JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. A. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners. Heard also Mr. Y. Ashang, Addl. G.A., for the State Respondents, Mr. A. Mohendro, learned counsel for the private respondents no. 3 to 46, referred to as the contesting private respondents and Mr. P. Tamphamani, learned counsel for the respondents no. 47 to 61. 2. The petitioners have challenged the seniority list dated 15.12.2014 (Annexure-A/5 to the writ petition) for the post of Inspectors in the office of Registrar, Co-Operative Society, Manipur alleging that though the petitioners were regularly appointed earlier in the year 1994, the private respondents, who were regularly appointed subsequently in the year 1999, have been placed above the petitioners. 3. The petitioners contend that the petitioners were initially appointed as Inspectors on officiating basis during the period 06.12.1990 and 17.02.1992. As the petitioners continued to serve for a long period, they approached the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court for regularisation of their services by filing writ petitions being C.R. No.6 of 1993, C.R. No.8 of 1993, C.R. No.37 of 1993, C.R. No.1481 of 1992, and C.R. No.42 of 1992. In the said writ petitions, the Gauhati High Court passed an interim order on 30.3.93 to the effect that the petitioners shall not be ousted from service. 4. It has been submitted that while the aforesaid writ petitions were pending, the office of the Registrar, Co-Operative Society initiated the process for regularisation in different posts as per the Office Memorandum dated 22.08.1994. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as evident from the letter dated 21.2.1994 issued by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies prior to the regularization process, there were as many as 16 posts of Inspectors were lying vacant in the office of Registrar, Co-Operative Society. Mr. Bimol, submits that as the petitioners were continuing their Services on officiating basis as mentioned above, in terms of the policy decision of the State Government as contained in the aforesaid Office Memorandum, the officiating appointees were regularised by holding a special DPC. Thus, on the basis of the recommendation of the Class-III DPC held on 05.08.94 and as approved by the Government on 06.08.1994, the present petitioners along with 6 others were appointed as Inspectors, Co-Operative Societies in order of merit vide order dated 08.08.94 issued by the Registrar, Co-Operative Society (Annexure-A/4 to the writ petition). Thus, on the basis of the recommendation of the Class-III DPC held on 05.08.94 and as approved by the Government on 06.08.1994, the present petitioners along with 6 others were appointed as Inspectors, Co-Operative Societies in order of merit vide order dated 08.08.94 issued by the Registrar, Co-Operative Society (Annexure-A/4 to the writ petition). The aforesaid appointment order, was superceded by a subsequent order dated 31.8.94 clarifying that the petitioners and 6 others would be deemed to be appointed as Inspector of Co-Operative Society on regular basis w.e.f. 08.08.94. In view of regularisation of the services of the petitioners as Inspectors, the aforesaid writ petitions filed by the petitioners were also closed as not pressed vide order dated 24.11.94. Mr. Bimol submits that it is evidently clear that the petitioners were appointed as Inspectors under the direct recruitment quota on regular basis w.e.f. 08.08.94 and accordingly, their service benefits including seniority will be counted from 08.08.94. However, according to the petitioners, the problem has arisen because of the private respondents, who, though, were appointed subsequently in the year 1999, have been placed above the petitioners in the seniority list as mentioned above. 5. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the contesting private respondents, though were regularly appointed in the year 1999, were earlier appointed in various capacities as Inspectors against the ad-hoc vacancies. Mr. Bimol, submits that earlier a DPC was held on 12/13 Feb. 1987 on the recommendation of which a number of Inspectors were appointed. However, as the number of recommendees were more than the existing vacancies, these excess recommendees were placed in a panel list for appointment against further vacancies. The names of the respondents No. 3 to 15 were included in the said panel list. Mr. Bimol states that as far as the private respondents No.17 to 23 are concerned, they were recommended for appointment as Inspectors on the basis of the recommendation of the DPC held on 4.6.1991 to 27.6.1991 on ad-hoc basis against temporary vacancies caused due to ad-hoc promotion of 14 officials and the remaining private respondents were recommended for appointment against the temporary vacancies which were to come in the department due to retirement/promotion/expiry, etc. as is clearly evident from the proceeding of the DPC held on 4.6.1991 to 27.6.1991, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition. Mr. as is clearly evident from the proceeding of the DPC held on 4.6.1991 to 27.6.1991, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition. Mr. Bimol submits that on the basis of the recommendation of the DPCs held in 1987 and 1991, the private respondents were recommended for appointment temporarily on regular basis w.e.f. 01.01.1992 as mentioned in the order dated 25.8.1992 (Annexure-A/8 to the writ petition). However, subsequently, the State Government directed the Registrar, Co-Operative Society vide order dated 24.10.92 to modify the appointment order of the private respondents by indicating the temporary vacancies. Accordingly, the order was issued on 29.10.92 in respect of the private respondents wherein it has been shown that the private respondents No.3 to 16 were shown to be appointed as against vacancies caused by promotion of 14 Inspectors to the posts of Sub-Registrar. Similarly, in respect of remaining private respondents 17 to 23, they were given promotion against the vacancies caused by resultant vacancies in the higher posts and in respect of some of the private respondents, the nature of the vacancies has been shown to be caused by deputation and training as clearly evident from the order dated 29.10.1992 (Annexure-A/10 to the writ petition). Mr. Bimol, submits that this appointment order would clearly indicate that the private respondents were appointed against the ad-hoc/anticipated/deputation vacancies and certainly not against regular vacancies as in the case of the petitioners. 6. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel also has submitted that the fact that there were no regular vacancies to adjust the appointment of the contesting private respondents is clearly evident from the subsequent order of the Government dated 01.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts to accommodate these private respondents (Annexure-A/11 to the writ petition). In the said order, it has been mentioned that in compliance of the order of the Hon’ble High Court in C.R. No.6 of 1993, C.R. No.8 of 1993, C.R. No.37 of 1993, C.R. No.1481 of 1992, and C.R. No.42 of 1992, the State Government created 61 supernumerary posts in the grade of Inspector of Co-Operative Societies and that these supernumerary posts shall be abolished as and when existing incumbents are absorbed against the vacancies found in the regular establishment due to promotion/retirement/expiry. Mr. Mr. Bimol submits that the writ petitions mentioned in the said order dated 1.12.1999 are those writ petitions filed by the present writ petitioners but there was no direction of the High Court for creation of any supernumerary post. Mr. Bimol, alleges that the aforesaid writ petitions had been mentioned and invoked only for the purpose of creating supernumerary posts to favour the private respondents. He submits that as far as the present petitioners are concerned, the question of creation of supernumerary posts does not arise in as much as the Government had already indicated as far back as in the year 1994 as contained in the letter dated 21.2.1994 that 16 vacancies were available in the grade of Inspectors. Accordingly, Mr. Bimol contends that after the creation of supernumerary posts, the private respondents were appointed on regular basis vide order dated 4.12.1999. But by the said order, the petitioners were mistakenly shown to have been regularised along with these private respondents against the posts created under the supernumerary posts though such was not required for the petitioners as they had already stood regularised vide order dated 8.8.94 read with 31.8.94 as mentioned above. Mr. Bimol, further submits that perusal of the regularisation order dated 4.12.99 would show that there is no reference to any recommendation of any DPC. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel however, hastened to add that the aforesaid order dated 4.12.1999 was not brought to the knowledge of the petitioner. In any event, when the existence of this order dated 4.12.99 came to the notice of petitioners during the fixation of the impugned seniority list, the petitioners were compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ petition being, W.P(C) No.66 of 2015 challenging the said order. Mr. In any event, when the existence of this order dated 4.12.99 came to the notice of petitioners during the fixation of the impugned seniority list, the petitioners were compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ petition being, W.P(C) No.66 of 2015 challenging the said order. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel submits that the petitioners however, did not pursue the aforesaid writ petition in view of the stand taken by the State Government in the said writ petition that the petitioners were appointed as Inspectors of Co-Operative Societies on regular basis w.e.f. 8.8.94 against available vacancies on the recommendation of a duly constituted DPC and after obtaining approval from the Government and as such, the petitioners would be entitled to all the service benefits with effect from the date of their regular appointment as Inspectors of Co-Operative Societies i.e. 8.8.94 and there arises no question of depriving the petitioners of their rights or causing any prejudice to them by issuing the order on 4.12.99. In view of the aforesaid stand taken by the State respondents, the said writ petition was closed on 27.03.2015. 7. Mr. Bimol contends that it is thus clearly evident that the private respondents were actually appointed on regular basis only in the year 1999 by creating supernumerary posts though they were appointed earlier in the year 1992 on the recommendation of the DPCs. The initial appointments were against ad-hoc/anticipated/deputation vacancies as clearly mentioned in the appointment order dated 29.10.1992 and in that view of the matter, the contesting private respondents who were subsequently regularly appointed are not entitled to count their seniority from the date of initial temporary appointment made against the ad-hoc/anticipated/deputation vacancies but from the date when they were regularly appointed against vacancies by creating supernumerary posts in the year 1999. The contesting private respondents are to be treated as regular appointees in the grade of Inspectors under direct recruitment quota from the year 1999. In that event, placing of the private respondents above the petitioners is illegal, contends Mr. A. Bimol. 