ORDER : This writ petition has been filed for payment of arrears of salary, amount of family pension, gratuity and other post retiral dues with effect from 15.10.1998 since the husband of the petitioner had died on 14.10.1998 in harness and no payment has been made till date. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the husband of the petitioner late Sudarshan Prasad was posted as Meter Reader, Electric Division, Jamshedpur, under the erstwhile Bihar State Electricity Board on the basis of matriculation certificate. Some doubts appeared regarding genuineness of the matriculation certificate of the husband of the petitioner and as such, correspondence was made from Bihar Vidyalay Pariksha Samitee, Patna for verification of the date of birth as also for the genuineness of the matriculation certificate vide letter contained in Memo No. 954 dated 08.09.1994 issued by Director (Personnel) Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna. Thereafter, husband of the petitioner was directed to submit original mark-sheet, original admit card and school leaving certificate by the Director (Personnel) but for some reason husband of the petitioner failed to submit the same and as such, he was placed under suspension vide office order no. 2420 dated 10.06.1998. 3. Joint Secretary (Vigilance), Bihar Vidyalaya Pariksha Samitee, Patna vide letter no. 42 dated 18.08.1998 informed the Electrical Superintending Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Jamshedpur that the service of late Surendra Prasad was found to be forged. It is stated that although the husband of the petitioner was placed under suspension and some proceeding was initiated, no punishment was imposed upon late delinquent Sudarshan Prasad and in the meantime, he died in harness on 14.10.1998 during his suspension. 4. The widow of late Sudarshan Prasad sent many representations for payment of post-retiral benefits as also for compassionate appointment and decision was taken by the Joint Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna vide letter no. 1638 dated 29.09.1999 as follows:- (a) Wife of late Sudarshan Prasad will not be entitled to death cum retiral benefits as the deceased has got the job in the Board on the basis of fake matriculation certificate. (b) Dependents of the deceased late Sudarshan Prasad will not be considered for compassionate appointment. (c) The amount due to General Provident Fund and Group Savings Scheme will be released as per the Rules of the Board. 5. The petitioner however, in pursuance of the decision of the letter no. (b) Dependents of the deceased late Sudarshan Prasad will not be considered for compassionate appointment. (c) The amount due to General Provident Fund and Group Savings Scheme will be released as per the Rules of the Board. 5. The petitioner however, in pursuance of the decision of the letter no. 1638 dated 29.09.1999 has been paid certain amount of G.P.F. and certain mode of Group Savings Scheme. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that that it is settled law that whenever any employee dies in harness during the pendency of any department proceeding or any disciplinary action pending for purpose of imposition of penalty on account of misconduct, the proceeding automatically lapsed or is abated by reason of death of delinquent employee. The husband of the petitioner was placed under suspension vide office order no. 2420 dated 16.06.1998 for contemplation of some departmental proceeding, but said late Sudarshan Prasad died on 14.10.1998 while he was under suspension, therefore the deceased employee remained an employee of Bihar State Electricity Board and the relation of master and servant was not severed because no final punishment was imposed upon the delinquent employee. Expression of this contention is cited in Jayanti Devi Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 3 BLJR 2179, wherein it is cited that “by reason of death of any delinquent departmental proceeding or any disciplinary action would terminate and abate”. Petitioner has also referred to the case of Basudeo Tiwary Vs. Sido Kanhu University & Others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, AIR 1998 SC 3261 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- 14. The appellant has since demised during the pendency of these proceedings, no further direction either as to further inquiry or reinstatement can be given. We declare that the termination of the appellant by the respondent as per the notification referred to by us is invalid. Consequently, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness. Needless to say that the appellant would become entitled to the payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination of his services up to the date of his death on the basis of last pay drawn by him. Let Respondent take action within a period of three months from today to work out the arrears due to the appellant from the date of his termination till his death, and pay the same to his legal representatives. 7. Let Respondent take action within a period of three months from today to work out the arrears due to the appellant from the date of his termination till his death, and pay the same to his legal representatives. 7. The learned counsel for the State of Jharkhand and State Electricity Board opposed the prayer and at the outset submitted that para 2 of the writ petition is not true and falsely stated. The petitioner has filed writ petition before this court which was disposed on 05.02.2001 in C.W.J.C. No. 273 of 2000(R) Lakhi Devi Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board and others with permission to the petitioner to take appropriate remedy against the said order in accordance with law. In view of this contention that the matter was already been agitated before appropriate forum petitioner does not deserve relief. He has relied in the ruling in Canning Mitra Phonenix Ltd. Vs. M/s. Popular Constructions & Another, AIR 1993 Bom 67 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. Mr. Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st defendants, has submitted that granting of leave under O.II. R.2 of the Code is discretionary and leave is not required to be granted mechanically. He has further submitted that where a person is entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, leave has to be obtained at the time of omitting to sue for all such reliefs i.e. at the time of filing of the first suit. In his submission, a defendant should not be vexed twice for one and the same cause of action. This Rule is aimed against multiplicity of suits in respect of the same cause of action i.e. to prevent further litigation. While putting reliance upon the case of K.R. Deshpande V. R.S. Deshpande Mr. Thakhar has submitted that if one closely looks at the language of O. II. R. 2(3) it is clear that the point of time under order O. II. R. 2(3) is the point of time of the institution of the first suit.” 8. The learned counsel for the respondents further cited that in AIR 2000 Bombay 34, SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. and Others, Vs. World Tanker Carrier Corporation and another the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “.... R. 2(3) is the point of time of the institution of the first suit.” 8. The learned counsel for the respondents further cited that in AIR 2000 Bombay 34, SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. and Others, Vs. World Tanker Carrier Corporation and another the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “.... as long ago as 1917 the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal of England laid down solitary Principles to be followed by the litigants while seeking equitable relief from the Court. These Principles are laid down in the case of The King V. The General Commissioners for the purposes of the Income-tax Acts for the District of Kensington, reported in 1917 King’s Bench Division page 486. Therein the following principles are laid down by Viscount Reading. C.J.: “Before I proceed to deal with the facts I desire to Say this: where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant’s affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the application in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of misleading affidavit. The aforesaid principles were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Whilst dismissing the appeal, it was ultimately observed as follows by Warrington. L.J.:- “.... The aforesaid principles were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Whilst dismissing the appeal, it was ultimately observed as follows by Warrington. L.J.:- “.... I express no final opinion, but it may be that the result of this is that the applicant has no further remedy. In the case of Reg. V. Bodmin Corporation (2) Day, J. Said: “As I read the authorities, it has always been held, whenever this objection has been taken, and the attention of the Courts has been called to the point, that no second application for a prerogative writ will be granted when the first application has been discharged. There are many authorities which support this contention; but I think apart from authority, that it is a most convenient view to take of the jurisdiction of the Court in such matters. It is a view which has commended itself to many judges who have acted upon it, and it commends itself to me. It is no doubt extremely convenient that no second application for a high prerogative writ should be allowed after a first application has been refused. Such a writ is an extraordinary remedy, and persons seeking it may very reasonably be required not to apply for it unless they have sufficient cause for doing so. They must come prepared with full and sufficient materials to support their application, and if those materials are incomplete I think it is quite right that they should not be allowed to come again.” It may be that the result of our decision in that the application loses her remedy. If so, she has only herself and her legal advisors to thank for it.” In my view the facts which have emerged in this case clearly fall within the ration expressed by Viscount Reading, C.J. and Warrington, L.J. the observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. In the case of T. Arivandandam (Supra) also make it abundantly clear that if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action then the same should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing. The Court has to remind itself of S.35-A CPC and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious, motives. Thus it becomes clear that a dishonest litigant loses his remedy. The Court has to remind itself of S.35-A CPC and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious, motives. Thus it becomes clear that a dishonest litigant loses his remedy. It is the bounden duty of the parties to the litigation to ensure that the pleadings make a candid and fair statement of facts. The facts must not be stated in a manner to mislead the Court as to the true State of affairs. In the present case the plaintiffs have deliberately distorted the findings of the Supreme Court given in the WTCC case. They have deliberately mixed up the relief for damages with the relief for declaration in order to give the illusion of a cause of action and that this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the same. Keeping the aforesaid facts and circumstances in view, I am of the considered opinion that the plaint has to be rejected with heavy costs.” 9. To Support his argument counsel for the respondents has also cited Baban Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Others, W.P. (S) 6351 of 2010, decided on 24.07.2014. 10. To the issue of the question res-judicata or the issue of having omitted to mention that a prior writ had been earlier filed the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the issue of res-judicata would not apply because the issues must have been adjudicated and that was not so since it had merely been withdrawn. 