JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ-application, the writ-applicant, a dismissed Branch Manager of the Bank of India, has prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 10.5.2001 passed by the appellate authority in the Appeal preferred by the petitioner dated 15.1.2001 challenging the penalty order dated 17th November, 2000. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority be also declared illegal and be quashed and set aside. (AA) The order of dismissal was passed under pressure and influence of higher authorities of the Head Office and does not appear to be independent decision of the inquiry officer and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. (B) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service along with full back wages and other consequential benefits. (BB) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside (1) the proceedings of departmental inquiry against the petitioner and (2) report of inquiry officer dtd. 3/11/2000 made against the petitioner, by holding the same to be arbitrary, discriminatory, perverse in breach/violation of the Bank of India Officers Employee (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, in breach/violation of the principles of natural justice and in clear violation of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the further proceedings of the impugned order dated 10.5.2001 passed by the appellate authority and 17th November 2000. (D) Ad-interim relief in terms of para (C) above may kindly be granted. (E) This application may kindly be allowed with costs. (F) Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to pass any other further order/s as may be deemed fit, just and proper in the interest of justice." 2. The writ-applicant, while serving as a Branch Manager at the Ankleshwar Industrial Estate Branch of the Bank of India, was served with a departmental charge-sheet containing the following charges:- "1. You alongwith Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (Credits), Ankleshwar Ind. Est. Branch in collusion with 1. The writ-applicant, while serving as a Branch Manager at the Ankleshwar Industrial Estate Branch of the Bank of India, was served with a departmental charge-sheet containing the following charges:- "1. You alongwith Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (Credits), Ankleshwar Ind. Est. Branch in collusion with 1. Shri Milan R. Shah and in gross violation of bank's laid down norms and procedures and with the malafide intention accommodated Shri Milan R. Shah by sanctioning various credit facilities to the following firms which are managed and controlled by Shri Milan R. Shah. Out of the above five firms the three firms namely M/s. Vrushabh Marketing, Proprietress Mrs. Ila Shah, wife of Mr. Milan Shah of 105, Budhdev Complex, Bharuch, M/s. Darsil Associates, HUF, Mr. Milan R. Shah of 26, Uma Complex, Ankleshwar & M/s. N.M. Shah & Co. Proprietress, Trupti Dharmesh Shah (Ex. Employee of Dhwani Enterprises) of 26, Uma Complex, Ankleshwar exists on paper only. Credit facilities were sanctioned without obtaining status report from previous bankers of the firms. Moreover, you knowingly did not verify the antecedent of the these firms/its proprietors etc. and also did not made proper analysis of the Balance Sheet/financial statement. Payment of the 32 gold coins sold, were allowed to be made by allowing over limits, from c/c/account of M/s. Dhwani Lubricant Pvt. Ltd. And thus allowed diversion of funds for the purpose other than the approved purposes without ensuring the end use of the funds. The demand loans were sanctioned with the intention to accommodate Shri Milan R. Shah and to help him to close his A/c. With Central Bank of India, Bharuch Branch which was standing in the name of Dhwani Enterprises and was identified as NPA a/c. By them, for which a cheque for Rs. 15,45,400/- was issued from the A/c of Ms. Dhwani Enterprise fvg. Central Bank of India a/c. Dhwani Enterprises and presented in clearing on 05.01.2000. All the 5 proposals have been sanctioned by you in the capacity of branch manager. The vouchers pertaining to transactions have also been signed by you alongwith Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (Cr.) 2. You willfully and in flagrant violation of banks laid down norms and procedure and also with malafide intention accommodated Shri Milan R. Shah by purchasing fake bills in the A/c of M/s. Vrushabh Marketing M/s. Darsil Associates & M/s. N.M. Shah & Co. which were non-existent firms. Manager (Cr.) 2. You willfully and in flagrant violation of banks laid down norms and procedure and also with malafide intention accommodated Shri Milan R. Shah by purchasing fake bills in the A/c of M/s. Vrushabh Marketing M/s. Darsil Associates & M/s. N.M. Shah & Co. which were non-existent firms. On 02.05.2000, you sanctioned purchase of bills worth Rs. 45.00 lacs in Dhwani Group of A/cs. The proceeds of the bills so purchased by you were utilised to clear the balance outstanding against the earlier bills purchased and which had become overdue. The bills amounting to Rs. 34,06,049/- (purchased for Rs. 27,66,778/-) purchased in the A/c. of M/s. Vrushabh Marketing, M/s. Darsil Associates and M/s. Shah & Co. were purchased in gross violation of Bank's laid down norms and procedures inasmuch as the address of the drawees were not mentioned on the bills and no L/R was enclosed to confirm having dispatched the goods. In case the bill of M/s. N.M. Shah and company all bills of Exchange were not even signed by the drawer of the bills and instead of sending them to the drawees/their bankers the same were knowingly kept in the branch. 