8. In this regard, Mr. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of V. Shreenivasa Reddy and ors. vs. Govt. of A.P. & ors., (1995) 1 Supp. SCC 572 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para No. 14 as follows. “14. A. Bimol. 8. In this regard, Mr. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of V. Shreenivasa Reddy and ors. vs. Govt. of A.P. & ors., (1995) 1 Supp. SCC 572 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para No. 14 as follows. “14. It is now settled law that appointment/promotion must be in accordance with the Rules, direct recruitee takes his seniority from the date of which he starts discharging the duty of the post borne on the cadre while a temporary appointed dehors the rules or an ad hoc basis or to a fortuitous vacancy gets seniority from the date of regular appointment.” 9. Similarly, referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Madalaimuthu & Anr., Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors, (2006) 6 SCC 558, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it stands to reason that a person who is appointed temporarily to discharge the functions in a particular post without recourse to the recruitment rules, cannot be said to be in service till such time as his appointment is regularized. It, therefore, follows that it is only from the date on which his services are regularized that such appointee can count his seniority in the cadre. 10. Accordingly, Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned seniority list of the Inspectors in the Registrar, Co-Operative Societies is required to be set aside and redrawn on the basis of the dates of regular appointments, in respect of the petitioners w.e.f. 08.08.94 and the contesting private respondents w.e.f. 4.12.99. 11. Mr. Mohendro, learned counsel appearing for the contesting private respondents, however, submits that it is not correct that these private respondents were regularly appointed in the year 1999. He submits that they were appointed in the year 1992 after they were recommended by a regularly constituted DPC after taking part in the written test and interview as part of the recruitment process after the posts were widely advertised through daily local papers and All India Radio as clearly evident from the proceedings of the DPC meeting held on 04.06.1991 to 27.06.1991. Mr. Mohendro submits that prior to that there was another DPC held on 12th & 13th February, 1987. Mr. Mohendro submits that prior to that there was another DPC held on 12th & 13th February, 1987. However, because of certain litigations, the result of the said DPC could not be declared and ultimately it reached the Supreme Court and as per the direction of the Supreme Court, another DPC was held from 04.06.1991 to 27.06.1991. Thus, the private respondents No. 3 to 13 who were already recommended by the DPC held in the year 1987, and kept in the penal list then, were appointed in 1992 along with the private respondents who were recommended by the DPC by the subsequent DPC held in 1991. Mr. Mohendro submits that as clearly mentioned in the Government letter dated 25.08.1992, the contesting private respondents were recommended for regular appointment as Inspectors w.e.f. 01.01.1992. Further, it has been also mentioned that their inter se seniority shall be in order as given in the said letter as per recommendation of the respective DPCs according to their merit. Subsequently, the contesting private respondents were appointed vide order dated 29.10.1992 against the vacancies shown in the said letter. It has been submitted that since the private respondents were given appointment on the basis of the recommendation of duly constituted DPCs after advertisement of the posts/vacancies and also taking part in the recruitment process, their appointment cannot be said to be not regular so as to deprive them the benefit of seniority. It has been submitted by Mr. Mohendro that not only the case of the contesting private respondents, but also in the case of petitioners they were appointed not against any regular vacancies but the regular vacancies against which the petitioners and the private respondents were adjusted were created on supernumerary basis later on, as evident from the order dated 01.12.1999 (Annexure A/11 to the writ petition). Mr. Mohendro submits that the aforesaid order dated 01.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts shows that 48 (forty-eight) numbers of Inspectors of Co-operative Society, Manipur were created on supernumerary basis for adjustment of those persons appointed vide Co-operative Department order dated 29.10.1992 i.e., the contesting private respondents. Similarly, another set of 13 posts of Inspectors were created on supernumerary basis to adjust the appointment of those who were appointed on 08.08.1994 as mentioned in the said letter dated 01.12.1999, i.e., the petitioners. Mr. Similarly, another set of 13 posts of Inspectors were created on supernumerary basis to adjust the appointment of those who were appointed on 08.08.1994 as mentioned in the said letter dated 01.12.1999, i.e., the petitioners. Mr. Mohendro submits that therefore, it is not correct to say that there were regular vacancies to the post of Inspectors in 1994 when the petitioners were regularly appointed. According to him, the earlier letter dated 21.02.1994 which indicates existence of 16 vacancies are actually resultant vacancies due to promotion/regularisation of Inspectors to the higher post of Sub-Registrars. The 16 vacancies shown in the said letter dated 21.02.1994 is nothing but anticipated vacancies which would arise on account of regularisation of Inspectors on promotion as Sub-Registrars. In other words, these were temporary vacancies. 12. Mr. Mohendro submits that the fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents were adjusted against subsequently caused regular vacancies, can be ascertained from the subsequent adjustment orders dated 10.08.2004, 16.07.2012 and 05.03.2013 (Annexures C/6, C/7 and C/8 filed by the respondent No. 33). The aforesaid orders clearly mention that the appointments of the petitioners as well as the private respondents which were earlier adjusted against supernumerary posts created in the year 1999 were again readjusted against the regular vacancies caused by expiry, retirement, promotion, etc. Thus, Mr. Mohendro submits that the aforesaid orders very clearly indicates that there were no regular vacancies either for the petitioners or for the private respondents in the year 1992 or 1994. In that view of the matter, Mr. Mohendro submits that seniority is to be counted from the respective dates of appointment in 1992 and 1994 and not from the date of availability of regular vacancies. In case of the contesting private respondents, even though substantive vacancies were not available at the time of their appointment in 1992, the fact remains that they were appointed by following all the procedures for regular appointment and as such they ought to be given the seniority from the date of the initial appointment in 1992 and not from the subsequent dates of actual accrual of regular vacancies. Mr. Mohendro also submits that all these orders issued in 2004, 2012 and 2013 had not been challenged by anybody including the present petitioners. 13. Mr. Mohendro, learned counsel also submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable at all. It has been submitted by Mr. Mr. Mohendro also submits that all these orders issued in 2004, 2012 and 2013 had not been challenged by anybody including the present petitioners. 13. Mr. Mohendro, learned counsel also submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable at all. It has been submitted by Mr. Mohendro that prior to publication of the impugned seniority list, a tentative seniority list was published in the year 2003, but the petitioners did not raise any objection. In the said tentative seniority list, the petitioners were placed below the private respondents which was not objected by the petitioners. Therefore, if the petitioners had not raised any objection to it, it would be deemed that they had accepted such a position. Thus, they have waived their rights, if any, to challenge the subsequent seniority list, based on earlier seniority lists. It has been submitted by Mr. Mohendro that apart from that, another tentative seniority list was published in the year 2007 in which the petitioners were shown to be junior to the private respondents. 14. Thereafter, a tentative seniority list was published on 28.04.2009 against which the petitioners No. 1, 3, 4 and 6 submitted their objections. However, the said objections were rejected by the authority on 05.10.2009 stating that the posts held by the petitioners are against supernumerary posts and there is nothing wrong in keeping the private respondents above the petitioners. It has been submitted that the aforesaid letter dated 05.10.2009 has not been challenged by the petitioners. Thereafter, the final seniority list was published on 06.01.2010. 15. It has been submitted by Mr. Mohendro that it was only after lapse of four years that the petitioners submitted a representation on 07.04.2014 for reviewing the earlier seniority list dated 06.01.2010. The said final seniority list was challenged by the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 269 of 2014, which was disposed of by directing the respondent authorities to consider the representation submitted by the petitioners. In terms of the aforesaid direction of the Hon’ble Court, the respondent No. 2 disposed of the representation vide order dated 03.09.2014 thereby confirming the final seniority position of the private respondents and the petitioners as on 01.12.2009 vide seniority list issued on 06.01.2010. It has been submitted that the present impugned seniority list dated 15.12.2014 is merely a revised seniority list by deleting the names of those expired or retired in the meantime. It has been submitted that the present impugned seniority list dated 15.12.2014 is merely a revised seniority list by deleting the names of those expired or retired in the meantime. It has been submitted that the writ petitioners have not mentioned all these facts and hence they have not approached this Court with clean hands. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the petition is liable to be dismissed for not coming with clean hands and is also hit by principle of waiver. 16. Mr. Mohendro relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal & Anr. Vs. Dinesh Kumar Sharma, (2007) 1 SCC 683 has submitted that the date of substantive appointment is to be taken into account and not the date of occurrence of vacancy for determining seniority. In the present case, since the private respondents were appointed on substantive basis in 1992, they are entitled to count their seniority from 1992. Mr. Mohendro relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indu Shekhar Singh and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 129 has submitted that the right to claim seniority is not a fundamental right but merely a civil right and as such, the right is to be decided purely by the statutory rules and as such, he cannot enforce the same by invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Mombisana Singh Vs. Kh. Tomba Singh & Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 747 Mr. Mohendro has submitted that in absence of any statutory rules to determine seniority list, the State is required to evolve a policy and since there is no such policy, in the present case the seniority list should be fixed from the date of substantive appointment. Further, relying of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. B. Jayaraman, (1994) Supp 1 SCC 95 he submits that seniority is to be determined by reckoning the length of service. In the present case, the private respondents had been appointed in 1992 and had rendered service longer that the petitioners and hence ought to be senior to the petitioners. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.C. Gupta Vs. N.K. Pandey, (1988) 1 SCC 316 Mr. In the present case, the private respondents had been appointed in 1992 and had rendered service longer that the petitioners and hence ought to be senior to the petitioners. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.C. Gupta Vs. N.K. Pandey, (1988) 1 SCC 316 Mr. Mohendro submits that the inordinate delay in challenging the order of seniority would be fatal. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Janam Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., (1994) 2 SCC 622 Mr. Mohendro submits that determination of seniority with reference to the date of entering in the service will be consistent with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in the present case, the seniority should be decided on the basis of continuous length of service as it will be safest and reasonable principle to be adopted. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 715 , Mr. Mohendro submits that the seniority should be reckoned from the date of regular appointment and not from the date of confirmation. He submits that the confirmation can arise only when the substantive vacancy or regular vacancy arises. In the present case also the private respondents had been regularly appointed earlier in 1992, and as such subsequent occurrence of substantive vacancy ought not to be a factor to deny seniority from the earlier date of appointment in 1992. Mr. Mohendro further relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.Chandrasekaran & Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 69 submits that the present writ petition ought to be dismissed as the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands in as much as the petitioners have not disclosed the fact that the authorities had disposed of the representation against the seniority list vide order dated 03.09.2014 by which the claim of seniority of the petitioners was rejected. 17. Mr. Y. Ashang, learned G.A. appearing for the State respondents has contended that when the petitioners were appointed in the year 1994 there were no regular vacancies. In fact, this is clearly evident from the order dated 01.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts for adjusting their appointments in the year 1994. Mr. 17. Mr. Y. Ashang, learned G.A. appearing for the State respondents has contended that when the petitioners were appointed in the year 1994 there were no regular vacancies. In fact, this is clearly evident from the order dated 01.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts for adjusting their appointments in the year 1994. Mr. Y. Ashang also submits that the effective date of appointment of the petitioners is 08.08.1994 and in case of the private respondents, 01.01.1992, as are clearly mentioned in their respective appointment orders. Mr. Y. Ashang submits that in the final re-adjustment orders issued in 2004, 2012 and 2013, while readjusting the appointments of the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents against the regular vacancies caused by expiry, retirement, promotion, etc., it has been clearly mentioned in the said orders that these orders of readjustment will not disturb the other conditions contained in their initial appointment orders. Thus, the petitioners and the contesting private respondents will be treated to have been appointed in the year 1994 and 1992 respectively. 18. Mr. Y. Ashang submits that the seniority position of the present petitioners and the contesting private respondents have been determined in accordance with the effective date of appointment mentioned in their respective appointment orders, and as such the petitioners would be placed below the private respondents. 19. Heard also Mr. P. Tamphamani, learned counsel for the respondents No. 47-61 who submits that they are above the petitioners as well as other private respondents no. 3 to 46 in seniority to which Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. Mohendro, Ld. counsel for the remaining private respondents have no issue. Mr. Tamphamani submits that this issue of seniority has been lingering for the last 20 years and because of this pending case they had been deprived of the opportunity of being promoted to the higher posts and prays that the petition be dismissed, stay order be vacated, and direction be issued for considering promotion to the higher posts. 20. Mr. A. Bimol, in response, has submitted that the real issue before this Court is about determination of seniority on the basis of the date of regular appointment. 20. Mr. A. Bimol, in response, has submitted that the real issue before this Court is about determination of seniority on the basis of the date of regular appointment. According to him, the petitioners had been appointed on regular basis in 1994 whereas in respect of private respondents, it is clearly mentioned in their appointment order that their appointment is purely on temporary basis and they were regularly appointed subsequently in the year 1999. Therefore, the question of giving seniority to the private respondents from the date of appointment on temporary basis in the year 1992 ought not be allowed. He submits that unless the appointment is regular, seniority cannot be given under any other kind of appointment including temporary appointment. 21. As regards the contention of the private respondents that the petitioners had not come with clean hands, and that the petition is hit by waiver, it has been submitted that these facts about the non challenging of the earlier seniority list or the rejection by the authority of the representation filed by some of petitioners is no more relevant in view of the fact that the final seniority list which was published in the year 2010 was challenged by the petitioners and as such, the issue of concealing of facts does not arise. It has been submitted that the State respondents had filed two contradicting affidavits, in one of which the State had taken the stand that the petitioners were appointed on regular basis while in the other affidavit it has been stated that there were no regular vacancies, which amounts to filing false affidavits and as such the concerned official deponent is liable for criminal contempt. 22. From the above contentions of the rival parties what this Court could make out is that the dispute for seniority is amongst two groups of persons appointed under the direct recruitment quota to the post of Inspectors. The petitioners contended that they had been regularly appointed in the year 1994 whereas the main contesting private respondents No. 3 to 46 were appointed on regular basis subsequently in the year 1999. And as such, these private respondents subsequently appointed on regular basis are to be placed below the petitioners while fixing the seniority list. The petitioners contended that they had been regularly appointed in the year 1994 whereas the main contesting private respondents No. 3 to 46 were appointed on regular basis subsequently in the year 1999. And as such, these private respondents subsequently appointed on regular basis are to be placed below the petitioners while fixing the seniority list. The contesting private respondents as well as the State Government on the other hand, however, contended that they were appointed in the year 1992 by following the rules, though there might not be regular vacancies at the time, which is also true of the present petitioners, in as much as when the petitioners were regularly appointed in the year 1994, there were no regular vacancies and all the regular vacancies came to existence only in the year 1999 when supernumerary posts were created. Accordingly, the contesting private respondents are entitled to count their seniority w.e.f. 1992. 23. The other issues raised are whether the present writ petition is barred by principle of waiver and whether the petitioners had not approached this Court with clean hands for which the present petition is liable to be non suited. 24. Dealing with the first issue relating to the respective dates of regular appointments, it may be noted that as per the relevant recruitment rules, 85% of the posts of Inspectors are to be filled up by way of direct recruitment and remaining 15% by promotion. Since this dispute is confined amongst the direct recruits only, the dates of regular appointments will be crucial for determination of the inter se seniority amongst them. Both the contending parties are agreeable to the principle that the seniority will be based on the date of regular appointment amongst the direct recruits. This naturally would lead to the determination as to when the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents were regularly appointed. It is also now well settled that a person can be said to be regularly appointed only when he or she is appointed by following the recruitment rules and against regular vacancies in which event, such person can be said to be borne in the cadre and become a member of the cadre. Thus, keeping in mind these basic principles, we may proceed to examine the issue at hand. 25. Thus, keeping in mind these basic principles, we may proceed to examine the issue at hand. 25. The petitioners claim that they were regularly appointed in the year 1994 vide orders dated 08.08.1994 read with 31.08.1994 on the basis of recommendation of a class III DPC purportedly against regular vacancies. As regards this claim that they were regularly appointed in the year 1994 against the regular vacancies, the petitioners have relied on the letter dated 21.02.1994 in which it has been shown that 16 vacant posts of Inspectors were available, which of course, has been disputed by the contesting private respondents. Since the aforesaid order dated 21.02.1994 is crucial for determination whether there were regular vacancies at the relevant time or not, the same is reproduced hereinbelow:- “NO.E-COOP/6/853 GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES: MANIPUR Imphal, the 21st February, 1994. To, The Addl.Chief Secy.(Coopn.), Government of Manipur. Sub:- Apptt./Extension of Inspectors validity of Vacant post - regarding. Sir, With reference to your letter No.101/83/74-Coop/(IV)/11 dated 24-1-94 on the above subject I have the honour to furnish vacancy position of Cooperative Department in detail is given below. The following statement/chart will observe the expected resultant vacancies. Sl. No. Name of the posts Sanctioned strength No. of Officers holding the post Remarks 1. Addl. RCS 1 NIL Vacant. 2. Jt. RCS 4 6 They are adhoc Employees including three deputation. 3. Dy. RCS 12 15 Out of 15 Dy. RCS 11 Dy. RCS is drawing their pay as ARCS list is furnished. 4. Sub-Registrar 92 92 2 S/R are Regularised. 90 S/R on adhoc basis. 3 S/R on deputation. 6. Inspector 187 171 16 posts are vacant. It is observed from the above chart that the following vacancy will be available. 