JUDGMENT : Z.K. Saiyed, J. 1. The appellant has filed present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code praying to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 29.11.2013 passed by the learned District Court, Gandhinagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 111 of 2010 as well as judgment and decree dated 28.10.2010 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Gandhinagar in Regular Civil Suit No. 101 of 2006. 2. The brief facts of the case are present appellant filed the Regular Civil Suit No. 101 of 2006 for certain declaration and permanent injunction. The suit property is situated at Village : Bhat, Taluka & District : Gandhinagar, Survey No. 50 admeasuring 23,978 Sq.Mtrs., of non-agricultural land within the ownership of Tribhovanbaug Park Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. The appellant sought injunction against the transferring, parting with disputed land by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in any manner. During the pendency of the suit certain declarations are also sought. The said suit was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 28.10.2010 by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Gandhinagar. Against the said judgment and order present appellant preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 111 of 2010, wherein it was stated that disputed property was earlier purchased by the present appellant from his own income and for developing the land he has incurred huge amount. The defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are sons of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has prayed for cancellation of document dated 17.9.2005 in favour of Narayan Developers executed by defendant No. 6 - Tribhovanbaug Park Housing Society Ltd., and he further prayed for specific performance of development agreement dated 15.1.1997 in his favour by defendant No. 6 society. He further prayed that defendants be directed to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the non-agricultural land of disputed property. He also prayed that plaintiff has nowhere signed in the document dated 22.9.2000 because as per claim of the plaintiff, there was no consideration given to the plaintiff and plaintiff has not signed in the document therefore such document is void ab initio. 3. Heard Mr. Mayur Rajguru, learned advocate for the appellant. He has submitted that learned District Court has rightly held in favour of the plaintiff that cancellation of Development Agreement dated 22.9.2000 is a forged and private opinion obtained by defendants of Shri J.J. Patel cannot be believed over the expert's opinion of FSL. 3. Heard Mr. Mayur Rajguru, learned advocate for the appellant. He has submitted that learned District Court has rightly held in favour of the plaintiff that cancellation of Development Agreement dated 22.9.2000 is a forged and private opinion obtained by defendants of Shri J.J. Patel cannot be believed over the expert's opinion of FSL. He has submitted that a person who is guilty of fraud cannot take advantage of situation. 4. He has submitted that while forging of cancellation of Development Agreement havala entries were made in five accounts. When first cheque was drawn from the account of Narayan Trust of Rs. 35,00,000/- only an amount of Rs. 2,160/- was lying in the said account. Despite the said aspect the said cheque has been honoured by the Bank and amount came to be transferred in the account of Uday T. Patel. On the same day, same amount has been transferred by the cheque of Uday T. Patel to the account of Ghanshyam Organizer and in turn from the account of Ghanshyam Organizer cheque came to be credited in the account of Tribhuvanbaug Cooperative Society. He has submitted that from the account of defendant No. 1 society, cheque was credited in the account of present plaintiff. Thereafter on the same day, cheque of Rs. 35,00,000/- came to be debited from the account of plaintiff and came to be credited in the account of Narayan Trust i.e. account from which first cheque had surfaced. This fraud followed by further havala entries have not at all been appreciated by the Courts below. 5. He has submitted that it was established from the evidence on record that one of the accused in FIR lodged as Crime Register No. I-7 of 2006 with CID Crime viz. Vinodbhai B. Patel, who was working as Accountant for many years with the plaintiff had made said entries in the books of account of plaintiff and he had filed income-tax returns. Therefore the said document could not have been relied upon and it cannot be said to be not corroborative to FSL report. He has submitted that first Appellate Court has rightly decided that opinion of private expert has less weightage compare to Government Agency i.e. FSL report. He has submitted that three expert persons of FSL have concluded that document dated 22.9.2000 is not written by the appellant. He has submitted that first Appellate Court has rightly decided that opinion of private expert has less weightage compare to Government Agency i.e. FSL report. He has submitted that three expert persons of FSL have concluded that document dated 22.9.2000 is not written by the appellant. There is specific conclusion in the opinion which is at Ex. 509 to the effect that the disputed signature is not made by the appellant. He has submitted that havala entries made by the accountant and FIR is registered against the accountant for the offence in question, this is very clearly showing corroborative piece of evidence to support the FSL opinion. The accountant has in collusion with defendants made several havala entries and created the said documents. He has submitted that when property worth crores of rupees is being conveyed by Agreement and if the Agreement is not even notarized, Court cannot believe genuineness of the document. Therefore, credibility of private party's opinion creates doubt and Government Agency FSL opinion is genuine and believable. He has submitted that this Court after hearing both the sides vide order dated 31.3.2014 passed the order of status-quo. Lastly he has prayed to allow present Second Appeal. 