JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicants, retrenched daily wagers, have prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this petition; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 16.5.2002 and 22.3.2002 respectively at Ann.: LA passed by the respondents terminating the services of the petitioners and further be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the present petitioners with all consequential and incidental benefits. (C) This Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioners with effect from 1998. (CC) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and thereby be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 5.10.2011 passed by the respondent No. 2. (D) Pending admission and final disposal of the petition, this Honourable Court may be pleased to stay and suspend the operation, implementation, execution and enforcement of the impugned order dated 16.5.2002 and 22.3.2002 respectively Ann.: A and further be pleased to direct the respondents to permit the petitioners to discharge their duties and further be pleased to direct the respondents to maintain status quo prevailing on the previous day of the passing of the impugned order of termination. (E) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, this Honourable Court may be pleased to direct the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioners with effect from 1998. (F) Any other and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice." 2. The case of the writ-applicants may be summarised as under: "The writ-applicants were appointed by the respondent Corporation on daily wages by order dated 14th November 1998. (F) Any other and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice." 2. The case of the writ-applicants may be summarised as under: "The writ-applicants were appointed by the respondent Corporation on daily wages by order dated 14th November 1998. After putting in almost four years of service, all of a sudden, by the impugned orders dated 16th May 2002 and 21st April 2002 respectively, their services came to be terminated on the ground that they, along with other employees, had indulged in a fraud. It was alleged that the bogus record sheets were prepared, wherein the false entries of number of days of work were shown, and by practicing such fraud, appointments were obtained in the Corporation. Thus, the misconduct alleged was of a very serious nature. A show-cause notice was issued in this regard, calling upon the writ-applicants to show-cause as to why their services should not be terminated. On 29th May 2002, reply was filed to the said show-cause notice." 3. The case in hand is very unusual. The order of termination from service preceded the issue of the show-cause notice. I also take notice of one order passed in the present writ-application by the learned Single Judge dated 9th September 2011, which reads as under: "Upon considering the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides and as broad consensus arrived at between them at this stage, it is agreed that both the petitioners shall make appropriate representation within 15 days hereof to the respondent No. 2 about their grievance and after receipt of such representation and after providing reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to ventilate their grievance, the respondent No. 2 shall decide the representation within 15 days from the date of receipt of representation. The respondent No. 2 shall communicate his final decision to the petitioners and the Ld. Counsel for the parties shall apprise about the decision which may be taken by the respondent No. 2, to this Court. 2. The matter shall remain pending till the decision is taken as aforesaid, subject to keeping open rights of both the sides to challenge the decision in this petition. D.S.P." 4. Counsel for the parties shall apprise about the decision which may be taken by the respondent No. 2, to this Court. 2. The matter shall remain pending till the decision is taken as aforesaid, subject to keeping open rights of both the sides to challenge the decision in this petition. D.S.P." 4. It appears that pursuant to the order passed by this Court referred to above, the representation was rejected vide order dated 5th October 2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner. 5. Hence, this petition. 6. The principal argument of the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicants is that the services of the writ-applicants could not have been terminated without a regular departmental inquiry, since serious allegations of fraud and fabrication of records were levelled. 7. According to the learned counsel, although his clients were daily wagers, yet in the wake of the serious nature of the allegations levelled against them, they are entitled to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 8. The learned counsel submitted that the termination of his clients amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the same was without complying the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. According to the learned counsel, the impugned orders be quashed and the Corporation be directed to reinstate the writ-applicants in service with backwages. 10. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation. He submitted that the writ-applicants were daily wagers and, therefore, their services could have been terminated at any point of time. Mr. Munshaw pointed out that a formal inquiry in this regard was conducted, which revealed that the writ-applicants herein, along with others, had indulged in mal-practice by creating bogus record sheets and showing false details therein as regards their days of work. According to Mr. Munshaw, the writ-application should be rejected on the ground that the writ-applicants have an efficacious alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the Corporation committed any error in terminating the services of the writ-applicants. 12. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the Corporation committed any error in terminating the services of the writ-applicants. 12. I am of the view that as misconduct of a serious nature has been alleged and the services came to be terminated on that ground, a regular departmental proceeding should have been initiated against the writ-applicants. Indisputably, the order of termination is stigmatic in nature. 13. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, that as the writ-applicants were daily wagers there was no requirement of initiating a regular departmental inquiry. 14. The law as regards the aforesaid is well-settled. In the case of MCD v. Praveen Kumar Jain, (1998) 9 SCC 468 , the respondent No. 1 was on the muster-roll as a daily wager. It was alleged that he had committed misconduct of persuading a fellow workman to interpolate the name of the respondent No. 1 along with one another's name in the list of recommended employees for regularization in service. The appellant conducted a preliminary inquiry into the alleged misconduct and passed an order of discharge against the respondent No. 1. The matter went before the Labour Court. A preliminary issue was framed by the Labour Court as to whether the inquiry conducted by the management was valid and proper. The question was answered in favour of the appellant Management. However, the successor Presiding Officer came to the conclusion on the merits of the controversy that there was no legal evidence to justify the order of termination passed against the respondent. The said award of the Labour Court was unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court in a writ petition and that is how the appellants took the matter further before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed in para 4 as under: "4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for Respondent No. 1. In our view, an impossible situation has been created for the appellant. The Supreme Court observed in para 4 as under: "4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for Respondent No. 1. In our view, an impossible situation has been created for the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant was right when he contended that in the statement of Respondent No. 1 recorded in the preliminary enquiry he had clearly admitted that he had typed only seven names of persons eligible for being regularised and the additional two names of Mahender Kumar and himself were not typed by him. This showed that Mahender Kumar had got these two names inserted and if the benefit of the name of Respondent No. 1 was to accrue on account of such interpolation, on broad probabilities Respondent No. 1 could be said to have colluded with Mahender Kumar and got his name inserted through his agency at least and therefore for such misconduct he was required to be suitably dealt with. Unfortunately, for the appellant the impugned order of termination extracted above does not how that it was passed after a departmental enquiry wherein the disciplinary authority was satisfied about the said misconduct. On the contrary, it seeks to terminate the services of Respondent No. 1 by way of a simple discharge and not by way of any penalty. It is only during the proceedings before the Labour Court that a different stand was taken that it was by way of penalty. This stand was obviously taken by the appellant because the order of simpliciter termination would have remained stillborn as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was admittedly not complied with by the appellant. With this difficulty staring in the face, a stand was taken that it was by way of penalty. If it was by way of penalty then at least a regular departmental enquiry had to be conducted. It was also required to be followed by the enquiry officer's report resulting in adverse finding against Respondent No. 1 and its acceptance by the disciplinary authority. Nothing of this sort was done. There is neither the enquiry officer's report holding Respondent No. 1 guilty of charge which in fact was never framed against him nor is there any acceptance of such a finding of the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority. Nothing of this sort was done. There is neither the enquiry officer's report holding Respondent No. 1 guilty of charge which in fact was never framed against him nor is there any acceptance of such a finding of the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority. In fact the disciplinary authority has never held Respondent No. 1 guilty of any charge of misconduct. It is also interesting to note that while challenging the award of the Labour Court in writ petition the appellant clearly stated in para 3 of the writ petition that since Respondent No. 1 and Shri Mahender Kumar were merely on casual engagement/muster-roll employees and were not regular employees of the petitioner-Corporation or that of DDA, they were not entitled to a departmental inquiry as is required for the regular employees of the petitioner-Corporation. As such a stand was taken, it is obvious that the termination order based on misconduct is not the result of any departmental enquiry against Respondent No. 1. Consequently, the impugned order of termination would fail even on that ground. If it is a simpliciter discharge order it is violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and if it is a penalty order, as contended by the appellant, it would fail on merits as not having followed the procedure of departmental enquiry. In either view of the matter, the impugned order must be held to be rightly set aside by the Labour Court and the said decision was also rightly confirmed by the High Court." 15. In para 5, the Supreme Court observed as under: "5. However, as Respondent No. 1 was knowing typing at the relevant time and as the order under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act has been passed by this Court while admitting this appeal, we deem it fit to direct that even though Respondent No. 1 will be entitled to continuity of service and reinstatement in service as directed by the Labour Court, the back wages deserve to be reduced to 50% instead of cent percent as awarded by the Labour Court. This order is passed keeping in view the salient features of this case and especially keeping in view the fact that Respondent No. 1 succeeds on account of the bungling on the part of the appellant." 16. In paragraphs 6 and 7, the Supreme Court observed as under: "6. This order is passed keeping in view the salient features of this case and especially keeping in view the fact that Respondent No. 1 succeeds on account of the bungling on the part of the appellant." 16. In paragraphs 6 and 7, the Supreme Court observed as under: "6. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed. The award of reinstatement with continuity of service is confirmed subject to grant of 50% back wages from the date of termination till actual reinstatement. No order as to costs. 