11. Moreover, the petitioner was asked to submit original mark sheet, original admit card and school leaving certificate by the Director, Personnel which he did and the same were examined by the competent authority of Bihar School Examination Board, Patna and based on that investigation report his certificate and other relevant documents were found to be forged and after that he was suspended vide office order No. 2420 dated 10.06.1998. 12. The counsel of Bihar State Electricity Board has adopted argument of the counsel for the Jharkhand State Electricity Board. 13. If one were to look at the factual position, it is seen that the husband of the current petitioner died while the Departmental Proceeding was still subsisting. The claim of the current petitioner is that since he died in the middle of departmental proceedings, the proceedings automatically lapsed or is abated by reason of death. What is the implication of such circumstances. The claim of the current petitioner is that since he died in the middle of departmental proceedings, the proceedings automatically lapsed or is abated by reason of death. What is the implication of such circumstances. The petitioner has cited some cases to claim his prayer in such a situation. On a reading of the Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Jayanti Devi (Supra) it is observed in paragraph 8 of Judgment which is as follows:- “8. It is well-settled that a departmental proceeding can be initiated against the Government servant for the purpose of imposing penalty if misconduct is established. The imposition of penalty like dismissal or removal has nexus to the contract of service. The proceeding, therefore, automatically lapse or terminated by reason of death of delinquent employee unless otherwise it is continued in accordance with Rules. Similar question arises before the Bombay High Court in the case of Hirabai Deshmukh & Anr. V. State of Maharashstra, 1986 Lab.I.C. 248. A Division Bench while deciding the question observed:- “The provisions with regard to dismissal, removal and suspension of the civil servant do not permit holding of any further enquiry into the conduct of such a civil servant after his death. Such proceeding are intended to impose departmental penalty and would abate by reason of the death of civil servant. The purpose of proceedings is to impose penalty, if misconduct is established against the civil servant. That can only be achieved if the civil servant continues to be in service. Upon broader view the proceedings are quasi- criminal in the sense it can result in fault finding and further imposition of penalty. The character of such proceedings has to be treated as quasi-judicial for this purpose. In the light of the character of the proceedings and the nature of penalty like dismissal or removal, or any other penalties, minor or major it has nexus to the contract of service. Therefore, if the person who has undertaken that contract is not available, it should follow that no proceedings can continue. Thus when the proceedings are quite personal in relation to such a contract of service, the same should terminate upon death of the delinquent. By reason of death, such proceedings would terminate and abate. Therefore, if the person who has undertaken that contract is not available, it should follow that no proceedings can continue. Thus when the proceedings are quite personal in relation to such a contract of service, the same should terminate upon death of the delinquent. By reason of death, such proceedings would terminate and abate. We think that such a result is also inferable from the provisions of Rule 152-B of the Bombay Civil Services Rules.” In Jayanti Devi (Supra), the Hon’ble Court then directed for the release of all the death- cum- retirement dues in favour of the petitioner. 14. Petitioner has also relied on Basudeo Tiwary (Supra). Just to reiterate the point, the point that has been made there in paragraph 14 is repeated. The appellant therein too has demised during the pendency of the proceedings, and the Hon’ble Apex Court held that no further direction can be given and declared: “....we declare that the termination of the appellant by the respondent as per the notification referred to by us is invalid. Consequently, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness...” What is important to note is that he was considered to have been deemed to have died in harness. Which would suggest that he or his successor would be able to receive whatever dues he was then otherwise entitled to or if there had been no disciplinary proceedings. So the respondents then are stopped from raising the issue of misconduct and should have paid whatever retiral benefits and dues that accrued to his successor. The issue of omitting to mention that a previous writ had not had been filed, then actually becomes a later issue. In fact she was compelled to file the first writ, because she was herself denied. If her dues had been allowed in the first instance, then the first writ itself would not have been filed. 15. It may be appropriate to quote from another relevant Judgment at this juncture, that as from S.K. Mastan Bee Vs. General Manager, South Central Railway and Another, (2003) 1 SCC 184 , “6. We notice that the appellant’s husband was working as a Gangman who died while in service. 15. It may be appropriate to quote from another relevant Judgment at this juncture, that as from S.K. Mastan Bee Vs. General Manager, South Central Railway and Another, (2003) 1 SCC 184 , “6. We notice that the appellant’s husband was working as a Gangman who died while in service. It is on record that the appellant is an illiterate who at that time did not know of her legal right and had no access to any information as to her right to family pension and to enforce her such right. On the death of the husband of the appellant, it was obligatory for her husband’s employer viz. the Railways, in this case to have computed the family pension payable to the appellant and offered the same to her without her having to make a claim or without driving her to a litigation. The very denial of her right to family pension as held by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench is an erroneous decision on the part of the Railways and in fact amounting to a violation of the guarantee assured to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution. The factum of the appellant’s lack of resources to approach the legal forum timely is not disputed by the Railways. The question then arises on facts and circumstances of this case, was the Appellate Bench justified in restricting the past arrears of pension to a period much subsequent to the death of the appellant’s husband on which date she had legally become entitled to the grant of pension?....” By the quote it seems to say that S.K. Mastan Bee had become entitled to the grant of the pension on the death of her husband. It is to be noted that the Apex Court has brought the guarantee within the ambit of article 21 of the Constitution of India. 16. Now to see the Judgments cited by the respondents. Thus, Canning Mitra Phoenix Ltd. (Supra) addressed the issue of O. II, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Paragraph 5 of the Judgment puts the issue in perspective, accordingly it is quoted here:- “5. The 1st defendants have objected to grant of such leave of the plaintiff’s at this stage. Thus, Canning Mitra Phoenix Ltd. (Supra) addressed the issue of O. II, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Paragraph 5 of the Judgment puts the issue in perspective, accordingly it is quoted here:- “5. The 1st defendants have objected to grant of such leave of the plaintiff’s at this stage. According to the 1st defendants, the plaintiffs ought to have obtained the leave of this Court to omit to sue the 1st defendants for relief of claiming damages from the 1st defendants under the provisions of O. II, 2. of the Code at the time of filing of this suit and the plaintiffs having then not obtained such leave, the plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain the same at this stage and as such, the petition now filed by the plaintiffs for leave under O.II, 2. Of the Code is misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is also the case of the 1st defendants that the plaintiffs having not obtained the leave to omit to sue the 1st defendants for recovery of damages at the time of filing of this suit, the 1st defendants had altered their position to their detriment and the plaintiffs are now estopped from filing any other suit against the 1st defendants to recover any damages.” Then in para 8 the Hon’ble High Court observed:- “8. Reading R. 1 with R. 2 of O.II of the Code, the intention of the legislature appears to be that as far as possible all matters in dispute between the parties relating to the same transaction should be disposed of in the same suit. These Rules are aimed against a multiplicity of suits in respect of the same cause of action. The object is to prevent further litigation. R. 2 provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the same cause of action. He is not entitled to split his cause of action into parts and bring separate suits in respect of each part. If he omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of the claim arising from the same cause of action, he will be precluded from suing the portion so omitted or relinquished, even though he states in his plaint that he intends to bring a second suit for the portion omitted. If he omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of the claim arising from the same cause of action, he will be precluded from suing the portion so omitted or relinquished, even though he states in his plaint that he intends to bring a second suit for the portion omitted. .....” Consequently the Hon’ble Court did not grant the application for leave. 17. The second case cited by the respondent, was Snp Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). In this instance they had filed a suit seeking a two reliefs. “(a) .......decree in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for a sum of Rs. 50 crores being the damages suffered by the plaintiffs and (b) for a declaration to the effect that plaintiffs being a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 are exclusively owned and controlled by the second and third plaintiffs who are Indian shareholders, citizens of India and are in no manner whatsoever linked, owned or controlled, legally or beneficially by the Merali family. Further declaration is sought to the effect that the legal and beneficial ownership of the vessels managed by the first plaintiffs vests with the entities/ owners unconnected with the plaintiffs.” The issue of not stating facts or misleading facts has been dealt in length, but it is useful to reproduce certain paragraphs or extracts here. In deciding the case above, the words of Viscount Reading, C.J. is cited as follows:- “19.... before I proceed to deal with the facts I desire to say this : where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court.” Continuing it cites Warrington, L.J. dismissing the appeal as follows:- “.... I express no final opinion, but it may be that the result of this is that the applicant has no further remedy. In the case of Reg. I express no final opinion, but it may be that the result of this is that the applicant has no further remedy. In the case of Reg. V. Bodmin Corporation (2) Day, J. Said: “As I read the authorities, it has always been held, whenever this objection has been taken, and the attention of the Courts has been called to the point, that no second application for a prerogative writ will be granted when the first application has been discharged. There are many authorities which support this contention; but I think apart from authority, that it is a most convenient view to take of the jurisdiction of the Court in such matters. It is a view which has commended itself to many judges who have acted upon it, and it commends itself to me. It is no doubt extremely convenient that no second application for a high prerogative writ should be allowed after a first application has been refused. Such a writ is an extraordinary remedy, and persons seeking it may very reasonably be required not to apply for it unless they have sufficient cause for doing so. They must come prepared with full and sufficient materials to support their application, and