ORDER : P.K. Lohra, J. Accused-petitioner has laid this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to assail the impugned order dated 15th of December, 2010 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge No.3, Jodhpur (for short, 'learned revisional Court') upholding the order dated 8th of August, 2007 passed by Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur (for short, 'learned trial Court') taking cognizance against the petitioner for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'NI Act'). 2. Bare necessary facts, for the purpose of this petition, are that Cheque bearing No.227765 dated 9th of May 2007 worth Rs. 1,00,000/- given by the petitioner to the complainant against discharge of his alleged debt or liability was dishonored by the bank due to closing of his account. It is in that background the complainant served a notice on the petitioner under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the N.I. Act on 23rd of May, 2007 and the same was received by the petitioner on 25th of May, 2007. Thereafter the complainant filed a complaint against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence on 8th of June, 2007 i.e. before expiry of statutory period of fifteen days. 3. The learned trial Court, after considering the complaint supported by affidavit of the respondent-complainant, proceeded to take cognizance against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence by its order dated 8th of August, 2007. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner invoked revisional jurisdiction, but the effort made by the petitioner before the revisional Court also proved abortive and the revisional Court dismissed the revision petition. It is in that background petitioner has approached this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Anil Bhandari, submits that any complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act filed before expiry of fifteen days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is not a complaint in the eye of law and, therefore, both the impugned orders cannot be sustained. Learned counsel further submits that if, on the strength of this laconic cognizance order, trial is allowed to proceed, the same would result in miscarriage of justice. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhandari has placed reliance on a larger Bench decision of Supreme Court in case of Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey & Anr. [2014 AIR SCW 5751]. Learned counsel further submits that if, on the strength of this laconic cognizance order, trial is allowed to proceed, the same would result in miscarriage of justice. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhandari has placed reliance on a larger Bench decision of Supreme Court in case of Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey & Anr. [2014 AIR SCW 5751]. In this verdict, on a reference being made by two Judges Bench of Supreme Court, larger Bench of Supreme Court has considered the nature of offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act and furthermore the alleged omission of the drawer to constitute the aforesaid offence, the Court held :- "35. Insofar as the present reference is concerned, the debate broadly centers around clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. The requirement of clause (c) of the proviso is that the drawer of the cheque must have failed to make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Clause (c) of the proviso offers a total period of 15 days to the drawer from the date of receipt of the notice to make payment of the cheque amount on its dishonour. 36. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines 'complaint'. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of law. Any complaint before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque." Essentially, the Court was concerned with following two questions : "(i) Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section 138 (c) of the Act aforementioned ? And, (ii) If answer to question No.1 is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142 (b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired ?" while answering these two questions, the Court held :- "40. Our answer to question (i) is, therefore, in the negative. 41. Our answer to question (i) is, therefore, in the negative. 41. The other question is that if the answer to question (i) is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired. 42. Section 142 of the NI Act prescribes the mode and so also the time within which a complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act can be filed. A complaint made under Section 138 by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has to be in writing and needs to be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. The period of one month under Section 142(b) begins from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. However, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within the prescribed period of one month, a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period. Now, since our answer to question (i) is in the negative, we observe that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. This direction shall be deemed to be applicable to all such pending cases where the complaint does not proceed further in view of our answer to question (i). As we have already held that a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the Court of sufficient cause. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the Court of sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly." 5. In this view of the matter, the order of cognizance against the petitioner for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is per se laconic and cannot be sustained and so also the order of revisional Court affirming the same. 6. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the revisional Court as well as the learned trial Court taking cognizance against the petitioner for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act are annulled and the respondent-complainant is set at liberty in accordance with the observations made in Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra).