ORDER : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. By order dated 24th May, 2016, the trial Court declined the application of the plaintiff/petitioner under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking amendment with reference to the subsequent developments post adjudication of the matter by the trial Court, vide judgment and decree for eviction dated 8th August, 1995; of which the plaintiff-petitioner is aggrieved of. 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal materials facts are that an Eviction Suit No. 61/1989, under the Old Rent Control Act, 1950, was instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner that was decreed, vide judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, by the Court of Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur. Both the parties to the suit proceedings, instituted appeals under Section 96 of CPC. The judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, was set aside by this Court vide order dated 15th March, 2016, holding thus; "Mr. M. M. Ranjan, learned Sr. Counsel submits that since order dated 15.11.1995 could have been considered by the learned court below, then finding of default would have different. Therefore, this matter may be remanded back to the learned trial court after setting aside the entire judgment. Learned counsel for the respondent landlord plaintiff has also no objection in remanding matter back for fresh decision on the material available on record. In view of it, with consent of learned counsels, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 8.8.1995 is quashed and set aside and the matter remanded back to the learned trial court with the direction that after considering the order dated 15.11.1995 and orders of review and material available on record, decide the suit afresh according to law expeditiously, preferably within three months, from the date of receiving the certified copy of this order. Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith." 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, while assailing the impugned order dated 24th May, 2016, asserted that the subsequent facts and developments; post-judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, are sought to be brought on record. 4. Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith." 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, while assailing the impugned order dated 24th May, 2016, asserted that the subsequent facts and developments; post-judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, are sought to be brought on record. 4. It is further contended that even the counsel for the respondent-tenant, during the course of arguments, on the appeals against the judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, prayed for consideration by the trial Court, of an order dated 15th November, 1995 and the prayer was granted, which is also subsequent to judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995. 5. According to the learned counsel, the trial Court declined the application, seeking amendment, ignoring the singular facts of the case so also the settled position of law, declared by the Apex Court of Land, in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 (1) SCC 770 , which has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent opinion in the case of Baldev Krishan v. Satya Narain, Civil Appeal No. 7163/2013, decided on 27th August, 2013. 6. Per contra; learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, while supporting the impugned order, asserted that the trial Court committed no illegality and/or perversity, while declining the application of the plaintiff-petitioner, for the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while remanding the matter back to the trial Court, made a specific direction to decide the matter afresh considering the order dated 15th November, 1995, and orders of review as well as the materials available on record. Therefore, in case, the application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, was to be granted, the entire nature of the matter would change. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar so also carefully considered that impugned order dated 24th May, 2016, made by the trial Court. 8. Indisputably, the suit proceedings instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner were adjudicated upon by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner was decreed. 8. Indisputably, the suit proceedings instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner were adjudicated upon by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner was decreed. Both the parties for suit proceedings instituted first appeals before this Court, which were registered as S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 200/1995 (Sanjeev Kumar Bhargava v. Smt. Sneh Lata & Anr.) and S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 222/1995 (Sneh Lata v. Sanjeev Kumar). 9. The appeals were disposed off vide order dated 15th March, 2016, whereby the matter was remanded back to the trial Court for decision afresh, taking into consideration the order dated 15th November, 1995, and orders of review as well as materials available on record. 10. From a glance of the application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, it is reflected that all the factual matrix, which is subsequent to judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995, has been detailed out in the application seeking permission for necessary amendments in the backdrop of the subject matter of the suit proceedings. 11. In the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (Supra), a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that to assert right and avail of remedy, the party has to make out a case legally and factually, in accordance with the current realities and the Court is required to take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both the sides are scrupulously obeyed. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of para 4 of the opinion, which reads thus: "4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the de crotal remedy. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the de crotal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments (subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 12. From the order of remand, it is apparent on the face of record, that the respondent-tenant wants consideration of an order dated 15th November, 1995, post-judgment and decree dated 8th August, 1995. 13. In the factual matrix and circumstances of the case at hand, the prayer of the plaintiff-petitioner to bring on record the subsequent developments by an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, would be in consonance with fair play. In the case of Baldev Krishna (Supra), the Supreme Court, relying upon the opinion in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra), observed thus; "5. In the case of Baldev Krishna (Supra), the Supreme Court, relying upon the opinion in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra), observed thus; "5. The discussion of the law should properly start with the three-Judge Bench decision in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders: (1975) 1 SCC 770 . Our research reveals that the question in hand has not received the attention of any larger Bench and hence if the ratio decidendi of Pasupuleti is to be varied, it per force has to be done by a larger Bench. In these circumstances, Pasupuleti holds the field on the question of the consideration to be given to events which have occurred subsequent to the institution of a suit and the disposal of any statutory appeal. Pasupuleti requires the Court