JUDGMENT : RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V., J. 1. The appellant, after having found guilty of fratricide, has preferred this appeal challenging the conviction, and sentence. 2. Prosecution case runs thus:- Ammini Amma is the mother of Sekharan, the accused, and Rajan, the deceased. She was staying with Sekharan and his family in the family house. The deceased Rajan is her elder son and there were pending disputes between her two sons in respect of a pathway lying on the eastern side of the family house, which was being used by deceased Rajan to gain access to his property which was situated about 20 meters towards the north. There were frequent spats between Rajan and Sekharan and it has come out in evidence that both were alcoholics. On 17.2.2009, there arose some dispute in connection with the blowing up of the fuse of a water pump between Rajan and Sekharan and the prosecution alleges that Sekharan kicked Rajan resulting in Rajan falling on the ground. Prosecution further alleges that, in a horrendous act, Sekharan poured petrol on the body of Rajan, who was lying down, and set him ablaze using a cigarette lighter kept by him in his possession. Rajan sustained serious burn injuries and the incident was witnessed by Ammini Amma, the mother and Savithri, the wife of the accused. Ammini Amma attempted her best to douse the flames. Hearing their cries neighbours came to the rescue and Rajan was removed to the General hospital, Ernakulam, in a very serious condition. 3. PW1 the son-in-law of Rajan received information of the incident and after obtaining necessary information about the incident, went to the Mulanthuruthy police station and gave Ext.P1 statement based on which crime was registered by PW9, the Sub Inspector of police on 17.2.2009 at 9.45 p.m. u/s 307 of the IPC. 4. Rajan was initially seen by Dr.Markose Paul Roy, the Assistant Surgeon at the General Hospital, Ernakulam at about 10.25 p.m. on 17.2.2009 and the case sheet was marked as Ext.X1. The cause of the injury was spoken by the injured himself to the Doctor and it was stated that his brother Sekharan had poured petrol on his body and set him ablaze. 5. The cause of the injury was spoken by the injured himself to the Doctor and it was stated that his brother Sekharan had poured petrol on his body and set him ablaze. 5. Sensing the worst after getting a cue from the treating doctor, PW9 the Sub Inspector of police, submitted Ext.P10 application before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I, Ernakulam, requesting to initiate steps to record the dying declaration of Rajan, whose condition was critical. 6. PW5, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I, Ernakulam, recorded the dying declaration of Rajan after obtaining necessary certification from the doctor and after independently assessing his mental state. 7. On 18.2.2009, the Circle Inspector of police, Piravom who was examined as PW11 took over investigation and Ext.P4 is the scene mahazer prepared by him. He seized MO1 to 6 which were found at the scene. Thereafter, he questioned the witnesses to the occurrence. On 21.2.2009 at 9.30 p.m. he arrested the accused and produced him before the learned Magistrate. 8. The inevitable took place on 24.2.2009, on which day Rajan succumbed to the burn injuries. 9. PW 11 conducted inquest over the dead body of Rajan and he prepared Ext.P5 report. He submitted Ext.P13 report to add S.302 of the IPC. The body of Rajan was sent for autopsy to ascertain the cause of death. PW6, the District police Surgeon attached to the General Hospital, Ernakulam, conducted autopsy and he furnished Ext.P7 certificate. He thereafter, took steps to record the statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C of the mother and wife of accused Sekharan. The materials seized from the scene were sent for chemical analysis to the Forensic Science Lab and Ext.P15 is the report of analysis. For a short while, ie, from 29.5.2009, PW10, the Circle Inspector of Piravom, took over investigation and he prepared the forwarding note for sending the materials seized as per Ext.P18 mahazar for chemical analysis. Later, investigation was taken over by PW11, who, after completing the investigation, laid final report before the jurisdictional Magistrate. 10. The Court before which the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offence and finding that the offence is to be tried by a Court of Sessions, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, u/s 209 of the Cr.P.C after following the necessary procedure. 10. The Court before which the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offence and finding that the offence is to be tried by a Court of Sessions, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, u/s 209 of the Cr.P.C after following the necessary procedure. The said Court made over the case to the Additional Sessions Court (Ad hoc-I), Ernakulam, for trial and disposal. 11. The latter Court, on receipt of records and on appearance of the accused before the said Court framed charge for the offence punishable u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed that he be tried. The prosecution examined PW1 to 11 and through them Ext.P1 to 15 were marked. MO1 to 6 were identified and marked. Ext.X1 and X1(a) case sheet and case history respectively of deceased Rajan were also marked. 13. