Parmeshwar Prashad (since deceased) v. State of Rajasthan through Chief Secretary
2016-11-17
K.S.JHAVERI, MAHENDRA MAHESHWARI
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioners who are claiming to be trustees pursuant to the Will of the person, namely; Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh of Khetri (hereinafter referred to as the deceased in the petition). 2. It will not be out of place to mention that the testator was the Member of Constitute Assembly of the Constitution of India and he was owning different properties within the State of Rajasthan and in Delhi which are referred in Schedule-’A’ which reads as under : Properties of Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh of Khetri S No. Details of the Property District Name of the Village & Township Approximate Value Remarks 1 Khetri House, 5, Sardar Patel Road Delhi New Delhi Rs. 4,00,000.00 Value accepted by wealth tax office 2 Hotel Khetri House Jaipur Jaipur City Rs. 4,00,000.00 25775 Sq. Yds of land within the house under sale agreement with Hind Cooperative Housing Society 3 Kothi Sukh Mahal Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 2,00,000.00 4 Kothi Jai Niwas Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 2,00,000.00 5 Kothi Amar Hall Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 75,000.00 6 Nizamat Tehsil Building Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 1,50,000.00 Sale of the Govt. of Rajasthan negotiated for Rs. 2,64,000/- 7 Ajit Niwas Bagh Farm Jhunjhunu Dhadha Rs. 2,00,000.00 Area 95 Kacha Bigha 8 Record Room Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 30,000.00 9 Haveli Prohitji Wali Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 25,000.00 10 Dera Brijlalji Wala Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 5,000.00 11 Farrash Khana Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs.10000 12 Chabutra inside Town Jhunjhunu Khetri Rs. 500.00 13 Tin-shed Mela Gugaji Jhunjhunu Mehara Jatuwas Rs. 500.00 14 Sabka Patwar Ghar Jhunjhunu Papurna Rs. 500.00 3. Immediately on the death of the original owner of the property on 28.01.1987, one of the petitioners informed to the competent authority on 14.02.1987, as referred to the SDO Khetri that Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh has expired on 28.01.1987 at Bombay and had submitted the attested copy of the Will and that death certificate was also forwarded to him. It was also stated that by virtue of the Will, Khetri trust is created and four trustees to whom he has bequeathed all his movable and immovable property which may be noted in the record.
It was also stated that by virtue of the Will, Khetri trust is created and four trustees to whom he has bequeathed all his movable and immovable property which may be noted in the record. However, the proceedings were initiated by the State Government pursuant to the order of one Deputy Secretary on 03.07.1987 (Annexure-16) which reads as under : jktLFkku ljdkj dk;kZy; ftyk dysDVj] >qU>quq dzekad&2585@U;k;@07 fnukad 22-07-1987 rglhynkj] [ksrM+hA fo”k;%& Lo- jktk cgknqj ljnkj flag] [ksrM+h dh py ,oa vpy lEifr ds vkf/kiR; ,oa LokfeRo ds lEcU/k esaA mijksDr fo”k; esa mi ‘kklu lfpo] jktLo xzqi&3 foHkkx] t;iqj us vius i= la[;k 10@04 jktLo@xzqi&3@tk@07 fnaukd 3-7-87 ls vkns’k iznku fd;k gS fd Lo0 jktk cgknqj ljnkj flag [ksrM+h dh jktLFkku jkT; esa fLFkr lEifr ij jktLFkku bLohV jsxwys’ku ,DV 1956 ds izko/kku ykxw gksrs gSA vr% jktk cgknqj ljnkj flag [ksrM+h dks >qU>quw ftys esa fLFkr lEifr ds lEcU/k esa mDr vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr dk;Zokgh vfoyEc djs ,oa dh xbZ dk;Zokgh ls bl dk;kZy; dks Hkh voxr djkosaA Lo- jktk cgknqj ljnkj flag dh jktLFkku o jkT; ls ckgj ,oa fons’kksa esa Hkh ;fn dksbZ lEifr gks rks mldk iw.kZ fooj.k izkIr dj fu;kekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tkosA izHkkjh vf/kdkjh U;k; ‘kk[kk] ftyk dysDVj dk;kZy;] >qa>quw 1075@23-7 vfr vko’;d R.A. iVokjh g0 [ksrM+h c/kkj MkMk Qrsiqjk dks fy[ks fd jktk ljnkj cgknqj flag dh tks Hkh py&vpy lEifr gks mldh lwph e; fooj.k ds rS;kj dj ds is’k djsaA g0 fxjnkoj o N.T. cqgkuk dks Hkh fy[kk tkos fd tks Hkh dgha dksbZ py vpy lEifr dgha jktk [ksrM+h dh gks mldh lwph dks rS;kj dj ds is’k djsa rFkk dCts jkt esa ykosaA g0 23-7 iqu% ;g Hkh gS fd HkwriwoZ fBdkuk [ksrM+h lqijokbZtj Jh vCnqy guhQ dks Hkh HkstsaA g0 27@7 4. It can be gathered from the order of the District Collector, Jhunjhunu where he has referred that pursuant to the order of 03.07.1987, the property of the late Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh has vested with the State Government and the Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 will come into play and proceedings under the same Act will be initiated.
