Chandubhai Lavjibhai Lunagariya v. Ramnikbhai Nathabhai Sardhara
2016-08-03
S.H.VORA
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S.H. Vora, J. 1. Rule. Learned advocate Ms. Jayani Shah waives service of rule for the respondent. 2. By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges order dated 28.4.2016 passed below application Exh. 117 in Regular Civil Suit No. 244 of 2012, whereby the learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajkot allowed the application in exercise of powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code") permitting the respondent - plaintiff to place on record examination-in-chief of the plaintiff on payment of cost of Rs. 3000/-. 3. Before submissions made at bar, certain undisputed facts deserve to be noted. 3.1 The respondent - plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of sale agreement dated 3.10.2012 in respect of land bearing survey No. 309 paiki 6 and 309 paiki 21 situated at village Tardhadiya, Tal & Dist: Rajkot. The respondent - plaintiff purchased both the properties and he made payment of Rs. 51,000/- by cheque in respect to each land and made further payment of Rs. 4 lac in cash and thus, the respondent - plaintiff paid Rs. 5,02,000/-. For decision of the present petition, other averments made in the plaint are not necessary and therefore, they are not recorded in the order. 3.2 Vide order dated 10.3.2015, this Court has directed to decide and dispose of the suit within one year, which period ultimately came to be extended upto 10.9.2016. The learned trial Judge framed issue in the suit on 20.3.2015. The respondent - plaintiff side concluded his oral evidence on 20.7.2015 and filed closing pursis at Exh. 82. The petitioner - defendant commenced his oral evidence on 3.10.2015 and closed his oral evidence on 5.4.2016. When the suit before the trial Court was posted for final arguments on 11.4.2016, the respondent - plaintiff filed application Exh. 117 for permitting him to give his oral evidence in addition to the evidence adduced by his power of attorney holder below Exh. 34 i.e. Mr. Sanjaysinh Waghela, more particularly, because of the following reply given by the power of attorney holder in his cross-examination. "Exh-34, page No. 10:-- "I do not know as to when entry was made in his name regarding the agriculture land belonging to Ramnikbbhai Nathabhai Sardhara located at the respective place".
34 i.e. Mr. Sanjaysinh Waghela, more particularly, because of the following reply given by the power of attorney holder in his cross-examination. "Exh-34, page No. 10:-- "I do not know as to when entry was made in his name regarding the agriculture land belonging to Ramnikbbhai Nathabhai Sardhara located at the respective place". Exh-34, page No. 11:-- "I state regarding the question that the plaintiff has the income tax returns for the year 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 that he should have the same. I do not know. I can produce if he has." Exh-34, page No. 12:-- "I do not know as to whether he can appear before the court and give evidence himself." Exh-34, page No. 13:-- "I have not brought with me today the evidence as to when tenure holder entry as agriculturist of Ramnikbbhai Nathabhai Sardhara was made. It is true that I have not brought with me today the evidence that he was tenure holder as agriculturist from 30/10/2012 till the last date when my evidence was recorded. It is true that I have not brought with me today the income tax returns of Ramnikbhai for the year 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014. It is true that if the aforementioned income tax returns are produced, it can be brought on record as to what is the financial capacity of Ramnikbhai Nathabhai." Exh-34, page No. 16:-- "I cannot submit proof as to what was the monthly income of Ramnikbhai Sardhara for the last three to four years." 3.3 Since the learned trial Judge allowed application Exh. 117, the present petitioner is before this Court. 4. I have heard learned advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. U.D. Shukla for learned advocate Ms. Jayani Shah for the respondent - plaintiff. 5. According to the submissions of learned advocate for the petitioner - defendant, the learned trial Judge has committed grave error in allowing application Exh. 117 in permitting the examination-in-chief of the respondent - plaintiff to be taken on record and in reopening of the right of the respondent - plaintiff to lead further evidence in exercise of inherent powers conferred upon the Court under section 151 of the Code.
