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2016 DIGILAW 1713 (HP)

Manoj Kumar v. Mathra Dass

2016-08-17

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14.8.2007, passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2007, whereby the judgment and decree dated 13.11.2006, passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No. 2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 263/1 of 2005/1997 was ordered to be modified. 2. The brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal are that the plaintiff Mathra Dass filed a suit for declaration that he and defendant No. 1 Bhag Singh were joint owners in possession over the land measuring 64.1 Bighas, comprised in Khasra Nos. 103, 104, 333, 711, 713, 922/813, 925/814, 830, 832, 834, 835, 837, 838/1, 839, 840, 841, Kita 16, Khata/Khatauni No. 71/86 situated in village Ghandalwin, Pargana Ajmerpur, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (herein after referred to as the suit land) and they were having ½ share each in it by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977 executed by their father Sh. Rama Ram in their favour, which was registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Ghumarwin on 24.11.1977 vide No. 294, with further declaration that mutation No. 1041 dated 18.9.1996 attested in favour of the plaintiff and defendants was wrong and illegal as the same was attested on the basis of false and forged documents. A decree for permanent injunction was also sought for restraining the defendants from interfering over the suit land by cutting the trees, changing the nature or making any alienation qua any part of the suit land on the basis of wrong entries in any manner. In the alternative, a decree for possession was also prayed in case the plaintiff was disposed from the suit land forcibly by the defendants during the pendency of the suit. 3. It was averred in the plaint that father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 late Sh. Rama Ram was owner in possession over the suit land and on 23.11.1977, he executed a will in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, which was registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Ghumarwin on 24.11.1977. 3. It was averred in the plaint that father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 late Sh. Rama Ram was owner in possession over the suit land and on 23.11.1977, he executed a will in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, which was registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Ghumarwin on 24.11.1977. It was further averred that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were having ½ shares each in the suit land by virtue of will dated 23.11.1977 and Smt. Duri Devi widow of late Shri Rama Ram, was having only life interest on the basis of said will. It was further averred that defendant No. 1 on 16.1.1997 threatened that he had got the mutation No. 1041, dated 18.9.1996 attested in his favour of Khasra No. 787, measuring 1-16 bighas and qua rest of the land, the mutation was attested in favour of the plaintiff, defendants No. 2 to 4 on the basis of forged and false documents of late Smt. Duri Devi, as such, the said mutation being wrong, illegal, null and void deserves to be set aside. 4. The suit was contested by defendants No. 1 to 3 by filing a joint written statement in which they raised preliminary objections qua maintainability, estoppel, res-judicata, cause of action and locus standi etc. On merits, it was averred that late Shri Rama Ram executed his last and valid Will on 23.11.1977 in favour of plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and Smt. Duri Devi his widow and as per the recital in the will, plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and Smt. Duri Devi were having 1/3rd shares each over the suit land. It was further averred that Smt. Duri Devi further executed her last and valid Will in favour of defendants No. 2 to 4 in equal shares and as far as land comprised in Khasra No. 787 was concerned. Smt. Duri Devi had executed a Will in favour of defendant No. 1 on 5.9.1995. it was denied that plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were having ½ share each in the suit land by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977. It was averred that Duri Devi was not having any life interest, whereas, she was having 1/3rd share as per the last Will. As such, Duri Devi was not a limited owner but was absolute owner over her 1/3rd share. It was averred that Duri Devi was not having any life interest, whereas, she was having 1/3rd share as per the last Will. As such, Duri Devi was not a limited owner but was absolute owner over her 1/3rd share. It was denied that the Will dated 5.6.1995 was a forged and false document. Since Duri Devi was absolute owner of her share in the suit property, as such, mutation No. 1041 was valid and binding as per Will validly executed by Smt. Duri Devi. Lastly, it was asserted that no cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint. 5. In replication, the allegations made in the written statement were denied and corresponding averments made in the plaint were reiterated. It was averred in the replication that Smt. Duri Devi was not entitled to execute any Will in favour of defendant No. 1 and defendants No. 2 to 4 as after her death, the said land was to be inherited by the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in equal share. It was further averred that since, Duri Devi was having only limited interest in the suit land, as such, Will executed by her on 5.6.1995 in favour of defendant No. 1 and defendants No. 2 to 4 was wrong, illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff qua the suit land. 6. On 10.8.2002 and 20.6.2005, learned trial Court framed the following issues/additional issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration as claimed by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977? OPP 2. Whether mutation No. 1041, dated 18.9.1996 is wrong, illegal and null and void as alleged? OPP 3. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction? OPP 4. Whether suit is not maintainable by virtue of pendency of appeal in the Court of Ld. District Judge Bilaspur? OPD 5. Whether the suit has not been valued properly? OPD 5A. Whether Smt. Duri Devi widow of Rama Ram had executed her last ‘Will’ dated 5.6.1995 in favour of the defendant No. 1 of her land measuring 1-16 Bighas comprised in Khasra No. 787 and of the rest of her land also executed the same ‘Will’ in favour of the defendants No. 2 to 4, if so, its effect? OPD 5B. Whether the suit is barred by principle of resjudicata by virtue of Judgment and decree passed by Ld. OPD 5B. Whether the suit is barred by principle of resjudicata by virtue of Judgment and decree passed by Ld. Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur, Camp at Ghumarwin on the same subject matter between the parties, If so, its effect? OPD 6. Relief.” 7. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence and evaluating the same dismissed the suit. However, the appeal preferred against the same was allowed and consequently the suit of the plaintiff/respondent was ordered to be decreed. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court, the defendant has filed the instant appeal, which came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “3. Whether the property held by a Hindu female in lieu of her preexisting right of maintenance is to be held by her as a absolute owner in view of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act? 4. Whether the findings arrived at by Ld. First Appellate Court that mutation No. 1041, dated 18.09.1996 is null and void, is sustainable in the eyes of law being not based on any oral and documentary evidence to that effect? 5. Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the findings of Ld. Trial Court on Issue No. 5-A by disregarding oral and documentary evidence in that behalf? 6. Whether the finding returned by the Ld. First Appellate Court that Will dated 5.6.1995 is false and forged, is sustainable in the eyes of law in view of the fact that the same has been proved in accordance with law by the defendants before Ld. Trial Court?” Question No. 3 8. It is the pleaded case of the defendant that Smt. Duri Devi had succeeded to 1/3rd share of the property of her deceased husband by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977 and was, therefore, an absolute owner of the property that fell to her share. Whereas, the case of the plaintiff/respondent is that by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977, Smt. Duri Devi was entitled to her 1/3rd share qua the suit land only as a limited owner and after her death the same was to revert back to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in equal shares. 9. Whereas, the case of the plaintiff/respondent is that by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977, Smt. Duri Devi was entitled to her 1/3rd share qua the suit land only as a limited owner and after her death the same was to revert back to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in equal shares. 9. It was not in dispute that deceased Rama Ram had executed a will of his entire property vide Will dated 23.11.1977, thereby bequeathing 1/3rd share each to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and late Smt. Duri Devi. It is also not in dispute that in terms of the Will, Smt. Duri Devi was conferred right over the land of Sh. Rama Ram till her life and was to get her share cultivated from her two sons. It was further stipulated that she would have no right to sell the land. 10. Now in light of the admitted facts, the moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether Smt. Duri Devi had only a life interest in the property or the same had blossomed into a complete ownership in terms of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (herein after referred to as the “Act” for short). 11. Section 14 of the Act reads thus:- “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property:— (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” 12. Though there is plethora of law on the subject, however, at this stage, I need only refer to a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Vs. Pentapati Rama Krishna and others, (2016) 2 SCC 56 , wherein after discussing the entire law on the subject it has been held that property given to Hindu woman in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance, even if by Will creating only life interest, the same would get transformed into an absolute right by operation of Section 14(1). This is because under the Hindu law, the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed properties, then his wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such properties. This claim of the Hindu woman is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations, which read thus:- “12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant, confined his argument to the question of law as to whether the High Court erred in law in holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in the properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:- 12.1 Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each and every Will granting a limited/life interest in a property to a widow is deemed/assumed to be in lieu of her maintenance. If the testator in his Will specifically provides that he is granting only life interest in the property to his widow, his right to limit his widows right in the property is recognized by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, the testators right to dispose off his property by will or other testamentary disposition is recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, the testators right to dispose off his property by will or other testamentary disposition is recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the same Act otiose. 12.2 In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. (1972) 4 SCC 86 , a 3 Judge Bench of this Court held to the effect that a widow who succeeded to the property of her deceased husband on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights in the property other than those conferred by the will.. The life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. 12.3 In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 SCC 99 , this Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment in Tulsamma case. 12.4 V. Tulsammas case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it may not be applicable to cases of testamentary succession. However, in terms of law declared therein, a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in a property to the widow on the ground that the widow has a pre-existing right of maintenance. 12.5 This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75 , where it was held at paras 13 and 14 that the right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be rendered otiose by a wide interpretation of Section 14(1) and that these two provisions have to be balanced. 12.6 The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors. 12.6 The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therein that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or under the statutory law. 12.7 Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal. 12.8 The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singhs case and followed subsequently, therefore, appears to be that the question as to whether Section 14(1) applies to a Will granting life interest to a widow hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of maintenance. This leads to the second arguments. 