3. You along with Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (credits) frequently allowed TODs/Overlimit in the c/c A/c of M/s. Dhwani Enterprise and Dhwani Lubricants P. Ltd. The TOD's/Over-limits so allowed were beyond your delegated authority and in contravention to Bank's laid down norms and procedures. In order to conceal this fact, you knowingly did not report the same to controlling office/higher authorities as is required under bank's laid down procedure. On some occasions, even funds were allowed to be transferred from one a/c to another by allowing TOD/Over-limit in one a/c. 4. You along with Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (Credits), in gross violation of bank's laid down norms and procedure accommodated Shri Milan R. Shah by issuing Inland C/Cs. On 1.6.2000, two of the L/Cs issued were of huge amount of Rs. 25.00 lacs. To conceal the fact of having issued these L/Cs. You knowingly did not keep record of the same as also the copy of the L/Cs issued and it came to the light only when the beneficiary namely M/s. IOC provided the copies of the L/Cs to the bank. No liability vouchers were passed by the branch and no proposal for sanction of issuance of these L/Cs was prepared. You knowingly did not keep record of the same as also the copy of the L/Cs issued and it came to the light only when the beneficiary namely M/s. IOC provided the copies of the L/Cs to the bank. No liability vouchers were passed by the branch and no proposal for sanction of issuance of these L/Cs was prepared. No security/security documents were obtained in this regard. Moreover, with a view to conceal the fact of devolvement of the L/Cs vouchers were passed on 12.5.2000 and 14.6.2000 i.e. on the date of your relieving from the branch debiting customers account and crediting B/R under L/C. All the L/Cs and the vouchers have been signed by you in the capacity of Branch Manager along with Shri G.S. Vasava, Asstt. Manager (Credits). 5. You in gross violation of banks laid down procedure and beyond your delegated authority issued Bank Guarantees without preparing any proposals and without recording your sanction and also without obtaining any security/security documents of the same and without charging commission against some of the Bank Guarantees issued. No copy of the guarantees issued by the branch is kept on the branch record. 3 of the guarantees issued by you are for Rs. 25.00 lacs each. Issuance of two Guarantees issued on 1.6.2000 for Rs. 25.00 lacs each came to the light only when the beneficiary viz. M/s. IOC advised the bank in this regard and provided copies of the same. The said Bank Guarantees are not recorded in the banks book of accounts. The commission/charges in respect of these bank guarantees is not reflected in banks books of account. Moreover these guarantees have been issued on stamp papers purchased on a date subsequent to the date of issue of the guarantees. You have thus abused your official position and issued the said guarantees with malafide intention of causing wrongful gains to yourself and also to the customer and the wrongful loss to the bank. You thus aided and abetted Mr. Milan R. Shah in siphoning bank's funs and acted against the interest of the bank. Due to your aforesaid misconducts, as mentioned under Article of Charge I to V stated hereinabove bank is likely to suffer financial loss to the tune of Rs. 96.69 lacs on account of the balance outstanding in various a/c of the Dhwani Group plus the amount of Guarantees invoked for Rs. Due to your aforesaid misconducts, as mentioned under Article of Charge I to V stated hereinabove bank is likely to suffer financial loss to the tune of Rs. 96.69 lacs on account of the balance outstanding in various a/c of the Dhwani Group plus the amount of Guarantees invoked for Rs. 85.00 lacs total Rs. 181.69 lacs." 3. The writ-applicant, on receipt of the departmental charge-sheet, filed his reply dated 17th October 2000, denying all the allegations levelled in the charge-sheet. 4. An Inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer, on conclusion of the inquiry, arrived at the conclusion that the charges stood proved. The copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the writ-applicant. The disciplinary authority, thereafter, proceeded to pass the impugned order dismissing the writ-applicant from service. The operative part of the order passed by the disciplinary authority reads as under: "9. In view of the above and considering the entire enquiry proceedings documentary and oral evidence brought on record of the enquiry findings of I.A. And this being a perpetrated fraud committed by you in collusion with Shri R.T. Patel, Ex-Manager and borrower Shri Milan R. Shah thereby involving the bank to suffer heavy financial loss. I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if you are awarded extreme penalty of Dismissal from bank's service with immediate effect which shall necessarily by disqualification for future employment in terms of Reg. 4(j) of Bank of India Officer Employee's (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1976 fro the irregularities committed by you during your tenure at Ankleshwar Ind. Estate Branch and proved against you. 10. Accordingly, I impose on you major penalty of DISMISSAL from Bank's Service. Dismissal which shall necessarily be a disqualification for future employment in terms of Reg. 4(j) of BOI Officer employee (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1976. 