JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The petitioner was an applicant for Rajiv Gandhi Gramin LPG Vitrak Yojna (for short ‘RGGLV’). However, his candidature was rejected on the ground that he did not have ‘land in the name of self’ or within ‘Family Unit’ in the advertised location. 2. The ‘Family Unit’ is defined in the brochure in the following terms: ‘Family Unit’ in case of married person/applicant, shall consist of individual concerned, his/her spouse and their unmarried sons/daughters. In case of unmarried person/applicant, ‘Family Unit’ shall consist of individual concerned, his/her parents and his/her unmarried brothers and unmarried sisters. In case of divorcee, ‘Family Unit’ shall consist of individual concerned, unmarried sons/unmarried daughters whose custody is given to him/her. In case of widow/widower, “Family Unit’ shall consist of individual concerned, unmarried sons/ unmarried daughters.” 3. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that while submitting his application, he submitted all the relevant documents which included the revenue papers of Village Dugrain wherein his father Sh. Safder Ali was the owner of the land which was more than the land required for construction of the godown. 4. The respondents filed reply wherein they pleaded that as per the information given in the application form, the petitioner had offered the land of his brother-in-law and this relation does not come within the definition of “Family Unit’ as reproduced above. 5. The record produced before us, reveal that the petitioner has provided the following details of the land along with his relationship with the owner thereof:- Names of the owner of land Relationship with applicant. Date of registration of sale deed/gift/date of mutation Address of the location of the land for LPG Godown Khasra No./Survey No. Dimension of land Length in metre Breadth in metre AFTAB MOHD. BROTHER-IN-LAW 20.9.2005 Rampur (Kanaid). 1080 450 Mtrs. 50 Mtrs. AFTAB MOHD. SISTER HUSBAND 20.9.2005 Rampur (Kanaid) 1080 450 Mtrs. 50 Mtrs. 6. Indisputably, the brother-in-law does not come within the definition of ‘Family Unit’ and, therefore, the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the respondents. 7. BROTHER-IN-LAW 20.9.2005 Rampur (Kanaid). 1080 450 Mtrs. 50 Mtrs. AFTAB MOHD. SISTER HUSBAND 20.9.2005 Rampur (Kanaid) 1080 450 Mtrs. 50 Mtrs. 6. Indisputably, the brother-in-law does not come within the definition of ‘Family Unit’ and, therefore, the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the respondents. 7. No doubt, in the application form, the petitioner has fairly disclosed the names of the owners of the land with his relationship along with such owners, but when he got down to file the instant petition, he concealed all these facts and as observed earlier, his specific case was that he had submitted the revenue papers of the property belonging to his father as is evident from para 10 of the petition, the relevant portion whereof reads thus: “That the petitioner fulfilled all the conditions laid down by the respondents for moving the application for distributorship/dealership in Village Dugrain as provided in the notification marked Annexure P-1. He attached all the relevant documents along with the application. Along with application, the petitioner attached the revenue papers of village Dugrain wherein his father Shri Safder Ali is mentioned as the owner of the land more than the land required for the construction of the godown. A relevant portion of the jamabandi showing the father of the applicant owning 1686 shares out of 15145 shares in the land in village Dugrain/Kanaid as shown in the jamabandi for the year 2005-06 is attached herewith and is marked Annexure P-3 to this writ petition…” 8. It is settled in law that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is an equity jurisdiction. One must approach the court with clean hands, clean heart, clean mind and clean objective and the person who has suppressed the material fact is not entitled for adjudication on merits. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. 9. One must approach the court with clean hands, clean heart, clean mind and clean objective and the person who has suppressed the material fact is not entitled for adjudication on merits. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. 9. The practice adopted by the petitioner is deprecated and such an unscrupulous litigation is otherwise not welcome in an equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and this has been so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various pronouncements, which have thereafter been followed and reiterated by this Court and we only need to refer to a recent judgment delivered by this Bench in CWP No. 364 of 2016 titled Pratap Singh Verma vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 31st May, 2016, wherein this Court held: “16. It is also apt to record herein that the petitioner, in para 24 of the writ petition has averred that he has not filed any similar writ petition relating to the same matter in this Hon’ble Court or in any other Court of law, which is contrary to the factual position. Thus, he has sworn-in a false affidavit and made this Court to believe that no such remedy has been sought by the petitioner from any other Courts and on the face of it, is misuse of process of law. 17. Our this view is fortified by the judgment delivered by the apex Court in case titled T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal and another reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 . It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the judgment herein. “2. Here is an audacious application by a determined engineer of fake litigations asking for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court on an interlocutory application for injunction. The sharp practice or legal legerdemain of the petitioner, who is the son of the 2nd respondent, stultifies the court process and makes decrees with judicial seals brutum fulmen. The long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the confidence and credibility of the community in the judicature is to survive. The contempt power of the Court is meant for such persons as the present petitioner. We desist from taking action because of the sweet reasonableness of counsel Sri Remasesh.” 18. The long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the confidence and credibility of the community in the judicature is to survive. The contempt power of the Court is meant for such persons as the present petitioner. We desist from taking action because of the sweet reasonableness of counsel Sri Remasesh.” 18. The apex Court in P.S.R. Sadhanatham vs. Arunachalam and another reported in (1980) 3 SCC 141 laid down the following similar principles of law. “13. It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the Court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted 'visa'. It is also true that in the criminal jurisdiction this strictness applies a fortiori since an adverse verdict from this Court may result in irretrieval injury to life or liberty. 