7. Respondent No. 1 shall be reinstated pursuant to the present order within six weeks from today and all other consequential monetary benefits including 50% back wages shall be paid over to him within eight weeks. It is made clear that the monetary benefits made payable to Respondent No. 1 pursuant to our present order shall be subject to adjustments of any payments made in the meantime to him as per the order of this Court under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act." 17. The above referred decision of the Supreme Court answers both the submissions canvassed by Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation. 18. In the Telecom District Manager and others v. Keshab Deb, (2008) 8 SCC 402 , the Directorate of Telecom terminated the services of the respondent who was working as a casual labour on daily wages because he had misbehaved with his senior officers, misused and damaged the Government vehicle and was arrested, convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 8 days and to pay a fine of Rs. 30 for the offence under Section 34(6) of the Police Act. Before the High Court, the petitioner raised a contention that he was a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that his services were terminated without meeting the statutory requirements as contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He prayed for regularization of his services relying on a scheme. A Single Judge transferred his case to the Central Administrative Tribunal on the principle rendered in the case of the Union of India v. Deep Chand Pandey, (1992) 4 SCC 432 , that the remedy for termination of service of a railway employee employed on daily wage basis lies before the Tribunal and not before the High Court. A Single Judge transferred his case to the Central Administrative Tribunal on the principle rendered in the case of the Union of India v. Deep Chand Pandey, (1992) 4 SCC 432 , that the remedy for termination of service of a railway employee employed on daily wage basis lies before the Tribunal and not before the High Court. The Administrative Tribunal held the termination illegal and directed reinstatement with all service benefits and regularization. Contempt proceedings were initiated for non-compliance with the Tribunal's order and the appellants approached the High Court in writ and thereafter the Supreme Court in SLP. The Supreme Court, while disposing of the appeal, observed as under: "18. In a case of the present nature where inter alia an employee maintains a writ petition not only on the ground of violation of equality clause enshrines under Article 14 of the Constitution of India but also on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he has an option to choose his own forum. Section 28 does not bar the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It saves the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. An employee who claims himself to be a workman, therefore, will have a right of election in the matter of choice of forum. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the Central Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned judgment. Furthermore the respondent claimed regularization in services. Such an application was maintainable. As to whether he would be entitled to such a relief or not, however, is a different question. 19. A Tribunal indisputably was entitled to exercise its jurisdiction for enforcement of a fundamental right. 20. In any event the appellants themselves raised the contention as regards the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It may be true that no jurisdiction can be conferred by consent but this Court while exercising a discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is entitled to take note thereof. It may not allow a party to raise such a contention before it, having regard to its conduct. 21. The Tribunal and consequently the High Court were correct that the termination of the services of the respondent was illegal. 22. He, according to the appellants, has committed a misconduct. His services had been terminated on that ground. But therefore he was entitled to an opportunity of being heard. 21. The Tribunal and consequently the High Court were correct that the termination of the services of the respondent was illegal. 22. He, according to the appellants, has committed a misconduct. His services had been terminated on that ground. But therefore he was entitled to an opportunity of being heard. A regular departmental proceedings should have been initiated against him; the order of termination being stigmatic in nature. While, however, granting a relief, the superior Courts should take into consideration the factors relevant there for, which, in our opinion, in the instant case are:- a. Recruitment of the respondent was ex facie illegal as prior thereto neither any advertisement was issued nor the employment exchange was notified in regard to the vacancy. b. It does not appear that the respondent had even got himself registered with the Local Employment Exchange. c. He being a daily rated casual employee did not have any right to continue in service. 23. Even in a case where an order of termination is illegal, an automatic direction for reinstatement with full back wages is not contemplated. He was at best entitled to one month's pay in lieu of one month' notice and wages of 15 days of each completed years of service as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He could not have been directed to be regularized in service or granted any a temporary status. Such a scheme has been held to be unconstitutional by this Court in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and others, (2004) 7 SCC 112 and Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1 . 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that grant of compensation instead of a direction of reinstatement with back wages would meet the ends of justice. 