It can be gathered from the order of the District Collector, Jhunjhunu where he has referred that pursuant to the order of 03.07.1987, the property of the late Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh has vested with the State Government and the Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 will come into play and proceedings under the same Act will be initiated. Pursuant to which the Tehsildar has initiated proceedings and has taken possession of the property which has been referred herein above and possession report was submitted where he has taken possession of seven properties at Tekri by panchnama dated 31.01.1987 which has been situated at Khetri District Jhunjhunu. 4.1. Similar proceedings are also initiated for the Jaipur properties in the month of September, 1987 and pursuant to which a panchanama was prepared on 29.09.1987 (Annexure-23) and possession of the properties were taken by the State Government. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has contended that trustees were in possession and they were dispossessed by summary proceedings and the following facts which emerges from the record were not properly considered by the competent authority, namely; physical possession of the property was with the trust as contemplated under the Act. There is no abandonment of the property. In fact, the hotel was operational and some of the property were rented to the tenants and the tenants were paying rent regularly to the deceased and probate proceedings were initiated before the competent Court at Delhi and at least there were two claimants, namely petitioner Trust and other claimant was claiming to be as legal heirs. 6. We make it clear that we have not considered the matter beyond the prayers which have been claimed by the petitioner in the petition, which reads as under : (a) Writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order of direction and do issue calling for the records of the impugned orders dated-July 3, 1987, July 22, 1987 and August 3, 1987 and all other orders under which the impugned proceedings for taking possession of the properties of the deceased Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh which had vested in the Trust by virtue of his will. And setting aside or quashing of the said actions, orders as being in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or ultra-vires of the Constitution of India.
And setting aside or quashing of the said actions, orders as being in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or ultra-vires of the Constitution of India. (b) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents, their officers and servants not to give effect to and or to take steps and proceedings whatsoever under the provisions of the Rajasthan Escheat Regulation Act or Rules made thereunder and any order passed in exercise of the alleged powers conferred under the said Act or the Rules. (c) Writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents, their servants and agents to allow the petitioner and other executors and trustees, their officers and employees to run and maintain the movable and immovable properties of the deceased without any hurdle or hinderance by the respondents authorities. (d) Issue declaration to the effect that the Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 is bad if it contemplates the compulsory acquisition of movable and immovable properties of the deceased person. (e) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of prohibition or any other appropriate order or direction restraining the respondents their servants and agents from taking any action against the petitioner and the properties of the deceased in pursuance of or in furtherance of the impugned orders and steps taken by the respondents as stated in the preceding paragraphs of the writ petition. (f) Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may be granted to the petitioner. (g) Costs of this writ petition be awarded to the petitioner. 7. The main contention which has been raised by the counsel for the petitioner that in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others - AIR 1958 SC 328 , it has been observed as under : “27.
7. The main contention which has been raised by the counsel for the petitioner that in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others - AIR 1958 SC 328 , it has been observed as under : “27. A contention was also raised on behalf of the appellant that even if the impugned Act did not encroach on any of the Constitutional rights of the appellant, it clearly violated the rights of the employees in that it deprives them of their right to wages earned by them, that it was therefore void as against them as being in contravention of Article 31 (2), -and being void against them, it was void against the appellant as well. For the respondents, it is contended that the Act cannot be held to infringe Article 31 (2) even as regards the employees, as choses in action equally with money are outside the operation of that Article, and reliance is placed on the observations already referred to in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (supra) at pages 942, 960-961 and 1015 to 1018. Now, as the Act takes over the rights of the employees in respect of wages due to them even when they are not barred without making any provision for compensation of the same to them, it must at least to that extent be held to be unconstitutional, whether as contravening Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31 (2) it is unnecessary to decide. 28. It is then argued that this is an objection open only to the employees, and that the appellant can make no grievance of it. It is no doubt true that a question as to the constitutionality of a statute can be raised only by a person who is aggrieved by it; but here, the statute deals with rights arising out of contract, and that presupposes the existence of at least two parties with mutual rights and obligations, and it is difficult to see how when the rights of one party to it are interfered with, those of the other can remain unaffected by it. Let us assume that the appellant makes a payment to the Board under section 3 (1) of the impugned Act on the footing that the law is not unconstitutional as against him.
