JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. Heard Ld. Advocate Miss Bhavini H. Jani for the Applicant and Ld. Advocate Mr. Gaurav Chudasama for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, whereas Ld. A.P.P. Mr. K.P. Raval for Respondent No. 1 State, which is a formal party since dispute is between wife and her in-laws under Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 2. The petitioner wants to challenge the judgment and order dated 16th September, 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 112/2012 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge of Bhavnagar. By such impugned judgment the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 and 3 herein is allowed and thereby the judgment and order dated 29th November, 2012 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar in Miscellaneous Application No. 963/2010 is quashed and set aside by allowing the appeal. Thereby the order of the Magistrate granting several reliefs under The Domestic Violence Act in the form of restraining the respondent from harassing the petitioner and to pay maintenance to the petitioner so also compensation has been quashed and set aside. It seems that the Sessions Court has considered that when the petitioner is widow, she is not entitled to reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act. 3. However, at present we are not much concerned with the merits of the main revision but for filing such revision there is delay of 795 days and therefore, the petitioner filed this application for condonation of delay. 4. It is contended by the petitioner that being a widow and needy woman, she could not chase and cope-up with the time and that in absence of source of income, she could not file such revision in time because she was not properly advised by anyone. It is also contended that, under the advise received by her, initially she has preferred Special Civil Application No. 3154/2015 for challenging the impugned order in revision but since Criminal Revision is to be filed, such Special Civil Application was withdrawn and thereafter, she has preferred the present revision petition. 5. The Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have opposed the petition by filing the Affidavit-In-Reply. Ld. Advocate has also argued vehemently submitting that there is inordinate delay and that even after withdrawal of Special Civil Application from this court, revision is not filed at the earliest point of time. The reply is also containing averments on the merits of the revision application. 2 and 3 have opposed the petition by filing the Affidavit-In-Reply. Ld. Advocate has also argued vehemently submitting that there is inordinate delay and that even after withdrawal of Special Civil Application from this court, revision is not filed at the earliest point of time. The reply is also containing averments on the merits of the revision application. However, at present we are not much concerned with the merits of the main revision except to consider that practically it is a debatable issue whether all the reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act can be refused only because the victim is widow or when she is not claiming any relief against her husband may be because he is died. 6. Otherwise also the perusal of the record makes it clear that there is sufficient cause for not filing the revision in prescribed period of limitation. It cannot be ignored that the petitioner is widow who has been harassed by her in-laws and in absence of financial support by way of the maintenance, it would be certainly difficult for her to chase the litigation and cope-up with the requirements of the time and therefore when sufficient cause is shown, there is no reason to deny to condone the delay. 7. In view of above facts and circumstances and as held in Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. v. Amardeep Association & Ors. reported in (2013)2 GLR, 1399 when there is substance in the main revision application, irrespective of observation in any other judgments, delay needs to be condoned. For the purpose, at the cost of repetition, I would like to reproduce relevant paragraphs of judgment in the case of Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. v. Amardeep Association & Ors., which is confirmed by the judgment and order dated 20.03.2013 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 12142/13, which read as under:- "To decide the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to consider that whether there is sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in filing any litigation beyond the prescribed period of limitation. There are catena of judgments, more particularly when "sufficient cause" and "reasonable ground" are not defined under the law, that in general, the dispute shall be resolved on its own merits rather than technicalities, and that therefore, "sufficient cause" and "reasonable ground" for condonation of delay cannot be defined in any narrow manner, and thereby, there cannot be strait-jacket formula that what is "sufficient cause" and what is "reasonable ground" for condonation of delay, it goes without saying that "sufficient cause" and "reasonable ground" may be different from case to case and though particular cause or ground may not be sufficient and reasonable to condone the delay in a particular case, similar ground or cause may be sufficient and reasonable enough to condone the delay in any other given case, if on judicial scrutiny of matter, it is so found by the competent Court to condone such delay. Therefore, without influenced by decision cited during the argument, we have to examine the cause of action for filing the Letters Patent Appeal and cause for delay in filing such Letters Patent Appeal. It clear that there cannot be a strait-jacket formula or rule either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and that every case is to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that case only. The only requirement for condonation of delay is that whether there is "sufficient cause" for the litigant not to initiate the litigation in prescribed time of limitation. It cannot be ignored that in almost