25. In Atyan Pichhara Barg Chhatra Sangh and another v. Jharkhand State Vaishya Federation and others, 2006 (6) SCC 718 this Court while opining that affirmative action is subject to judicial review and while stating that unequals cannot be treated as equals upon noticing the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, stated the in the following terms:- "23. Mandal Commission case has specifically noted that there is no constitutional bar to a State categorising the Backward Classes as backward and more Back ward Class. Mandal Commission case has specifically noted that there is no constitutional bar to a State categorising the Backward Classes as backward and more Back ward Class. The State of Jharkhand by its actions seeks to disempower communities that have been extended the benefits of reservation after a conscious adoption of the Bihar Act. What GO No. 5800 seeks to do by combining the Extremely Backward Class and Backward Class into one group is to treat unequals as equals thus violating the notion of substantive equality and Article 14 of the Constitution of India bringing it within the purview of judicial review by the Court." 26. This Court in Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 127 has held as under:- "50. Differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution. This principle is too well-settled now to be reiterated by reference to cases. There is intelligible basis for differentiation. Whether the same result or better result could have been achieved and better basis of differentiation evolved is within the domain of legislature and must be left to the wisdom of the legislature. Had it been held that the scheme of 1980 was within the authority given by the Act, we would have rejected the challenge to the Act and the scheme under Article 14 of the Constitution." It was further held:- "52. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the rationale, justification and the genesis of the law of nationalisation being the creation of economic instrumentalities to sub-serve the constitutional and administrative goals of governance in a social welfare society, the running of public sector undertakings is neither for profit earnings of the management nor for sharing such profits with the workmen alone but to utilise the investible funds available as a result of such ventures and undertakings for socially-oriented goals laid down by the governmental policies operating on the said sectors. In this connection reference was made before us to the decision in the case of State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy." 27. In this connection reference was made before us to the decision in the case of State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy." 27. Even if the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, respondent was only entitled to be paid a just compensation. While, however, determining the amount of compensation we must also take into consideration the stand taken by the appellants. They took not only an unreason able stand but raised a contention in regard to absence of jurisdiction in the Tribunal. They admittedly did not comply with the order passed by the Tribunal for a long time. It had raised contention which are not otherwise tenable." 19. In the case of Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 588 , the appellant, who was engaged as casual labour by the Telecom Department at Agra, had worked continuously as such for more than 10 years and had also acquired 'temporary' status, was prosecuted for an offence under Sections 324, 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. Ultimately, he was acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra. However, in the mean time, his services were terminated, against which he made a representation to the General Manager, Telecom Department, Lucknow. However, the representation was also ordered to be rejected. 20. It appears that the order of termination was challenged before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, it was contended that the order, ex-facie, was punitive in nature. It was further contended that the services of the appellant could not have been terminated without holding a regular departmental inquiry. The Tribunal dealt with the contentions as follows: "4. After perusing the record and considering the rival arguments, we are of the view that the respondents could either initiate departmental enquiry against the applicant for the alleged misconduct, or terminate his services by payment of retrenchement compensation, overlooking the misconduct alleged against him. In the present case, the retrenchment compensation was paid and it appears that the same was accepted by encashing the cheque by the applicant. Accordingly, he cannot now be allowed to urge that the termination was bad because there was no enquiry into the alleged misconduct against him. 5. In the present case, the retrenchment compensation was paid and it appears that the same was accepted by encashing the cheque by the applicant. Accordingly, he cannot now be allowed to urge that the termination was bad because there was no enquiry into the alleged misconduct against him. 5. From the allegations made in para 4 of the application, we find that a report was also lodged against the applicant with the Police in respect of the same incident and a case was registered against him for offences under Sections 324, 427 and 504, I.P.C. The applicant was also arrested and a chargesheet was filed against him in the Court. The case was pending on the date of the application and we do not know what happened to the prosecution thereafter, but it appears that there was prima facie some material against the applicant to hold that his services were not satisfactory and to retrench his services on that basis. Accordingly for the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this OA and it deserves to be dismissed." 21. While holding that the reasoning of the Tribunal was fallacious, the Supreme Court observed as under: "5. The reasoning of the Tribunal is fallacious. If an order had been passed by way of punishment and was punitive in nature, it was the duty of the respondents to hold a regular departmental enquiry and they could not have terminated the services of the appellant arbitrarily by paying him the retrenchment compensation. The observation of the Tribunal that the respondents had a choice either to hold a regular departmental enquiry or to terminate the services by payment of retrenchement compensation is wholly incorrect. 