JUDGMENT : Mr. P.R. Shivakumar, J. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 74 of 2010 on the file of the Additional District Munsif, Karur is the appellant in the second appeal. The defendants therein are the respondents in the second appeal. 2. Karuppannan, the appellant herein, filed the above said suit for a declaration that the action taken by the defendants by erecting Oil Engine Generators or any other kind of machineries in plaint 'B' schedule property causing nuisance will result in discomfort to him and his family members, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from erecting a telecommunication tower in the plaint 'B' schedule property till the disposal of the suit and for cost. The suit was resisted by the respondents herein and after trial, the learned trial Judge, by judgment and decree dated 08.10.2010, decreed the suit in respect of the prayer for injunction and dismissed the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration. 3. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit in respect of declaration, Karuppannan, the appellant herein, filed an appeal in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 on the file of the Additional Sub-Judge, Karur. The first respondent herein preferred a cross appeal challenging that part of the decree of the trial Court granting the relief of injunction. The learned lower appellate Judge chose to dismiss the appeal preferred by Karuppannan, the appellant in the second appeal/plaintiff in the original suit, namely A.S. No. 20 of 2011 by a judgment and decree dated 24.01.2012. Thereafter, the learned lower appellate Judge, took up the cross-appeal filed by the first respondent herein separately, allowed the same by a separate judgment and decree dated 13.09.2013 and thereby set aside the decree granted by the trial Court for permanent injunction, ultimately resulting in the dismissal of the suit in entirety. 4. As against the dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff, namely A.S. No. 20 of 2011, the appellant has not filed any second appeal. On the other hand, the appellant/plaintiff has chosen to file the present second appeal only against the decree passed in the cross-appeal. 5. 4. As against the dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff, namely A.S. No. 20 of 2011, the appellant has not filed any second appeal. On the other hand, the appellant/plaintiff has chosen to file the present second appeal only against the decree passed in the cross-appeal. 5. The second appeal was admitted on 10.02.2014 formulating the following questions to be the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal: (1) Whether the 1st Appellate Court is right in allowing the cross appeal in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 on 13.09.2013, while on 24.01.2012 allowing the decree of injunction passed by the trial Court made in O.S. No.74 of 2010 to continue? (2) Whether the very cross appeal is maintainable before the 1st appellate Court while the remedy to the 1st respondent is to file appeal before the Hon'ble Court, if aggrieved against the order passed by the Additional Sub-Judge, Karur, made in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 on 24.01.2012 ? (3) Whether the Additional Sub-Judge has passed conflicting judgments in view of the order passed in cross appeal in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and in Appeal No. 20 of 2011 ? (4) Whether the Court below is right in refusing to grant the equitable relief to the appellant? 6. The arguments advanced by Mr. N. Shanmugaselvam, learned counsel for the appellant, by Mr. K. Govindarajan, learned counsel for the first respondent and by Mr. V. Balaji, learned counsel for the second respondent were heard. The materials available on record were also perused. 7. Before adverting to the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal, it shall be helpful to narrate briefly the following facts leading to the filing of the second appeal:- Karuppannan, the appellant in the second appeal/plaintiff is the owner of the plaint 'A' schedule property, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 20.03.2010 marked as Ex. A1. He has constructed a house and he along with other members of his family, is residing there. The plaint 'B' schedule property situates near the plaint 'A' schedule property and it is owned by Tharmendran, the second respondent/second defendant. He has leased out the same to the first respondent, namely Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, a company having its Registered Office at Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi-110 001, for erection of a telecommunication tower. The plaint 'B' schedule property situates near the plaint 'A' schedule property and it is owned by Tharmendran, the second respondent/second defendant. He has leased out the same to the first respondent, namely Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, a company having its Registered Office at Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi-110 001, for erection of a telecommunication tower. Contending that the erection of such a telecommunication tower will cause nuisance to the appellant herein/plaintiff and his family members, he filed the above said suit O.S. No. 74 of 2010 for a declaration and injunction. The exact prayers made in the plaint are extracted hereunder: “Therefore it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass a decree and judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants as follows: (a) granting a decree for declaration declaring the action of the defendants (by erecting oil engine generators or any other kind of machineries in the suit B schedule property emitting nuisance) will cause discomfort to the plaintiff and his family members; (b) granting a decree for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants, their men, servants, agents, associates, subordinates or any one in their behalf in any manner putting up the construction for erection of the tower till the disposal of the suit; (c) awarding the cost of the suit; and (d) granting such other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case and thus render justice.” 