14. Having said this, we must emphasise that we are living in times when many societal pollutants create new problems of un-redressed grievance when the State becomes the sole repository for initiation of criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicization of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Art. 136 even though the justice of the lis may well justify it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in person vendettas between private individuals" as Lord Shawcross 2 once wrote, in the absence of an independent to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standing' is necessary for Art. 136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private individuals - not the State alone - may institute criminal proceedings. The law Reforms Commission (Australia) in its Discussion Paper No.4 on "Access to Courts - I Standing: Public Interest Suits" wrote: The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may commence proceedings and prosecute in the Magistrate's court. The argument for retention of that right arises at either end of the spectrum - the great cases and the frequent petty cases. The great cases are those touching government itself - a Watergate or a Poulson. However independent they may legally be any public official, police or prosecuting authority, must be subject to some government supervision and be dependent on government funds; its officers will inevitably have personal links with government. The great cases are those touching government itself - a Watergate or a Poulson. However independent they may legally be any public official, police or prosecuting authority, must be subject to some government supervision and be dependent on government funds; its officers will inevitably have personal links with government. They will be part of the "establishment". There may be cases where a decision not to prosecute a case having political ramifications will be seen, rightly or wrongly, as politically motivated. Accepting the possibility of occasional abuse the Commission sees merit in retaining some right of a citizen to ventilate such a matter in the Courts. Even the English System, as pointed by the Discussion Paper, permits a private citizen to file an indictment. In our view, the narrow limits set in Vintage English Law, into the concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'standing' needs liberalization in our democratic situation. In Dabholkar's case (1975) 2 SCC 702 this Court imparted such a wider meaning. The American Supreme Court relaxed the restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in the famous case of Baker v. Carr, (1962) 369 US 186. Lord Denning, in the notable case of the Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N'jie, 1961 AC 617 spoke thus: ................the words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; Prof. S. A. de Smith takes the same view: All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest-the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him. Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note: In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the action popular is. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by preventing inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers. It contains an element of the action popular is. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by preventing inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers. In Dabholkar's case, one of wrote in his separate opinion: The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the Judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system. This view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission.” 19. The apex Court in cases Chandrapal Singh and others vs. Maharaj Singh and another reported in (1982) 1 SCC 466 and State of Kerala vs. Thressia and another reported in AIR 1994 SC 1488 has laid down the similar principles of law. 20. The apex Court in K.K. Modi vs. K.N. Modi and others reported in (1998) 3 SCC 573 held as under: “43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet and Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase "abuse of the process of the Court" thus : "This terms connotes that the process of the Court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The Court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. . . . . . . . . The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material." 44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of Court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the Court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of Courts' discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding.” 21. Similar principles of law have been laid down by the apex Court in Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and others vs. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 100 and Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2008) 1 SCC 560 . It is apt to reproduce paras 15 to 17 of the judgment rendered in Udyami Evam’s case supra, herein. “15. In the said counter-affidavit, it has further been disclosed that after being unsuccessful in their attempt to stall the recovery proceedings against the Samiti, a fictitious welfare Sanstha, namely, Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha was started by appellant 2. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the attempt on the part of the appellants herein must be termed as "abuse of the process of law". 16. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior Court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. 16. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior Court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. In Advocate General, State of Bihar vs. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and Another, 1980 3 SCC 311 , this Court was of the opinion that such a repeated filing of writ petitions amounts to criminal contempt. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is not merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee quantified at Rs.50,000.” 22. This Court in CWP No. 9480 of 2014 along with connected matter titled Vijay Kumar Gupta versus State of HP and others decided on 9.1.2015 and RSA No. 481 of 2002, decided on 9.1.2015 titled Subhash Chand Sharma versus Smt. Shakuntla Devi (deceased) through her LRs Dr. Chander Shekhar and another, has laid down the same law.” 10. As observed above, the petitioner has not only misused the process of the Court but has abused the process of law and thereafter made himself liable for imposition of costs. However, we refrain from doing so, as the petitioner appears to be unemployed. 11. Having said so, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.