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C with regard to the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against him. Apart from denying the circumstances he stated that the deceased, who is none other than his brother attempted to commit suicide and it was the accused who had persuaded him to name him as the assailant so that the deceased could save himself from a possible criminal prosecution for suicidal attempt. He denied having committed any act which would constitute an offence and maintained his innocence. 14. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted u/s 232 of the Cr.P.C he was asked to enter on his defence. He chose not to adduce any evidence. 15. The Court below relied on Ext.P6 dying declaration given by the deceased to PW5, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I, Ernakulam, and also the statement made by the deceased to PW7, the doctor who had examined him when he was taken to the hospital that it was his brother who had committed the heinous act of pouring petrol and other attendant materials came to the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully established that the victim was subjected to fatal burns by the accused with the intention to murder him. The Court further held that the facts and circumstances without doubt enable the Court to conclude that the death of the deceased is a homicidal death meted out by the indicted himself and held him guilty for the offence punishable u/s 302 of the IPC. He was therefore, convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000.- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence u/s 302 of the IPC. The entire fine amount was ordered to be paid to the dependents of the deceased u/s 357 (1) (b) of the Cr.P.C. 16. Since the appeal was preferred by the appellant from the jail while undergoing sentence and he could not appoint a counsel of his choice, Adv.Reena Abraham was appointed as State Brief by this Court to defend the accused. 17. Mrs. Reena Abraham, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in her immaculately prepared and well presented arguments submitted that there was no evidence worth the name to connect the accused with the death of deceased Rajan. The learned counsel would submit that the first informant is not a witness to the occurrence and the evidence tendered by him is nothing but hearsay. Insofar as PW2 and 3 are concerned, the have not even whispered in their evidence that Sekharan had anything to do with the sustaining of burn injuries by Rajan on the fateful day. The learned counsel would further submit that the Assistant Surgeon did not properly ascertain the mental fitness of the injured and the certificate issued by him cannot be relied on to hold that the deceased was in a proper frame of mind at the time of giving the declaration to the Magistrate. It was pointed out that Ext.X1 and X1(a) would reveal that Rajan had sustained 75% burn injuries and was in a critical condition and he could not have given any such statement. The learned counsel would further submit that the dying declaration which was not corroborated by any other pieces of evidence could not have been the basis of conviction. It was pointed out that Ext.X1 and X1(a) would reveal that Rajan had sustained 75% burn injuries and was in a critical condition and he could not have given any such statement. The learned counsel would further submit that the dying declaration which was not corroborated by any other pieces of evidence could not have been the basis of conviction. The learned counsel also highlighted the defence version that Rajan had attempted to commit suicide as he was bankrupt and being his younger brother, the appellant had himself taken over the authorship of the crime to avoid any possible prosecution against Rajan under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal code for attempted suicide. The learned counsel then pointed out that the failure of the prosecution to properly explain the presence of the kerosene can near to the scene of crime would prove fatal. 18. The learned counsel then went on to point out that failure of the prosecution to prove any motive to do away with Rajan is an additional circumstance favoring the defence. The evidence of PW2 and 3 were highlighted by the learned counsel to support her contentions. According to the learned counsel, the Apex Court, on numerous occasions, have held that as a rule there must be material corroboration for a dying declaration before it can be used as evidence. The learned counsel, concluded her submissions asserting that the Court below has erred in law and on facts in holding the accused guilty without applying the time honored and settled principles laid down by the Apex Court governing cases where the prosecution relies on dying declaration to bring home the guilt. 19. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the eye witnesses who were examined as PW2 and PW3 are the mother and wife respectively of the accused and though their 164 statements were also recorded to ensure that they state a truthful version of the incident at the time of trial, they resiled from their earlier version and did not support the prosecution case. The learned Public prosecutor further contended that Ext.P1 statement was furnished by PW1 within an hour of the incident wherein a conspectus of the incident which took place had been stated. The learned Public prosecutor further contended that Ext.P1 statement was furnished by PW1 within an hour of the incident wherein a conspectus of the incident which took place had been stated. Though PW1 is not an eye witness, the fact that the crime was registered without delay and the name of the accused finds a place in the same goes a long way in showing the genuineness of the prosecution version. The learned Public Prosecutor would further submit that PW7, the Assistant Surgeon at General Hospital, Ernakulam, had attended to Rajan at 10.25 p.m. at the Burns ward and he had recorded in the case history that the injured himself had revealed that his brother Sekharan had poured petrol on his body and set him on fire. According to the learned Public Prosecutor this evidence is unchallenged and the same by itself can be the basis of conviction. 