JUDGMENT : Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. The petitioner is an accused in FIR No. 273/2014 which initially was registered against him and his co-accused under Sections 147, 149, 325, 201 and 504 of the Indian penal Code. The complainant in this case is Ram Prakash Singh alias Moni, resident of House No. 108, Basant Bihar, Rakkar Colony, Tehsil and District Una. 2. According to the complainant on 2.9.2014 while at his resident he was informed by his nephew Karan Singh that some one is breaking open lock of his showroom. He accompanied by his wife Smt. Indu rushed to the spot. He noticed the shutter of the showroom in-order. Only one glass was found broken. His wife is suffering from throat infection and he, therefore, went to market in his vehicle PB-10-ER-Temp 4032 for bringing medicine for her from medical store. Around 10:25 P.M. while crossing through railway bridge near Shani Dev temple, he noticed an Indica car being driven in high speed on Malahat road. On seeing the Indica car, he stopped the vehicle which he was driving. The moment he alighted from his car the accused-petitioner started hurling filthy abuses to him. The accused-petitioner and his co-accused who alighted from the back seat of the car started administering beating to him. He was beaten by them with sticks and fisticuffs due to which he received injuries on his right leg and below right side eye on his face besides his head. He had disclosed the name of accused-petitioner and regarding his co-accused has expressed his inability to disclose their names. 3. On the report so lodged by Ram Prakash alias Moni aforesaid a case was registered under Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Investigation was conducted. During the course of investigation conducted by the police it transpired that the petitioner and his co-accused being member of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of their common object have administered beating to the complainant with sticks and fisticuffs besides hurling filthy abuses and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sections 147, 149, 325 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The challan against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused now stand filed in the Court. Learned Sessions Judge, Una has framed charge against each of them under Sections 147, 325 readwith Section 149 and under Section 201 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The challan against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused now stand filed in the Court. Learned Sessions Judge, Una has framed charge against each of them under Sections 147, 325 readwith Section 149 and under Section 201 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial presently is at the stage of recording the prosecution evidence. However, the proceedings in the case stand stayed by this Court as per the interim order passed in Cr.MP No. 561 of 2015 on 10.12.2015. 4. The proceedings against the accused-petitioner have been sought to be quashed on the grounds, inter alia, that the case has been registered against him as counter blast to FIR No. 260 of 2014 he lodged against Ram Prakash Singh alias Moni under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal code. As a matter of fact a cross FIR has been registered against respondent No. 2-complainant herein at the instance of the accused-petitioner with the allegation that he assaulted Aditya Parasher his son on railway bridge when they were coming back after paying obeisance in the temple of Baba Kumb Dass. Respondent No. 2-complainant was driving his white coloured Fortuner car and his wife was occupying the front seat. He allegedly stopped the vehicle without any provocation and prevented the accused-petitioner and other occupants of his car from proceeding ahead. He in a ferocious mood came down of his car and started hurling abuses to him as well as his deceased son Aditya Parasher. When the accused-petitioner also alighted from his car respondent No. 2 started fighting with him. Deceased Aditya Parasher and the workers working in his swimming pool which were occupants of the rear seat also alighted from the car and came to his rescue. Thereafter hot exchanges took place between both parties. Thereafter the deceased and the worker accompanying him boarded the car again. Deceased Aditya Parasher wanted to drive the car, however, respondent No. 2 has taken out a knife from his car. He opened the door of driver side of the car occupied by the accused-petitioner and his co-accused and stabbed Aditya Parasher at his chest in left side. The injury inflicted by respondent No.2 started bleeding. On seeing all this the accused-petitioner allegedly came out of the car and he administered beating to respondent No. 2 with kicks and fisticuffs. He opened the door of driver side of the car occupied by the accused-petitioner and his co-accused and stabbed Aditya Parasher at his chest in left side. The injury inflicted by respondent No.2 started bleeding. On seeing all this the accused-petitioner allegedly came out of the car and he administered beating to respondent No. 2 with kicks and fisticuffs. He also snatched a stick in the hands of the wife of respondent No. 2 and inflicted its blow on his person. The accused-petitioner before leaving to hospital hit the car of respondent-complainant twice and thrice so that he could not flee away from the place of occurrence. The injured Aditya Parasher was removed to hospital for treatment, however, he succumbed to the injuries and died later on. 5. It is thus seen that there are cross FIRs. In the case registered against Ram Prakash Singh alias Moni respondent No. 2 herein charge has already been framed and fourteen witnesses produced by the prosecution stand examined. The proceedings in that case has also been ordered to be stayed by this Court as per the order passed in Cr.MP (Cr.MMO No. 38 of 2016) No. 135 of 2016 titled Bhavak Prashar Versus State of Himachal Pradesh vide order dated 19.2.2016. As noticed hereinabove in this case also charge against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused stand framed and the proceedings in the trial are at the stage of recording prosecution evidence. The FIR has been sought to be quashed on the sole ground that respondent No. 2 is a influential person of the area. He runs the property mafia. Therefore, the FIR at his instance has been registered in connivance with the police as a counter blast to the case he registered in connection with the murder of his son Aditya Parasher. The injuries on the person of respondent No.2 according to accused-petitioner may be self inflicted. 