JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter-alia prayed for direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Deoghar (Respondent no.3) vide memo dated 17.11.2011 (Annexure-3) pertaining to dismissal from the services and the petitioner has further prayed for issuance of writ/direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the appellate authority i.e. D.I.G., Santhal Pargana Range, Dumka (respondent no.4) vide memo dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure-5) confirming the order passed and thereby, dismissing the appeal and for issuance of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits from the date of dismissal. 2. The facts as disclosed in the writ application, in a nutshell, is that for the self same charges, criminal case as well as departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. In the criminal case, the petitioner was acquitted by the court of learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge-Cum-Special Judge, Deoghar under Sections 376(2)(g), 120(B) & 201 I.P.C. and Section 3(X) S.C & S.T Prevention of Attrocities Act alongwith other accused persons. However, for the self same charges a disciplinary authority was also initiated proceeding against the petitioner. In the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was proceeded departmentally and the inquiry officer furnished the report. Agreeing with the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority held the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissed from the services vide memo dated 17.11.2011. The petitioner thereafter, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority denying the entire allegations and also representing that the findings of the disciplinary authority are not in accordance with law. The appellate authority disagreed with the contention of the petitioner and agreeing with the findings of the disciplinary authority, dismissed the appeal vide memo dated 21.11.2012. On the same set of facts, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case whereas, dismissed in the departmental proceedings. Learned senior counsel further submits that the copy of the enquiry report has not been supplied moreover enquiry officer has travelled beyond the charges which is not permissible to travel beyond charges nor the inquiry officer can enquire into allegations in which delinquent officer has not been charged with. In support of the contentions, senior counsel has referred to decision as reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 and 2006 (5) SCC 25 . In support of the contentions, senior counsel has referred to decision as reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 and 2006 (5) SCC 25 . Senior counsel further submits that on same and similar charges, one Gyanendra Yadav has given lesser punishment whereas the petitioner has subjected to discrimination and has been awarded major punishment of dismissal from the services. 3. Per-contra a counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent no. 3 controverting the averments made in the writ applications. In the counter-affidavit, it has been inter alia submitted that the petitioner was posted as magazine guard at Police Centre, Deoghar, he was not on duty without prior permission and after escaping from the duty, an offence on the same day i.e. 31.08.2009 which gave rise to Deoghar P.S. Case No.268/09 by registered under Section 376(2)g/120B/201 Indian Penal Code read with 3(X) of Prevention of Atrocities on Schedule Cast/Schedule Tribe Act and accordingly a Departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. It has further been submitted that the petitioner fled away and while absconding crime in Bhojpur District of Bihar State and arrested by the police which gave rise to Behiya P.S. Case No.89 of 2010 registered under Section 307/504 Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 Arms Act. The petitioner suppressed aforesaid fact during the departmental proceeding and appeal where the petitioner was brought to Deoghar on remand from the judicial custody of Bhojpur District (Bihar) as per the remand vide Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit. The discipline and law and order is the back bone of Police force and the petitioner played role of law breaker whereas duty bound to perform role of law protector, thus, the disciplinary authority has rightly terminated the petitioner from services after following all procedure prescribed and the appellate authority after examining the case of the petitioner from all probable angles arrived at the final conclusion that the petitioner's termination was well in accordance with law, rule under circular. It has further been submitted that it is the settled principle of law that acquittal in criminal proceeding shall have no impact upon departmental proceeding both proceedings are separate in nature and ratio in Capt. M. Paul Anthony and GM tank case is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 4. Heard Dr. S.N. Pathak, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. M. Paul Anthony and GM tank case is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 4. Heard Dr. S.N. Pathak, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. Shruti Shrestha, J.C to A.G, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the documents on records. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the relevant documents on records, it appears that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference due to the following facts and judicial pronouncements: (i) In the instant case, the petitioner though has been acquitted in a criminal case but he has been dismissed from services in a departmental proceeding. The standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. In the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another Vs. S. Samuthiram as reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold paragraph no.26 as under: 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the Respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. (ii) So far now the question is about adequacy of the punishment or about the quantum of punishment. Looking to the nature of misconduct committed by the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal awarded to the petitioner is absolutely just, proper and adequate. Neither the punishment can be levelled as unreasonably excessive nor it can be levelled shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct committed by him. On the contrary, looking to the nature of duty with which the petitioner was wedded with being a constable was to protect public life and property and if petitioner is involved in such type of misconducts, the punishment of dismissal is absolutely just and proper. So far contention of the petitioner, non supply of the copy of the inquiry report has vitiated the proceeding but non-supply of the enquiry report per se the departmental proceeding as it all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the delinquent employee has not established as to what prejudice has been caused to him. In the facts of the present case, it appears that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & others Vs. Alok Kumar as reported in (2010) 5 SCC 349 , paragraph nos. 89 and 92 held as under: 89. The well-established canons controlling the field of bias in service jurisprudence can reasonably be extended to the element of prejudice as well in such matters. Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact or there should be such definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from such default which relates to statutory violations. Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact or there should be such definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from such default which relates to statutory violations. It will not be permissible to set aside the departmental enquiries in any of these classes merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice. 92. We are not able to accept the contention addressed on behalf of the respondents that it is not necessary at all to show de facto prejudice in the facts of the present cases. We may notice that the respondents relied upon the judgment of this Court in ECIL that imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority without furninshing the material to the respondents was liable to be quashed, as it introduces unfairness and violated the sense of right and liberty of the delinquent in that case. No doubt in some judgments the Court has taken this view but that is primarily on the peculiar facts in those cases where prejudice was caused to the delinquent. Otherwise right from S.L. Kapoor Case, a three Judge Bench of this Court and even the most recent judgment as referred to by us in Kailash Chandra Ahuja case has taken the view that de facto prejudice is one of the essential ingredients to be shown by the delinquent officer before an order of punishment can be set aside, of course, depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Judicia posteriora sunt in lege fortiora. In the latter judgment the view of this Court on this principle has been consistent and we see no reason to take any different view. Prejudice normally would be a matter of fact and a fact must be pleaded and shown by cogent documentation to be true. Once this basic feature lacks, the petitioner may not be able to persuade the Court to interfere with the departmental enquiry or set aside the orders of punishment. 6. On the cumulative effect of aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, the impugned order of punishment of dismissal vide order dated 17.11.2011 Annexure-3 and the order dated 21.11.2012 passed by the appellate authority (respondent no.4) vide Annexure-5 confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority do not warrant any interference by this Court. 7. 6. On the cumulative effect of aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, the impugned order of punishment of dismissal vide order dated 17.11.2011 Annexure-3 and the order dated 21.11.2012 passed by the appellate authority (respondent no.4) vide Annexure-5 confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority do not warrant any interference by this Court. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.