JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present petition, petitioners have laid a challenge to award dated 27.11.2006, passed by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala in Reference No. 105/2002, RBT No. 143/04 (for short `impugned award’), wherein learned Tribunal below held that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute of the employees of the Cooperative Societies and as such answered the reference in negative. 2. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the passing of the impugned award by learned Tribunal below, present petitioners approached this Court by way of present petition, specifically stating therein that issue with regard to jurisdiction of employees of Cooperative Societies stands settled in terms of judgment passed by this Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited vs. State of H.P. and Others, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 713, wherein it has been held that once it is proved that the employee is a workman and the employer is an industry, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short `Act’) would be applicable in such cases irrespective of the fact that the employer is a Cooperative Society constituted under the Cooperative Societies Act. Petitioners have specifically averred in this petition that they were appointed as workmen in Tea Factory w.e.f. 21.4.1998 and during this period they discharged their duties to the utmost satisfaction of their employer but ultimately on 31.10.2001 their services were dispensed with by the respondent without any rhyme and reason and without resorting to the provisions of the Act. Petitioners also averred that they were in continuous service with the respondent in Tea Factory before termination of their services and they had completed 240 days in each calendar year and as such their services, if any, could be terminated by invoking Section 25-F, G and H of the Act. Petitioners specifically averred that since their services were not dispensed with in accordance with the provisions of Act, therefore, their termination is required to be quashed and set aside. 3. Petitioners specifically averred that since their services were not dispensed with in accordance with the provisions of Act, therefore, their termination is required to be quashed and set aside. 3. Shri Hamender Chandel, learned counsel representing the petitioners, vehemently argued that the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below is not sustainable because the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of law settled by this Court relying upon various pronouncements made by Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time, wherein it has been categorically held that once it is proved that employee is a workman and employer is an industry, the provisions of the Act would be applicable, irrespective of the fact that the employer is a Cooperative Society constituted under the Co-operative Societies Act. He vehemently argued that in the present case, it stands proved on record that the petitioners are the workmen and respondent is a factory within the meaning of the Act, and as such finding of the learned Tribunal below that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter in question is not sustainable and same deserves to be rectified in accordance with law. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Chandel forcefully contended that matter needs to be decided afresh in the light of judgment referred hereinabove and in case the impugned award is allowed to sustain, great prejudice, whatsoever, would be caused to the petitioners, who have admittedly rendered their valuable services to the respondent w.e.f. 21.4.1998 till 31.10.2001. 4. Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the respondent, supported the impugned award and strenuously argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award and as such call for no interference of this Court, at this stage. During arguments having been made by him, he invited the attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. And Others, (1997)5 SCC 125 , to demonstrate that dispute relating to disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the Cooperative Societies needs to be dealt with strictly in terms of bye-laws of the Society and in that regard jurisdiction of the Labour Court is completely barred. 5. Mr. Dadwal also contended that present writ petition is not maintainable at this belated stage and same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. As per Mr. 5. Mr. Dadwal also contended that present writ petition is not maintainable at this belated stage and same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. As per Mr. Dadwal impugned award was passed on 27.11.2006, whereas present writ petition has been filed on 9.10.2010 i.e. after four years of passing of impugned award. He also invited the attention of this Court to the averments contained in the writ petition to demonstrate that no explanation worth the name has been rendered in the petition with regard to delay in maintaining the petition. Mr. Dadwal, while referring to the judgment relied upon on behalf of the petitioners, stated that there was no occasion, whatsoever, for the learned Tribunal below to take note of the same as it was not in existence at the time of passing of the impugned award. To substantiate his arguments with regard to delay and latches, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by this Court in LPA No. 48 of 2011, titled as Satija Rajesh vs. State of H.P., decided on 26.8.2014, wherein this Court, relying upon various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, came to the conclusion that delay and latches in maintaining the petition cannot be brushed aside without any reason. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 7. Bare perusal of the impugned award suggests that the present petitioner has been non-suited on the ground of jurisdiction and learned Tribunal below has not returned any findings on the merits of the claim put forth on behalf of the petitioners. At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce the operative part of the impugned award:- “Before proceeding to determine and return findings on issues no.3 it is necessary, to, at the very outset return findings on issue no.3 as only when it is determined by this Tribunal that this court has the jurisdiction to try the subject matter of controversy and that accordingly the reference is maintainable, that, their would be a legal necessity to return findings on other issues. The parties are not at contest on the fact that the respondent is a society registered under the co-operative Societies and in whose employment the claimants rendered services as a supervision. The parties are not at contest on the fact that the respondent is a society registered under the co-operative Societies and in whose employment the claimants rendered services as a supervision. Since it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment rendered in 1997(5) SCC 125 , that where any dispute relates to disciplinary proceedings against an employee of a co-operative society, the jurisdiction, of this Tribunal is barred, and the Registrar, alone is the competent authority to as titrate upon the dispute, as such a dispute touches upon the business and management of the society. In view of the specific ouster of jurisdiction of this Tribunal, in, the light of the interpretation afforded to as analogous provisions to the one in the provisions of the H.P. Co-operative societies, Act, where by, with regard to disputes relating to disciplinary matters of an employee of cooperative societies, such, a dispute has been held to be not maintainable before this tribunal, therefore, with the ouster of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, I, would hold that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon this Reference. Hence this point is decided in the negative. Issues decided accordingly.” 