13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the fact that the life interest in property granted to the widow by way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to be specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court based on examination of evidence and material on record. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of the decision in G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao, (2008) 12 SCC 392 , learned counsel submitted that issues are required to be framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of maintenance. 14. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. 15. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. 15. The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate, Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. 16. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944 , three Judges Bench of this Court has elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 20) “20. Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance: "(1) that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow; (2) though the widows right to maintenance is not a right, to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widows right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a preexisting right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance. 17. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, their Lordships observed: (V. Tulasamma case, SCC pp. 120- 21, para 30) “30. 17. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, their Lordships observed: (V. Tulasamma case, SCC pp. 120- 21, para 30) “30. In the light of the above decisions of this Court the following principles appear to be clear: (1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Act which is to enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which was in consonance with the changing temper of the times; (2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held by this Court in Badri Pershad case. (3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and farreaching changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and female in matters of intestate succession; (4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision. 18. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the law and different authorities came to the following conclusions: (V. Tulsamma case, SCC pp. 135-36, para 61) “61. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus: "(1) The Hindu females right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the females limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or arrears of maintenance, etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2). (6) The words possessed by used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words restricted estate used in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee. 19. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru, (1972) 4 SCC 86 . In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that case will not apply in the facts of the present case. In Mst. Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of the property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his entire estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and thereafter, the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The properties were mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960. The properties were mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960. On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the basis of Will, but the appellant claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali under her Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on the strength of Will cannot claim any right in those properties over and above that was given to her under the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 20. The facts in Karmis case and that of the present case are fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920 in which Subba Rao has mentioned that his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He, then, married to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of the properties owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the widow Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water from the well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for his third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule property till her life. The intention of the executant is therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to his third wife Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executant directed that his entire estate will devolve upon his widow Veeraraghavamma. 21. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493 , while interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act observed: (AIR pp. 1499-1500, para 16) “16. 21. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493 , while interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act observed: (AIR pp. 1499-1500, para 16) “16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression property the widest connotation. The expression includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognised as owner, but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu other right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu other right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in severalty of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual or civil. It cannot be assumed having regard to this development that in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in Pratapmull case. Section 4 of the Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act. 22. Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628 . In that case, by a registered document of partition, the related right was given to the widow - the user of the land with the condition that she will have no right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the case falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under: (SCC p. 631, para 6) “6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest in the properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share is merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is not possible to conclude that the properties in question were given to her subject to the condition of her enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the trial court as well as the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of the case do not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore the trial court as well as the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of the case do not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently Subhrai Bai must be held to have had an absolute right in the suit properties, in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 23. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312 , life estate was granted to a Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of preexisting right. Following the ratio decided in Tulasammas case, their Lordships held that the decision in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held: (Thota Sesharathamma, SCC p. 321, paras 9-10) “9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14(1) and comes into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ. 10. The case of Mst Karmi v. Amru on which a reliance has now been placed by learned counsel for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a bench of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It may be noted that two Honble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover were common to both the cases. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru, one Jaimal died in 1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. Appellant in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were collaterals of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed a will dated December 18, 1935 and by a subsequent will dated November 13, 1937 revoked the first will. By the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Amru collaterals. On the death of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutated in the name of Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst Karmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated April 25, 1958 executed by Nihali in her favour. On the death of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutated in the name of Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst Karmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated April 25, 1958 executed by Nihali in her favour. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim title to the properties on the basis of the will executed by the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision in Mst Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act. 24. Reference may also be made to the decision of three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390 , where a Hindu wife was bequeathed life interest for maintenance by Will with the condition that she would not have power to alienate the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. On this fact their Lordships following the ratio decided in Tulasammas case (supra) held that by virtue of Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property. 25. Mr. K. Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case of Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 465 , Subhan Rao and Others vs. Parvathi Bai and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68 . 26. In Santoshs case, (2008) 1 SCC 465 this Court followed the decision given in Nazar Singhs case, (1996) 1 SCC 35 and held that the pre-existing right of wife was crystallized and her limited interest became an absolute interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. 27. 26. In Santoshs case, (2008) 1 SCC 465 this Court followed the decision given in Nazar Singhs case, (1996) 1 SCC 35 and held that the pre-existing right of wife was crystallized and her limited interest became an absolute interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. 27. A similar question arose for consideration before this Court in Subhan Rao case, where a portion of suit property was given to the plaintiff-wife for her maintenance subject to restriction that she will not alienate the land which was given to her maintenance. The question arose as to whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the owner of the suit property. Considering all the earlier decisions of this Court, their Lordships held that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the preexisting right in lieu of her right to maintenance transformed into absolute estate. 28. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 35 , this Court following the decision in Tulasammas case held as under: (Nazar Singh case, SCC pp. 38-39, para 9) “9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the most important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. The principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her.] According to sub-section (1), where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the said property was possessed by her. Where, however, the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the words in sub-section (1), which insofar as is relevant read: Any property possessed by a female Hindu after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner. In other words, though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression possessed is concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by several decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of this case.” (Emphasis in original) 29. In Sadhu Singhs case, (2006) 8 SCC 75 , the facts of the case were quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu Singhs case, (2006) 8 SCC 75 , the facts of the case were quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu Singhs case, this Court proceeded on the basis that the widow had no preexisting right in the property, and therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will cannot get enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act. 30. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellants last contention was that in the absence of any pleading and proof from the side of the appellant to substantiate the plea that Veeraraghavamma was occupying the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit A-2 is a document which very categorically provided that the property in question was given to Veeraraghavamma to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the genuineness of the said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that Veeraraghavamma was enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our considered opinion, unless the factum of bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and her continuous possession are disputed, the question of pleading and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the arrangement made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of maintenance. Hence, the ratio decided in G. Ramas case (supra) does not apply. 31. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the original owner of the property, realized the fact that his wife Veeraraghavamma was issueless and she has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his property. He further realized that physically he was weak and may not survive for long period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family members. For the maintenance of his third wife Veeraraghavamma, he gave the tiled house with site and compound wall with the stipulation that she shall enjoy the property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities. Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. She will also be entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities. Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. In view of the admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right to the suit property. 32. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has elaborately discussed the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto and came to the conclusion that the trial court committed serious error of law in holding that by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not become absolute. 33. Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance life interest has been created in favour of Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever form a limited interest is created in her favour who was having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same has become an absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 34. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and the judicial pronouncements of this Court in a series of decisions, we hold that the impugned judgment of the High Court is perfectly in accordance with law and needs no interference by this Court.” 13. In addition to the aforesaid judgment I may refer to a Hon’ble three Judges Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol of Shri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Trirukoil and others, (1996) 8 SCC 525 , wherein it was held that the Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and Hindu Succession Act etc. have been brought on statute removing the impediments which stood in the way under the Sastric law. It was further held that explanation I to Section 14(1) gives wide amplitude to the acquisition of property in the widest terms. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The only condition precedent is whether Hindu female had a pre-existing right under the personal law or any other law to hold the property or the right to property. Any instrument, document, device etc. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The only condition precedent is whether Hindu female had a pre-existing right under the personal law or any other law to hold the property or the right to property. Any instrument, document, device etc. under which Hindu female came to possess the property—moveable or immoveable—in recognition of her pre-existing right, though such instrument, document or device is worded with a restrictive estate, which received the colour of preexisting restrictive estate possession by a Hindu female, the operation of sub section (1) of Section 14 read with Explanation I, remove the fetters and the limited right blossoms into an absolute right. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations, which read thus:- “26. It is true that Section 30 of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the execution of the wills need to be given full effect and the right to disposition of a Hindu male derives full measure thereunder. But the right to equality removing handicaps and discrimination against a Hindu female by reason of operation of existing law should be in conformity with the right to equality enshrined in the Constitution and the personal law also needs to be in conformity with the Constitutional goal. Harmonious interpretation, therefore, is required to be adopted in giving effect to the relevant provisions consistent with the constitutional animation to remove gender-based discrimination in matters of marriage, succession etc. Cognizant to these constitutional goals, Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, Hindu Succession Act etc. have been brought on statute removing the impediments which stood in the way under the Sastric law. Explanation I to Section 14 (1) gives wide amplitude to the acquisition of property in the widest terms. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The only condition precedent is whether Hindu female has a pre-existing right under the personal law or any other law to hold the property or the right to property. Any instrument, document, device etc. under which Hindu female came to possess the property-movable or immovable - in recognition of her pre-existing right, though such instrument, document or device is worded with a restrictive estate, which received the colour of preexisting restrictive estate possession by a Hindu female, the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 read with Explanation I, remove the fetters and the limited right blossoms into an absolute right. 27. 27. As held by this Court, if the acquisition of the property attracts sub-section (1) of Section 14, sub-section (2) does not come into play. If the acquisition is for the first times, without any vestige of pre-existing right under the instrument, document or device etc. then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-section (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be understood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act had come into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female acquired or possessed the property in recognition of her pre-existing right or she gets the rights for the first time under the instrument without any vestige of pre- existing right. If the answer is in the positive, sub- section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus construed, both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given their full play without rendering either as otios or aids as means of avoidance.” 14. It would be noticed that the learned Lower Appellate Court relied upon certain decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered by two Hon’ble Judges to come to the conclusion that any acquisition of possession of the property by a female after coming into force the Hindu Succession Act would not normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act, as the invocation or applicability of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act would depend upon the nature of rights acquired by her. In case, she takes the right as an heir under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, she takes it absolutely. In case, she takes the right as an heir under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, she takes it absolutely. However, if she acquires any rights in the estate of the deceased husband under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction placed on her right will bring into operation or invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, whereby the acquisition made under a Will has been statutorily engrafted as an exception to the operation of the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 15. It is more than settled that on the principle of comity and discipline, the decision of larger Benches is binding on the smaller Benches and therefore, it is the law laid down by the larger Benches, which would prevail and is required to be religiously followed. 