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2016 DIGILAW 162 (JHR)

Sudhir Mathur @ Sudhir Kumar Mathur v. State of Jharkhand

2016-01-21

RAVI NATH VERMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : The petitioners by filing a revision application have questioned the legality of the order dated 16th September, 2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in connection with Govindpur P.S. Case No. 332 of 2005 whereby and whereunder, the cognizance of offence has been taken under Sections 47 (a) (b), 55, 57, 58, 59 of Excise Act and also under Sections 420/120(b) of I.P.C. and direction has been given to issue summons for appearance of the petitioners. 2. The prosecution case, which is relevant for the proper adjudication of the issue involved in this revision application, in short, is that on secret information, one Sumo vehicle bearing no.- HR-30A-7776 was intercepted by the informant and the police party near village Bagsuma at G.T. Road, when it was coming from Jamtara and 13 boxes of foreign liquor of different brands kept inside the Sumo were seized. After seeing the police party, three persons boarded on the vehicle escaped from there but the driver of the vehicle was apprehended, who disclosed that the liquor was being sold through different agents of Dhanbad. 3. After investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Officer against the petitioners whereafter the cognizance of offence was taken as indicated above. Hence, this revision. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners assailing the order impugned as bad in law and perverse seriously contended that the order impugned has been passed without applying judicial mind and no ingredients responsible to constitute the offence under Sections 420 and 120(b) of I.P.C. are present and that the court below in a mechanical manner has taken cognizance of the offence under the aforesaid provisions also. Learned counsel further submitted that the court below has not assigned any reason or showing any satisfaction regarding prima-facie case took cognizance. It was further submitted that the only offence, which could have been alleged against this petitioner, was under the provisions of Excise Act and, accordingly, the petitioners could be prosecuted only under the provisions of Excise Act and not the offences covered under the Penal Code. Lastly it was submitted that an interlocutory application bearing no. It was further submitted that the only offence, which could have been alleged against this petitioner, was under the provisions of Excise Act and, accordingly, the petitioners could be prosecuted only under the provisions of Excise Act and not the offences covered under the Penal Code. Lastly it was submitted that an interlocutory application bearing no. 2333 of 2015 has also been filed for condonation of delay of 1549 days in filing this criminal revision application on the ground that the petitioner-Sudhir Mathur in search of his job had gone outside the State of Jharkhand and when he contacted his counsel, who was conducting the trial in court below, he advised him to prefer this revision application before this Court for quashing of the order taking cognizance to the extent of Sections 420 and 120(b) I.P.C. and that since it is a bonafide and unintentional delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied on a judgment reported in (1981) 2 SCC 758 ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilal Sapuru and others wherein it has been held that the revisional power of the High Court cannot be restricted on technical grounds such as limitation and it was not justified to dismiss the revision petition on the ground of limitation. 5. Contrary to the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel representing the State contended that finding prima facie sufficient materials on record, the court below took cognizance of the offence and at the very threshold, the order taking cognizance cannot be set aside and there is no bar in taking cognizance of offences covered under the Penal Code. 6. Apparently, 13 boxes of foreign liquor kept inside the seized vehicle was recovered by the informant and during investigation, no evidence has come forward or any document has been produced on behalf of the accused-petitioner to disclose the sources from where they procured the said foreign liquor. The moment the petitioners and other accused persons entered into the territorial jurisdiction of Dhanbad from very that point of time, by not paying the excise duty, they have committed offence and it could be inferred that prima facie sufficient materials are on record to show that those liquors were brought to Dhanbad for its delivery to different agents. The moment the petitioners and other accused persons entered into the territorial jurisdiction of Dhanbad from very that point of time, by not paying the excise duty, they have committed offence and it could be inferred that prima facie sufficient materials are on record to show that those liquors were brought to Dhanbad for its delivery to different agents. The dishonest intention to cheat Government by petitioners and other accused could always be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the conduct of accused. Obviously, the ingredients responsible to constitute offence under Sections 420 and 120(b) I.P.C. are available on record. 7. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that when cognizance of offence has been taken under the provisions of Excise Act, no cognizance can be taken under any offence covered under the Penal Code, I am constrained to hold that merely because there may be overlapping in the two offences, it does not mean that the petitioners cannot be tried under the offence covered under the Penal Code when there is prima facie evidence available on record to show the dishonest intention to cheat Government by not paying excise duty. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora & Others; 2013 (10) SCC 581 while considering the question of quashing the entire criminal proceeding at early stage has held in paragraphs 30 and 31 as follows:- “30. It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not “kill a stillborn child”, and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial court at a later stage. 31. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned complaint or orders impugned herein. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.” 9. In the light of the ratio decided above, the court should not quash the order taking cognizance as a matter of rule especially when the ingredients of the offence as alleged are present. The court below would proceed to decide the question on the basis of the evidences led before it. 10. Since there is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to interfere in the order impugned, I do not find any cogent reason to condone the delay. Hence, the revision application, being devoid of any merit is, hereby, dismissed. The interlocutory application bearing no. 2333 of 2015 is also disposed of.