Let us assume that the appellant makes a payment to the Board under section 3 (1) of the impugned Act on the footing that the law is not unconstitutional as against him. What is there to prevent the employee from suing to recover the same amount from the appellant on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional ? It will be no answer to that claim to plead that the appellant has already paid the amount to the Board. The fact is that a statute which operates on a contract must affect the rights of all the parties to the contract, and if it is bad as regards one of them, it should be held to be bad as regards the others as well. It is unnecessary to pursue this question further, as we have held that the Act is unconstitutional even as regards the appellant.” 7.1. In the case of State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh and others - 1983(3) SCC 118 it has been observed as under : “271. Before closing the colorful chapter of this historical case we would now like t o deal with the last point which remains to be considered and that is the question of Escheat. So far as this question is concerned, M.M Prasad, J. has rightly pointed out that as the State of Bihar did not enter the arena as a plaintiff to claim the properties by pleading that the late Maharaja had left no heir at all and, hence, the properties should vest in the State of Bihar, it would be difficult to hold that merely in the event of the failure of the plaintiffs’ case the properties would vest in the State of Bihar. 272. It is well settled that when a claim of escheat is put forward by the Government the onus lies heavily on the appellant to prove the absence of any heir of the respondent anywhere in the world. Normally, the court frowns on the estate being taken by escheat unless the essential conditions for esheat are fully and completely satisfied. Further, before the plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the claim of the State.
Further, before the plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the claim of the State. In the instant case, the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh merely satisfied themselves by appearing to oppose the claims of the plaintiffs-respondents. Even if they succeed in showing that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of late Maharaja, it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the plaintiffs’ claim would lead to the irresistible inference that there is no other heir who could at any time come forward to claim the properties.” 8. Section 2(4) of the Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1956) reads as under : (4) “Property to which this Act applies” means any property vesting in the State qua ultima heres under Article 296 of the Constitution of India by escheats or as bona vacantia; 8.1. Section 4 reads as under : 4. Report by Tehsildar :- (1) Upon receipt of information as to the existence within Tehsil of any property to which this Act applies. Whether or not in the possession of any person, the Tehsildar shall- (a) Ascertain whether or not there is any person entitled to such property. (b) Prepare an inventory thereof showing the prescribed particular. (c) Take over possession of it in the prescribed manner, and (d) Make a report of the collector : Provided that if such property is in the present possession of any person, such possession shall not be disturbed. (2) Any property of which possession is taken under sub-section (1) and which is subject to speedy and natural decay or consists of live-stock or is otherwise of perishable nature may be forthwith sold by public auction by the Tehsildar and the fact of such sale together with the amount of the proceeds thereof shall be reported to the Collector. 8.2. Section 6(5) reads as under : “6.
8.2. Section 6(5) reads as under : “6. Inquiry by Collector.- (5) It shall be the duty of the Collector to obtain full information from the public records and by personal inquiries respecting any property to which this Act applies, being in all cases careful not to infringe any private rights or to occasion unnecessary trouble or vexation to individuals.” 8.3. Section 6(9)(b) reads as under : “6(9)(b) The last owner of the property in question died in the state and without leaving any known heir, that the claim preferred under sub-section (6) is not prima facie maintainable, that there is no such person entitled to claim such property and that it is a bona fide case of property vesting in the state as ultimo heiress under Article 296 of the Constitution of India, By escheats or as bona vacantia, for want or rightful owner, he shall apply to the court for a vesting order in respect of the property and for the custody thereof in the meanwhile : Provided that no application for restoration of such possession or fan vesting order shall be made until the time prescribed for preferring an appeal under section 7 has expired or until the appeal, if any, preferred has been disposed of. 8.4. Section 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) reads as under : 8. Proceedings by court.-(3) The court may, pending the disposal of the application, appoint an administrator for the possession, safe custody, due care, maintenance and management of the property forming the subject matter of the application. (4) Such administrator shall, previous to his entering upon office, give security in a sum to be fixed by the Court for the faithful discharge of his trust and shall be entitled to such remuneration as the Court may fix. (5) In the event of the administrator falling to give such security and of there being no other person willing to accept the appointed and give the required security, the Court shall appoint the Collector to be the administrator with power to continue or alter the arrangements, if any, made under clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 6 and without being required to give any security.” 8.5. Section 9(1) reads as under : “9.
Section 9(1) reads as under : “9. Claims and vesting order.-(1) If in response to the proclamation issued under section 10, any person prefer a claim and satisfies the court of his right to the possession of the property, in question or any part of it, the Court shall direct the Collector or the administrator, as the case may be, to deliver the property to such person after deducting or on payment of the expenses, if any, incurred in the maintenance, management, safe custody and taking thereof. The collector or the administrator shall act according to such direction and the provisions of sub-section (6) of the section 6 shall apply.” 9. It is contended that even if the Act is applicable, the procedure followed is not proper. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word ‘abandoned’ has been explained by the Supreme Court in para 27 referred herein above judgment of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others (supra) and as per their own say, rightly or wrongly the Trust was in possession and they were claimant and probate proceedings were initiated and, therefore, the Act itself is not applicable and even if the Act is applicable, in view of proviso to Section 4, possession could not have been taken and further assuming even if the possession is taken on the presumption that the Act is applicable, then procedure contemplated under Section 6 is required to be followed and if it is found ultimately that the rightful owner is required to be handed over possession of escheat property after applying to the competent Court for a vesting order in respect of the property and for the custody thereof in the meanwhile. 10. No such procedure is followed and the provisions which are required to be referred is sub-clause (3) of Section 8, more particularly, (4) where the administrator is required to be appointed, can be appointed in the office on furnishing security in a sum fixed by the Court for the faithful discharge of his trust and shall be entitled to such remuneration as the Court may fix. No such procedure has been followed for over a period of 29 years, the property has been destroyed and the noble object of the noble soul has been frustrated by the arbitrary action of the State Government. 11.