to "take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." After laying down these propositions the decision was to the effect that the recovery of another accommodation by the landlord during the pendency of the case, had material bearing on the right to evict since that right would be defeated by the statutory provisions itself. Pasupuleti did not have the occasion to consider Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, (1973) 1 SCC 688 ; counsel were clearly remiss in not bringing this decision to the Court's notice. Close upon the heels of this decision is Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, (1976) 4 SCC 417 also rendered by a three-Judge Bench. Phool Rani was cited and overruled in Shantilal and, therefore, the former ought not to be cited or considered any further. The tenor of Shantilal is in consonance with and not contrary to Pasupuleti, as it necessarily must be. What has been held is that if the requirement of the Plaintiff as well as his heirs is in issue before the Court, the passing away of the Plaintiff will not defeat the lis. Another three-Judge Bench in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 has followed Pasupuleti, again as it was precendentially bound to. The plurality was of the view that a decree or order does not become final till the appeal filed against it is finally disposed of. Another three-Judge Bench in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 has followed Pasupuleti, again as it was precendentially bound to. The plurality was of the view that a decree or order does not become final till the appeal filed against it is finally disposed of. In his dissenting note, Pathak, J emphasised upon the fact that it was only in the course of the Second Appeal that the tenant endeavoured to draw the attention of the court to the demise of the landlord. Accordingly, Pathak, J was of the opinion that since there were concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court, the demise of the Plaintiff-landlord in the course of the Second Appeal would not have any detrimental legal consequences to his claim. We may add here, by way of emphasis, that a Second Appeal would not entail the determination of questions of fact but must conform to the discipline of only considering question of law of substantial importance. Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, (2004) 5 SCC 772 is a decision of a two-Judge Bench and, therefore, need not detain us in view of the ratio decidendi of larger Benches. Significantly, it was not brought to the notice of the Court that Phool Rani had already been overruled by two larger Benches. However, the distinguishing feature in this case was that consequent upon the death of the original landlord-Plaintiff his legal heirs had been allowed to be impleaded and the case progressed from that stage, not in the appellate court but before the Trial Court. It has been duly noted at the final hearing of the eviction Suit by the Trial Court, all the Plaintiff's sons had specifically set up their own bona fide needs." 14. The learned counsel for the parties are directed not to seek unnecessary adjournments. The trial Court would proceed in consonance with the steps suggested by the Apex Court of the Land, in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. v. Nirmala Devi and Ors., 2011 (8) SCC 249 , holding thus: "52. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials. A. Pleadings are foundation of the claims of parties. Civil litigation is largely based on documents. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the trial judge to carefully scrutinize, check and verify the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties. This must be done immediately after civil suits are filed. B. The Court should resort to discovery and production of documents and interrogatories at the earliest according to the object of the Act. If this exercise is carefully carried out, it would focus the controversies involved in the case and help the court in arriving at truth of the matter and doing substantial justice. C. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. D. The Court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The Court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely careful and cautious in granting ex-parte ad interim injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the Defendants or Respondents and only after hearing concerned parties appropriate orders should be passed. F. Litigants who obtained ex-parte ad interim injunction on the strength of false pleadings and forged documents should be adequately punished. No one should be allowed to abuse the process of the court. G. The principle of restitution be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice. H. Every case emanates from a human or a commercial problem and the Court must make serious endeavour to resolve the problem within the framework of law and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and justice. G. The principle of restitution be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice. H. Every case emanates from a human or a commercial problem and the Court must make serious endeavour to resolve the problem within the framework of law and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and justice. I. If in a given case, ex parte injunction is granted, then the said application for grant of injunction should be disposed of on merits, after hearing both sides as expeditiously as may be possible on a priority basis and undue adjournments should be avoided. J. At the time of filing of the plaint, the trial court should prepare complete schedule and fix dates for all the stages of the suit, right from filing of the written statement till pronouncement of judgment and the courts should strictly adhere to the said dates and the said time table as far as possible. If any interlocutory application is filed then the same be disposed of in between the said dates of hearings fixed in the said suit itself so that the date fixed for the main suit may not be disturbed. 53. According to us, these aforementioned steps may help the courts to drastically improve the existing system of administration of civil litigation in our Courts. No doubt, it would take some time for the courts, litigants and the advocates to follow the aforesaid steps, but once it is observed across the country, then prevailing system of adjudication of civil courts is bound to improve. 54. While imposing costs we have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and be realistic what the Defendants or the Respondents had to actually incur in contesting the litigation before different courts. We have to also broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses which have to be incurred towards drafting and filing of the counter affidavit, miscellaneous charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc. 15. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. 16. The impugned order dated 24th May, 2016, is hereby quashed and set aside. 17. The application, under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner, is granted. The plaintiff-petitioner is allowed to incorporate the amendments prayed for. 15. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. 16. The impugned order dated 24th May, 2016, is hereby quashed and set aside. 17. The application, under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner, is granted. The plaintiff-petitioner is allowed to incorporate the amendments prayed for. The trial court is directed to proceed the matter expeditiously, in view of the directions already issued for early adjudication of the matter. 18. Stay application also stands disposed off.