8. Careful perusal of the aforesaid findings returned by the learned Tribunal below suggests that learned Tribunal below, relying upon the judgment rendered in R.C. Tiwari’s case supra, came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is barred and Registrar, Co-operative Societies alone is the competent authority to decide the dispute, if any, between the employee and employer of the Society. However, this Court, after perusing the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited case supra, which is based upon the various judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, is of the opinion that view taken by the learned Tribunal below is not correct and same deserves to be rectified in accordance with law. 9. Bare reading of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court clearly suggests that Industrial Tribunal had the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made. Further perusal of the judgment passed by this Court suggests that it has taken into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court qua the issue in question from time to time. Further perusal of the judgment passed by this Court suggests that it has taken into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court qua the issue in question from time to time. It would be apt to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment below: “14. The apex court in Krishna District Co-operative Marketing Society Limited, Vijayawada Vs. N.V. Purnachandra Rao and others (1987) 4 SCC 99 again dealt with a similar question. The question before the Supreme Court was whether an employer whose establishment is covered under the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishment Act, 1966 is required while retrenching any worker to comply with the provisions of Section 25 of the I.D. Act. The apex court after considering the entire law held as follows:- “10. The result of the above discussion is that if the employees are `workmen’ and the management is an `industry’ as defined in the Central Act and the action taken by the management amounts to `retrenchment’ then the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the provisions of Chapter VA of the Central Act and the said rights and liabilities may be adjudicated upon and enforced in proceedings before the authorities under Section 41(1) and Section 41(3) of the State Act.” 15. The apex court in The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and others Vs. The Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others 1969 (2) SCC 43 dealt with the similar question. The question before the apex court was whether a dispute relating to the change in the service condition of an employee of a Co-operative Society could be dealt with by the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act being a dispute touching upon the business and management of the society or whether it could only be decided under the provisions of the I.D. Act. The apex court held as follows:- “7. Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by the first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly by referred for decision to the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act. The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself. It is true that Section 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of service of the employees of a registered society; but the meaning given to the expression “touching the business of the society”, in our opinion, makes it very doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions of service can be held to be covered by this expression. Since the word “business” is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society.” 16. Dealing with the question as to what is the effect of byelaws, the apex court held as follows:- “10. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x In fact, after such bye-laws laying down the conditions of service are made and any person enters the employment of a society, those conditions of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service specifically forming part of the contract of service. The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. In a number of cases, conditions of service for industries are laid down by Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that, though such Standing Orders are binding between the employers and the employees of the industry governed by those Standing Orders, they do not have such force of law as to be binding on Industrial Tribunal adjudicating an industrial dispute. The jurisdiction which is granted to Industrial Tribunals by the Industrial Disputes Act is not the jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws and enforcing existing contracts. Industrial Tribunal have the right even to vary contracts of service between the employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a civil court or a Registrar acting under the Co-operative Societies Act, so that the circumstance that, in granting relief on Issue No.1, the Tribunal will have to vary the special bye-laws framed by the Co-operative Bank does not lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be incompetent to grant the reliefs sought in this reference. In fact, the reliefs could only be granted by the Industrial Tribunal and could not fall within the scope of the powers of the Registrar dealing with a dispute under Section 61 of the Act.” 17. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the decision of the apex court in R.C. Tiwari Vs. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. and others (1997) 5 SCC 125 . In this case the apex court while dealing with Section 55 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act held that in view of the wide definition in Section 55, a dispute relating to the services of an employee squarely falls within the ambit of the terms (management and business of the society). In this case the apex court while dealing with Section 55 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act held that in view of the wide definition in Section 55, a dispute relating to the services of an employee squarely falls within the ambit of the terms (management and business of the society). It would be pertinent to mention that Section 55 of the M.P. Societies Act is couched in much wider terms than Section 72 of the H.P. Act and specifically provides that where a dispute regarding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society arises between a society and its employees, the same shall be decided by the Registrar or other officers appointed by him which decision shall be final. In that case the employee after his services were terminated sought a reference under Section 55 and after the decision in the reference had been made, he approached the labour court. It was in these circumstances that the court held that the labour court had no jurisdiction to decide this dispute which had already been decided and the reference itself was bad in law. In our considered view this judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case since in the present case the employee straightaway approached the labour court and did not approach any authority under the Co-operative Societies Act. 18. In fact this question is no longer res integra. A Bench of the Apex Court in Morinda Co operative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Morinda Co operative Sugar Mills Workers’ Union (2006) 6 SCC 80 has dealt with virtually an identical question in relation to the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. Section 55 of the said Act is virtually identical to section 72 of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act. Placing reliance on the earlier judgment in Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. case supra, the apex court held that the word business has to be equated with the actual trading in commerce and other business activity and that a dispute relating to the services conditions of the workman employed by the society cannot be held to be disputed touching the business of the society. 