117 in permitting the examination-in-chief of the respondent - plaintiff to be taken on record and in reopening of the right of the respondent - plaintiff to lead further evidence in exercise of inherent powers conferred upon the Court under section 151 of the Code. According to his submission, the impugned order is illegal, erroneous, inasmuch as the examination of power of attorney holder of the plaintiff was taken on record and he was cross-examined by the petitioner - defendant and thereafter, the respondent - plaintiff has no right to move such application and therefore, the respondent - plaintiff cannot be examined again in the matter with a view to fill up the lacuna in the case or to destroy the case of the petitioner - defendant. In support of his submission, learned advocate for the petitioner - defendant has pressed into service the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ram Rati v. Mange Ram (D) through Lrs. and others reported in 2016 (3) Scale 219 and decision of this Court rendered in case of Noorbanu Haji Hasan Vs. Havabai Haji Hasan and others reported in 2001 (2) GLR 1026 . 6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. U.D. Shukla for the respondent, after drawing attention of the Court to page 2D and 7 of affidavit-in-reply, would contend that the power of attorney holder of the respondent - plaintiff, who has been examined in place of the plaintiff, has no personal knowledge and therefore, he cannot be examined. After drawing the attention of the Court towards cross-examination of the respondent - plaintiff's power of attorney holder below Exh. 34 and more particularly, reply given by said power of attorney at page Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16 of his evidence, as noted herein above, with regard to the readiness and willingness of the respondent - plaintiff and also the nature of the land, he would further contend that the answer to the said question is well within the personal knowledge of the respondent - plaintiff and therefore, the respondent - plaintiff is entitled to file his affidavit.
According to his submission, the impugned order cannot be termed as illegal or contrary to law, because the respondent - plaintiff did not want to fill up the lacuna in the previous evidence, but the affidavit in evidence of the plaintiff would assist the learned trial Court in finally deciding all the disputes between the parties. Learned advocate Mr. Shukla would further contend that the petitioner - defendant would have a chance to cross-examine the respondent - plaintiff in connection with the affidavit evidence placed by the respondent - plaintiff on record and at the most, this Court may also impose cost to the respondent - plaintiff and at the end, he placed reliance upon decision in case of Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha reported in (2010) 10 SCC 512 and more particularly, para 18, which is reproduced as below: "18. We may now summarise for convenience, the position as to who should give evidence in regard to matters involving personal knowledge: (a) An attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit. (b) If the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved. (c) The attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. (d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney holder, necessarily the attorney holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney holders.
This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney holders. (e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney holder, the principal has to examine that attorney holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder. (f) Where different attorney holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney holders will have to be examined. (g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his 'state of mind' or 'conduct', normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his 'bona fide' need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his 'readiness and willingness' fall under this category. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or 'readiness and willingness'. Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad." 7. Having heard the submissions made at bar and considering the principles settled in the case law cited at bar, the issue for consideration in this case is whether the respondent - plaintiff can be permitted to examine him as witness, after examination of his power of attorney holder, for further elaboration of questions remained unanswered in the cross-examination of the power of attorney requires to be answered in view of the provisions contained in section 151 of the Code. 8. Upon hearing the submissions made at bar, it is evidently clear that as power of attorney holder of the respondent - plaintiff failed to give reply to the suggestions/questions put in cross-examination by the petitioner - defendant, the respondent - plaintiff moved an application below Exh.