8. It may be noticed that relief (a) alone is the main relief sought for in the plaint. Though the relief sought for in the prayer (b) may, at the outset, appear to be a consequential relief, a close study of the said prayer will make it clear that prayer (b) is only for an interim relief of injunction pending disposal of the original suit. Though the relief sought for in the prayer (b) may, at the outset, appear to be a consequential relief, a close study of the said prayer will make it clear that prayer (b) is only for an interim relief of injunction pending disposal of the original suit. Though the plaint 'A' schedule property owned by the appellant/plaintiff and the 'B' schedule property owned by the second respondent/second defendant, which was leased out to the first respondent/first defendant for erection of a telecommunication tower, are said to be the adjacent lands, it is claimed by the second respondent/second defendant that the house property of the appellant/plaintiff in which he and his family members are residing is at a distance of 90 feet away from the plaint 'B' schedule property; that only a maintenance room occupying an extent of 120 sq.ft has been put up 30 feet away from the proposed tower and that such maintenance room is located at more than 60 feet away from the house of the appellant/plaintiff. 9. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, the first respondent/first defendant contended that the plaintiff's attempt to lease out the property described in Plaint 'A' schedule to the first respondent for erecting a telecommunication tower proved to be unsuccessful as plaint 'A' schedule property was found not suitable for erection of the telecommunication tower and the first respondent selected the plaint 'B' schedule property as the one suitable for erection of such telecommunication tower. It is the further contention of the first respondent that after entering into a lease arrangement with the second respondent/second defendant, the first respondent/first defendant started digging trench in plaint 'B' schedule property in order to erect a transmission tower and at that juncture, the appellant/plaintiff chose to approach the trial Court with the suit for the above said reliefs with untenable averments and that hence, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff, who himself offered his own property for the erection of telecommunication tower, could not be heard to say that the erection of telecommunication tower in the neighbouring property will cause nuisance to him and the members of his family. 10. A perusal of the pleadings of the parties, especially the prayer part of the plaint, will make it clear that Prayer No. (b) in the plaint is not for the relief of permanent injunction which shall be operative even after the disposal of the suit. 10. A perusal of the pleadings of the parties, especially the prayer part of the plaint, will make it clear that Prayer No. (b) in the plaint is not for the relief of permanent injunction which shall be operative even after the disposal of the suit. On the other hand, the prayer made therein is for an injunction restraining the defendants from putting up the construction for erection of the telecommunication tower till the disposal of the suit. Though the word “injunction” has been prefixed with the word “permanent”, the scope of the prayer is limited since the injunction sought for is till the disposal of the original suit. The learned trial Judge, without considering the scope of prayer (b) in proper perspective, has chosen to frame Issue No.1 assuming that Prayer (b) was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from putting up any construction in plaint 'B' Schedule property for the erection of telecommunication tower as a final and permanent relief. The said mistake shall be obvious from the first issue framed by the trial Court which reads as follows: "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for in the plaint?" That is the reason why the learned trial Judge, while holding that the appellant herein/plaintiff was not entitled to the declaration sought for in accordance with Prayer No.(a) found in the plaint, went further to hold that the appellant herein/plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction against the respondent herein/defendants from putting up any construction for the erection of the telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property owned by the second respondent/second defendant, which had been leased out to the first respondent/first plaintiff. The very same mistake is reflected in the decree of the trial Court also, which is to the following effect: "1. the first respondent herein/first defendant, till obtaining the necessary certificates required by law and erects the telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property, the defendants were restrained by a decree of permanent injunction; 2. The suit would stand dismissed in respect of the prayer for declaration; and 3. No costs" 11. the first respondent herein/first defendant, till obtaining the necessary certificates required by law and erects the telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property, the defendants were restrained by a decree of permanent injunction; 2. The suit would stand dismissed in respect of the prayer for declaration; and 3. No costs" 11. The entire discussion of the trial Court proceeded on the footing that the respondents/defendants were to be restrained by a decree of permanent injunction not to erect telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property till the first respondent Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited would get all the necessary certificates as per law for erection of the telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property. In fact, the appellant/plaintiff need not have filed any appeal as what was granted in the decree passed by the trial Court regarding prayer (b) was a larger relief in scope than what had been prayed for in the plaint. Though the appellant/plaintiff preferred the appeal in A.S. No. 20 of 2011, which came to be dismissed by the lower appellate Court confirming the dismissal of the suit for the relief of declaration, the appellant/plaintiff has not chosen to file any second appeal challenging that part of the decree of the trial Court declining the relief of declaration which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. Hence, the question whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration as sough for in Prayer (a) in the plaint is no longer open to be canvassed and the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration has attained finality. 