20. The learned Prosecutor would further point out that on the date of incident itself at 11.20 p.m. PW5, judicial Magistrate after obtaining requisition from the Investigating Officer had recorded the dying declaration after following the proper procedure and after obtaining certification from the doctor. The learned Public Prosecutor would further contend that the defence of the accused that the victim had attempted to commit suicide in view of his bankruptcy and the accused was persuaded to take up the authorship of the crime to save the deceased from a possible prosecution for attempt to commit suicide, is inherently weak, unsubstantiated and does not fit in with commonsense. The learned Prosecutor would submit that Ext.P6 and prompt lodging of the FI statement along with the testimony of the treating doctor and the evidence of doctor who conducted the autopsy would prove the case of the prosecution beyond any doubt whatsoever. It is further submitted that the accused does not deserve any leniency and the learned Sessions Judge has meticulously considered all the aspects and there is no reason warranting interference. 21. The homicidal death of Rajan while undergoing treatment for burn injury sustained on 17.2.2009 is sought to be proved by the prosecution by examining PW6 the Civil Surgeon attached to the Government hospital, Ernakulam. The autopsy was conducted on 24.2.2009 and Ext.P7 is the postmortem certificate issued by him. 21. The homicidal death of Rajan while undergoing treatment for burn injury sustained on 17.2.2009 is sought to be proved by the prosecution by examining PW6 the Civil Surgeon attached to the Government hospital, Ernakulam. The autopsy was conducted on 24.2.2009 and Ext.P7 is the postmortem certificate issued by him. It reveals the following injuries:- Injuries (antemortem) (i) contusion of root of sigmoid meso colour and also involving left psoas major muscle on the left 12x7 cm, green with brown in colour (seen at dissection) (ii) Burns: (a) face, head and neck almost the entire region of scalp and hair had been spared. Scalp hair as the front of head shown singeing. Almost the entire face, ears and neck showed epidermal burns with root staining. This strip of skin around the eyelids showed sparing (k. rigor) (b) Upper limbs: The front aspects of both upper limbs showed dermo epidermal burns. The back aspect of the right upper limbs was mostly spared and of the left upper limbs partly spared of burns. (c) Chest and abdomen : The entire front and back aspect of the chest and abdomen showed dermo epidermal burns with “dermal jacketing” (d) Penis and genital : An area of skin corresponding to the undergarments was spared of burns on the part of hip and greater part of genitals were spared of burns but the tip of penis and lower scrotum showed epidermal burns. On the back aspect the right buttock showed an area of sparing and rest showed dermoepidermal burns. (e) Lower limbs :- The greater part of the front and back aspect of both legs and thighs showed dermo-epidermal burns. The feet and distal 5 cm of the lower legs and a strip of skin on the upper back aspect of right thigh were spared of burns. All burnt areas showed pus and infection. Approximately 75% of the total body area surface had stained burns. 22. Based on the findings in the postmortem certificate PW6 has opined that the deceased had died due to infective complications of burns. He has also stated while he was examined as PW6 that injury No.1 is possible by a kick by another and burns noted are possible if the person is poured with petrol on his body and lit with fire while lying down. He has further stated that all burns are deep and some are superficial. He has also stated while he was examined as PW6 that injury No.1 is possible by a kick by another and burns noted are possible if the person is poured with petrol on his body and lit with fire while lying down. He has further stated that all burns are deep and some are superficial. He concluded by saying that the burns sustained by the deceased are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 23. Exhibit P 7 and the evidence of PW 6 would leave no manner or doubt that Rajan had died due to infective complications of the burn injuries which he had sustained on 17.2.2009 near the courtyard of his house. 24. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the prosecution has established that it was the accused who had caused the burn injuries on the body of Rajan, which resulted in his death. The prosecution examined PW1 to 3 to state its version of the incident. PW1, the son in law of Rajan did not witness the incident. PW2 and 3 who are the mother and wife of Sekharan had witnessed the incident and their statements were also recorded u/s 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure that they stick to their initial version during the trial. 