11. The penalty of dismissal is effective immediately. 12. You may, if so desire, prefer an appeal against this penalty order to the Dy. General Manager and Jt. Zonal Manager, Gujarat Zone, Ahmedabad and Appellate Authority within 45 days of receipt of this penalty order. 13. The period spent by you under suspension shall not be counted as on duty and you will not be paid any allowance/difference other than the subsistence allowance already drawn by you." 5. The writ-applicant, being dissatisfied, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. 13. The period spent by you under suspension shall not be counted as on duty and you will not be paid any allowance/difference other than the subsistence allowance already drawn by you." 5. The writ-applicant, being dissatisfied, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after due consideration of the matter, thought fit to dismiss the appeal vide order dated 10th May 2001. The operative part of the appellate order reads as under: "8. In view of what is stated above, and after going through the complete records of your case, once again I do not find any merit in your submissions/contentions raised vide your aforesaid appeal. Moreover, the facts remains that all the charges levelled against you vide charge sheet dtd. 1.10.2000 have been conclusively proved in the enquiry. Considering the gravity ad seriousness of the charges, the penalty imposed by the D.A. commensurate with the gravity of misconduct alleged and proved against you. Therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the penalty of your dismissal without notice imposed upon you by the D.A. Vide order dated 17.11.2000. 9. I, therefore, confirm the penalty of your dismissal from Bank's service with immediate effect in terms of Regulation 4(j) of BOI Officer Employee's (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 imposed upon you by the Chief Regional Manager, Surat Region & D.A. vide penalty order dated 17.11.2000 and consequently, your appeal stands rejected." 6. Being dissatisfied, the writ-applicant has come up with this writ-application. 7. Mr. Adesara, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant, has a solitary contention to raise. According to him, the allegations levelled against his client were on par with one Shri G.S. Vasava, who, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the Assistant Manager in the Branch. Mr. Adesara submitted that Shri Vasava also was held to be guilty of all the acts of misconduct as alleged. He was also ordered to be dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority. His appeal was also ordered to be dismissed by the appellate authority. However, he preferred a review application addressed to the General Manager (HR and Review Authority). The review application came to be disposed of in the following terms: "6. He was also ordered to be dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority. His appeal was also ordered to be dismissed by the appellate authority. However, he preferred a review application addressed to the General Manager (HR and Review Authority). The review application came to be disposed of in the following terms: "6. Having called for and meticulously examined all the related records of the case vis-à-vis the contentions of the petitioner put forth in his Review Petition and his submissions made in the personal hearing, the undersigned wishes to mention at the outset, that the charges levelled against the petitioner are quite serious and they are proved on the basis of evidence, both oral and documentary, brought an inquiry record. Further, on perusal of the entire records of the case, the undersigned does not see any lacuna or violation of principles of natural justice, either in conduct or inquiry or at any stage of the departmental proceedings. 7. However, the undersigned considers it pertinent to point out here the observations of the Inquiring Authority, vide his findings, that as regards to the malafide intention, there was no documentary evidence to prove the nexus between the borrower and the petitioner and probability cannot be taken as proof of any nexus between the borrower and petitioner, the undersigned feels that the said observations acquires significance and needs serious consideration, particularly, when viewed in the light of the fact that the petitioner was working as a second officer and hence, was expected to work under the control and supervision of Shri R.T. Patel, the then Manager of the Branch. The said factual position, coupled with the letter dated 14/12/2000 of Shri Milan R. Shah, the borrower, wherein the borrower has stated that he had direct dealings with Shri Patel, the then Manager of the Branch, submitted by the petitioner, leads the undersigned to the logical and probable conclusion that the contention of the petitioner that he did not have malafide intention does have force/substance and deserves consideration. 8. 8. Further, in the personal hearing accorded by the undersigned to the petitioner, the crux of his submission was that he, while working in the Branch as Second Officer, had signed the documents on inquiry record on the basis of which the charges were proved, in good faith and under pressure from/directions of the Manager, without ever doubting his credentials and honesty and in the process, the Manager duped the petitioner taking advantage of his lack of knowledge, naivety and innocence. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the matter in its entirety and taking into account the mitigating/extenuating factors, the undersigned, even though not in favour of reinstating the petitioner in the Bank's service, nevertheless, modifies the penalty of "Dismissal" imposed on the petitioner to that of "Compulsory Retirement". Accordingly, the undersigned, in his capacity as the Reviewing Authority, passes the following order: ORDER The major penalty of "Dismissal from Bank's service" as inflicted upon Shri G.S. Vasava by the Disciplinary Authority vide his order dated 17/11/2000 and as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide his order dated 15/05/2001 be and is hereby modified to the penalty of "Compulsory Retirement from Bank's service" in terms of Regulation 4(h) of Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. 10. This order will come into force with effect from the date of implementation of the penalty of "Dismissal". 11. The Review Petition dated 19/10/2001 submitted by Shri G.S. Vasava is accordingly disposed of." 8. According to Mr. Adesara, if the General Manager of the Bank thought fit to modify the order of penalty from dismissal to one of compulsory retirement in terms of the Regulation No. 4 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, then the same treatment deserves to be given to the writ-applicant. According to Mr. Adesara, there was no good reason for the General Manager to distinguish the case of Shri Vasava with that of the writ-applicant. 9. No contention other than the one referred to above was raised by Mr. Adesara. 10. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Chudgar, the learned counsel appearing for the Bank. He submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Bank in dismissing the writ-applicant from service. 11. Adesara. 10. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Chudgar, the learned counsel appearing for the Bank. He submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Bank in dismissing the writ-applicant from service. 11. He pointed out that serious allegations were levelled and the writ-applicant being a Branch Manager of a Nationalized Bank was expected to discharge his duties with utmost honesty, integrity and devotion. He pointed out that even the writ-applicant could have preferred a review application before the General Manager as the one preferred by Shri Vasava. Having not preferred any such review application, the writ-applicant cannot now complain or cannot assert as a matter of right that since Shri Vasava was inflicted with the punishment of compulsory retirement, the writ-applicant also should be inflicted with the punishment of compulsory retirement. He submitted that awarding a lesser punishment to a co-delinquent is not a good ground for judicial interference with the quantum of the punishment. He submitted that normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court except in appropriate cases, that too, only after reaching to the conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate. He submits that there being no merit in this writ-application, the same may be rejected. 12. In reply to the contention canvassed on behalf of the Bank that the writ-applicant had not preferred any review application before the General Manager and, therefore, he cannot complain of having been discriminated with Shri Vasava who thought fit to prefer the review application, and upon review, the order of penalty was modified, Mr. Adesara relied on the Regulation No. 18 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, which provides for review. Regulation No. 18 reads as under: "18. Adesara relied on the Regulation No. 18 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, which provides for review. Regulation No. 18 reads as under: "18. Review: Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Reviewing Authority may call for the record of the case within six months of the date of the final order and after reviewing the case pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit: Provided that- (i) If any enhanced penalty, which the Reviewing Authority proposes to impose, is a major penalty specified in clauses (f), (g), (h), (i) or (j) of regulation 4 and an enquiry as provided under regulation 6 has not already been held in the case, the Reviewing Authority shall direct that such an enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6 and thereafter consider the record of the enquiry and pass such order as it may deem proper; (ii) If the Reviewing Authority decides to enhance the punishment but an enquiry has already been held in accordance with the provision of regulation 6, the Reviewing Authority shall give show cause notice to the officer employee as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass an order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer employee." 13. According to Mr. Adesara, the plain reading of the Regulation No. 18 would suggest that the power is only with the reviewing authority to call for the record of the case within six months of the date of the final order, and after reviewing the same, pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit. According to Mr. Adesara, the understanding of his client was that by virtue of Regulation No. 18, a delinquent has no right to prefer an application for review, and in such circumstances, the review application was not filed by his client. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the Bank committed any error in passing the impugned order. 15. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the Bank committed any error in passing the impugned order. 