1. Addl. RCS 1 2. ARCS 1 1 post is clear vacancy. 3. Sub-Registrar 3 Deputation vacancy. 4. Inspector 16 Resultant vacancy due to the regularisation of Sub- Registrar. 5. Anticipated vacancy on retirement during 1994. 8 Total : 29 It is pointed out that no of excess existing substitute/officiating Inspector are 63 numbers including 13 Inspectors extended upto 31-10-1993. The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court has instructed not to oust them without the approval of the court. Yours faithfully, Sd/ (S. Devasekhar Sharma) Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Manipur.” (emphasis added) 26. Mr. 8 Total : 29 It is pointed out that no of excess existing substitute/officiating Inspector are 63 numbers including 13 Inspectors extended upto 31-10-1993. The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court has instructed not to oust them without the approval of the court. Yours faithfully, Sd/ (S. Devasekhar Sharma) Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Manipur.” (emphasis added) 26. Mr. Bimol, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on the basis of the aforesaid letter dated 21.02.1994 which shows the vacancy position in the grade of Inspectors, the DPC was held in terms of the Office Memorandum dated 22.08.1994 which provides for regularisation of posts held by the present petitioners against the direct recruitment quota. It has been stated that the aforesaid regularisation of the petitioners could not have been affected unless there were regular vacancies. 27. That apart, the petitioners have also relied on the stand taken by the State respondents in a subsequent writ petition filed by the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 66 of 2015 in which the State respondents had filed an affidavit to the effect that the petitioners were appointed as Inspectors Co-operative Societies vide order dated 08.08.1994 on regular basis against available vacancies on the recommendation of a duly constituted DPC and after obtaining approval from the Government. Therefore, they are entitled to all service benefits from the date of appointment as Inspectors of Cooperative Societies i.e. 08.08.1994. 28. Accordingly, Mr. Bimol relying on the aforesaid document and actions of the State viz., the letter dated 21.02.1994, regularisation order dated 08.08.1994 read with order dated 31.08.1994 and the order of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 66 of 2015 dated 27.03.2015, has strenuously argued that since the petitioners were appointed on regular basis against existing regular vacancies, the petitioners would be entitled to reckon their seniority with effect from the date of regular appointment i.e. 08.08.1994. Mr. Bimol has contrasted the case of the contesting private respondents by contending that in the case of the contesting private respondents, they were appointed purely on temporary basis in the year 1994 as Inspectors as clearly mentioned in their appointment order dated 29.10.1992 and also in the subsequent regular appointment order issued on 04.12.1999 after the creation of supernumerary posts. Bimol has contrasted the case of the contesting private respondents by contending that in the case of the contesting private respondents, they were appointed purely on temporary basis in the year 1994 as Inspectors as clearly mentioned in their appointment order dated 29.10.1992 and also in the subsequent regular appointment order issued on 04.12.1999 after the creation of supernumerary posts. While the contesting private respondents have not denied the creation of supernumerary posts in the year 1999 to adjust their appointment to the posts of Inspectors on regular basis, yet their plea is that they were appointed in the year 1992 in accordance with rules i.e. on the basis of recommendation of a Selection Committee after going through the recruitment process consisting of written test and viva voce, thus having competed along with other eligible candidates after the posts/vacancies were advertised as clearly mentioned in the proceedings of the DPC held on 04.06.1991 to 27.06.1991. The contesting private respondents have also specifically denied that there were vacancies in the year 1994 as claimed by the petitioners. 29. Since the claim of regular appointment has a nexus with the availability of regular vacancy as in the present case, there could not have been regular appointment without substantive vacancy, this Court has proceeded to examine further in detail the rival claims of the parties to ascertain whether there were indeed regular vacancies to the posts of Inspectors when appointments of the petitioners and the respondents were made in the year 1994 and 1992 respectively. In this regard, the Court will first examine the letter dated 02.02.1994 as quoted above, which forms the basis of the claim of the petitioners that there were 16 posts of regular vacancies available in the grade of Inspectors against which they were regularly appointed in 1994. Para No. 2 of the aforesaid letter, however, uses the expression “The following statement/chart will observe expected resultant vacancies”, thus using the words “expected resultant vacancies” rather than “regular vacancies”. Similarly, in the 3rd paragraph of the letter, the following expression is used, “It is observed from the above chart that the following vacancies will be available”. In the chart referred to in the 3rd paragraph in respect of post of Inspector at Sl. No. 4 on the remark column, it has been mentioned as “Resultant vacancy due to the regularisation of Sub-Registrar”. In the chart referred to in the 3rd paragraph in respect of post of Inspector at Sl. No. 4 on the remark column, it has been mentioned as “Resultant vacancy due to the regularisation of Sub-Registrar”. The last paragraph also uses the extended upto “It is pointed out that no. of excess existing substitute/officiating Inspector are 63 numbers including 13 Inspectors 31-10-1993.The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court has instructed not to oust them without the approval of the court.” Thus, a perusal of the aforesaid letter 21.02.1994 would clearly indicate that the vacancies which are shown existing at that time in respect of Inspectors were really not regular vacancies but future/resultant vacancies which would be available. These 16 expected resultant vacancies were possibly on account of regularisation in the higher post of Sub-Registrar which were, presumably, filled up from amongst the Inspectors. Therefore, what this letter indicates is that once these Inspectors who were appointed to the higher posts of Sub-Registrars were regularised to the post of Sub-Registrars, 16 resultant vacancies would accrue in the grade of Inspectors. The fact that there were no regular vacancies at the relevant time is also corroborated by the last paragraph of the said letter which mentions that there were excess appointment to the post of Inspectors by way of substituted/officiating basis numbering 63 which also includes 13 Inspectors which was referring to the petitioners and others. In the light of the above analysis the contention of the contesting private respondents that this letter dated 21.02.1994 does not really show the existence of “regular” vacancies but these vacancies were merely expected/resultant vacancies and in fact, the thirteen persons including the petitioners were also excess appointees who were appointed on officiating basis, seems to be more plausible and acceptable. The aforesaid letter does not clearly indicate that 16 posts of regular vacancies in the grade of Inspectors were available when the aforesaid letter was written on 21.02.1994. There is also no knowing whether just before the special DPC was held, substantive/ regular vacancies arose after regular promotion of Inspectors to higher posts. 30. Mr. Bimol has strenuously argued that the petitioners were “regularly appointed” as clearly mentioned in their appointment order, which is what really matters according to him to claim seniority from the date of appointment order. 30. Mr. Bimol has strenuously argued that the petitioners were “regularly appointed” as clearly mentioned in their appointment order, which is what really matters according to him to claim seniority from the date of appointment order. The regularisation was made on the basis of the Office Memorandum dated 21.08.1994 which was issued by the State Government a policy decision to regularise ad-hoc appointees against the direct recruitment posts. Though the regularisation order of the petitioners has not been challenged, nor its validity has been raised by anybody including the present petitioners, this Court finds that the aforesaid Office Memorandum dated 22.08.1994 on the basis of which the petitioners were regularly appointed was meant for ad-hoc appointees and not officiating appointees. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were initially appointed on officiating basis and not by way of ad-hoc basis. Their initial appointment order clearly mention that they were appointed on officiating basis against deputation vacancies. Though the petitioners might not have been strictly eligible under the Office Memorandum dated 22.08.1994, they nonetheless have been given regular appointment in terms of the aforesaid Office Memorandum. Therefore, even if the validity of their regular appointment is upheld, this Court needs to examine further as to whether such regular appointment order will also confer the benefit of seniority to the petitioner from the date of regular appointment in the present context. 31. Coming to the order dated 27.03.2015 passed in W.P. (C) No. 66 of 2015, wherein the authorities had taken a stand in their affidavit-in-opposition that the petitioners were regularly appointed as Inspectors of Co-operative Societies w.e.f. 08.08.1994 against available vacancies, it may be also mentioned that the respondents have not used the expression, “regular vacancies” but, only “against available vacancies” in the said affidavit. This Court would like to mention that averments made in affidavits, based on documents, are normally relied on by the Court while dealing with writ petitions in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, such averments, if do not correctly reflect the contents and nature of the document/evidence on record, may not have binding effect and the Court can draw necessary conclusions on the basis of such records/ documents, rather than the averments based on such records/documents, unless there is a specific judicial conclusion or finding of fact recorded. However, such averments, if do not correctly reflect the contents and nature of the document/evidence on record, may not have binding effect and the Court can draw necessary conclusions on the basis of such records/ documents, rather than the averments based on such records/documents, unless there is a specific judicial conclusion or finding of fact recorded. It may be noted that this Court had not given any finding in the said writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 66 of 2015 but merely noted the submission of the petitioners and directed to take necessary actions accordingly. This Court, however, would proceed with the presumption that at the time of holding the said DPC in the year 1994 for regularisation of the service of the petitioners, there were regular vacancies available. 