8. Upon hearing the submissions made at bar, it is evidently clear that as power of attorney holder of the respondent - plaintiff failed to give reply to the suggestions/questions put in cross-examination by the petitioner - defendant, the respondent - plaintiff moved an application below Exh. 117 to reopen the evidence with a permission to the respondent - plaintiff to examine him in the witness box for the purpose of tendering reply/document to the questions/suggestions remained unanswered in the deposition of the power of attorney holder recorded below Exh. 34. To justify such recourse, learned advocate for the Mr. U.D. Shukla for the respondent gave much emphasize on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Man Kaur (supra). In Court's considered opinion, reliance placed on the said decision is misplaced. The obvious reason is such that in the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court after considering the provisions of Specific Relief Act and more particularly, section 16(C) of the said Act and evidence placed on record in the proceedings before the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court found and observed that third party, who has no personal knowledge, cannot give evidence about readiness and willingness even if he is an attorney holder of the person concerned. In nutshell, the attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transaction or belongings of the principal of which principal alone has personal knowledge. There is no disagreement on such principles settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Man Kaur (supra), but the point is whether after conclusion of trial, the respondent - plaintiff can be permitted to offer him as a witness to answer the questions/suggestions which remained unanswered in the deposition of power of attorney holder. Looking to the frame of the application Exh. 117, it appears that there is an attempt on the part of the respondent - plaintiff to overcome the lacuna, which remained in his case. If such course is allowed, the very purpose and object of right of cross-examination will be defeated and it will amount to examination of the plaintiff once again in the matter. The provisions of section 151 do not permit such course and therefore, the trial Court has not correctly appreciated the provisions of section 151.
If such course is allowed, the very purpose and object of right of cross-examination will be defeated and it will amount to examination of the plaintiff once again in the matter. The provisions of section 151 do not permit such course and therefore, the trial Court has not correctly appreciated the provisions of section 151. At this juncture, it is relevant and useful to reproduce the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 15 and 16 of decision rendered in Ram Rati (supra) cited by learned advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah for the petitioner. "15. After surveying the various principles stated by this Court on Section 151 from 1961, in K.K. Velusamy (supra), they have been succinctly summarized as follows under paragraph-12: "xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is "right" and undo what is "wrong", that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code.
In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the Court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court." 16. Some good guidance on invocation of Section 151 of the CPC to reopen an evidence or production of fresh evidence is also available in K.K. Velusamy (supra). To quote paragraph-14: "14. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination.
To quote paragraph-14: "14. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there is a time gap between the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands on earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other party comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, permit the production of such evidence if it is relevant and necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court may deem fit to impose." 9. In nutshell, the respondent - plaintiff adopted such a course to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code and therefore, the Court cannot exercise its inherent powers and permit the respondent - plaintiff to reopen the stage of evidence after examination of his power of attorney holder below Exh. 34. In the present proceedings, the parties have led the evidence and thus, completed the oral and documentary evidence before the trial Court. Since amended provisions of the Code expects the trial Court to hear the arguments immediately after completion of the evidence and then to proceed to pronounce the judgment, section 151 of the Code cannot be put into operation to reopen the stage of evidence and more so, the respondent - plaintiff's power of attorney holder already examined before the trial Court, who dealt with the suit - transaction for and on behalf of the plaintiff. It is not the case of the respondent - plaintiff that he comes across some evidence, which he could not lay his hands earlier or some evidence came into existence after completion of evidence or was not within the knowledge of power of attorney.
It is not the case of the respondent - plaintiff that he comes across some evidence, which he could not lay his hands earlier or some evidence came into existence after completion of evidence or was not within the knowledge of power of attorney. Thus, looking to the over all scope of section 151 of the Code and decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ram Rati (supra), the learned trial Judge has fallen into error of law in allowing application preferred by the respondent - plaintiff below application Exh. 117 and therefore, present petition deserves to be accepted. 10. In the result, the petition stands allowed and impugned order dated 28.4.2016 passed below application Exh. 117 in Regular Civil Suit No. 244 of 2012 is hereby quashed and set aside with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. FURTHER ORDER After pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate Mr. Shashvata Shukla with learned advocate Ms. Jayani Shah for the respondent requests to stay operation of the order passed by this Court today so as to enable him to challenge the same before higher forum. Since the matter before the trial Court is at the stage of arguments, the request is refused.