15. It is now well settled by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court that in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not venture into the re-appreciation of evidence or interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the inquiry proceedings, if the same are conducted in accordance with law or go into the reliability/adequacy of evidence, or interfere, if there is some legal evidence on which the findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks the conscience. 16. It is equally well settled that the High Courts in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 can only consider whether the inquiry held by the competent authority was in accordance with the procedure established by law, and the principles of natural justice, whether irrelevant or extraneous consideration and/or exclusion of admissible or material evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence being influenced the decision rendering it vulnerable. 17. This Court may interfere if the finding is wholly arbitrary and capricious based on no evidence which no reasonable person could have ever arrived at. 18. The inquiring authority, vide its report, concluded that all the charges were held to be established reflecting upon his integrity, devotion and diligence towards the work. The disciplinary authority later considered the relevant record of the case including the findings of the inquiring authority and the submissions made by the writ-applicant and thought fit to pass an order of dismissal from service. 19. The appellate authority also looked into the matter and thought fit to affirm the order of dismissal from service considering the materials on record. 20. I take notice of the fact that the inquiring officer has examined each and every charge levelled against the writ-applicant including the documents produced by the presenting officer and came to the conclusion that all the charges stood fully proved. In a departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond the reasonable doubt. 21. In a departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond the reasonable doubt. 21. The documents produced by the petitioner, which are as such not controverted by the petitioner, support all the allegations and the charges levelled against him. 22. In the case of State Bank of India and others v. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013)2 SCC 740 , the Supreme Court, in paras 25 and 26, observed as under: "25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a well acceptable principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In State Bank of India and others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212 : (2006 AIR SCW 5457), this Court held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence acting as a court of Appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the Inquiring Authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules. 26. This court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 held: "7...Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence especially when the charged officer had not participated in the inquiry and had not raised the grounds urged by him before the High Court by the Inquiring Authority."" 23. In a very recent pronouncement in the case of the Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015)2 SCC 610 , the Supreme Court in details has explained the position of law so far as the scope of interference in the matter relating to the disciplinary proceedings is concerned. I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court from paras 12 to 20 as under: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: "7......The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs-21 to 24, which read as follows: "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs-21 to 24, which read as follows: "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 966 ) said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." 16. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." 16. These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [ (1977) 2 SCC 491 ]. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions:- "4....... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good......" 17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : ( AIR 2014 SC 1141 ), these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything. 18. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings: "Article-I was held as proved by the Inquiry authority after evaluating the evidence adduced in the case. Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P. Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92 during the time of inquiry. Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P. Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92 during the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence witness during the inquiry to support his claims including that on 23.11.92 he left the office on permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was handicapped in producing his defence witness....." 19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values. 24. In the case of the Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & others v. P.C. Kakkar, AIR 2003 SC 1571 , the Supreme Court in paras 14 & 15 held as under: "14. A Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer, Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer, Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, 1996 (9) SCC 69 , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. 