6. Heard Ms. Bhoomi Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents. She has submitted that appellant's case is based on two things, firstly that no consideration has been paid to the appellant for such transaction and appellant has not signed the document in question. She has submitted that appellant has no right or interest in the property. She has submitted that defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have not taken possession forcibly of the property in the year 2005. She has submitted that amount of Rs. 48,50,000/- was paid to the appellant for relinquishment of his right to develop the disputed property and plaintiff had waived such rights. 7. She has submitted that the trial Court has concluded that the suit agreement of termination of development agreement in favour of Dr. T.N. Patel HUF is not fraud as alleged by the appellant. She has submitted that appellant had received consideration of Rs. 48,50,000/- by cheque transaction and, therefore, allegation of cancellation of development agreement is void and it is not tenable. With regard to document dated 22.9.2000 she has submitted that the appellant has shown having received the amount of Rs. T.N. Patel HUF is not fraud as alleged by the appellant. She has submitted that appellant had received consideration of Rs. 48,50,000/- by cheque transaction and, therefore, allegation of cancellation of development agreement is void and it is not tenable. With regard to document dated 22.9.2000 she has submitted that the appellant has shown having received the amount of Rs. 48,50,000/- in his books of accounts and has shown in the income-tax return, same is evident from various ledger accounts at Ex. 369 to 376 and the bank statement at Ex. 321 and 322. She has submitted that appellant himself was the drawer of the first cheque as trustee of Narayan Family Trust to Uday Patel as well as last cheque of Karta of T.N. Patel. She has submitted that after credit entry was received in the bank account maintained by the appellant, he had not carried on a subsequent transaction with the family member or in case if he had issued a cheque to a third party or an outsider than in that case the bank would have certainly honoured his transaction pursuant to the balance available on account of the first credit entry in his account. She has submitted that this goes to show that consideration is said to have been received once the credit entry is shown in the bank account and, therefore, agreement dated 22.9.2000 is not void. She has submitted that the society has accepted appellant's written request for relinquishment of development rights and then paid Rs. 38 lacs on 9.9.2000 received from Ghanshyam Organizer to T.N. Patel HUF (Developer) society also executed development agreement in favour of Ghanshyam Organizer dated 22.9.2000 and thereafter balance of Rs. 13,50,000/- was made to the appellant. 8. She has submitted that appellant filed Civil Suit No. 1074 of 2005 before the City Civil Court on 23.6.2005 and same was withdrawn by him on 9.7.2005. This establishes that appellant had complete knowledge of the fact that the possession of the disputed land was with Ghanshyam Organizer and, therefore, the allegation that possession being forcibly taken away by the respondents is not right. 9. She has submitted that report of the FSL cannot be read without necessary corroboration. She has submitted that report of FSL mentions that, "in short, I do not found any similarities except natural variation". 9. She has submitted that report of the FSL cannot be read without necessary corroboration. She has submitted that report of FSL mentions that, "in short, I do not found any similarities except natural variation". It is submitted that as per the settled law, evidence of hand writing expert is only opinion evidence and need not be given serious credence in peculiar facts and circumstances and the Court cannot afford to overlook the fact that the science of identification of handwriting is an imperfect and frail one. It is also submitted that comparison of handwriting is not a perfect science. Deviation in signature can arise due to natural variations and various other causes. Therefore, it would not be safe to rely solely on the testimony of the handwriting expert. She has submitted that learned trial Court has not committed any mistake or any illegality in not believing FSL report and believing report of Mr. J.J. Patel because it is also not corroborated. She has submitted that opinion in FSL report regarding appellant's signature being not supported by any corroborative piece of evidence, while opinion of Shri J.J. Patel, private expert is reliable because it is supported by sufficient corroboration. 10. I have heard learned advocates of respective parties. I have gone through the submissions advanced by both the sides. I have gone through the documents produced on record. I have gone through the orders passed by the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court. It appears that appellant's case is based mainly on two grounds, firstly for cancellation of development agreement i.e. appellant has nowhere signed and his signature has been forged and secondly for such cancellation of document the appellant did not receive the amount but only havala entries were made. The Ex. 369 to 376 produced before the trial Court are relevant documents and the bank statement Ex. 321 and 322, wherein it is clearly stated that appellant is shown to have received the amount of Rs. 48,50,000/- in his accounts and which is shown in the income-tax return. 