25. PW1 is the son-in-law of the deceased. He is the person who lodged FI statement at 9.45 p.m. on the same day before the Sub Inspector of police, Mulanthuruthy police station. In his evidence he spoke about the dispute between the appellant and the deceased in connection with a pathway lying on the eastern side of the house of the accused which was used by the deceased for accessing his property. The rest of his evidence concerning the incident would not help the prosecution because it is nothing but hearsay. However, he stated that Rajan had died after six days while undergoing treatment and that he had initially gone to the police station and it was thereafter, that he had gone to the hospital. 26. PW2 is Ammini Amma, the mother of both the accused and the deceased. She deposed that she used to reside with the accused and his family. According to her, there used to be frequent fights between Rajan and the accused in connection with the pathway. 26. PW2 is Ammini Amma, the mother of both the accused and the deceased. She deposed that she used to reside with the accused and his family. According to her, there used to be frequent fights between Rajan and the accused in connection with the pathway. The incident had occurred in the courtyard of Rajan's house. She poured water on the body of Rajan to douse the fire. She denied her earlier statement that it was Sekharan who had set fire to the deceased. Ext.P2 to P2(c) contradictions were brought out by the prosecution and the same was proved through PW11, the Investigating Officer. The learned public prosecutor highlighted the fact that the evidence of PW 2 did not reveal that the appellant had made any effort to extinguish the fire which had enveloped Rajan's body though he was present there. 27. PW3 is Savithri, the wife of the accused. She also did not support the prosecution version for obvious reasons. She stated that on the date of occurrence there was fight between accused and Rajan and all of them were beaten. Immediately thereafter she went out to meet some person and when she returned she heard the cries of her mother-in-law. She saw Rajan lying on the ground engulfed in flames and PW2 was seen making an effort to put out the flames by pouring water on his body. She was also contradicted by her previous statement in writing and Ext.P3 to P3 (b) were marked which were duly proved when the Investigating Officer was in the box. 28. The prosecution places the greatest amount of reliance on the statement given by the deceased Rajan to PW7, the Assistant Surgeon of the General hospital, Ernakulam, and also to Ext.P6 dying declaration recorded by PW5 the learned Magistrate. 29. We shall deal with the evidence of PW7 first. PW7 is Dr.Markose Paul Joy, the then Assistant Surgeon attached to the General hospital, Ernakulam. Through the said witness prosecution had marked Ext.X1 case sheet and Ext.X1(a) case history of Rajan. PW7 testified that Rajan was brought to his ward at 10.25 p.m. on 17.2.2009. He was initially taken to the causality and then shifted to the Burns Ward as his condition was critical. Through the said witness prosecution had marked Ext.X1 case sheet and Ext.X1(a) case history of Rajan. PW7 testified that Rajan was brought to his ward at 10.25 p.m. on 17.2.2009. He was initially taken to the causality and then shifted to the Burns Ward as his condition was critical. After referring to Ext.X1(a) case history he stated that the history was spoken to by the patient himself and he had stated that his brother Sekharan poured petrol on him and lit fire. Ext.X1 (a) would reveal that the patient was conscious and oriented and he had sustained partial and full thickness burns involving about 75% of total body surface area. He gave instruction for recording the dying declaration of the injured. He further stated that at 11.25 p.m. the Magistrate came for recording the dying declaration. He issued certificate, certifying that the patient was conscious and on his own senses and he is in a fit condition to make a declaration. He had also signed in the dying declaration prepared by the learned Magistrate and identified his signature in Ext.P6. 30. We cannot fail to note that in respect of burn injuries sustained by Rajan at the hands of the accused at about 8.45 p.m. the FI statement was recorded and crime got registered at 9.45 p.m. the victim was removed to the hospital where he was examined by the doctor at 10.25 p.m. and the alleged cause of injury was noted by him, which implicates the appellant. Ext.P6 dying declaration was recorded by the learned Magistrate at 11.20 p.m. This in short is the sequence and chronology of events that took place on 17.2.2009. 31. There is no challenge in the cross examination about the mental fitness of the victim or in respect of his assertion that the victim had disclosed the cause of injury to the doctor. The trend of cross examination was to bring out if proper treatment was imparted, the life of the victim could be saved. In other words, nothing contrary was elicited to discredit the doctor's evidence. 32. The prosecution examined the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I Ernakulam, as PW5. He testified that on 17.2.2009 at 11.20 p.m. he had recorded the dying declaration of Rajan at the General hospital, Ernakulam, as per the requisition of the C.I of police Mulamthuruthy. In other words, nothing contrary was elicited to discredit the doctor's evidence. 