12. However, the first respondent/first defendant has chosen to prefer the cross-appeal challenging the grant of permanent injunction and seeking the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for injunction also. The appeal filed by the appellant herein/plaintiff regarding the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration came to be filed on 11.02.2011. Before ever notice in the said appeal A.S. No. 20 of 2011 came to be served on the respondents herein/defendants, the first respondent/first defendant preferred the cross-appeal challenging the grant of the decree of permanent injunction in respect of prayer (b) made in the plaint. Hence, the learned lower appellate Judge ought to have numbered the same as a separate appeal rather than cross-objection. Hence, the learned lower appellate Judge ought to have numbered the same as a separate appeal rather than cross-objection. Either it be a cross-appeal or a cross-objection, the learned trial Judge ought to have heard both the appeals preferred by the appellant/plaintiff and the first respondent/first defendant jointly as they arose from one and the same case and one and the same judgment. However, for the reasons best known to the learned lower appellate Judge, the appeal preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff, namely A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant were heard separately, without assigning any appeal number for the cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant. The same resulted in two separate judgments of the learned lower appellate Judge, one dated 24.01.2012 pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the other dated 13.09.2013 pronounced in the cross-appeal. 13. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal that the decree passed in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff dismissing the same has the effect of confirming the decree passed in the original suit O.S. No. 74 of 2010 and it shall operate as a res judicata and hence, the cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant ought not to have been allowed. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal that the judgment pronounced in the cross-appeal, which is the subject matter of the present second appeal, is in conflict with the judgment pronounced in A. No. 20 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff and that hence, the decree passed by the learned lower appellate Judge in respect of the cross-appeal is liable to be set aside. 14. The above said contention has been made on the basis of the perception of the learned counsel for the appellant herein/plaintiff regarding the scope of the decree dated 24.01.2012 made in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 that by the dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff, the decree of the trial Court dated 08.10.2010 in entirely remained confirmed and that the decree granting permanent injunction passed by the trial Court in the original suit was allowed to continue. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the only question that arose for consideration before the lower appellate Court in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 was whether the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration should be interfered with and set aside; that no question regarding the sustainability of the decree granted in favour of the appellant herein/plaintiff in respect of the prayer for permanent injunction arose for consideration in the said appeal; that therefore, the judgment pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the decree granted therein on 24.01.2012, by no stretch of imagination, could be taken as confirmation of the decree of permanent injunction passed in favour of the appellant herein/plaintiff and that hence, the question of res judicata barring the hearing of the cross appeal filed by the first respondent/first defendant would not arise at all. 15. Order 41, Rule 22 CPC deals with the cross-objections that may be taken by the respondent in an appeal. For the sake of convenience, the entire Rule 22 is reproduced:- "22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree 1[but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellant Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. [Explanation- A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.] (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto-Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. 2[(3) Omitted] (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions-relating to appeal by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable apply to an objection under this rule." 16. A reading of sub-clause (1) will make it clear that a respondent in an appeal may take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection within one month from the date of service of notice on him or within such further time as the appellate Court may deem fit to allow. Sub-Clause (4) says that in case the appellant withdraws the appeal or the appeal is dismissed for default, the cross-objection filed by the respondent shall nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other party as the Court may deem fit. Sub-Clause (4) says that in case the appellant withdraws the appeal or the appeal is dismissed for default, the cross-objection filed by the respondent shall nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other party as the Court may deem fit. The same will give an idea that in case a decree passed by the trial Court is partly in favour of the plaintiff and partly in favour of the defendant and either the defendant or the plaintiff files an appeal in respect of that portion of the decree which is against him and gets an order of dismissal of the appeal filed by him confirming that part of the decree passed against him, still the other party, who has preferred either an appeal (cross appeal) or cross-objection challenging that part of the decree which is against him, shall be permitted to proceed with such appeal or cross-objection since that part of the decree was not the subject matter of challenge in the appeal filed by the former party. 17. In the case on hand, what was considered in the appeal A.S. No. 20 of 2011 filed by the appellant herein/plaintiff was only "whether that part of the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration could be sustained or not?" The learned lower appellate Judge, on re-appreciation of evidence, by his judgment and decree dated 24.01.2012, has held that the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration was proper and sustainable and that the challenge made to the same would fail, with the result that the appeal challenging the dismissal of the suit regarding the prayer for declaration was liable to be dismissed. The consequence shall be that the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration would stand confirmed. But the same cannot be stretched further, unless the question of sustainability of the decree granting the relief of injunction was canvassed and decided, to hold that the other part of the decree would also stand confirmed. 