6. The appellant, no doubt, was a casual labour but as observed by the Tribunal, he had acquired temporary status with effect from 1-10-1989. Once an employee attains the 'temporary' status, he becomes entitled to certain benefits one of which is that he becomes entitled to the constitutional protection envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution and other Articles dealing with services under the Union of India. Once an employee attains the 'temporary' status, he becomes entitled to certain benefits one of which is that he becomes entitled to the constitutional protection envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution and other Articles dealing with services under the Union of India. A perusal of the impugned order by which the services of the appellant were terminated indicates that since the appellant had beaten one Mahender Singh with iron rod and had also bitten him with teeth on 20-4-1992 at 8.00 p.m. while the said Mahender Singh was on duty as Gateman, Tax Bhawan, Agra, therefore, his services were terminated with immediate effect. Thus the services were terminated on account of the allegation of assault made against the appellant. This Court on 24-1-2000 passed the following order:- "Learned counsel appearing for the respondents is granted six weeks' time to seek instructions whether regular departmental proceedings were taken in this matter or not." 7. When the case was next taken up, the entire papers relating to the enquiry were placed before us by the counsel for the respondents which indicate that a regular departmental enquiry was not held and only a preliminary enquiry was held against the appellant on the basis of which his services were terminated. The letter dated 21st of April, 1992, from Assistant Engineer Trunks, T.M.X. Tax Bhawan, Agra-3, to Shri Shital Din, Divisional Engineer, Phones (Planning and Administration) Agra, recites, inter alia as under:- "Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor of this unit assaulted on Shri Mahendra Singh, Gate Man who was on duty at Main gate of Tax Bhawan, Agra and was performing 14.00 to 22.00 hrs duty on 20-4-1992. This mishappening occurred at 20.00 hrs. on 20-4-1992. At the time of incident, I was in Trunk Exchange, Agra, when Shri Mahendra Singh, Gate Man approached to the undersigned in injured condition for help. I rushed to the gate of Tax Bhawan for spot verification and making detailed enquiry of the case. I found that the culprit Shri Nar Singh Pal was abusing Shri Mahendra Singh, Gateman, Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor not only assaulted on Shri Mahendra Singh, Gateman but he also threatened to kill me when I was making spot enquiry. As per my observation Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor was under drunk condition. I found that the culprit Shri Nar Singh Pal was abusing Shri Mahendra Singh, Gateman, Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor not only assaulted on Shri Mahendra Singh, Gateman but he also threatened to kill me when I was making spot enquiry. As per my observation Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor was under drunk condition. I immediately informed to you thereafter S.O. Rakabga Police Station on phone regarding this incidence." The letter further recites as under:- "I shall be grateful if you may kindly take a suitable action against Shri Nar Singh Pal, Ty. Mazdoor who has created hindrance in government work, damages of the government property and created the terror and horror amongst the staff due to his gunda activities and has threatened the undersigned." 8. The documents which have been placed before us pertain to the preliminary enquiry made against the appellant in which the statement of certain persons who had seen the incident was recorded. The services of the appellant were, thereafter, terminated by paying him the retrenchment compensation through a cheque along with the order dated 20-5-1992. The order having been passed on the basis of preliminary enquiry and not on the basis of regular departmental enquiry without issuing a chargesheet or giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, cannot be sustained. 9. We may, at this stage, refer to the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1896 : 1980 Lab IC 1004) in which the learned Judge observed as under:- "53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." 10. Applying the above principles, the order in the instant, case, cannot be treated to be a simple order of retrenchment. It was an order passed by way of punishment and, therefore, was an order of dismissal which having been passed without holding a regular departmental enquiry, be sustained." 22. Thus, in view of the afore-noted three decisions of the Supreme Court, the writ-applicants herein as daily wagers could not have been terminated from the service arbitrarily with a stigma attached to it. Even a daily wager is entitled for protection and his services cannot be terminated by a stigmatic order without holding a regular departmental inquiry. 23. The above takes me to consider what relief should be granted to the writ-applicants. 24. As observed by me above, the termination is illegal on two grounds: first, no regular departmental inquiry was initiated, and secondly, the case is one of retrenchment without following the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 25. Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, made an attempt to submit that the termination of the writ-applicants will not amount to 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act because their termination was by way of punishment for the alleged misconduct. 26. 25. Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, made an attempt to submit that the termination of the writ-applicants will not amount to 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act because their termination was by way of punishment for the alleged misconduct. 26. I am not impressed with this submission because Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act makes it very clear that 'retrenchment' means, 'the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include..... As held by me that the punishment inflicted was not by way of any regular departmental inquiry, and in such circumstances, it is difficult for me to take the view that the termination would fall within the ambit of 'punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action'. 27. So far as the issue of relief is concerned, let me look into the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of B.S.N.L. v. Bhurumal, AIR 2014 SC 1188 . I may quote the following observations contained in paragraphs 19 to 25: "19. The only question that survives for consideration is as to whether the relief of reinstatement with full back wages was rightly granted by the CGIT. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted compensation instead of reinstatement. In the case of BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In the case of Incharge Officer and Anr. v. Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily wage basis, and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2-3 years and where the termination had taken place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty (supra), this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments, as is clear from the following discussion. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty (supra), this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments, as is clear from the following discussion. "Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court, namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp.330 and 335 paras 7 and 14 Paras 7 and 15 of AIR) "It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decision reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee." Jagbir Singh has been applied very recently in Telegraph Deptt. v. Santosh Kumar Seal, wherein this Court stated: (SCC p.777, para 11 (para 8 of AIR)) "In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice." 21. In the case of Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb the Court emphasized that automatic direction for reinstatement of the workman with full back wages is not contemplated. He was at best entitled to one months' pay in lieu of one month's notice and wages of 15 days of each completed year of service as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He could not have been directed to be regularized in service or granted/given a temporary status. Such a scheme has been held to be unconstitutional by this Court in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Co-op. Societies and Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi. 22. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that likewise, even when reinstatement was ordered, it does not automatically follow full back wages should be directed to be paid to the workman. He drew our attention of this Court in the case of Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha and Metropolitan Transport Corporation v. V. Venkatesan. 23. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 24. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of nonpayment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization (See: State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 )). Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 25. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied." 28. While awarding the compensation, the host of factors, inter alia, the manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant. 29. The Apex Court in many other decisions has taken the view that, even a casual or seasonal workman who has rendered continuous service for one year or more cannot be retrenched without complying with the requisites of Section 25(F). Reliance can be placed on L. Robert D. Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and another, 82(1999) DLT 958, Ratan Singh v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 396 ; 1982 LLR 2160 Samistha Dubey v. City Board, Itawah, (1998) 8 SCC 460 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar. It is settled law that the expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' in the definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in Section 2(oo) of the Act covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in Section 25-F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as Sections 25-FF and 25-FFF. Therefore, even striking off the name of a workman from the rolls without anything more constitutes retrenchment within the meaning of the expression 'retrenchment' in Section 2(oo). Thus, if termination of service of a workman is brought about for any reason whatsoever, it would be retrenchment except if the case falls within any of the excepted categories, i.e. (i) termination by way of punishment inflicted pursuant to disciplinary action; (ii) voluntary retirement of the workman; (iii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation, if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; (iv) or termination of the service on the ground of continued ill health. Once the case does not fall in any of the excepted categories, the termination of service even if it be according to automatic discharge from service under agreement would nonetheless be retrenchment within the meaning of expression in Section 2(oo). The Apex Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27 , had spelt out the cases where termination of services of a workman will not be retrenchment and engagement of a workman as a daily wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on notice that he has been engaged for a fixed period and after that he would not be entitled to continue. It was held at page 37 of S.M. Nilajkar (supra) as under: "13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; (ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simplicitor, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the above said terms by the employer at the commencement of employment. 14. The engagement of a workman as a daily-wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or up to the occurrence of some event, and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short lived. The contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short-lived and as per the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project coming to an end. The workman may not therefore complain that by the act of the employer his employment was coming to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of sub-clause (bb) abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily-wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment." 30. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, interest of justice shall be subserved if the respondent Corporation is directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 1,50,000.00 (Rupees One Lac Fifty Thousand Only) to each of the writ-applicants. The said sum should be paid to the two writ-applicants within eight weeks from today, failing which, it will carry interest @ 9% per annum. 31. The writ-application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.