6. Mr. Ranjan Lakahanpal, Advocate, learned Counsel representing the accused-petitioner has vehemently argued that the beating administered by the accused-petitioner was absolutely in exercise of his right of private defence and also that this only should have been the normal reaction of a person in whose presence his son was stabbed. 6. Mr. Ranjan Lakahanpal, Advocate, learned Counsel representing the accused-petitioner has vehemently argued that the beating administered by the accused-petitioner was absolutely in exercise of his right of private defence and also that this only should have been the normal reaction of a person in whose presence his son was stabbed. It has also been pointed out that the accused-petitioner never intended to cause hurt to the complainant-respondent No. 2 and in the circumstances prevailing on the spot and in exercise of right of defence the accused-petitioner administered beating to respondent No. 2. 7. Learned Counsel representing the complainant-respondent No. 2 while drawing the attention of this Court to the record of the case has forcefully contended that the wife of accused-petitioner was quarrelling with her brothers and mother through out on that day. Respondent No. 2 who has been inducted as tenant by brother-in-law of the accused-petitioner had nothing to do with their property dispute. Therefore, according to Mr. Chauhan respondent No. 2 has nothing to do with the murder of Aditya Parasher the son of the accused-petitioner. He according to him was beaten up by the accused party without any rhyme and reason. 8. Learned Additional Advocate General has contended that after the report has been lodged against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused the case against them was registered on receipt of the information qua the nature of the injuries received by respondent No. 2. Also that on completion of the investigation all the accused including accused-petitioner were challaned in the Court and charge against each of them now stands framed. 9. On analyzing the rival submissions and also the record available at this stage, it is crystal clear that the present is a case where both parties quarreled with each other. The occurrence has led in registration of two cross FIRs. As per the settled legal principle cross cases are to be tried together because quashing of proceedings in one of the case may affect adversely the other case on merits. The occurrence has led in registration of two cross FIRs. As per the settled legal principle cross cases are to be tried together because quashing of proceedings in one of the case may affect adversely the other case on merits. If coming to these cases in the event of the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused-petitioner are quashed and set aside, the defence of the complainant-respondent No. 2 (accused in FIR No. 260 of 2014) is likely to be adversely effected because the report he lodged against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused on the basis whereof FIR No. 273/2014 has been registered against them is his defence in the criminal case registered against him vide FIR No. 260 of 2014 aforesaid. 10. Otherwise also, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure should not be exercised to defeat the legitimate prosecution and the High Court rather should refrain from exercising such powers in a case where on an information lodged at the police Station an offence is registered and the evidence collected during the course of investigation. I am drawing support in this regard from the judgment of this Court in Sanjeev Bhardwaj Versus State of H.P. and others, 2013(3) Him. L.R 1897. I reproduce the relevant portion of this judgment which reads as follow: “5. Having gone through the record and also analyzing the rival submissions, before coming to the merits of the case, it is desirable to take down the legal principles applicable to a case of this nature settled by the Apex Court in State of Haryana and others versus Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604. The relevant portion of this judgment reads as follow: “108. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604. The relevant portion of this judgment reads as follow: “108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to given an exhaustive list of myriad kind of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding in instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 6. What, therefore, emerges from the law so laid down by the Apex Court is that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C, should not be exercised to defeat the legitimate prosecution and the High Court rather should refrain itself from exercising such powers in a case where on an information lodged at the police Station an offence is registered and the evidence collected during the course of investigation. Such powers, however, can be exercised in those cases where the allegations in the complaint, even if taken at its face value and accepted as true in its entirety, does not disclose even prima-facie the commission of an offence as it is that complaint which can be said to be the abuse of process of law and deserves to be quashed. 