32. However, in spite of such presumption and averments made in the affidavit of the State as mentioned above, there are other documents which have been brought to the notice of this Court by the contesting private respondents as well as the State Government that when the petitioners were regularised in 1994 there were no regular or substantive vacancies. This Court finds difficulty in brushing aside and ignoring the aforesaid contention of the contesting respondents as well as the State that there were no substantive vacancies since the year 1992 and substantive/regular vacancies came into existence only by creation of supernumerary posts in the year 1999 against which the appointments of the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents as Inspectors were adjusted and thereafter, only on accrual of a regular/substantive vacancies on account of retirement, death, promotion, etc. in the year 2004 onwards, the appointment of the petitioners and the private respondents were actually readjusted against substantive vacancies to the post of Inspectors. 33. Apart from the letter dated 21.2.1994, which does not clearly indicate that the vacancies in the grade of Inspectors were “regular” or “substantive”, there is a letter dated 25.03.1994 from the Respondent no. 1 to the Registrar of Societies written with reference to the earlier letter dated 21.2.1994 before the regularisation of the petitioners (Annexure C/4 and R/4 of the affidavits in opposition of the private respondents). It provides a different perspective which will be relevant for determining as to whether there were regular vacancies or not in the grade of Inspectors at the relevant time. It provides a different perspective which will be relevant for determining as to whether there were regular vacancies or not in the grade of Inspectors at the relevant time. The said letter dated 25.3.1994 reads as follows: “No.101/83/74-Coop (V) Government of Manipur Secretariat: Co-operation Department Imphal, the 25th March, 1994. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Manipur. Sub:-Apptt./extension of Inspector validity of vacant post. Sir, I am directed to refer to your letter No.E-Co-op/6/65 dt. 21-2-94 on the above subject & to point out that number of excess existing substitute/officiating Inspectors as 63 appears not to show correct position. Out of the 63 Inspectors, regular appointment of 48 Inspectors on the recommendation of the DPC have already been cleared vide your order No.E-Co-op/6/85/V-II dated 29-10-92. At this late stage to treat their apptt. as not regular would unnecessarily invite complications which will only lead to time consuming & expensive litigation. The 13 adhoc Inspectors have already obtained High Court order not to oust them from service & continuing upto March 94 should be regularised by holding a special DPC in the first week of April 94 without fail. A suitable date may kindly be fixed and submit proposal for nomination of 3rd Member of the DPC. Yours faithfully, Sd/ (L. Jitendra Sharma) Under Secretary (Co-operation), Government of Manipur, Imphal.” 34. What the said letter dated 25.3.1994 suggests is that, of the 63 excess appointments in the grade of Inspectors as mentioned in the last paragraph of the letter dated 21.2.1994, 48 were appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the DPC vide order dated 29.10.1992, (which is the appointment order of the contesting private respondents). The State Government decided to treat the appointment of the 48 appointees as Inspectors to be regular so as to avoid any expensive litigation and complications as the appointments of the said 48 Inspectors were made only after the Hon’ble Supreme Court intervened and passed the order on 9.4.1991 in SLP No.497/91. After taking such a position, the State Government also seem to proceed to treat the remaining vacancies to be regular so that the petitioners could be also regularised. Accordingly, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was directed to hold a Special DPC for regularisation of the remaining excess appointees (i.e., the petitioners and others). After taking such a position, the State Government also seem to proceed to treat the remaining vacancies to be regular so that the petitioners could be also regularised. Accordingly, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was directed to hold a Special DPC for regularisation of the remaining excess appointees (i.e., the petitioners and others). In fact the State Government while giving approval to the appointment of the private respondents treated the appointment of the 48 Inspectors (the contesting private respondents herein) to be regular as mentioned in the approval letter dated 25.08.1992 (Annexure A/8 to the petition). From the aforesaid said letter of the State Government dated 25.3.1994, what one can make out is that the appointment of 48 Inspectors (the private respondents herein) should be treated as regular and accordingly, the remaining 13 excess appointees in the grade of Inspectors (which includes the present petitioners) should be regularised by holding a special DPC by treating these vacancies as regular vacancies. 35. It was in the said background that the regularization process of the present petitioners was initiated by treating the vacancies as regular. In other words, what one can conclude is that since the appointments of the 48 Inspectors were to be treated as regular, the services of the petitioners could be regularised by holding Special DPC by treating the vacancies as regular. This explains the reason why the State Government in their affidavit in opposition in W.P. (C) No. 66 of 2015 stated that the petitioners were regularised against available vacancies, though without using the expression existing regular vacancies. The vacancies which existed in 1994 were not really “substantive” or “regular” vacancies in the sense understood in service jurisprudence, but were resultant temporary vacancies due to appointment of Inspectors to the higher grade of Sub-Registrars. But the State government in order to avoid any complications or costly litigation decided to treat all these 63 vacancies to be regular for making regular appointment of the private respondents as well as the petitioners. 36. Accordingly, in order to rectify this shortcoming and to regularise the appointments of the respondents and the present petitioners, the State Government resorted to creating supernumerary posts in the year 1999 vide order dated 1.12.1999 (Annexure A/11) on the basis of which the fresh regularisation order dated 4.12.1999 was issued covering both the contesting private respondents as well as the petitioners. 37. 37. The aforesaid order dated 1.12.1999 being also significant is reproduced herein below. “GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIAT: COOPERATION DEPARTMENT ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR: MANIPUR Imphal, the 29th November, 1999. 1st December No.2/3/97-Co-op: In compliance with the orders of the Hon’ble High Court in C.R. Nos. 124/91, 1428/92, 6/93, 8/93 and 37/93, the Governor of Manipur is pleased to accord ex-post facto sanction to the creation of the following supernumerary posts in the Co-operative Department, Manipur for the surplus staff appointed by the Department under the orders of Registrar, Co-operative Societies indicated below against the posts: Sl. No. Name of the posts Pay scale No.of post created. Remarks. 1 2 3 4 5 Inspector Co-operative Societies. Rs.1350-30-1440- 40-1800-EB-50- 2200/- (pre-revised). 48 Appointed vide Co-op.Department orders No. E-Coop/6/85/ Vol-II dt.29-10-92. 2. do Do 13 Appointed vide Co-op. Department orders No. E-Coop/6/85/ Vol-II dt. 3-8-94. 3. L.D.C. Rs. 950-20-1150- EB-25-1500/- 11 Appointed vide Co-op. Deptt. orders No. E-Co-op/ 4/7/85(Pt-I) dt. 2-1-92, 4-1-92, 9-1-92, 13-1-92, 17-1-92,20-1-92, 20-2-92, 28-2-92,and 16-4-92, and No.E-Co-op/12/85 dt. 23.1.92. 2. Further, the Governor of Manipur is pleased to order that the Supernumerary posts so created shall be abolished as and when the existing incumbants are absorbed againsat the vacancies available in regular establishment are available for their accommodation arising due to promotion, retirement, expiry etc. 3. The expenditure involved is debitable to the appropriate Head of Account under Non-Plan of the Co-operative Department, Manipur. This issues with the concurrence of Finance Department, Government of Manipur vide their U.O.No.1/1999-2000/FD(16/p266) dated 27-11-99. By orders and in the name of Governor, Sd/ (S. Kulachandra Singh) Deputy Secretary (Co-op), Govt. of Manipur. Copy to:- 1. The Accountant General (A&E), Manipur. 2. The Joint Secretary (Finance), Govt. of Manipur. 3. The Joint Secretary (DP), Govt. of Manipur. 4. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Manipur. He is requested to strictly comply with the orders contained in para 2 above. Further, he is also requested to intimate the action taken by him in this regard. 5. All Treasury Officers/Sub-Treasury Officers, Manipur. 6. Guard file/Orders book.” 38. The aforesaid order dated 1.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts clearly indicates the number of supernumerary posts to accommodate the 48 Inspectors appointed in 1992 (i.e., the private respondents) and the 13 Inspectors appointed in 1994 (i.e., including the petitioners). 5. All Treasury Officers/Sub-Treasury Officers, Manipur. 6. Guard file/Orders book.” 38. The aforesaid order dated 1.12.1999 creating supernumerary posts clearly indicates the number of supernumerary posts to accommodate the 48 Inspectors appointed in 1992 (i.e., the private respondents) and the 13 Inspectors appointed in 1994 (i.e., including the petitioners). This supernumerary post creation order clearly indicates that there were no “regular” or “substantive” vacancies in 1992 when the private respondents were given appointed and also in the year 1994 when the petitioners and others were regularised. 