18. In fact, the points for determination formulated by the learned lower appellate Judge in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff do not include a specific question regarding the sustainability of the decree granted in respect of the prayer for permanent injunction. 18. In fact, the points for determination formulated by the learned lower appellate Judge in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff do not include a specific question regarding the sustainability of the decree granted in respect of the prayer for permanent injunction. The points for determination formulated by the lower appellate Court in the said appeal (A.S. No. 20 of 2011) are : "(1) Whether the trial Court is not correct in decreeing the suit as prayed for? and (2) Could the appeal be allowed?" The first question was not happily worded. It should have been "whether trial Court was correct in not decreeing the suit as prayed for?" 19. The learned lower appellate Judge answered the first point in Paragraph 16 of the said judgment and the relevant portion reads as follows: "The trial Court has given valid and acceptable reasons for not decreeing the suit as prayed for. Hence, this Court is of the view that, the trial Court is perfectly correct in not decreeing the suit as prayed for. Hence, Point No. 1 is decided against the appellant/plaintiff." Based on the said finding, the result portion of the judgment has been provided to the effect that the judgment and decree of the Additional District Munsif, Karur dated 08.10.2010 pronounced/granted in O.S. No. 74 of 2010 were confirmed and the appeal was dismissed with cost. A clear reading of the said judgment will make it obvious that the learned lower appellate Judge, while disposing of A.S. No. 20 of 2011, did not advert to the challenge made by the first respondent/first defendant to the decree of the trial Court in respect of the prayer for permanent injunction. Hence, this Court comes to the conclusion that the decree passed in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 on 24.01.2012 did not adjudicate upon the sustainability of the decree of the trial Court in O.S. No. 74 of 2010 in respect of the prayer for injunction and that hence, there was no bar for consideration of the said question in the cross-appeal filed by the first respondent/first defendant, which was filed even prior to the service of notice in A.S. No. 20 of 2011. Accordingly, the first and second substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal are answered against the appellant/plaintiff and in favour of the first respondent/first defendant holding that the decree of the lower appellate Court dated 24.01.2012 made in A.S. No.20 of 2011 does not provide a bar for the consideration of the cross-appeal filed by the first respondent/first defendant challenging the decree of the trial Court regarding the relief of permanent injunction. 20. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff is that by pronouncing two separate judgments, one in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein/plaintiff and the other in the cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent herein/first defendant, the lower appellate Judge rendered conflicting decisions. It is his contention that the decree of the trial Court dated 08.10.2010 made in O.S. No. 74 of 2010 was confirmed by the lower appellate Court by its judgment dated 24.01.2012 pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011, whereas the said decree came to be subsequently set aside by the very same lower appellate Court by its judgment dated 13.09.2013 made in the cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent herein/first defendant. At the outset the said contention may appear to contain substance in it. But a clear reading of the judgments of the lower appellate Court dated 24.01.2012 pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the judgment of the lower appellate Court dated 13.09.2013 made in the cross appeal preferred by the first respondent herein/first defendant, will make it clear that the lower appellate Court did not advert to the question of sustainability or otherwise of the decree granted by the trial Court in favour of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of the prayer for permanent injunction in the judgment dated 24.01.2013 pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and that the said question was considered exclusively in the judgment of the lower appellate Court dated 13.09.2013 pronounced in the cross appeal filed by the first respondent herein/first defendant. Hence, this Court is not in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court has pronounced conflicting judgments one in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the other one in cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant. Both operate on different fields regarding different reliefs and they do not overlap. Hence, this Court is not in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court has pronounced conflicting judgments one in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 and the other one in cross-appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant. Both operate on different fields regarding different reliefs and they do not overlap. Accordingly, the third substantial question of law formulated by this Court at the time of admission is also answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. 