ORDER : P.K. Lohra, J. Challenge to impugned order dated 16th of August, 2016 passed by Special Metropolitan Magistrate (N.I. Act Cases), No.5, Jodhpur Metropolitan (for short, 'learned trial Court') at the behest of accused-petitioner is laid by invoking inherent powers of this Court. 2. The factual matrix giving rise to this petition are that respondent-complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (for short, 'Act), inter-alia, on the ground that a cheque bearing No. 033850 dated 21st of December 2011 for a sum of Rs.1,25,000, given by petitioner to respondent-complainant is dishonored by the Bank with a memo showing insufficiency of funds in the Bank account of the petitioner. Later on, the respondent-complainant served a notice on the petitioner within the stipulated period. The complaint is filed 61 days beyond the period of limitation. For seeking condonation of delay, the respondent-complainant submitted an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned trial Court upon consideration of the application for condonation of delay, while resorting to Section 142 of the Act, by the order impugned, condoned the delay and took cognizance against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prem Dayal Bohra, submits that respondent-complainant has not shown any sufficient cause for condonation of delay yet the learned trial Court has condoned the delay and taken cognizance against the petitioner which is a clear case of abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel would contend that although discretion is conferred on a Court to condone delay in laying complaint but the said discretion is required to be exercised judiciously and sans sufficient cause for delay, delay is not liable to be condoned. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that order impugned is clearly vitiated in law. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submits that learned trial Court has exercised its discretion while taking into account the reasons incorporated in the application for condonation of delay by the respondent-complainant and therefore the said order is not liable to be tinkered with. Learned counsel further submits that the discretion exercised by learned trial Court for condonation of delay cannot be made subject matter of judicial review in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned order. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the discretion exercised by learned trial Court for condonation of delay cannot be made subject matter of judicial review in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned order. 6. Chapter XVI of the Act deals with penalties in case of dishonor of certain cheques for insufficiency of funds in the accounts. Section 142 of the Act postulates cognizance of offences. As per clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act, complaint can be made by an individual under Section 138 of the Act within 45 days from the date of accrual of cause of action under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. However, proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act envisage condonation of delay after expiry of the aforesaid period under certain circumstances. 7. The Legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the Magistrate to condone delay after recording its satisfaction about sufficient cause for not making a complaint within the prescribed period of limitation. In the instant case, the learned trial Court upon consideration of prayer for condonation of delay, has recorded its satisfaction about sufficient cause and therefore I am not inclined to upset the said discretionary order of learned trial Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 8. It is trite that language employed under proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act is pari materia to Section 5 of the Limitation Act and there are umpteen number of judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court that words "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Limitation Act are to be construed liberally with pragmatic approach. Therefore, if the trial Court has liberally construed sufficient cause in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, I feel dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order as the same has not resulted in miscarriage of justice. 9. Resultantly, petition fails and same is hereby dismissed summarily.