Jay Ram Prasad, S/o Moti Paswan v. State of Jharkhand
2016-11-28
ANANDA SEN, PRADIP KUMAR MOHANTY
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for the Respondents. 2. In this Letters Patent Appeal, the appellant/petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.07.2016 passed in W.P.(S) No.3361 of 2014 wherein learned Single Judge has been pleased to dismiss the said Writ Petition. 3. The case of the petitioner/appellant is that at the relevant point of time while he was working as Officer-in-Charge of Birsa Nagar Police Station, a complaint was submitted by one S. Davidson against him alleging therein that the delinquent-appellant demanded a T.V. to show favour to the complainant which was gross misconduct on the part of the deliquent official. 4. The Deputy Superintendent of Police conducted a preliminary enquiry and submitted his report vide letter dated 24.02.2007 alleging therein that the petitioner demanded a T.V. for the aforesaid work. 5. After receipt of the report of the preliminary enquiry, the department decided to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant. Pursuant thereto, the Dy.S.P. (Law & Order) was appointed as Enquiry officer to conduct departmental enquiry against the appellant/petitioner vide Letter No.1314 dated 28.02.2007. Charge-sheet was also issued to the appellant. 6. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the effect that the allegations contained in the memo of charge are false and he never demanded any Television. 7. In the departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer has examined two witnesses and exhibited two documents and came to a finding that the petitioner/appellant is guilty of the charges. Basing upon his enquiry report, the disciplinary authority proposed to impose the punishment of reverting the petitioner to basic Scale of pay vide Memo dated 31.08.2011. Subsequently vide Memo dated 01.10.2010, respondent No.3 approved the proposal made by the respondent No.4 by reducing the petitioner to his basic scale of pay for a period of three years. 8. Being aggrieved thereof, the petitioner preferred departmental appeal which was also dismissed vide memo dated 19.08.2013. Subsequently on 05.09.2013 the petitioner preferred a memorial before the respondent No.2 who dismissed the same on 06.05.2014. 9. Against the aforesaid orders, the petitioner preferred the Writ Petition which was registered as W.P.(S) No.3361 of 2014 challenging the above-said punishment imposed against him. 10.
Subsequently on 05.09.2013 the petitioner preferred a memorial before the respondent No.2 who dismissed the same on 06.05.2014. 9. Against the aforesaid orders, the petitioner preferred the Writ Petition which was registered as W.P.(S) No.3361 of 2014 challenging the above-said punishment imposed against him. 10. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 19.07.2016 dismissed the same with a finding that it is not a case in which the order of punishment has been passed ignoring the relevant materials available on record nor the case is based on no evidence and confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority. 11. Against that order, the petitioner/appellant preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner while assailing the order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge has submitted that the learned Writ Court ought to have taken into consideration that charges levelled against the petitioner /appellant are false as there is no evidence with regard to demand of TV and no such recovery of T.V. was made from the delinquent. Learned counsel further stated that the learned Single Judge also erred by not considering the admitted position that the complainant never appeared before the Enquiry Officer to support the accusation levelled against the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in law by not taking into consideration the fact that such punishment of reducing the basic scale of pay for a period of three years is very harsh and not liable to be sustained in the eyes of law. He lastly submitted that the appellant has been punished solely on the finding arrived at during the preliminary enquiry, which is illegal and is against the principle of natural justice. 13. In support of his contention, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments : Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. Vs. Jai Bhagwan, reported in 2011 (6) SCC 376 . Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr., reported in 2013(4) SCC 301 . U.P. SRTC Vs. Ram Kishan Arora, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 627 . Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 14. Mr.
Vs. Jai Bhagwan, reported in 2011 (6) SCC 376 . Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr., reported in 2013(4) SCC 301 . U.P. SRTC Vs. Ram Kishan Arora, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 627 . Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 14. Mr. Vikash Kumar, learned JC to AAG appearing for the State submits that there is no infirmity or illegality committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Writ Petition and confirming the order of punishment imposed by the respondents. In other words, charges which were levelled against the petitioner/appellant have been proved and the evidence of witnesses are very clear and cogent. Since the charges have been proved, the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishment which is not harsh. He further submits that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine the witness and to adduce the relevant documents in his defence, but he chose to abstain. Learned counsel lastly submits that when the charges levelled against the petitioner was proved and the quantum of punishment is sufficient, the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal needs no interference by this Hon'ble Court and the same is liable to be dismissed. 15. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and also perusal of the above facts as well as carefully scrutinized the judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the instant case, admittedly the complainant was neither produced nor examined in the departmental proceeding. The Dy.S.P., who conducted the preliminary enquiry was a witness in the departmental proceeding who proved preliminary enquiry report. It is he who proved the statement of the complainant given during preliminary enquiry, in the regular departmental proceeding. Thus, the delinquent could not cross-examine the complainant. The another witness who was produced in the departmental proceeding was only a formal witness, who only stated that preliminary enquiry was conducted and a report was submitted wherein charges were found to be correct. Except, the above materials, there is nothing to substantiate the charges levelled against the appellant. 16. In the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi (supra), it has been held that in a departmental enquiry relating to a case of misconduct, non-examination of the complainant is fatal to the departmental proceeding.
Except, the above materials, there is nothing to substantiate the charges levelled against the appellant. 16. In the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi (supra), it has been held that in a departmental enquiry relating to a case of misconduct, non-examination of the complainant is fatal to the departmental proceeding. It has been held that non-examination of complainant denied the opportunity of cross-examination to the delinquent which is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 17. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), it has been held that preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issuance of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out as to whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance. 18. In the case, admittedly, there is no dispute that the entire departmental enquiry is based upon the preliminary enquiry report. Even the Appellant was held guilty only on the basis of preliminary enquiry report. In view of the judgment referred to above, the entire process adopted by the respondents is bad in law, and is illegal. 19. In view of the discussions made above, this Court set aside the judgment dated 19.07.2016 passed in W.P.(S) No.3361 of 2014 and accordingly, quash the punishment order, appellate order and revisional order as contained in Annexure-5, 6 and 8. 20. Accordingly, this LPA stands allowed.