all judgments where in delay is not condoned Hon'ble the Apex Court has categorically observed and held that if sufficient cause is shown, delay can be condoned and that term "sufficient cause" is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a manner which sub-serves ends of justice and that there cannot be hard and fast rule laid down for condonation of delay. If we look into judgments referred herein under, it becomes clear that generally Courts should be reluctant to shut out a consideration of the case on merits on the grounds of limitation or any other similar technicality, AIR 2012 SC 640 , Abdul Gafoor v. State of Bihar, if there is delay in filing petition, due to opinion of the Advocate on record and the Solicitor General etc., such delay deserves to be condoned, AIR 2011 SC 428 , Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma; there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellant, and therefore, the Court should decide the matter on merit by giving the expression "sufficient cause" a pragmatic justice-oriented approach AIR 2011 SC 977 , Union of India v. Giani; the meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended, and therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a strait-jacket formula of universal application, AIR 2011 SC 1150 , Parimal v. Veena; if case file has to be routed from various departments before decision to file appeal, it is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, AIR 2010 SC 1445 , State of J. & K. v. Mohmad Maqbool Sofi; while deciding application for condonation of delay, Court cannot go into the merits of the case, if averment made in the application is sufficient to condone the delay, there is no hesitation to condone such, AIR 2009 SC 1927 , State of Jharkhand v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani; the expression "sufficient cause" must receive liberal construction to advance substantial justice even condoning delay of more than 6,500 when question of law involved, AIR 2009 SC 2577 , State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi; and what counts is not length of delay, but sufficiency of cause and that what constitutes "sufficient cause" cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules, AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 695, State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan; delay of more than six years can also be condoned to avoid miscarriage of justice AIR 1984 SC 1744 , O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (Dead), by 3-Judges Bench of Apex Court. Moreover, at least in AIR 2008 SC 1688 , Sinik Security v. Sheel Bai, AIR 2009 SC 2170 , D.D. Vaishnav v. State of M.P., and : AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 195, Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court, Bhilwara, the Apex Court has condoned inordinate delay (769 days, 589 days and 178 days respectively) even by imposing some costs upon the applicant. 26. In AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, the Apex Court has held as under: The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Sec. 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: (1) "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact, experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non-grata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. 28. If we scrutinize all citations on the subject, the delay was not condoned mainly for the reason that either there is forged statement by the applicant or the cause for delay was shown as loss of paper by the Advocate or the main dispute is falling under Special Legislature like Rent Control or Arbitration or Consumer dispute. Though, in some cases, dispute falls within General Law, the second aspect for non- condoning the delay is actual delay in number of days, which is more than 1,000 days in 5 cases, out of total 8 cases referred by the opponent and discussed in Paragraph 21 above. Though, in some cases, dispute falls within General Law, the second aspect for non- condoning the delay is actual delay in number of days, which is more than 1,000 days in 5 cases, out of total 8 cases referred by the opponent and discussed in Paragraph 21 above. Unless there is a similar situation i.e. unless the case in hand falls within a special enactment or there is inordinate delay beyond couple of years, none of such referred and cited judgments confirms that delay cannot be condoned even if sufficient cause is shown, more particularly because of the reason that all such judgments are by the Division Bench only and in none of such judgments, any of the citations, which are relied upon and cited by the applicant and prior to the above-referred judgments, were ever overruled or distinguished or even referred and not followed in any of the case, which is referred by the opponent. As against that, if we scrutinize the judgments cited by the applicant and referred in Paragraphs 25 to 27, it becomes clear that at least those judgments are referred amongst different judgments within them so as to decide that the delay can be condoned if sufficient cause is shown. Whereas at least decision in O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (Dead), AIR 1984 SC 1744 is by the three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court wherein delay of more than 6 years was condoned observing that otherwise, it would result into miscarriage of justice. Therefore, when there is a judgment by the Bench of three-Judges of the Apex Court that to avoid miscarriage of justice, delay of even 6 years can be condoned and when the judgments referred and cited in Paragraphs 25 to 27 are yet not overruled or distinguished in any of the later judgment by the Bench of three-Judges, only because the Apex Court has not condoned the delay in some of the cited cases, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned in all cases after such judgments even if there is sufficient cause to condone the delay. Thus, in general, if there is sufficient reason to condone the delay, irrespective of the cited cases, delay can be condoned." In view of the above, delay of 795 days is condoned as prayed for. Rule is made absolute.