if those materials are incomplete I think it is quite right that they should not be allowed to come again.” It may be that the result of our decision in that the application loses her remedy. If so, she has only herself and her legal advisors to thank for it.” 18. In concluding, the Hon’ble Court further observed in SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. and Others (Supra), as follows:- “.....if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action then the same should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing. The Court has to remind itself of S.35-A CPC and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious, motives. Thus it becomes clear that a dishonest litigant loses his remedy. It is the bounden duty of the parties to the litigation to ensure that the pleadings make a candid and fair statement of facts. The facts must not be stated in a manner to mislead the Court as to the true State of affairs. In the present case the plaintiffs have deliberately distorted the findings of the Supreme Court given in the WTCC case. The facts must not be stated in a manner to mislead the Court as to the true State of affairs. In the present case the plaintiffs have deliberately distorted the findings of the Supreme Court given in the WTCC case. They have deliberately mixed up the relief for damages with the relief for declaration in order to give the illusion of a cause of action and that this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the same. Keeping the aforesaid facts and circumstances in view, I am of the considered opinion that the plaint has to be rejected with heavy costs.” Both these two cases cited by the respondent State dealt with commercial cases. However, from the just quoted words, some are more clearly noted. In the case of Viscount Reading, C.J. it is the extract: “....... but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the court that it had been deceived.” The question then before us in this case of Lakhi Devi will be:- Is she really seeking to deceive the court? Then the words of Warrington L.J. that need to ne noted are: “....... there are many authorities which support this contention; but I think apart from authority, that it is the most convenient view to take of the jurisdiction of the court in such matters.” The question then before us will be:- Does one adopt the most convenient view? Finally the Hon’ble Court itself observed:- “.....Thus it becomes clear that a dishonest litigant loses his remedy. It is the bounden duty of the parties to the litigation to ensure that the pleadings make a candid and fair statement of facts. The facts must not be stated in a manner to mislead the Court as to the true state of affairs. In the present case the plaintiffs have deliberately distorted the findings of the Supreme Court given in the W.T.C.C. case. They have deliberately mixed up the relief for damages with the relief for declaration in order to give the illusion of a cause of action and that this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the same. Keeping the aforesaid facts and circumstances in view, I am of the considered opinion that the plaint has to be rejected with heavy costs.” The question thus before us in this case is,- is Lakhi Devi being dishonest or deliberately distorting facts.? 19. Keeping the aforesaid facts and circumstances in view, I am of the considered opinion that the plaint has to be rejected with heavy costs.” The question thus before us in this case is,- is Lakhi Devi being dishonest or deliberately distorting facts.? 19. The next case cited by the respondent was Baban Singh (Supra). Therein the Hon’ble Single Judge, had cited paragraph nos. 3 and 4 from State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain reported in (1977) 2 SCC 806 , where it was observed as follows:- “Para 3;- the principle of estoppels per rem Judicata is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Manrginson V. Blackburn Borough Council, it may be said to be “the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action.” This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the sprit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or given rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. Para 4:- but it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Para 4:- but it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard: “I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that the res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be a abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive Res Judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.” 20. Thus one may again ask, has the matter reached finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions in the general interest of the community as a matter of policy but also on the other hand does the matter lead to multiplication of litigation? 21. In the just cited judgment, however, there is also stress on finality and conclusiveness and that the matter should have been adjudicated upon or that the cause of action must have resulted in a judgment. 22. There does seem to be some difference between finality, conclusiveness, matter adjudicated upon and multiplicity of litigation. Perhaps there is the need for considering every case on its own merits. 23. In trying to arrive at a conclusion in the case on hand, three other cases pertaining to suppression of information or material were looked at. In Narander Vs. 22. There does seem to be some difference between finality, conclusiveness, matter adjudicated upon and multiplicity of litigation. Perhaps there is the need for considering every case on its own merits. 