21. The fourth substantial question of law has been formulated based on the contention of the appellant that the lower appellate Court erred in refusing to grant equitable relief prayed for by the appellant/plaintiff. What is the equitable relief prayed for, has not been clarified by the appellant in the memorandum of second appeal. If at all the appellant/plaintiff has attempted to refer to the refusal to grant the relief of declaration, then it should be noticed that as against the dismissal of his appeal A.S. No. 20 of 2011, which took place on 24.01.2012, he chose to prefer no second appeal and hence the dismissal of the suit in respect of the prayer for declaration has attained finality. So far as the prayer for permanent injunction is concerned, much water has been flown into the controversy, because of the failure on the part of the parties as well as the courts below to consider the nature and scope of prayer (b) made in the plaint. The trial Court proceeded on the assumption that prayer (b) made in the plaint was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from putting up the construction for the erection of telecommunication tower in plaint 'B' schedule property, which shall be in force even beyond the disposal of the suit. On the other hand, the prayer made in the plaint makes it clear that the prayer for injunction was made only as an interim relief pending disposal of the suit. At the cost of repetition prayer (b) is reproduced: “(b) granting a decree for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants, their men, servants, agents, associates, subordinates or any one in their behalf in any manner putting up the construction for erection of the tower till the disposal of the suit;” 22. At the cost of repetition prayer (b) is reproduced: “(b) granting a decree for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants, their men, servants, agents, associates, subordinates or any one in their behalf in any manner putting up the construction for erection of the tower till the disposal of the suit;” 22. There is no other prayer specifically made in the plaint that similar injunction should be granted permanently or that such injunction should be granted till the first respondent/first defendant would get necessary permission, from all the authorities concerned, for the erection of the transmission tower. When the prayer is interim in nature, the learned trial Judge has gone a step further and granted a relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from putting up the construction for the erection of the telecommunication tower till the first respondent would get necessary permission from all the authorities. The said approach made by the learned trial Judge is not correct. The Court can grant a lesser relief than the one sought for. On the other hand, the Court cannot grant a larger relief than what has been prayed for in the plaint, simply relying the residuary plea for the grant of such other or further reliefs as the Court may deem fit, without the plaint being amended expanding the scope of the relief. The learned lower appellate judge also seems to have proceeded on the assumption that prayer (b) was for a permanent injunction rather than an interim injunction till the disposal of the suit. The same made the learned lower appellate Judge entertain an application for reception of additional documentary evidence and marking of Exs. B5 to B8 as additional documentary evidence. 23. Of course the procedure adopted by the learned lower appellate for recording the said additional evidence is not in accordance with the provisions found in Order 41, Rule 28 CPC. The same made the learned lower appellate Judge entertain an application for reception of additional documentary evidence and marking of Exs. B5 to B8 as additional documentary evidence. 23. Of course the procedure adopted by the learned lower appellate for recording the said additional evidence is not in accordance with the provisions found in Order 41, Rule 28 CPC. The documents sought to be produced as additional documentary evidence were the documents evidencing the no objection certificate issued by the Fire Service Department and also the judgment pronounced in A.S. No. 20 of 2011 besides a notice issued by the first respondent and certificate issued by one Veena Industries Pvt. Ltd. The same made the learned lower appellate Judge commit the mistake of simply incorporating an order allowing the application for reception of additional evidence in the judgment itself and marking the document without following the procedure contemplated under Order 41, Rule 28 CPC. Since the said procedure has not been followed by the lower appellate Judge, the additional documents marked as Exs. B5 to B8 can be ignored and they need not be taken into consideration. Even if those documents are omitted from the purview of consideration, the rest of the evidence available, which were adduced before the trial Court, would be enough to hold that the appellant/plaintiff shall not be entitled to the relief of permanent injunction not to put up any construction for the erection of telecommunication tower in the plaint 'B' schedule property. Even if it is assumed for argument sake that the appellant/plaintiff has made out a case that the appellant/plaintiff may be entitled to such a permanent injunction till the first respondent obtains necessary permission from the concerned authorities for the erection of the telecommunication tower, such relief could not have been granted in view of the limited scope of the prayer made by the appellant herein/plaintiff in the prayer portion of the plaintiff seeking such injunction only till the disposal of the suit. 24. The suit came to be disposed of on 08.10.2010 itself. On such disposal, prayer (b) in the plaint became in-fructuous and nothing survived thereafter to be adjudicated upon regarding the said prayer. 24. The suit came to be disposed of on 08.10.2010 itself. On such disposal, prayer (b) in the plaint became in-fructuous and nothing survived thereafter to be adjudicated upon regarding the said prayer. The learned trial Judge, without considering the scope of the said prayer, chose to enlarge its scope and grant a relief of permanent injunction and the same came to be rightly set aside by the learned lower appellate Judge by the judgment and decree dated 13.09.2013 made in the cross-appeal filed by the first respondent/first defendant. Though there are certain discrepancies, they are all procedural. In view of the limited scope of prayer (b) made in the plaint, the grant of permanent injunction beyond the date of disposal of the suit could not be sustained in law and on that score alone, the decree of the lower appellate Court setting aside the said part of the decree of the trial Court and dismissing the suit in its entirety in respect of both the prayers, does not require any interference by this Court in exercise of its power of second appeal. The procedural lapses and technicalities should not come in the way of rendering complete justice and avoiding unnecessary prolongation of litigation. On that score also, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court dated 13.09.2013 made in the Cross appeal preferred by the first respondent/first defendant do not deserve to be interfered with. The fourth substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission is also answered against the appellant. In the result, the second appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost in this second appeal. Appeal dismissed.