16. The conclusion drawn by the learned lower Appellate Court are clearly not in tune with the enunciation of law, as noted in the various judgments cited above. Above all, the conclusion drawn is in total variance with the ratio of law laid down by Hon’ble three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493 , Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628 , Tulsamma Vs. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 SCC 99 , C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol of Shri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Trirukoil and others, (1996) 8 SCC 525 and Shakuntla Devi Vs. Kamla, (2005) 5 SCC 390 . Therefore, I have no difficulty in concluding that the property held by a Hindu female in lieu of pre-existing right of maintenance, after coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, would blossom into complete ownership and therefore, she can deal with the same in any manner, she likes in accordance with law. No hurdle or fetters can be placed on such ownership. The question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the appellant. Question No. 4. 17. It is more than settled that mutation entries do not confer title and reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swarni (Smt) Vs. Inder Kaur (Smt) and others, (1996) 6 SCC 223 , wherein it has been held:- “7. Question No. 4. 17. It is more than settled that mutation entries do not confer title and reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swarni (Smt) Vs. Inder Kaur (Smt) and others, (1996) 6 SCC 223 , wherein it has been held:- “7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having scrutinised the judgment of the trial Judge as well as that of the lower appellate court, we find sufficient force in all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. At the outset, it may be noticed that the plaintiff had filed the suit claiming half interest for herself and claiming half interest in favour of the husband and sons of Roori and, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error to hold that the plaintiff could not have filed the suit in question. In view of rival stand of the parties the main question that arose for consideration was whether Roori was daughter of Gurbax Singh or Inder Kaur, defendant No. 5 was the daughter of same Gurbax Singh? The learned trial Judge after elaborate discussion of the evidence on record both oral and documentary came to the positive conclusion that it was Roori who was the daughter of Gurbax Singh as alleged by the plaintiff and not Inder Kaur. The lower appellate Court without focusing his attention to the weighty reasons advanced by the trial court and without examining the materials on record in that respect even did not set aside the said finding of the trial Judge and yet reversed the decree of the trial Judge. We have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the said judgment of the Additional District Judge is wholly unsustainable in law. The crucial point being as to who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh, namely Roori or Inder Kaur, and the trial Judge having come to the positive conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh, the lower appellate Court was not justified in not considering the material evidence as well as reasons advanced by the trial Judge and merely coming to the conclusion that the evidence on the file do not prove Roori to be the daughter of Gurbax Singh. Further, the lower appellate Court has not come to any positive finding that Inder Kaur was the daughter of Gurbax Singh. He has been swayed away by the so called mutation in the revenue record in favour of Inder Kaur. Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment. That apart, as it would be seen, the learned trial Judge had considered the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the parties to establish the respective stand as to who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh and on perusal of the same came to the conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh. The Additional District Judge has not even discussed anything about the said oral evidence and the reasonings advanced by learned trial Judge in coming to the conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh Non consideration of the oral evidence adduced by the parties, by the lower appellate Court vitiates the ultimate conclusion on the question whether Roori was daughter of Gurbax Singh or not. It is further seen that Gurdip Kaur, widow of Gurbax Singh had executed a Will in respect of the entire estate in favour of plaintiff and Roori and after death of Gurdip Kaur a succession certificate had been issued by the civil court under the Indian Succession Act in favour of plaintiff and said Roori. The said succession certificate and rights flowing therefrom cannot be ignored. Admittedly no attempt has been made by defendants 1 to 4 to annul the succession certificate on the grounds available under the Succession Act. The Additional District Judge committed serious error of law in not considering the said Will and the succession certificate in question which unequivocally clinches the matter and thereby the ultimate judgment of the Additional District Judge is vitiated. The Additional District Judge committed serious error of law in not considering the said Will and the succession certificate in question which unequivocally clinches the matter and thereby the ultimate judgment of the Additional District Judge is vitiated. The High Court also was in error in not examining these questions and dismissing the Second Appeal in limine.” Even otherwise, this question has become academic in view of my findings on question No. 3 (supra), whereby I have held Smt. Duri Devi to be the complete and absolute owner of the property that came to her share by virtue of Will dated 23.11.1977. Questions Nos. 5 & 6 18. Both these questions in fact do not arise for consideration, as the learned lower Appellate Court discarded the Will dated 5.6.1995 only on the ground that Smt. Duri Devi had only a life interest in the property and she, therefore, in absence of having conferred complete ownership of the property, cannot have right to further transfer the property whether by Will, gift, sale etc., but nowhere was the Will ever discarded or held to be false or forged. Rather no findings whatsoever were returned on the validity of the Will. These questions are accordingly answered. 19. In view of my aforesaid findings, more particularly on Question No. 3 (supra), I find merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court is set aside and the judgment and decree rendered by learned trial Court is upheld and affirmed, leaving the parties to bear their costs.