7. The apex Court has again held in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Surendra Kori, (2012) 10 SCC 155 , as under: “14. The High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not function as a court of appeal or revision. This Court has, in several judgments, held that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though wide, has to be used sparingly, carefully and with caution. The High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not function as a court of appeal or revision. This Court has, in several judgments, held that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though wide, has to be used sparingly, carefully and with caution. The High Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of wide magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.” 11. Now if adverting to the given facts and circumstances, it has come in FIR No. 260 of 2014 registered against respondent No. 2 at the instance of the accused-petitioner that on seeing the said respondent having stabbed his son he came out of his car and beaten up respondent No. 2 with kicks and fisticuffs. Not only this but a danda allegedly in the hand of the wife of respondent No. 2 was snatched by him and administered beatings therewith also to the said respondent. Thus, there is admission of administering beating to respondent No. 2 by the accused-petitioner not only with fisticuffs but danda also. Whether the accused-petitioner administered beating to respondent No. 2 apprehending danger to his life and he administered beatings to respondent No. 2 in the exercise of his right of private defence is a question to be gone into during the course of trial. However, object of right of private defence is not punitive but preventive. The right of private defence can only be exercised as sealed and not as weapon of offence. It is only preventive and not punitive or retaliatory. The right of private offence commences as soon as reasonable apprehension of any danger to body arises from any attempt or threat to commit the offence and continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. Now coming to the case in hand as per case of the accused-petitioner on seeing that the accused-petitioner had stabbed his son he came out of the car and administered beating to respondent No. 2 with kicks and fisticuffs. He even snatched danda also from the wife of respondent No. 2 and beaten the said respondent with danda also. Now coming to the case in hand as per case of the accused-petitioner on seeing that the accused-petitioner had stabbed his son he came out of the car and administered beating to respondent No. 2 with kicks and fisticuffs. He even snatched danda also from the wife of respondent No. 2 and beaten the said respondent with danda also. Nothing has come on record that respondent No. 2 after stabbing the son of the accused-petitioner also attacked the accused-petitioner and his co-accused. Prima-facie on seeing that his son was stabbed by respondent No. 2 the accused-petitioner enraged and thrashed the respondent No. 2. Therefore, at this stage it cannot also be believed that the act of the accused-petitioner to administer beatings to respondent No. 2 was absolutely in the exercise of his right of private defence. 12. Now, if coming to cross FIR Annexure- P1 registered at the instance of respondent No. 2 not only the accused-petitioner but his co-accused had also beaten up the said respondent. Record reveal that besides accused-petitioner his son deceased Aditya Parasher and three workers working in the swimming pool were also occupying the car. On the other hand, as per own version of accused-petitioner, respondent No. 2 was traveling in his car accompanied by his wife alone. Therefore, at this stage to make any observation of merits as to who was the assailants may effect the case of either party on merit. However, suffice would it to say that the present is not a case where it can be said that the allegation in the FIR Annexure-P1 if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute the commission of any offence by the accused-petitioner and his co-accused. The present is rather a case where quashing of proceedings against the accused-petitioner would affect adversely the proceedings in the trial against respondent No. 2. Above all when the charge against the accused-petitioner and his co-accused stand framed the present is not a case where the FIR should be quashed. The accused-petitioner may face trial and in case he is innocent to bring his innocence to the notice of the trial Court during the course of trial. 13. The judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Mohd. Salim Versus State, 2010 (175) DLT 473 relied upon by Mr. The accused-petitioner may face trial and in case he is innocent to bring his innocence to the notice of the trial Court during the course of trial. 13. The judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Mohd. Salim Versus State, 2010 (175) DLT 473 relied upon by Mr. Lakahanpal is distinguishable on facts because in that case an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal procedure was filed after the charge in the main case was framed against the complainant (accused in the main case) by the Court. The complainant was arrested on the day of occurrence itself. He was produced before the Magistrate on every occasion but he failed to implicate the accused he named in the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure at any stage of the proceedings against him till charge was framed against him. It is in this backdrop the order summoning the respondent in that case as accused was quashed and set aside. This, however is not the position in the case in hand for the reason that respondent No. 2 has not only lodged the complaint on the same day but as per the record informed the police about the occurrence from the spot itself. 14. In view of what has been said hereinabove, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. The interim order dated 10.12.2015 is ordered to be vacated. 15. The parties through learned Counsel representing them are directed to appear in the trial Court on 14.9.2016. The record be sent forthwith so as to reach in the trial Court well before the date fixed.