15. It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All ER 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dedley) Ltd. v. Crabtres (1974 LCR 120), it was observed : "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application." 25. In the case of the State Bank of India and another v. Bela Bagchi and others, AIR 2005 SC 3272 , the Supreme Court observed the following in para 15: "15. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) (9) SCC 69, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance." 26. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance." 26. In the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and another, AIR 2005 SC 314 , the Supreme Court observed in paras 32 and 33 as under: "32. The learned senior counsel also relied on para 14 of the above judgment. Replying on the above passage, Mr. Salve submitted that the appellant, the Branch Manager of a Bank is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity when he deals with the money of the depositors and the customers and, therefore, he is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of the Bank Officer. According to Mr. Salve, good conduct and discipline are inseparable for the functioning of every officer, Manager or employee of the Bank, who deals with public money and there is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in the case, when the Manager acted without authority and contrary to the rules and the scheme which is formulated to help the Educated Unemployed Youth. Mr. Salve's above submissions is well merited acceptance and we see much force in the said submission. 33. The Bank Manager/Officer and employees and any Bank nationalised/or non-nationalised are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bank. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and Trust and a misconduct. In the instant case Charge No. 5 framed against the appellant is very serious and grave in nature. We have already extracted the relevant rule which prohibits the Bank Manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner. While sanctioning the loan the appellant does not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realized the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. While sanctioning the loan the appellant does not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realized the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. The decision to sanction a loan is not an honest decisions. The Rule 34(3)(1) is a rule of integrity and therefore as rightly pointed out by Mr. Salve, the respondent Bank cannot afford to have the appellant as Bank Manager. The punishment of removal awarded by the Appellate Authority is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Before concluding, we may usefully rely on the judgment Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr. reported in 2003(3) SCC 605 . Wherein this Court has held as under:- "If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned single Judge upholding the order of dismissal." 27. Thus, in the overall view of the matter and also considering the position of law, I am of the view that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority committed no error in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the acts of misconduct as alleged. 28. I am not at all impressed by the submission of Mr. Adesara that since the reviewing authority thought fit to substitute the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the co-delinquent, viz. Shri Vasava, with that of the compulsory retirement, the writ-applicant also should be given the same treatment and his order of dismissal should also be substituted with one of the compulsory retirement in terms of the Regulation No. 4(h) of the Regulations, 1976. 29. I am not impressed for two reasons. Shri Vasava, with that of the compulsory retirement, the writ-applicant also should be given the same treatment and his order of dismissal should also be substituted with one of the compulsory retirement in terms of the Regulation No. 4(h) of the Regulations, 1976. 29. I am not impressed for two reasons. First, the writ-applicant did not deem fit to prefer any such review application although it was permissible for him to file the same. The interpretation sought to be put forward of Regulation No. 18 so far as the provision of review is concerned, is unpalatable. If the reviewing authority can exercise the power suo motu, then he can also exercise such power if he is called upon by the delinquent by preferring an appropriate application in that regard. Secondly, the reviewing authority has tried, and in my view, to a certain extent rightly drawn the distinction between the case of the writ-applicant herein with that of Shri Vasava. The reviewing authority, in its order, has stated that there was no evidence to establish any direct nexus between the borrower and Shri Vasava. Shri Vasava, being a subordinate officer to the writ-applicant, probably had no say in the matter. 30. Let me assume for the moment that the findings recorded by the reviewing authority are perverse, still the same should not enure to the benefit of the writ-applicant against whom the case is fully established. 31. I gave an option to Mr. Adesara that he may not press this writ-application with a view to file an appropriate review application before the reviewing authority. However, Mr. Adesara declined stating that it would be an empty formality for his client to prefer a review application at this stage. 32. In my view, no case worth the name is made out for interference. 33. As a result, this writ-application fails and is hereby rejected. Rule discharged.