JUDGMENT & ORDER : By filing this petition under Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the appellant-applicants(hereinafter mentioned as applicants) prayed for condoning the delay of 466 days in preferring the connected Second Appeal(RSA) No.36 of 2015, whereunder the appellate judgment and decree dated 27.03.2014 passed by learned District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar, in Title Appeal No.22 of 2012 has been challenged. 2. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. D. Chakraborty, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. H. Laskar for the applicants and learned counsel, Mr. D.K. Biswas for the respondent-opposite parties(hereinafter mentioned as opposite parties). 3. It is very candidly submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty that there were some lapses on the part of the applicants in presenting the appeal in time but it was bona fide and not deliberate and intentional. The delay has been caused in the process of collecting the necessary documents on the basis of which the applicants contested the suit. He has also submitted that the case of the applicants has got merit and there is every possibility of succeeding the appeal if it is disposed of on merit and taking into consideration the merit of the appeal delay may be condoned, if necessary, imposing reasonable costs on the applicants as otherwise the ends of justice shall suffer. 4. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that no reason at all assigned by the applicants for the delay in filing the appeal. According to learned counsel, Mr. Biswas, the words, ‘sufficient cause’ as contained in the provision should be construed keeping in mind the doctrine of equality. Once the first appeal was decided against the applicants and in favour of the opposite parties the applicants were supposed to be diligent to take step for preferring the appeal. Liberal approach does not mean that whatever cause is assigned it has to be accepted and the delay to be condoned. It is submitted that the application for condoning the delay has been filed as a matter of routine without assigning any sort of reasons, far from satisfactory reason, and so, if the delay is condoned, it will cause miscarriage of justice. The opposite parties are not at all agreeable to favour the applicants in the matter of condonation of delay, even accepting any amount of cost. 5. The opposite parties are not at all agreeable to favour the applicants in the matter of condonation of delay, even accepting any amount of cost. 5. The word ‘limitation’ in its legal and popular sense, refers to the time within which an action may be brought, or some act done, to preserve a right. In its ordinary sense, it means restriction or circumspection. Time is the essence of life. By lapse of time, one acquires a right and at the same time, a right extinguishes due to lapse of time. One is expected to do a particular act or thing in time either fixed by law or by nature. Where the law has prescribed a time limit to take certain action within a certain specified period of time, it has to be taken, by a party desirous to take action, within such specified period, failing which the party will lose his right to take action subject to any exception prescribed by the statute. The utility of a statute of limitation has never been a matter of doubt or dispute. It has been said that the statute of limitation is a statute of repose, peace and justice. It is one of repose because it extinguishes stale demands, and quiets title. In the words of John Voet, controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time least they should become immortal while men are mortal. It secures peace as it ensures security of rights; and it secures justice, as by lapse of time evidence in support of rights may be destroyed. There can thus be no doubt that it rests on sound public policy. The operation of the law of prescription has been explained by Lord Plunket in a striking metaphor. He stated that Time holds in one hand a scythe and in the other, an hour glass. The scythe mows down the evidence of our rights, while the hour glass measures the period which renders that evidence superficial. Commenting on this, a learned author observes that the metaphor could have been completed by adding, so far as India is concerned, that a framework of the hour-glass, would certainly decay, the glass to be broken, and send escape. 6. Commenting on this, a learned author observes that the metaphor could have been completed by adding, so far as India is concerned, that a framework of the hour-glass, would certainly decay, the glass to be broken, and send escape. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, [ (1998) 7 SCC 123 ] has held— The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium(it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 7. “Sufficient cause” is an expression, which is found in various statues. It has been liberally construed in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as “adequate” or “enough”. Any justifiable reason resulting in the appeal has to be understood as “sufficient cause”. 8. The judgment and decree in Title Appeal No.22 of 2012 was passed by learned District Judge, North Tripura on 27.03.2014. The second appeal was filed on 16.10.2015. The reasons for the delay have been assigned in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the application which read thus— “2. That the judgment and decree appealed against was delivered by the learned appellate court on 27th March 2014 and the limitation for preferring appeal against the impugned appellate decree including the time required for obtaining the certified copy thereof was expired on 7th July 2014 and the memorandum of appeal has been presented today and delay in the presentation of appeal is 466 days. 3. 3. That the file was handed over to the learned counsel of the appellant-petitioner Mr. D. Chakraborty in the first week of August 2014 for preparation of memorandum of appeal. 4. That the deed of gift dated 28-11-1966 made by the father of the plaintiff-respondent-opp.-parties donating the suit property to the Sribhumi Higher Secondary(+2 stage) School is a vital document for the defence and when the file was handed over to the learned counsel of the appellant-petitioners for preparation of memorandum of appeal, copy of the said deed of gift was not available in the file because of which it was not possible for the learned counsel to prepare the memorandum of appeal without perusing the aforesaid deed of gift and long time was spent for collection of the copy of the deed of gift because of which the appeal could not be presented in time.” From the above statement it is clear that the record was handed over to the learned counsel in the first week of August, 2014. Judgment and decree was passed on 27.03.2014. Nothing stated as to when the certified copy was obtained and why there was four months delay in handing over the records to learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty for preparation of the Memo. of Appeal. The next reason assigned is that the whole case of the applicants was based on a gift deed dated 28.11.1966 and learned counsel asked the appellant-applicants to hand over a copy of the gift deed for preparation of the Memo. of Appeal and since long time was taken in supplying a copy of the gift deed the appeal could not be filed in time. So from first week of August, 2014 to the date of filing of the appeal i.e. dated 16.10.2015, the entire period was passed for the collection of a copy of the gift deed. Nothing stated as to how that long period of time i.e. more than fourteen months were spent for collection of the copy of the gift deed which was the basis of the case of the applicants. Nothing stated as to how that long period of time i.e. more than fourteen months were spent for collection of the copy of the gift deed which was the basis of the case of the applicants. Except a bald statement that the time spent in collecting the copy of the gift deed no sort of reason assigned as to who was entrusted to collect it, what was the reason for not collecting it in time, what was the reason for not informing the lawyer in time, etc., and so the delay does not appear to have been explained with any cogent reason. 9. According to learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty the words, ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal construction so as to achieve the ends of justice. It has now been settled that the words, ‘sufficient cause’ should be liberally construed so as to achieve the ends of justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. 