32. The prosecution examined the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I Ernakulam, as PW5. He testified that on 17.2.2009 at 11.20 p.m. he had recorded the dying declaration of Rajan at the General hospital, Ernakulam, as per the requisition of the C.I of police Mulamthuruthy. The learned Magistrate deposed that he had ascertained from the treating doctor that Rajan was conscious and that he was in his own senses and in a fit condition to make a declaration. He asserted that a certificate was obtained from the doctor to that effect. The witness would further depose that he was satisfied after putting questions and obtaining answers to the victim that he was conscious and was in his own senses and that he was capable of giving rational statements. It was thereafter that the learned Magistrate had recorded the declaration given by the victim and that too in question and answer form. 33. In Ext.P6, when asked by the learned Magistrate as to how he sustained the burn injuries, Rajan stated that while he was returning back home after purchasing beedi and other articles, his brother Sekharan kicked him as a result of which, he fell down. While he was lying down on the ground, Sekharan poured petrol on his body and set him on fire using a cigarette lighter. PW2 and 3 were present and they tried to douse the flames by pouring water on his body. Sekharan is his younger brother and he was brought to the hospital by Parameswaran and Suresh. It is seen from Ext.P6 that PW7 has certified that the victim is conscious and is on his own senses and was in a fit condition to make a declaration. We have absolutely no reason to doubt the version of PW5 and 6 which, according to us, would seal the fate of the case owing to its implicit trustworthiness. 34. Then there is the evidence of chemical analysis borne out from Ext.P15 report in respect of the material objects which were seized from the scene of occurrence at the time of preparation of Ext.P4 scene mahazar. The material objects were produced before Court and they were sent to the forensic science lab as per Ext.P11 forwarding note prepared by PW10. Ext.P15 report reveals that petrol was detected on all the items on scientific analysis. 35. The material objects were produced before Court and they were sent to the forensic science lab as per Ext.P11 forwarding note prepared by PW10. Ext.P15 report reveals that petrol was detected on all the items on scientific analysis. 35. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant is right in her submission that the evidence tendered by PW1 to 3 will not in any way advance the case of the prosecution. PW 1 though deposed in terms of Exhibit p 1 is not an eye witness. PW 2 and PW 3 are near relatives and they did not support the case of the prosecution for obvious reason. PW 2 is the mother and PW 3 is the wife of the accused. It will not be in their best interests to see that the accused is convicted and sentenced for the offence committed by him. But as rightly submitted by the learned prosecutor, Ext.P6 dying declaration along with the evidence of PW5 to 7 and Ext. X1(a) would bring out in clinching fashion the culpability of the appellant. 36. The main contention that was raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is as regards the reliability of the dying declaration and according to the learned counsel, the same cannot be relied on without seeking for corroboration. The learned counsel highlighted the fact that the deceased Rajan had suffered 75% burns over his total body surface area and it could not be expected of him to disclose the cause of his injuries. 37. We have already referred to the statement of the deceased to the learned Magistrate above and the question is whether the same would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. 38. S.32(1) is extracted below for easy reference:- "S.32 (1) When it relates to cause of death - When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of he transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statement are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." 39. Such statement are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." 39. The above provision relates to the statement made by a person before his death. Two categories of statement are made admissible in evidence and further made them as substantive evidence. They are:- (1) His statement as to the cause of his death; (2) His statement as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. It has been held by the Apex Court that the second category can envelope a far wider amplitude than the first category. The words "statement as any of the circumstances" are by themselves capable of expanding the width and contours of the scope of admissibility. When the word "circumstances" is linked to "transaction which resulted in his death" the subsection casts the net in a very wide dimension. Anything which has a nexus with his death, proximate or distant, direct or indirect, can also fall within the purview of the sub-section. As the possibility of getting the maker of the statement in flesh and blood has been closed once and for all the endeavour should be how to include the statement of a dead person within the sweep of the sub-section and not how to exclude it therefrom. Admissibility is the first step and once it is admitted the Court has to consider how far it is reliable. Once that test of reliability is found positive the court has to consider the utility of that statement in the particular case. (Patel Hiralal Joitaram vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 2944 ) 40. The justice theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or promoting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. (Laxman v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 2973 ) 41. In Atbir v. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2010 (3) KLT Suppl. 81 (SC) the Apex Court after considering a wealth of precedents on the subject of dying declaration laid down the following principles:- (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. 42. In the case on hand, the injured himself had stated to the doctor at 10.25 p.m. about the circumstances of the transaction leading to the sustaining of injuries, which in unmistakable terms reveals the complicity of his sibling in this gravest of crime. Ext.X1(a) would reveal that none of the near relatives of the deceased were present near the injured at that time. At 11.20 p.m., the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate, and that too within three hours of sustaining the burn injuries. The doctor who had seen patient had certified as to the mental fitness of the injured. The dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate after following proper procedure and in the manner prescribed. 43. The learned counsel attempted to dilute the sanctity of the dying declaration by contending that the injured had survived till 24.2.2009 and the injured had no apprehension of immediate death. For a statement to be relevant under S 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, it is not necessary that death should have a nexus in terms of any fixed time, with the declaration, or that the victim should be in apprehension of immediate death. The conditions are that the statement should relate to the circumstances surrounding the event which ultimately led to the death. There should be nexus between the circumstances stated by the victim and his death. 44. Finally, as a last ditch effort, the learned Counsel, highlighting the evidence of the doctor submitted that the deceased had succumbed to the injuries due to complications and submitted that his life could have been saved if proper treatment was administered. There should be nexus between the circumstances stated by the victim and his death. 44. Finally, as a last ditch effort, the learned Counsel, highlighting the evidence of the doctor submitted that the deceased had succumbed to the injuries due to complications and submitted that his life could have been saved if proper treatment was administered. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the appellant can only be held guilty for having committed the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 45. S.299 of the IPC reads thus:- Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. "Explanation 2 to Section 299 answers the question posed by the learned counsel which reads thus:- "Explanation 2 - Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented." 46. The appellant has not made any endeavor to bring his case within any of the exception enumerated in Section 300 IPC so as to bring the case of the appellant outside the four corners of S 300 of the IPC. The appellant had sourced petrol from his Bike and after bringing down his elder brother to the ground after kicking him, had poured petrol, which is an inflammable liquid on his body and has set him ablaze. Evidence let in by the doctor reveals that the deceased had sustained 75 percent burns and if it was not for the timely act of his mother in attempting to douse the flames, the situation would have been even more fatal. The mere fact that Rajan survived till 24.2.2009 is no mitigating circumstance. The evidence would reveal that the appellant had committed the act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as he knew "to be likely to cause death of the deceased" and will come within the 2nd clause of S 300 of the IPC. 47. The mere fact that Rajan survived till 24.2.2009 is no mitigating circumstance. The evidence would reveal that the appellant had committed the act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as he knew "to be likely to cause death of the deceased" and will come within the 2nd clause of S 300 of the IPC. 47. After having analyzed the evidence and after having tested the same, with the principles of law on the subject, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has successfully proved that the victim was subjected to fatal burns by the appellant with intention to kill. We are convinced that Ext. P 6 is voluntarily made and true and there is no impediment in accepting the same. The statement given by Rajan to PW 7 would lend further corroboration to Exhibit P 6, if required. The above evidence coupled with the other facts and circumstances would lead to the irresistible conclusion that fatal burn injuries were inflicted on Rajan by none other than the appellant on the fateful day by pouring petrol on his body and setting him ablaze. The learned Sessions Judge has evaluated the evidence meticulously and has entered into the correct finding. After having undertaken an independent appraisal of the evidence let in we are of the view that no grounds have been made out for interference, either on the findings or on the question of sentence. 48. Appeal is dismissed. The conviction and sentence are confirmed. The appellant shall be entitled to set off as provided u/s 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period he has been in custody in this case, subject to the orders passed by the authority u/s 432/ 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.