No such procedure has been followed for over a period of 29 years, the property has been destroyed and the noble object of the noble soul has been frustrated by the arbitrary action of the State Government. 11. Counsel for the petitioner has also commented on the attachment order of 1987 (Annexure-16) which reads as under : vkt fnukad 3-04-1987 dks eqrkfcd vkns’k Jheku~ rglhynkj lk- [ksrM+h ds vkns’k dzekad@87@725 fnuakd 27-07-1987 dh ikyuk esa xzke gkaMk Qrsgiqjk esa fLFkr Lo- jktkcgknqj Jh ljnkj flag ds ckx esa py o vpy lEifr dks dCts jkt ysus gsrq cgejkg iVokjh gYdk ds igqapkA vkns’kkuqlkj py lEifr cSy tksM+h 1 rFkk 2 bUtu ftlesa 1 pkyw rFkk 1 iqjkuk [kjkc dks dCts jkT; fy;k tkdj Jh vCnqy gdhe iq= [kqnk cDl lk- [ksrM+h lqijokbZtj ,Dl fBdkuk [ksrM+h ds lqiqnZxhukes ij fn;k x;kA lqiqnxhZukek layXu gSA rFkk vpy lEifr d`f”k Hkwfe rFkk ckx e; cUnk [k-u- 1588@5-74] 1594@10-14] 1598@0-05] 1549@025] 1600@0-48] 1601@0-14] 1602@4-68] 1603@0-20] 1604@2-16] 1605@0-35 fdrk 10 jdck 24-13 dks dCtk jkT; fy;k tkdj o lqiqnZxh iVokjh gYdk Jh gksf’k;kj flag ds fd;k x;kA rFkk Jh vCnqy gdhe th ,Dl lqijokbZtj dks fgnk;r nh xbZ fd tks Qy o lCth csph tkos mldh rglhy [ksrM+h esa nh tkosxhA vr% ckn ikyuk vkns’k mfpr dk;Zokgh gsrq lsok esa Jheku rglhynkj lk- [ksrM+h izsf”kr gSA g0 vCnqy gdhe g0 vkbZ0,y0vkj0clbZ g0 gksf’k;kj flag iVokjh g0 MkMk Qrsgiqjk 11.1.
He has also referred to the possession order which reads as under : ekSdk dCtk fjiksVZ 1 vkt fnuakd 31-07-1987 dks fnu ds 11 cts ds vkns’k ftyk dysDVj egks- >qU>quw geus cs ekStwnxh iVokjh gYdk [ksrM+h & lqijokbZtj Jh vCnqy gdhe ,Dl fBdkuk [ksrM+h pkSdhnkj Jh eUukjke lq[k egy teknkj rglhy dk fujh{k.k fd;k rks blds rkyksa ij V~LV [ksrM+h dh lkSy yxh gqbZ gS vkSj bldh ftEesnkjh fBdkuk etdwj us lqijokbZtj ,Dl fBdkuk dks ns j[kh gS vkSj pkSdhnkj dks ns[kjs[k ij yxk j[ks gSA ikap uhps lkSy yxh gqbZ gS tks nq:Lr feyh rFkk 3 rhu lkSy Mij eafty esa yxh gqbZ gSA 2 dksBh vij gky dks ns[kk x;k mlds Hkh nksuksa xsVks ij V~LV [ksrM+h dh lkSy yxh gqbZ gS o fuxjkuh ds fy;s mijksDr lqijokbZtj dh ns[kjs[k gSA 3 dksBh t;fuokl igys ls gh jktk ds le; ,e-bZ-lh- dEiuh ds 2000@& :- ekgokj fdjk;s ij pyh vk jgh gSA ftldk vc Hkh ekgokjh fdjk;k fBdkuk lqijokbZtj olwy dj jgk gSA bl dksBh dk dqN QuhZpj dk lkeku bl dksBh dh ,d dksVMh esa j[kk gqvk gS ftldk rkyk cUn gSA mijksDr nksuksa dksfB;ka dh pkfc;ka V~LV [ksrM+h ftudk nQrj fnYyh gS muds ikl gSA 4 iqjkuh tsy fcfYaMx tks [k.Mgj gkyr esa mlds esu xsV ds rkyk yxk gqvk gS lkeku dksbZ ugha gS pkch [ksrM+h V~LV ds ikl fnYyh gSA 5 dksVZ fcfYaM+x o ekfQt[kkuk rglhy [ksrM+h ds fdjk;s ij gS ftldk fdjk;k lqijokbZtj ,Dl fBdkuk [ksrM+h olwy djrk gS blesa rglhy ,l-Mh-vks- dksVZ o uk;c rglhynkj dk dk;kZy; gSA 6 Vhau ‘ksM esyk xqxtkth esgkMk tkVwokl esa gS fBdkuk or esa jkg/kkjh Fkh vc iapk;r ds dCtk dj j[kk gS Ldwy Hkh dke esa ysrk