19. Keeping in view the aforesaid law, we are of the considered view that the Industrial Tribunal had the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it. 19. Keeping in view the aforesaid law, we are of the considered view that the Industrial Tribunal had the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it. The question raised by the workmen was that their services had been terminated without following the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. The workmen complained of violation of the protection granted to them under Chapter 5-A of the I.D. Act. The apex court has clearly held that this is a matter which can only be decided by the tribunals constituted under the I.D. Act. In view of the law laid down by the apex court, in our considered opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. We are of the considered view that the learned tribunal had the power and authority to decide reference made to it. 20. The petitioner society has failed to point out any infirmity in the order of the learned tribunal. Admittedly all the workmen had served more than 240 days. Their services were terminated without giving them retrenchment notice or compensation as provided under the Act. Their termination being per se illegal, the order of the learned tribunal directing their reinstatement alongwith back wages to the extent of 50% is legal and valid. The writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.” (pp.718-720) 10. After perusing the impugned award as well as the judgment of this Court referred hereinabove, it clearly emerge that counsel representing the petitioners failed to bring into notice of the learned Tribunal below the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishna District Co-operative Marketing Society Limited, Vijayawada vs. N.V. Purnachandra Rao and others, (1987)4 SCC 99 , The Co-operative central Bank Ltd. and others vs. the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others, (1969)2 SCC 43 , R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. And Others, (1997)5 SCC 125 , and Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Morinda Co operative Sugar Mills Workers’ Union, (2006)6 SCC 80 , wherein it has been repeatedly held that dispute relating to the service conditions of the workmen employed by the Society cannot be held to be dispute touches upon the business and management of the society. Morinda Co operative Sugar Mills Workers’ Union, (2006)6 SCC 80 , wherein it has been repeatedly held that dispute relating to the service conditions of the workmen employed by the Society cannot be held to be dispute touches upon the business and management of the society. Further, perusal of the aforesaid judgment suggests, that if the employees are workmen and the management is an industry, as defined in the Central Act, and the action taken by the management amounts to retrenchment, then the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the provisions of the Central Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act. 11. At this stage, counsel, representing the respondent-Society, vehemently argued that the judgment passed by the Division Bench in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited case supra, was not in existence at the time of passing of the impugned award and as such same could not be taken into consideration by the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned award. 12. Aforesaid contention put forth on behalf of the counsel representing the respondent-Society deserves to be rejected out rightly solely for the reason that prior to passing of the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court in the catena of cases, while dealing with the issue at hand, has concluded that Industrial Tribunal has an authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it in case it is proved that employee is a workman and employer is an industry. Moreover, judgment, being relied upon by counsel representing the petitioners passed by this Court, has taken note of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and as such same is applicable in the present case. 13. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, especially law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below is not sustainable and same deserves to be rectified in accordance with law. 13. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, especially law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below is not sustainable and same deserves to be rectified in accordance with law. As far as plea of delay and latches raised by the counsel representing the respondent-Society is concerned, this Court is of the view that petitioners have specifically stated in para-11 of the petition that due to lack of appropriate legal advise in the matter, they could not approach this Court within reasonable time but after getting proper advice and in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, they approached this Court by way of present petition. Admittedly, apart from above, petitioners have not rendered any explanation for approaching this Court at a belated stage, but after seeing the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that delay, if any, in maintaining the present petition deserves to be condoned and matter at hand needs to be adjudicated afresh by the learned Labour Court strictly in terms of judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court. At this stage, it is pertinent to take note of the fact that aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court also pertained to employees of the Society, wherein question before the Court was “Whether the employees of the Co-operative Societies, who were employees by the provisions of H.P. Cooperative Societies Act, can claim the benefit of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act”? 14. Accordingly, this Court taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case deems it fit to remand the case back to the learned Labour Court with the directions to decide the same afresh on merits after taking note of the judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court and Division Bench of this Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited case supra. Since, petitioners have been litigating for redressal of their grievance from the year 2001, learned Labour Court is expected to decide the issue at hand in light of observations made by this Court within a reasonable time, preferably within six months from today. 15. In view of the aforesaid observation/direction, this petition is disposed of. Interim direction, if any, is vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.