JUDGMENT : The present second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.03.2014 & 25.03.2014 respectively, passed by learned District Judge – IV, Dhanbad in Title Appeal No.84 of 2011 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division No.5, Dhanbad. 2. The appellant herein, was the plaintiff in the court below and he had instituted the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land and confirmation of possession and permanent injunction for restraining the defendant to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. The defendants filed their written statement stating therein that the suit land was recorded under the cadestral survey khata No.41 in the name of Shital Mahto who during his life time was in possession of the suit land and after his death his legal heirs and representatives came in possession of the same. That Gendu Mian, the plaintiff's ancestor, was never in possession in the said land in question, hence, the question of inheritance by the plaintiff does not arise neither did they acquire indefeasible right by adverse possession and the record of rights would show that the plaintiffs were never in possession over the suit land hence, the plaintiff do not have any right, title and interest over the suit land. The defendants in fact are a cooperative society registered under the Bihar Cooperative Society Act, 1935. They had purchased the suit land through the various sale deeds from the rightful owners and their name has been mutated in the sherista of the State of Bihar and they were paying rent for the same. That they have remained in possession of the suit lands. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court had framed as many as eight issues and the relevant issues were issue Nos.4, 5 & 6. The trial court held that the land was the raiyati land of the recorded tenant Shital Mahto who was in possession of the land and after his death his legal heirs and representatives inherited the suit lands. The land was transferred by registered sale deeds to the defendant/cooperative society. The trial court held that the land was the raiyati land of the recorded tenant Shital Mahto who was in possession of the land and after his death his legal heirs and representatives inherited the suit lands. The land was transferred by registered sale deeds to the defendant/cooperative society. The trial court recorded the finding that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the same neither did they challenge the final publication of the record of rights, published in the year 2005 and the suit was instituted in the year 2009 beyond the period of limitation. It was held that the suit was barred by acquiescence, waiver and estoppel and under Section 258 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant preferred Title Appeal No.84 of 2011 and the learned District Judge – IV, Dhanbad dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the trial court, consequent thereto the plaintiff/appellant has agitated this second appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has submitted that both the courts below have failed to appreciate the documentary evidence Ext. -2, the order dated 29.03.2006, Ext. -B, along with the khatiyan Ext. -3 which establishes the possession of the plaintiff. It is submitted that the findings of the courts below are perverse as it has relied on the sale deeds, rent receipts, order of mutation, and the approval of plan by MADA, which are the documents created after the execution of the sale deed. 4. Heard. The copy of the plaint and the written statements have been filed and are kept on record. At the outset it would be necessary to state that the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are purely questions of fact. The mandate of Section 100 of C.P.C is that the second appeal can only be admitted when there is substantial question of law involved in the appeal. It would be evident from the pleadings of the plaintiff-appellant that he has claimed his right, title, interest and possession both on the basis of the entry made in the record of rights and at the same time on the basis of adverse possession. Both these pleas are mutually destructive. It would be evident from the pleadings of the plaintiff-appellant that he has claimed his right, title, interest and possession both on the basis of the entry made in the record of rights and at the same time on the basis of adverse possession. Both these pleas are mutually destructive. I have gone through the findings of the lower appellate court which has analysed, discussed and appreciated the evidence by independent application of the judicial mind while recording its satisfaction that the plaintiff-appellant was never in possession neither is in possession of the suit land. Both the courts below have throughly examined, evaluated and appreciated the material evidence and held that the plaintiff-appellant had not acquired indefeasible right by adverse possession. The lower appellate court has discussed the principles of the maxim nee vinec calm nec precario, which means that the possession required must be adequate in continuity and publicity hostile to the real owner. Mere exercise of possession exclusively and continuously would not be enough in all cases to show that the person who is claiming title by adverse possession is doing it to the knowledge of the true owner rather he has to show as to from which point of time his possession became adverse to the knowledge of the actual owner. The appellate court has elaborately discussed the documentary evidence of both the parties and recorded its satisfaction that the plaintiff has not been able to establish his title by adverse possession, and there is no pleading or proof as to from which point of time the possession became adverse by claiming a hostile title to the knowledge of the owner. 5. As discussed above, when a claim of title is made, but subsequently there is no further assertion of title, the possession thereafter will not prima facie be adverse. The court below has taken note of the fact that the order of the revenue court passed in Case No.10/85 dated 10.03.1987 under Section 83 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, i.e., Ext.-B wherein the recorded tenant filed an objection to delete the name of Yusuf Ansari but the revenue officer rejected the application without assigning reasons or grounds for rejection. It has held that the order is vague and without application of mind. The lower appellate court has discussed Ext.-2, the order passed by the Revenue Officer with respect to the sale deeds (Exts. It has held that the order is vague and without application of mind. The lower appellate court has discussed Ext.-2, the order passed by the Revenue Officer with respect to the sale deeds (Exts. A to A15) which were found to be genuine and while discussing Ext. 1 & 3 it has arrived at the conclusion that the recording of abaidh dhakhal was challenged by the recorded tenant, in 1985, hence, it can't be said that the plaintiff has perfected his title by remaining in continuous possession of 12 years since his possession was challenged by the recorded tenant. The lower appellate court has discussed the deposition of P.W. -5, i.e., the appellant/plaintiff, who has admitted that the land was parti and neither he nor his father paid any rent or revenue to the government. 6. It is settled legal position that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of C.P.C., the court cannot reappraise or reappreciate the evidence when there is concurrent findings of fact by the courts below. In fact, the relevant materials and evidence has been appreciated and considered by the court below and it is not a case of no evidence neither the impugned judgment suffers from arbitrariness or perversity. In view of the discussion made above, in the considered opinion of this Court, no substantial question of law is involved meriting any interference by this Court in this second appeal. In the result the appeal stands dismissed at the stage of admission itself.