gSA 7 fdyk Hkks”kkyx<+ o fdyk ckxksj mlesa Hkw0iw0 fBdkuk [ksrM+h ds nks pkSdhnkj jgrs gS [k.M+gj gkyr esa gS dksbZ lkeku ugha gSA mijksDr ua- 1 y- 7 rd ds vkbZVe ds fy, lqijokbZtj ,Dl fBdkuk [ksrM+h o iVokjh gYdk [ksrM+h dks fgnk;r dj nh xbZ gS fd o izksiVhZ dh iwjh ns[kjs[k j[ksa dksbZ Hkh rksM+ QksM+ o fdlh pht dk [kqnZ cqnZ u gksA buds vykok vthr lkxj ds flok; rglhy [ksrM+h dh vU; fcfYaMx jktk lk- us viuh ekStwnxh esa gh Qjks[r dj nh Fkh mijksDr lEifr 1 y- 7 dCts jkt yh xbZA g0 vCnqy gdhe 31-07-1987 lqijokbZtj Hkw0iw0fB- [ksrM+h fujatuyky ‘kekZ iVokjh gYdk [ksrM+h fujatuyky ‘kekZ iVokjh gYdk [ksrM+h 31-07-1987 fu-vaxwBk eUukjke pkSdhnkj lq[kegy ,l0 Mh0 vksadkj flag teknkj g0 xksj/ku flag 31-07-1987 rglhy nkj [ksrM+h- >qU>quw jkt0 11.2.
He has referred to the order dated 16.09.1987 with regard to the Jaipur property which reads as under : dk;kZy; dyDVj jktxkeh lEifr t;iqj dzekad & vkj0th0 ¼11½ 87@839 fnuakd 16-09-1987 rglhynkj] rglhy & t;iqj t;iqjA fo”k; & ykokfj’k e`rd Lo0 jktk cgknqj ljnkjflag Hkw0iw0 lkaln dh leLr py vpy lEifr ds lEcU/k esaA lUnHkZ & vkidk i= dzekad vkj0,0@87@ 407 fnukad 7-08-1987 mijksDr fo”k;d izdkj.k esa vkidk mDr lUnfHkZr i= izkIr gqvkA tkap izfrosnu e; tkap i=koyh dk voyksdu djus ij ik;k x;k fd ykokfj’k e`rd Lo- jktk cgknqj ljnkjflag dh leLr py ,oa vpy lEifr ds fy, jktLFkku jktxkeh lEifr fu;eu vf/kfu;e] 1956 dh /kkjk 4 mi/kkjk 1 ds Dykt ch esa of.kZr izko/kkukuqlkj lwfp;ka rS;kj ugha dh gS] tks fd jktLFkku jktxkeh lEifr fu;e] 1957 ds fu;e 3 ds vuqlkj gksuh pkfg;s FkhA vr% rglhy dk;kZy; dks ewy i=koyh la[;k 1@87 i`”B 1 yxk;r 127 okfil ykSVkdj ys[k gS fd /kkjk 4 dh mi/kkjk 1 ds Dykt ch esa of.kZr lwfp;ka] fu;e 3 esa n’kkZ;h izfdz;kuqlkj rS;kj dj vfoyEc mDr of.kZr i=koyha ds lkFk okfil ykSVkosA pwafd mDr izdj.k esa vkius viuh tkap fjiksVZ fnuakd 31-07-1987 esa izFke n`”V;k Jh ljnkj flag dks ykokf’k e`rd ekuk gSA vr% jktLFkku jktxkuh lEifr fu;eu vf/kfu;e] 1956 dh /kkjk 6 mi/kkjk 1 ds Dykt , ds vUrxZr iznr ‘kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, vkidks vkns’k fn;s tkrs gS fd Lo- jktk cgknqj ljnkj flag Hkw0iw0 lkaln dh leLr py ,oa vpy lEifr dks fu;ekuqlkj rqjUr dCts jkt fy;k tkosA mlls gksus okyh vk; dks fu;ekuqlkj jktdks”k esa tek fd;k tkos o gksus okyh vk; dk iw.kZ fglkc j[kk tkosA jktfgr esa mDr dk;Zokgh fu;eksa ds vUrxZr rRdky dh tkdj ikyuk fjiksVZ lkr fnol esa fHktokuk lqfuf’pr djsA layXu mijksDrkuqlkj i=koyh dyDVj jktxkeh lEifr t;iqj RA funsZ’kkuqlkj dk;Zokgh gsrq ekxZn’kZu ekaxk tkos fd gksVy dh O;oLFkk fdl izdkj dh tkosA 11.3. Reference has also been made to the panchnama dated 29.9.1987 which reads as under : dk;Zokgh ekSdk ckcr dCtk ysus ykokfjl lEifr e`rd jktk cgknqj ljnkjflag th [ksrM+h gkml gksVy pkUniksy t;iqj fnuakd 29-09-1987 vkt fnuakd 29-09-1987 dks eqrkfcd vkns’k dyDVj jktxkeh lEifr t;iqj dzekad RG/11/87/839 Dtd.