10. Burden lies on the applicants to show that there was no negligence or inaction on their part and that they were all along diligent, serious and active in taking all required steps to prefer an appeal. Unfortunately, in the present case, there is nothing to show that the applicants acted with all seriousness and the delay caused was unavoidable even after exercise of all due diligence. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchyat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and Anr. reported in AIR 1968 SC 222 has observed :- “The discretion to condone the delay like other judicial discretions must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just. The words ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor in action nor want of bona fides is imputable to the application.” 12. In the case of Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Ors. The discretion is to know through law what is just. The words ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor in action nor want of bona fides is imputable to the application.” 12. In the case of Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Ors. reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006 , the Supreme Court has held— Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona-fides is imputable to the appellant. 13. In the case of Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao reported in AIR 2002 SC 1201 , the Apex Court has held— “The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. Whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. However courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the list terminates and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. However by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the list terminates and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter the courts should strike balance between the resultant effect of the order it was going to pass upon the parties either way” 14. In the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 : AIR 2005 SC 2191 , the Supreme Court has observed— The proof by ‘sufficient cause’ is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. The Court has further observed that what counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. The Apex Court also took cognizance of the usual bureaucratic delays which takes place in the functioning of the State and its agency/instrumentalities. 15. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh reported in 2010 AIR SCW 4848, the Supreme Court has held— Liberal construction of the expression “sufficient cause” is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. Even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of its acting vigilantly. 16. In the case of Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6510, the Supreme Court has observed— Sufficient cause is the cause for which party could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. 17. Culling out the binding precedence, the Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Anr. reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6158 has laid down the following principles for the approach and to be adopted by the Courts while dealing with application for condonation of delay— (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: - (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the Courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 18. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai reported in AIR 2012 SC 1629 the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment observed: “18. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression ‘sufficient cause’ would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” In paragraph 21 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has considered why the High Court committed mistake in condoning the delay. So I would like to refer para 21 and para 22 of the said judgment which read thus— “21. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points: (a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed. (b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed. (c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed. (d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial Court were not filed till 23.8.2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.5.2003 about the judgments of the trial Court. (e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against. 22. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 19. In my considered opinion, the legal position so far stands is that the words, ‘sufficient cause’ should not be construed so as to defeat the ends of justice. It should be liberally construed so as to achieve the ends of justice. The Court while considering the sufficient cause should not take into account the technicalities but should look for certain bona fide and reasonable explanation for the delay in presenting the appeal. It should be liberally construed so as to achieve the ends of justice. The Court while considering the sufficient cause should not take into account the technicalities but should look for certain bona fide and reasonable explanation for the delay in presenting the appeal. It has to be kept in mind that once limitation has expired, a right accrued in favour of the other party and while discarding that right already accrued in favour of the other party the Court should look for a reasonable explanation so as to render justice with a sense of equality. In the present case, there is no explanation assigned for the delay and simply a bald statement has been made that delay was caused in collecting the copy of gift deed which was the basis of the case of the applicants. Such an explanation is not at all acceptable to judicial conscience. 20. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has also submitted that the State instrumentality functions in a different manner than that of an individual and that should be considered by the Court while deciding the issue of “sufficient cause”. No doubt, the State functions through its instrumentalities and sometime the bureaucrats either intentionally or otherwise do not act with all promptitudes. Law has now well settled that unless the reason for the delay is clearly brought on record, for the lapses of bureaucrats there cannot be a differential treatment meted to the State litigant. I would like to refer here the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag v. Mst. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 and in para 3 of the judgment the supreme Court has observed thus— “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 21. In the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 the Supreme Court has observed— Section 5 of the limitation Act gives power to the court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The Supreme Court generally adopts a liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State respondents collective cause of the community. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State respondents collective cause of the community. Decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. 22. Keeping in mind the above observation of the Apex Court, I have considered the case of the applicants herein. I find no scope at all to satisfy myself with minimum requirement of the explanation that the applicants were prevented with ‘sufficient cause’ in not filing the appeal in time. 23. It is a settled law that number of days is immaterial. What is material is the reason behind the dely. If “sufficient cause” is assigned to the satisfaction of the Court to apply its discretion, delay of any number of days may be condoned where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation. There is also no legal requirement for explaining the delay on day to day basis. If “sufficient cause” is assigned to the satisfaction of the Court to apply its discretion, delay of any number of days may be condoned where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation. There is also no legal requirement for explaining the delay on day to day basis. If reason for the delay is explained with a strong foundation behind it, condonation may be allowed for any amount of delay. It is only necessary to explain it to the satisfaction of the Court with bona fide reasons. 24. In view of the discussions made above, I am of considered opinion that the applicants have failed to make out a case that they were prevented with sufficient cause in preferring the appeal in time and hence the application seeking condonation of delay stands rejected.