39. Though Mr. A.Bimol has strenuously argued before this Court that the petitioners were regularised on the basis of the recommendation of the Special DPC held in 1994 against regular vacancies, this Court finds that acceptance of such a contention would lead to an incongruous situation. If the petitioners were regularised against “regular” vacancies by holding a Special DPC only for the petitioners and without considering the claim of other eligible candidates, will it be fair and reasonable and not violate the mandate of Article 14 and 16? If the privates respondents who were appointed on the recommendation of a regular DPC as per rules and after subjecting them to competition with written test and interview along with other eligible candidates after public notification are also not considered along with the petitioners against such “regular” vacancies, can such procedure or action of the State pass the test of Article 14 and 16? If there were “regular” or “substantive” vacancies available in the year 1994, those vacancies ought to have been offered to the private respondents first as they were holding the posts of Inspectors on temporary basis after going through a regular selection process. Appointment of some of the private respondents ought to have been made regular by making adjustment against these 13 “regular” vacancies, rather than considering the claims of the petitioners. It would be iniquitous if the private respondents who were appointed after going through the regular process of recruitment in terms of the recruitment rules are continued to keep on temporary basis and their claims are ignored but considering the case of the petitioners only, by following a special process dehors the regular process by holding a Special DPC. It would be iniquitous if the private respondents who were appointed after going through the regular process of recruitment in terms of the recruitment rules are continued to keep on temporary basis and their claims are ignored but considering the case of the petitioners only, by following a special process dehors the regular process by holding a Special DPC. The allegedly “regular” vacancies to which the petitioners and others were considered for regularisation were not “personal” to them or reserved only for the petitioners, but were equally open to other “temporary” appointees like the contesting private respondents. In fact, this Court would hold that the private respondents who were also “tested” on merit by competition would have a better claim than the petitioners against those “regular” vacancies. Further, the Office Memorandum dated 22.8.1994 on the basis of which the petitioners were regularised is not part of the recruitment rules but a bounty from the State by way of a policy decision to benefit only a few persons without subjecting them to the regular recruitment process as per rules, but by making an exception to the normal rules. Obviously, the petitioners could not be made to steal a march over the private respondents while considering regularisation under the Office Memorandum. 40. Therefore, this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above would hold that there were no regular or substantive vacancies when the petitioners were regularised through a Special DPC in the year 1994 as in the case of the private respondents when they were appointed in the year 1994. 41. This position adopted by the Court is not contrary to the contents of the letter dated 21.2.1994 as the said letter does not clearly mention that the vacancies available at that time were “regular” vacancies and is also in conformity with the stand taken by the State Government in 1994 vide letter date 25.3.1994 before the petitioners were regularised by holding a Special DPC. Nor this stand is inconsistent with the regularisation order of the petitioners dated 8.8.1994 or the stand taken by the State Government in their affidavit in opposition filed in W.P.(C) No. 66 of 2015, as the State Government has not used the expression “regular vacancies” in the appointment order/affidavit. 42. Nor this stand is inconsistent with the regularisation order of the petitioners dated 8.8.1994 or the stand taken by the State Government in their affidavit in opposition filed in W.P.(C) No. 66 of 2015, as the State Government has not used the expression “regular vacancies” in the appointment order/affidavit. 42. This position will also be in conformity with the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution as regards the private respondents vis a vis the petitioners. The position adopted by the petitioners, if accepted, will lead to an anomalous situation, by giving undue benefit to the petitioners who were appointed initially on officiating basis against no substantive vacancy and without going through any selection process. Their initial appointment orders clearly mention that they had been appointed on officiating against deputation vacancies [vide Annexure A/1(Colly). Therefore, considering regular appointment of the petitioners by ignoring the case of other eligible candidates, and in the present case by ignoring the superior claim of the private respondents who were recommended by duly constituted DPCs as per rules would be violative of the equality clause as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In fact the private respondents have charged that some of the petitioners had participated in the regular DPC held in 1991 but they were not recommended which allegation has not denied by the petitioners. For example, it has been alleged that the petitioner no. 1 had appeared in the DPC held from 4.6.1991 to 27.6.1991 but was not selected. 43. The aforesaid view taken by this Court is also consistent with the subsequent orders of regularisation passed on 10.8.2004, 16.7.2012, 5.3.2013 (Annexures D/5, D/6 and D/7). In the order dated 10.8.2004 which was issued for readjustment against regular vacancies caused due to expiry, retirement, promotion etc. of the appointment of the private respondents, earlier adjusted by creating supernumerary posts, it has been specifically provided that this readjustment order will not disturb the conditions mentioned in the earlier appointment order dated 29.10.1992. Similarly, in the readjustment order dated 16.7.2012 it has been mentioned that the conditions contained in the earlier orders dated 29.10.1992 and 31.8.1994 will not be disturbed. Similar provision was made in the readjustment order dated 5.3.2013. 44. Similarly, in the readjustment order dated 16.7.2012 it has been mentioned that the conditions contained in the earlier orders dated 29.10.1992 and 31.8.1994 will not be disturbed. Similar provision was made in the readjustment order dated 5.3.2013. 44. What these readjustment orders dated 10.8.2004, 16.7.2012, 5.3.2013 clearly indicate is that the appointment of the private respondents in 1992 and the petitioners in 1994 were not against “regular” vacancies and their appointments have been adjusted later against subsequent regular vacancies when regular vacancies became available on account of expiry, retirement, promotion etc. However, the fact they had entered service as Inspectors in 1994 and 1992 will remain undisturbed and other service conditions will remain unaffected. 45. From the above analysis, the following situation emerges. On the one hand there is a group of direct recruits as Inspectors, i.e., the private respondents, who were appointed on the recommendation of duly constituted DPCs after they were subjected to written test and interview, thus following the regular recruitment process as per rules, though against vacancies which arose due to appointment of Inspectors to higher posts/deputation/training etc. On the other hand there is another group of Inspectors, i.e., the petitioners and others who were regularly appointed without going through the regular process of recruitment but by making exception to the general rules of public notification by advertising or through the employment exchange, but by merely applying the Office Memorandum dated 22.8.1994 which did not involve any scrutiny of the inter se merit of the eligible candidates and against vacancies, of which there is no incontrovertible material or document to show unambiguously that these vacancies were “regular” or “substantive” in nature to endow irrefutably the status of being a regular appointee. 46. While in respect of the private respondents, the shortcoming seems to be that though they were appointed after going through the regular recruitment process in 1992, regular vacancies were not available at the time of their appointment. 46. While in respect of the private respondents, the shortcoming seems to be that though they were appointed after going through the regular recruitment process in 1992, regular vacancies were not available at the time of their appointment. On the other hand, the shortcoming in respect of the appointment of the petitioners in 1994 is that though in the appointment orders, it is recorded as regular appointments, they were never subjected to any scrutiny on merit and the claim of other eligible candidates were not considered as required under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, but by way of special dispensation of the State, that too against vacancies of doubtful nature, as to whether “regular”/ “substantive” or not. 47. The parties on either side have not produced any rule of seniority as applicable in the State to determine the inter-se seniority of such groups of direct recruits. 48. It is well settled that in order to resolve the dispute relating to seniority, it should be ascertained as to whether there are any statutory provisions operating in the field and in absence of any such statutory rules, the executive instructions framed by the Government can be relied upon. Where, there are no such statutory rules or administrative instructions for fixation of seniority, the general principles evolved by judicial pronouncements would be applicable. In the present there are no statutory rules governing fixation of seniority rules. As regards any executive instructions, the counsel for the contesting parties have not brought to the notice of this Court any such executive instructions which would govern the present dispute between these two groups of direct recruits. Therefore, we have to rely on judicial pronouncements relating to fixation of seniority. 49. The vexed question of inter-se-seniority raises its head quite frequently amongst the employees spawning a plethora of judgments and principles. However, certain principles have been reiterated and applied in many instances developing into almost a canon of law. Though, there cannot be any fixed or determinate principle of seniority applicable in all situations, in view of varying provisions of seniority rules and statutes, yet certain principles have become too fundamental to be ignored. 50. However, certain principles have been reiterated and applied in many instances developing into almost a canon of law. Though, there cannot be any fixed or determinate principle of seniority applicable in all situations, in view of varying provisions of seniority rules and statutes, yet certain principles have become too fundamental to be ignored. 50. It is now a well settled principle that in fixing seniority, the length of service rendered by an employee in a particular grade or cadre is generally the accepted determinative factor, though it is not an universal rule, as its applicability may differ under different fact situations. A three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 544 , observed as follows: “7. The law is clear that seniority is an incidence of service and where the service rules prescribe the method of its computation, it is squarely governed by such rules. In the absence of a provision ordinarily the length of service is taken into account. ....” 51. The Hon’ble Supreme Court put it more emphatically this principle by treating the date of entry in service for determining seniority as the most safe rule in Ram Janam Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) 2 SCC 622 . It was held that, “10. From time to time controversy regarding inter se seniority is raised between persons recruited from different sources to the same service. In past, notional seniority used to be given to one group of officers, purporting to mitigate their hardship or to rectify any alleged wrong done to them in the process of recruitment or promotion. Ultimately it was realised that if liberty is given to fix seniority of an officer or group of officers belonging to a particular category with reference to a notional date, that will lead to great uncertainty in public service. The date of entry into a particular service was considered to be the most safe rule to follow while determining the inter se seniority between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from the different sources. After referring to different judgments of this Court, a Constitution Bench in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 came to the same conclusion. After referring to different judgments of this Court, a Constitution Bench in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 came to the same conclusion. The same has been reiterated in the case of State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey, (1993) 3 SCC 371 . It is now almost settled that seniority of an officer in service is determined with reference to the date of his entry in the service which will be consistent with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 52. When we follow this principle, the private respondents who were appointed in 1992 would be placed above the petitioners who were appointed in the year 1994. But the petitioners have objected to this by contending that the private respondents were not really appointed on regular basis but purely on temporary basis whereas the petitioners were appointed on regular basis in the year 1994. 