of the appellant to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge, which the appellant did by filing a Writ Appeal before the Division Bench. 4. It would be pertinent to mention here that though there was one more issue raised by the respondents before the Writ Court, that is whether the premises in question were covered by the Rent Control Act, namely, within the definition of 'premises contained in Section 3(n) of the Rent Control Act'. That issue was decided in favour of the appellant herein. 5. The respondents, however, did not challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge on this aspect. Even in appeal preferred by the appellant herein, no cross objections were filed raising the aforesaid issue. That issue was decided in favour of the appellant herein. 5. The respondents, however, did not challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge on this aspect. Even in appeal preferred by the appellant herein, no cross objections were filed raising the aforesaid issue. Notwithstanding the same, we find that the Division Bench vide its impugned judgment has gone into the issue as to whether the premises in question is covered by the Rent Control Act or not and has not decided the issue as to whether the appellant is landlord or not, though the appeal was preferred by the appellant on the said issue. By holding that the premises in question is not covered by the Rent Control Act, the Division Bench of the High Court has refrained from deciding the question as to whether the appellant is landlord or not. Section 3(n) defines 'premises' as under : "3(n) "premises" means- (i) A building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes;" The premises in question in respect of which the eviction is sought is built up/constructed area, though of agricultural land, and measures 8 cents. The question which fell for consideration before the High Court was as to whether the land in question is "used" for agricultural purposes. As pointed out above this particular area is constructed and not used for agricultural purposes. However in the opinion of the High Court since the entire land was agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes, in the absence of any conversion of this land into non-agricultural purposes under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, the same will be treated as agricultural land. 6. It is argued by Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel for the appellant, that the High Court has committed two errors in the impugned judgment. First, even when this was not an issue in the writ appeal, the same is decided. Secondly, it is argued that in any case the Rent Control Act, as per Section 1 of the said Act, extends to the entire State of Karnataka and only that area is excluded which is "used for agricultural purposes". Whether the area is agricultural or not is not the material consideration. Secondly, it is argued that in any case the Rent Control Act, as per Section 1 of the said Act, extends to the entire State of Karnataka and only that area is excluded which is "used for agricultural purposes". Whether the area is agricultural or not is not the material consideration. In support of this argument, learned senior counsel has referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Nalanikant Ramadas Gujjar v. Tulasibai (Dead) by LRs and Ors., (1996) 5 SCC 394 wherein the provisions of Bombay Rent Control Act, which are pari-materia, came up for consideration and this Court has held as under: "6. Section 5(8) of the Bombay Rent Act defines 'premises' as follows: "5.(8) 'premises' means- (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes, (b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including - (i) the garden, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building, (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building, (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging house." From a plain reading of the definition of 'premises' in the aforesaid Act it is apparent that it shall not include any land used for agricultural purposes but certainly shall include any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes. From the records it appears that there is no dispute that when the lease was granted in favour of the Binny Company as early as in the year 1889, it was an open site having no building thereon at that time. But the Binny Company had taken the said land for making construction over the same for installing ginning and pressing machines and in fact a building was constructed on the said piece of land in which ginning and pressing machines were installed. In this background, when the Bombay Rent Act came in force the leasehold area was not being used for agricultural purposes". 6. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment applies on all fours in the present case. In this background, when the Bombay Rent Act came in force the leasehold area was not being used for agricultural purposes". 6. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment applies on all fours in the present case. Since the area in question is not "used" for agricultural purposes it would be covered by the definition of Section 3(n) and would be the 'premises' in respect of which provisions of Rent Control Act are applicable. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Since the main issue in the said judgment, namely, whether the appellant is landlord or not has not been decided by the High Court, we remit the matter to the High Court for its decision on the said issue on merits. 7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.