11. The Ex. 369 to 376 produced before the trial Court are relevant documents and the bank statement Ex. 321 and 322, wherein it is clearly stated that appellant is shown to have received the amount of Rs. 48,50,000/- in his accounts and which is shown in the income-tax return. 11. So far as issue of believing of appellant and the report given by the FSL as well as private hand-writing expert are concerned, it is required to be noted that, in the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdevsingh, Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha, reported in AIR 1992 (SC) 2100 , the Apex Court has observed that, "there is no absolute rule of law or even of prudence which has ripened into a rule of law that in no case can the Court base its findings solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert but the imperfect and frail nature of the science of identification of the author by comparison of his admitted handwriting with the disputed ones has placed a heavy responsibility on the Courts to exercise" extra care and caution before acting on such opinion. Before a Court can place reliance on the opinion of an expert, it must be shown that he has not betrayed any bias and the reasons on which he has based his opinion are convincing and satisfactory. It is for this reason that the Courts are wary to act solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert; that, however, does not mean that even if there exist numerous striking peculiarities and mannerisms which stand out to identify the writer, the Court will not act on the expert's evidence. In the end it all depends on the character of the evidence of the expert and the acts and circumstances of each case". In pursuance to the same the Apex Court observed that, "in Ram Narain v. State of U.P., (1973) 2 SCC 86 : AIR 1973 SC 2200 this Court was called upon to consider whether a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony of the handwriting expert could be sustained. This Court held (para 4 of AIR): "It is no doubt true that the opinion of handwriting expert given in evidence is no less fallible than any other expert opinion adduced in evidence with the result that such evidence has to be received with great caution. This Court held (para 4 of AIR): "It is no doubt true that the opinion of handwriting expert given in evidence is no less fallible than any other expert opinion adduced in evidence with the result that such evidence has to be received with great caution. But this opinion evidence, which is relevant, may be worthy of acceptance if there is internal or external evidence relating to the document in question supporting the view expressed by the expert." A similar view was expressed in the case of Bhagwan Kaur v. Maharaj Krishan Sharma, (1973) 4 SCC 46 : AIR 1973 SC 1346 in the following words (para 27 of AIR): "The evidence of a handwriting expert, unlike that of a fingerprint expert, is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities have been quite often noticed. The courts should, therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of a handwriting expert." In Murari Lal v. State of M. P., (1980) 1704 : AIR 1980 SC 531 this Court was once again called upon to examine whether the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert needs to be substantially corroborated before it can be acted upon to base a conviction. Dealing with this oft repeated submission this Court pointed out (para 6 of AIR): "Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person 'specially skilled' in questions as to identity of handwriting' is expressly made a relevant fact. There is nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like illustration (b) to Section 114 which entitles the Court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars, which justifies the court in assuming that a handwriting expert's opinion is unworthy of credit unless corroborated. The Evidence Act itself (Section 3) tells us that a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists'. The Evidence Act itself (Section 3) tells us that a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists'. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of this interpretation clause in the Evidence Act lest we set an artificial standard of proof not warranted by the provisions of the Act. Further, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. It is also to be noticed that Section 46 of the Evidence Act makes facts, not otherwise relevant, relevant if they support or are inconsistent with the opinions of experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of an handwriting expert and there need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it." 12. In view of above observations made by the Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the report of the FSL cannot be believed as it is not corroborated by other material evidence, while opinion of Shri J.J. Patel, private expert is reliable because it is supported by sufficient corroboration. Thus the trial Court was right in disbelieving the FSL report. Both the Courts below have rightly believed the case of the present respondents that present appellant have received Rs. 48,50,000/- which has been shown in the books of account and in the income-tax return. 13. In view of above, Second Appeal deserves to be dismissed. It is dismissed. Thus the trial Court was right in disbelieving the FSL report. Both the Courts below have rightly believed the case of the present respondents that present appellant have received Rs. 48,50,000/- which has been shown in the books of account and in the income-tax return. 13. In view of above, Second Appeal deserves to be dismissed. It is dismissed. The Civil Application also stands dismissed accordingly.