53. Though the petitioners claim that they were appointed on regular basis as mentioned in their appointment orders, one needs to examine as to what really amounts to a regular appointment. Regular appointment would mean appointment by following the procedure laid down in the recruitment rule which, if not specifically mentioned in the rules, would require advertisement of the vacancies and consideration of the claim of other eligible candidates as required under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In this regard we may refer to the decision in State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 wherein the Supreme Court held that, “25. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 mandates that every appointment to public posts or office should be made by open advertisement so as to enable all eligible persons to compete for selection on merit—Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 , UPSC v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC 482 , State of Manipur v. Y. Token Singh, (2007) 5 SCC 65 , and Municipal Corpn., Hyderabad v. P. Mary Manoranjani, (2008) 2 SCC 758 . Although, the courts have carved out some exceptions to this rule, for example, compassionate appointment of the dependant of deceased employees, for the purpose of this case it is not necessary to elaborate that aspect. 26. Although, the courts have carved out some exceptions to this rule, for example, compassionate appointment of the dependant of deceased employees, for the purpose of this case it is not necessary to elaborate that aspect. 26. In Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela case3 this Court, while reversing an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal which had directed the Union Public Service Commission to relax the age requirement in the respondent’s case, elucidated the meaning of the expression “equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to public employment” in the following words: (SCC p. 490, para 12) “12. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words ‘employment or appointment’ cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation, etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution.” 54. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution.” 54. However, in the present case as already discussed above, the petitioners were not subjected to any of the aforesaid regular recruitment process but were regularised by resorting to a process which was an exception to the rule, on the recommendation of a special DPC, which was not required to examine the case of the petitioners on merit except for finding out whether the petitioners fulfilled the eligibility conditions laid down in the Office Memorandum dated 22nd August, 1994. The said Office Memorandum merely mentions in para 2(ii) that all ad-hoc appointees of both gazetted and non-gazetted posts against direct recruitment quota which were held on ad-hoc basis for at least 2 (two) years as on 01.01.1994 and for those who continue to hold their respective posts till date should be regularised through Special D.P.C. by the screening/eligibility of the candidates as per the existing RR of the posts. What the Office Memorandum requires is to examine whether the candidates who were holding the posts on ad-hoc basis possess the eligibility criteria or not, and not to find out whether they are really suitable by subjecting them to any kind of scrutiny. Hence, there is no reference to merit or suitability or otherwise before considering regularisation. It was merely a mechanical process to ascertain whether a person is appointed on ad-hoc basis and continued for 2 years and whether he possesses the eligibility conditions. It does not involve any subjective test to determine the suitability of the person to be regularly appointment, which is an integral part of any recruitment process to public employment. Therefore, even if the present petitioners claim that they had been regularly appointed in the year 1994 on the basis of a DPC, what is to be noted is that the said regularisation was not made by following the normal recruitment process of advertising the post and by holding any competitive test/examination as in the case of the private respondents and therefore, lacks the most vital component of the recruitment process for public employment as contemplated under Article 16 of the Constitution. 55. 55. Moreover, it is also equally settled principle that it is only when a person is borne in the cadre that he becomes a member of the service and could start counting his seniority and that happens only when he is regularly appointed as per rules against a substantive vacancy. In State of Rajasthan v. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi, (2009) 12 SCC 49 , the Supreme Court observed that “18. In order to become “a member of service” a candidate must satisfy four conditions, namely, (i) the appointment must be in a substantive capacity; (ii) to a post in the service i.e. in a substantive vacancy; (iii) made according to rules; (iv) within the quota prescribed for the source.” Though the aforesaid observation was made in the context of the service rules applicable in the said case, it is of general application, unless the rules provide otherwise, of which none has been produced by the parties. 56. It may be also noted that in P. Mohan Reddy v. E.A.A. Charles, (2001) 4 SCC 433 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that, “17. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of this Court would indicate that even though an employee cannot claim to have a vested right to have a particular position in any grade, but all the same he has the right of his seniority being determined in accordance with the Rules which remained in force at the time when he was borne in the cadre. 57. As already discussed above, it has not been shown with unimpeachable material or document that when the petitioners were regularly appointed in the year 1994, there were regular or substantive vacancies, without existence of which there could not be any regular appointment in the real sense of the term as far as the petitioners are concerned. Therefore, this Court would hold the view that even though the appointment order of the petitioner issued in 1994 mentions that they had been appointed on regular basis, it does not carry all the attributes of a regular appointment so as to endow the right of seniority from the said date. 58. Otherwise also, even if it is assumed that the appointment of the petitioners in the year 1994 were on regular basis, yet the claim of the private respondents for seniority over the petitioners by counting seniority from 1992 on the basis of continuous officiation cannot be ignored. 58. Otherwise also, even if it is assumed that the appointment of the petitioners in the year 1994 were on regular basis, yet the claim of the private respondents for seniority over the petitioners by counting seniority from 1992 on the basis of continuous officiation cannot be ignored. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (1990) 2 SCC 715 . Though in the said case the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the inter se seniority dispute between the promotes and the direct recruits, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also was referring to a very important principle for determination of seniority on the basis of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service, as mentioned in para 13 thereof, which is reproduced herein below: “13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan case, (1977) 3 SCC 399 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 391: (1977) 3 SCR 775 was unsound and fit to be overruled, but no attempt was made to substantiate the plea. We were taken through the judgment by the learned counsel for the parties more than once and we are in complete agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of continuous officiation by a government servant, after his appointment by following the rules applicable for substantive appointments, has to be taken into account for determining his seniority; and seniority cannot be determined on the sole test of confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se seniority has to conform to the principles of equality spelt out by Articles 14 and 16. If an appointment is made by way of stop-gap arrangement, without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments, there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of seniority. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case. To hold otherwise will be discriminatory and arbitrary. This principle has been followed in innumerable cases and has been further elaborated by this Court in several judgments including those in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P., (1980) 4 SCC 226 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 531: (1981) 1 SCR 449 , and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Committee and others v. R.K. Kashyap, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 194: 1989 SCC (L&S) 253: (1989) 9 ATC 784 with which we are in agreement. In Narender Chadha and others v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 157 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 226: (1986) 1 SCR 211 the officers were promoted although without following the procedure prescribed under the rules, but they continuously worked for long periods of nearly 15-20 years on the posts without being reverted. The period of their continuous officiation was directed to be counted for seniority as it was held that any other view would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There is considerable force in this view also. We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service.” (emphasis added) 59. The aforesaid principle was adopted and it forms part of the principles laid down in sub-para (B) of para 47 of the judgment as follows. “47. To sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. “47. To sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (C) ………………. (K) ……. ………” 60. The aforesaid principle was further elaborated and explained in the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of W.B. and Others Vs. Aghore Nath Dey and Others, (1993) 3 SCC 371 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the apparent conflicting position arising out of second part of sub-para (A) with sub-para (B) quoted above. In para 25 in the