23. In trying to arrive at a conclusion in the case on hand, three other cases pertaining to suppression of information or material were looked at. In Narander Vs. Government of M.P., AIR 1974 M.P. 1252, it was held:- “if a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceeding and thus amount to contempt to Court. But, it must be established satisfactorily that any deliberate and wrong statement was made and there was a favourable order in consequence of the statement.” What is important to note here whether any deliberate and wrong statement was made and a favourable order was a consequence of this wrong statement. Counsel for the petitioner was relying on the matter, not having been adjudicated at the first instance or in the first Writ. 24. In the order of the first writ bearing C.W.J.C. No. 273 of 2000(R), the operative part is:- “....Petitioner’s grievance, in respect of aforesaid reason given for not giving family pension to her, is not to be considered and decided in this writ application. It is, accordingly, permitted to be with drawn to enable her to take appropriate remedy against the said order in accordance with law.” This operative part was preceded to by a reference to Memo No. 1638 date 29/09/1999, which contains the reason for the denial for family pension. Reliance, on S.K. Mastan Bee (Supra), paragraph 6 observes: “......on the death of the husband of the appellant, it was obligatory for her husband’s employer viz. the Railways, in this case to have computed the family pension payable to the appellant and offered the same to her without her having to make a claim or without driving her to litigation.” Hence, in the case in hand, on petitioner’s husbands death, her entitlements began, and is not related to a consequence of suppression of some information to obtain a favourable order. 25. Another case that looked into the aspect of the suppression of information and/ or coming to court with unclean hands is Arunima Baruah Versus Union of India & Others. 25. Another case that looked into the aspect of the suppression of information and/ or coming to court with unclean hands is Arunima Baruah Versus Union of India & Others. Reported in (2007) 6 SCJ 120. The Hon’ble Court quoting from Hulsbury’s Laws of England noted :- “1305. He comes into equity must come with clean hands- A court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject matter of the litigation has been improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim ‘he who has committed inequity shall not have equity’, and relief was refused where a transaction was based on the plaintiff’s fraud or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a security improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy for a breach of trust which he had himself procured and whereby he had obtained money.... ” The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor deprives him of his right to equitable relief notwithstanding his disability. Where the transaction is itself unlawful it is not necessary to have recourse to this principle. In equity, just as at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by reason of the plaintiff’s demerits.” Hence, the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought. 26. A case which referred to the terms material facts, or suppression of material information is Naveen kumar Sharma Versus State of Haryana & Others, Reported in 2015 SCC On Line P&H 16594. In this case, the petitioner had sought appointment to the post constable in the Haryana Police, which, according to him, was denied in spite of him having been selected, only on the ground that in his application form, he had withheld the fact with regard to his arrest, which he was specifically required to disclose. Referring to the case of Chiranji Lal Vs. Financial Commissioner Haryana 1978 AIR (Pun) 326, it quoted:- “10. Referring to the case of Chiranji Lal Vs. Financial Commissioner Haryana 1978 AIR (Pun) 326, it quoted:- “10. In the aforesaid context, we cannot but hold that there has been mala fide and calculated suppression of material facts which, if disclosed would have disentitled the petitioners to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction or in any case would have materially affected the merits on both the interim and ultimate relief claimed. We categorically reject the plea of the writ petitioners that the failure to mention all these material facts clearly within their knowledge was either inadvertent or was occasioned by any bona fide omission.” 27. It is pertinent to note that suppression of material facts, which if disclosed would have disentitled the petitioner’s to extraordinary writ jurisdiction remedy. In the case on hand omission of mentioning the prior writ, is not something that would disentitle her from her entitlement, rather mentioning it would only secure what she was entitled to. Her counsel has submitted that the matter was not adjudicated upon, nevertheless, it was a fact that was omitted. 28. Finally Naveen Kumar Sharma (Supra), while citing some other judgments has quoted from Scrutton, L.J. in R.V. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) I K.B. 486 (CA) has observed:- “In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ court would become impossible.” 29. In the case on hand, the petitioner does not appear to me to be an unscrupulous litigant and deliberately misleading the court for unjustified gain, rather, it is reiterated once again, her right commenced on the death of her husband, to deny the same to the widow of the late Sudarshan Prasad would be throwing her to a merciless fate. In the case on hand, the petitioner does not appear to me to be an unscrupulous litigant and deliberately misleading the court for unjustified gain, rather, it is reiterated once again, her right commenced on the death of her husband, to deny the same to the widow of the late Sudarshan Prasad would be throwing her to a merciless fate. She had already lost her husband, it was most cruel on the part of the respondents to further deny her family pension and other admissible dues, if still pending, on the grounds they did. 30. Accordingly basing my reasoning on the judgment and decision of Jayanti Devi (Supra), Basudeo Tiwary (Supra) and S.K. Mastan Bee (Supra), and aforesaid reasoning, the writ application is allowed, and the respondents are directed to release family pension and any other death-cum-retirement dues with statutory interest in favour of the petitioner within two months from the date of the receipt/production of this copy of this order.