Reference has also been made to the panchnama dated 29.9.1987 which reads as under : dk;Zokgh ekSdk ckcr dCtk ysus ykokfjl lEifr e`rd jktk cgknqj ljnkjflag th [ksrM+h gkml gksVy pkUniksy t;iqj fnuakd 29-09-1987 vkt fnuakd 29-09-1987 dks eqrkfcd vkns’k dyDVj jktxkeh lEifr t;iqj dzekad RG/11/87/839 Dtd. 16-09-1987 ds funsZ’kkuqlkj ykokfjl lEifr e`rd jktk cgknqj ljnkjflag th dh py ,oa vpy lEifr dk dCtk ysus gsrq cgejkg Jh ,l-ch vk;Z R.A. [ksrM+h gkml gksVy igqapk ekSds ij eSustj loZJh fuHkZ;flag th ,ao Jh nr feJk] f’kojkt dqfuUnk Jh }kjdkizlkn vkfn ekSrfcjku o fdjk;snkjku mifLFkr feys eSustj Jh fuHkZ;flag dks Jheku dyDVj egksn; ds vkns’k ls voxr djk;k vkns’k ds vuqlkj [ksrM+h gkml gksVy o [ksrM+h gkml ds vgkrs esa fLFkr fdjk;snkjku o vU; leLr lk{kh tehu o edkukr dk dCtk crLnhd eSustj Jh fuHkZ;flag fy;k x;kA gksVy esa fLFkr py lEifr QuhZpj dzkdjh vkfn rhu Lvkd jftLVlZ esa ntZ gSA bUgs vius dCts esa fy;k x;k] ekSds ij dCtk ysus dh ?kks”k.kk dh xbZ lkFk gh fdjk;snkjku dkfctku dks fgnk;r dh xbZ fd vkt ls [ksrM+h gkml dh ckm.M~h o blds ckgj fLFkr jktk Jh ljnkjflag dh leLr py vpy lEifr ij ljdkj dk dCtk gks x;k gSA vr% fdlh Hkh py lEifr ij vukf/kd`r dCtk ‘kDy esa ifjorZu o cspku vkfn u fd;k tkos lkFk gh tks Hkh fdjk;k vc rd [ksrM+h gkml V~LV dks fn;k tkrk vk jgk gS og fu;ekuqlkj rglhy] t;iqj esa tek djk;k tkosaA bl le; ekSds ij [ksrM+h gkml gksVy py jgk gS vr% gksVy e; py lEifr esa LFkk;h :i ls tc rd fd dksbZ oSdfYid O;oLFkk ugha gks tkrh Jh fuHkZ;flag eSustj dks lqiqnZ dh tkrh gS] bUgsa fgnk;r nh tkrh gS fd Lvkd jftLVj esa ntZ ‘kqnk lkeku vius fuxjkuh esa j[ks vkSj fdlh izdkj [kqnZcqnZ u djs vkSj vkt ls vken [kpZ dk fglkc vyx ls j[ks lkFk dh fdjk;snkjku vU; dkfct O;fDr;ksa ds fdjk;sukes vkfn e; foLr`r lwfp funsZ’kkuqlkj lwfpizi= esa dk;kZy; esa izLrqr djsA gksVy [ksrM+h gkml ds eSustj Jh fuHkZ;flag us Statement from 20-09-1987 to 26-09-1987 is’k fd;k ftlds vuqlkj fnuakd 26-09-1987 dk Balance #- 8346&05 vads :i;k vkB gtkj rhu lkS fN;kyhl :i;k iSlk ikap ek= gS fnuakd 26-09-1987 ls vkt fnuakd 29-09-1987 rd dksb TRANJUCTION ugha fd;k x;k gksuk crk;kA eSustj Jh fuHkZ;flag dks fgnk;r nh xbZ fd vkt ls fnuakd 29-09-1987 ls vk; O;; dk fglkc rglhy dk;kZy; esa izLrqr djs rFkk O;; ,oa [kpZ ds fy;s iwoZ btktr Hkh rglhy ls izkIr djsA leLr deZpkjh;ku dh foLr`r iw.kZ fooj.k ds lkFk lwph izLrqr djsA mifLFkr iaftdk vkt miyC/k ugha gS tks fnuakd 5-10-1987 dks e; leLr Accounts ds’kcqd] ystj vkfn ds lkFk is’k djsA bZ’rgkj dCtkjkt ysus dk leLr mifLFkr ekSrfcjku ,oa eSustj Jh fuHkZ;flag vkfn ds lkFk le{k ?kks”k.kk dCtkjkt dh tkdj pLik fd;k x;k ,oa gLrk{kj djk;s x;sA g0 rglhynkj g0 (SP Arya), RA” 11.4.
Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in (2011)9 SCC 1 , para 168, 190 and para 219 which reads as under : “168. Article 300A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of law made by a competent legislature. The expression ‘Property’ in Article 300A confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognised by law. 190. Article 300A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorizing deprivation of property have not been complied with. While enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) [the “Rule of law” doctrine] and not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive.” 219.One of the fundamental principles of a democratic society inherent in all the provisions of the Constitution is that any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possession should be lawful. Let the message, therefore, be loud and clear, that rule of law exists in this country even when we interpret a statute, which has the blessings of Article 300A.” 12. In that view of the matter, we make it clear that through the proceedings which are culminated against the petitioner before the Delhi High Court which is subject matter of appeal before the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, on that basis they are not claiming.
In that view of the matter, we make it clear that through the proceedings which are culminated against the petitioner before the Delhi High Court which is subject matter of appeal before the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, on that basis they are not claiming. They are claiming on the basis of violation of principles of natural justice and the arbitrary action on the part of the State Government to initiate proceedings which are not governed by the Act and they are challenging the dispossession of the property and we also make it clear that while deciding the matter, we have considered the facts which were prevailing on the date of order passed and on subsequent development we are not making observations and no findings are given on that basis. 13. Counsel for the State Government Mr. Gill AAG has taken us to the proceedings and the order of the Collector. First he has justified that the Act will apply and their claim on the property is not proper and the order passed by the State Government is just and proper. 13.1. He further contended that in view of application No.4992/2015, where the Collector has decided the issue under the Act of 1956 and by order dated 02.02.2016, the claim of the petitioner was considered and on the basis of Delhi High Court judgment, they were not found to be claimant for the property. 14. He has taken us to the provisions of the Act and contended that on 28.01.1987 Raja Bahadur Sardar Singh died, on 31.01.1987 the claim was made and on 14.04.1987 the property was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Delhi and the order came to be passed on 22.02.1987 before the trust came to be registered and the Manager of the Hotel was appointed as receiver. In view of the provisions of Article 296 of the Constitution of India and in view of the proceedings which are stayed by this Court, the claim of the petitioner may not be entertained.
In view of the provisions of Article 296 of the Constitution of India and in view of the proceedings which are stayed by this Court, the claim of the petitioner may not be entertained. Order dated 06.03.1987 reads as under : dk;kZy; rglhynkj t;iqj ua0 ykokfjl /87/RA/309/ 7.03.1987 uksfVl cuke % Jh fuHkZ; flag iq= Jh vtesj flag gksVy [ksrM+h gkml pkaniksy ckgj] t;iqj fo”k; %& izk-i= Jh }kjdk izlkn ikjhd ckcr ykokfjl e`rd jktk cgknqj flag dks ykokfjl lEifr dh tkap ,oa jktLFkku jktxkeh lEifr vf/kfu;e ds rgr dCtsjkt ysus ckcrA fo”k;kUrxZr cjoDr ekSdk fujh{k.k fnuakd 4-03-1987 vki }kjk eSustj] gksVy [ksrM+h gkml] pkaniksy ckgj] t;iqj gksuk izdV fd;k gS rFkk leLr py o vpy lEifr [ksrM+h gkml dk dk;Z ns[kjs[k j[kuk crk;k x;k gSA vr% tfj;s uksfVl lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vids dCts dh lEifr ls lEcfU/kr fjdkM+Z e; lcwr nLrkostkr ,oa mDr lEifr esa fufgr gks rks fnuakd 12-03-1987 dks lqcg 10 AM ij Lo;a mifLFkr gksdj fuEu gLrk{kjdrkZ ds le{k izLrqr djsA lkFk gh vkidk fu;qfDr i= Hkh izLrqr djsA vU;Fkk ;g eku fy;k tkosxk fd vkids dCts dh [ksrM+h gkml t;iqj esa fLFkr gksVy o vU; py vpy lEifr iw.kZr;k ykokfjl gS vkSj ckn e;kn xqtjus dksbZ mez ugha lquk tkosxk rFkk vkids dCts dh leLr py vpy lEifr dks fu;ekuqlkj dCts jkt esa ys fy;k tkosxkA vkt fnukad 6-03-1987 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA g0 rglhynkj t;iqj 15. Section 6(7) was strongly relied upon and contended that the petitioners have no claim and the trust is not the rightful claimant of the property.