case of Aghore Nath Dey (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the position as follows: “25. In our opinion the conclusion (B) was added to cover a different kind of situation, wherein the appointments are otherwise regular, except for the deficiency of certain procedural requirements laid down by the rules. This is clear from the opening words of the conclusion (B), namely, 'if the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules' and the later expression 'till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules'. We read conclusion (B), and it must be so read to reconcile with conclusion (A), to cover the cases where the initial appointment is made against an existing vacancy, not limited to a fixed period of time or purpose by the appointment order itself, and is made subject to the deficiency in the procedural requirements prescribed by the rules for adjudging suitability of the appointee for the post being cured at the time of regularisation, the appointee being eligible and qualified in every manner for a regular appointment on the date of initial appointment in such cases. Decision about the nature of the appointment, for determining whether it falls in this category, has to be made on the basis of the terms of the initial appointment itself and the provisions in the rules. In such cases, the deficiency in the procedural requirements laid down by the rules has to be cured at the first available opportunity, without any default of the employee, and the appointee must continue in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service, in accordance with the rules. In such cases, the appointee is not to blame for the deficiency in the procedural requirements under the rules at the time of his initial appointment, and the appointment not-being limited to a fixed period of time is intended to be a regular appointment, subject to the remaining procedural requirements of the rules being fulfilled at the earliest. In such cases also, if there be any delay in curing the defects on account of any fault of the appointee, the appointee would not get the full benefit of the earlier period on account of his default, the benefit being confined only to the period for which he is not to blame. This category of cases is different from those covered by the corollary in conclusion (A) which relates to appointment only on adhoc basis as a stop-gap arrangement and not according to rules. It is, therefore, not correct to say, that the present cases can fall within the ambit of conclusion (B), even though they are squarely covered by the corollary in conclusion (A).” 61. Thus, in the aforesaid clarification by the Hon’ble Supreme Court what is contemplated is that where the initial appointment is made against an existing vacancy but there are certain deficiencies in the procedural requirement as prescribed by the rules for adjudging the suitability, once the procedural deficiency was rectified, the period of officiation can be counted for seniority. 62. In the present case, the situation is slightly different. 62. In the present case, the situation is slightly different. But by adopting the logic and rationale behind the aforesaid principle, one can say that in the case of the private respondents the procedural defect can be said to be lack of substantive vacancies, as otherwise all the other procedures required for making regular or substantive appointment were fulfilled, viz., advertisement, consideration of claims of all the eligible candidates, subjecting them to written test and interview for adjudging suitability and determining inter se merit of the candidates. The only procedural defect which may be said to be found is the lack of any substantive vacancy when the appointments were made. But once, the procedural defect of lack of substantive vacancies was made up by creating supernumerary posts and a fresh order of regularisation was issued in 1999, it can be said that their services were regularised in accordance with the rules and hence their case would fall under the category of sub-para (B) of Para 47 of the judgment in Direct Recruits (supra). 63. The private respondents were already appointed in the year 1992 by following the process for substantive appointment. There were advertisements in the local daily newspapers and the All India Radio for the posts and competitive test in terms of written test and interview were held in which some of the petitioners had also participated. Therefore, the aforesaid procedures adopted in respect of the private respondents can be said to be in terms of the rules and meant for substantive appointment. The only shortcoming or procedural defect as mentioned above, was the lack of substantive vacancy which was later on made up. In fact, when the approval was given by the State Government to the recommendation for appointment of the contesting private respondents by the said DPC held in the year 1991, the Respondent No. 1 referred the matter to the Department of Personnel and they had been advised by the D.P. that the persons recommended by the properly constituted DPC may be given regular appointments and accordingly, the Government proposed for appointment of the private respondents as Inspectors Grade II on regular basis w.e.f. 01.01.1992. However, subsequently, Government directed the Registrar of Societies to modify the order of appointment by indicating the vacancies against which the private respondents were appointed which were vacancies caused due to promotion to higher posts as mentioned in the appointment order dated 21.10.92. In fact, because of the lack of substantive vacancy the private respondents were given appointment on temporary basis. However, this appointment order cannot distract from the fact that the private respondents were subjected to the normal procedure for appointment on regular/ substantive basis. It may be also mentioned herein that the regularisation process of the present petitioners in 1994 was initiated by observing that the appointment of the private respondents in 1992 are to be treated as regular appointments as mentioned in the letter dated 25.03.1994 as discussed above. 64. The appointments of the private respondents in the year 1992 were continued uninterruptedly and in the year 1999, supernumerary posts were created to adjust the appointments of not only the private respondents but also the present petitioners. It was only that when actual regular/substantive vacancies in the grade of Inspectors arose on account of expiry, retirement, promotion of the incumbents, the appointments of the private respondents as well as the petitioners were again adjusted against these substantive vacancies. Therefore, as the private respondents were appointed in the year 1992 by following the process for substantive appointment as per rules which were ultimately adjusted against substantive vacancies later on, the period of officiation by the private respondents cannot be ignored towards fixation of seniority in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruits (supra) as mentioned above. 65. For the reasons discussed above, this Court is of the view that the decisions cited by Mr. Bimol, Ld. Counsel for the petitioners are of no assistance to the cause of the petitioners. 66. Therefore, this Court would hold that even if the petitioners are deemed to have been regularly appointed in the year 1994, the right of the private respondents to count their seniority from 1992 because of the above reason, cannot be denied. Thus, the private respondents would be entitled to count their seniority from 1992 even if they were initially appointed on temporary basis, as contended by the petitioners. 67. Thus, the private respondents would be entitled to count their seniority from 1992 even if they were initially appointed on temporary basis, as contended by the petitioners. 67. While holding so this Court has kept in mind that application of service rules may sometimes cause hardships to a particular sections of the employees, but so long as the rules are just fair and reasonable, it may not be a ground for interference as held in A.P. Co-op. Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320 as follows: “41. It is no doubt true that service rules, however, meticulously framed, there is always a chance of some hardship being caused to a particular section of the employees, but as long as the rules are just, fair and reasonable, even if two views are possible, the mere fact that some hardship, inconvenience or injustice results to some members of the service, is not a ground to strike down the rule. It is not safe to test the constitutionality of a service rule on the touchstone of fortunes of an individual. If the rule otherwise appears to be fair, just and reasonable and does not suffer from the vice of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution or any constitutional guarantee, the mere fact that some little hardship or injustice is caused to someone, is no ground to strike down the rule altogether. 68. In the light of the aforesaid principle, this Court is of the view that the course adopted by this Court in resolving the seniority dispute in the case is the most reasonable, fair, just and appropriate under the peculiar facts of the case, though it may seem to cause hardships to the petitioners, which actually it does not. On the other hand adopting the course as proposed by the petitioners would lead to an anomalous and unjust situation which cannot survive the test of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 69. Therefore, this Court directs that while the seniority of the petitioners would be counted from 08.08.1994 in terms of their appointment orders dated 08.08.1994 read with 31.08.1994, the contesting private respondents would be entitled to count their seniority with effect from the date of issue of their appointment on 29.10.1992 whey they were appointed as Inspectors. 69. Therefore, this Court directs that while the seniority of the petitioners would be counted from 08.08.1994 in terms of their appointment orders dated 08.08.1994 read with 31.08.1994, the contesting private respondents would be entitled to count their seniority with effect from the date of issue of their appointment on 29.10.1992 whey they were appointed as Inspectors. Though the private respondents No. 3 to 46 were given appointment as Inspectors w.e.f. 01.01.1991, this Court does not find any reason to count the seniority from 01.01.1991 before they were appointed. They shall be entitled to count their seniority from the date of issue of their appointment order viz., 29.10.1992. 70. As far as the private respondents no. 47 to 61 are concerned, since they are admittedly senior to both the petitioners as well as the respondents no. 3 to 46, they will be placed above both the petitioners and respondents No. 3 to 46. 71. This Court has noted that the impugned seniority list dated 15.12.2014 issued by the respondent no. 2 under Order No.E-Co-op/34/85/Vol - I correctly reflects the inter-se seniority position of the petitioners vis a vis the private respondents as well as in respect of themselves in the light of the conclusions arrived by this Court as discussed above and it does not suffer from any irregularity or infirmity hence, does not call for any interference from this Court. 72. In view of the above, and for the reasons discussed above, the writ petition is dismissed as devoid of merit. Parties are to bear their own costs.