Section 6(7) was strongly relied upon and contended that the petitioners have no claim and the trust is not the rightful claimant of the property. Section 6(7) reads as under: “6(7) The collector may, if any inquiry under this section involves a complicated question of law as to title or status which has not been previously adjudicated upon by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, and shall, if there are two or more claimants in respect of the same property, require any or all of the claimants to apply for a succession certificate in respect of such property or to institute a suit for a declaration of title thereto within such period not exceeding six months in the aggregate as the Collector may from time to time fix, and if such application or suit has been made or instituted, the Collector shall stay the proceedings before him and the disposal of the property shall be subject to the result thereof.” 16. Mr. Gill has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Bahadur Tandon v. Shankar Lal (since deceased) By LRs. (1980) 2 SCC 253 , para 7 of which reads as under : “7. The next question which we must consider is what was the effect of the dissolution of the company on the lease-hold interest which the company had in the land. No term of the lease has been brought to our notice by which the lease would stand extinguished on the dissolution of the company. If the company had a subsisting interest in the lease on the date of dissolution such interest must necessarily vest in the Government by escheat or as bona vacantia. In India the law is well settled that the property of an intestate dying without leaving lawful heirs and the property of a dissolved Corporation passes to the Government by escheat or as bona vacantia. Of course such property will be subject to trusts and charges, if any, previously effecting its vide M/s. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., v. Violat Ouchterlong Wapshare & Ors.
Of course such property will be subject to trusts and charges, if any, previously effecting its vide M/s. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., v. Violat Ouchterlong Wapshare & Ors. It is also to be noticed here that section 244(B) of the Companies Act 1913, as well as section 555(2) of the Companies Act 1956 expressly enjoin a duty on the liquidator to deposit, on the dissolution of the company, into an account in the Reserve Bank of India known as the Companies Liquidation Account any money representing unpaid dividend or undisputed assets lying in his hands at the time of dissolution. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Tulshi Ram Sahu & Anr. v. Gur Dayal Singh & Anr. and Mussamat Ramman Bibi v. Mathura Prasad & Anr. Both were cases of fixed rate tenancies. As pointed out by the Full Bench in Tulsi Ram Sahu & Anr. v. Gur Dayal Singh & Anr., one of the incidents of a fixed rate tenancy was that provided by section 18 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1901 which prescribed that a right of occupancy would stand extinguished when a fixed-rate tenant died leaving no heir entitled under the Act to inherit the right of occupancy. It followed there from that the land had to revert to the landlord and could not go to the Government by escheat. On the other hand in Sonet Kooer v. Himmat Bahadur & ors. The Privy Council held that on the failure of heirs to a tenant holding land under Mukerrori Tenure there was nothing in the nature of the tenure which prevented the Crown from taking the Mukerrori by escheat, subject to the payment of rent to the Zamindar. If the lease-hold interest of the company in the land became vested in the government on the dissolution of the company it must follow that the suit at the instance of the plaintiffs was not maintainable.” 17. No other contention is raised by any of the party, therefore, we are deciding the matter on the basis of submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 19.
No other contention is raised by any of the party, therefore, we are deciding the matter on the basis of submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 19. Before proceeding the matter, we make it clear that we are not deciding the title over the property, we are only examining the matter and the action of the State Government which is subject matter of the petition. 20. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties and in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred herein above in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others (supra), we accept the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that since they were in possession, whether it was acceptable to the State Government or not but nevertheless as per panchnama which is drawn the trust was found in possession and Manager was appointed by them and, therefore, in view of the observations made by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others (supra), the property was not abandoned. In that view of the matter, invocation of the provisions of the Act itself is not bona fide and the order of the Deputy Secretary directing the Collector and the subordinate officers is contrary to law. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the initiation of the proceedings itself is bad in law. 20.1. Assuming without admitting that even if the Act is applicable, even then in view of provisions of Section 4 and its proviso, which clearly says that ‘present possession of any person’ which clearly indicated that only possession is material not how they are in possession. In that view of the matter, the proviso which clearly indicates that the possession shall not be disturbed whereas not only the possession is disturbed but sub-clause (c) of Section 4(1) which clearly envisages that taking over possession is in the prescribed manner seems to be not followed. 20.2.
In that view of the matter, the proviso which clearly indicates that the possession shall not be disturbed whereas not only the possession is disturbed but sub-clause (c) of Section 4(1) which clearly envisages that taking over possession is in the prescribed manner seems to be not followed. 20.2. The other contention with regard to applicability of the Act, we are of the opinion that with regard to the subsequent enquiry and the enquiry which was required to be done, no doubt order is placed on record, but we are not examining the same in view of the two findings referred to above, therefore, the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The possession which was taken is without authority of law and the same is not permissible under the law. 21. In that view of the matter, we declare that the action of the State Government is not only arbitrary but contrary to the provisions of law and dehors the Constitutional provisions and the scheme. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 03.07.1987, 22.07.1987 and 03.08.1987 are quashed and set aside. The writ petition is allowed. 21.1. The respondents no.2 to 4 are directed to hand over possession to the petitioner on or before 12.12.2016. If the possession is not handed over, it will be open for the petitioner to file appropriate proceedings before this Court by way of contempt proceedings against the Collector and all other respondents. 22. We have not accepted the prayer for damages since there is no prayer for damages in prayer clause of petition however, it will be open for the petitioners to file appropriate proceedings for damages and all other claims we have examined only the prayers which are subject matter of this proceedings. Writ petition allowed - Prayer for damages not accepted.