JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned consent judgment and decree dated 17.04.2015 passed by learned 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad in Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, by which, on the consent terms produced by the respondents herein original plaintiff and the original defendants, the learned trial Court has passed the consent decree in terms of the consent terms, the applicant herein (third parties) has preferred present application for leave to appeal permitting him to prefer First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. The facts leading to filing of the present application in nutshell are as under:- "2.1. It is the case on behalf of the applicant that originally land bearing block No. 84, Mouje Hanspura, Tal: Dakroi, Dist. Ahmedabad admeasuring 25698 sq. mtr. was owned and occupied by one Laxmanji Badaji Thkaor-respondent No. 2-original defendant No. 2, Shardaben Badaji Thakor and Khodaji Fataji Thakor. That the original owners Laxmanji Badaji Thkaor, Shardaben Badaji Thakor and Khodaji Fataji Thakor executed agreement to sell in favour of the applicant on 04.02.2008. According to the applicant, the possession of the land in question was also handed over to him on 04.02.2008. According to the applicant, Rs. 16,70,000/- was paid to the original owners. It is the case of the applicant that thereafter after getting search report and the agreement to sell dated 02.02.2012 from the office of the Sub-Registrar, he came to know that respondent No. 2 herein - original defendant No. 1 had executed one agreement to sell in favour of one Ashwin Navnitbhai Chovatia and Jayantikumar Valjibhai Desai after taking an amount of Rs. 10 lakhs. According to the applicant, agreement to sell executed in favour of the applicant was much prior to execution of the said agreement to sell dated 02.02.2012 and the said agreement was executed only with a view to dupe the applicant, the applicant preferred Special Civil Suit No. 178 of 2012 on 12.03.2012 seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell dated 2.2.2012, the specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 04.02.2008 executed by the respondent No. 2 in favour of the applicant, declaration and permanent injunction. That the said suit came to be filed on 12.03.2012. That the learned trial Court issued urgent notice on 13.03.2012, making it returnable on 2.04.2012. That the said suit came to be filed on 12.03.2012. That the learned trial Court issued urgent notice on 13.03.2012, making it returnable on 2.04.2012. According to the applicant, he also got registered the lis pendens of the Special Civil Suit No. 178 of 2012 before the Sub Registrar on 26.03.2012. It is the case on behalf of the applicant that despite the above and despite the pendency of the Special Suit No. 178 of 2012, the respondent No. 2 herein alleged to have executed one another agreement to sell in favour of respondent No. 1 on 13.02.2014 and the same was registered with the office of the Sub Registrar. That on the basis of the said agreement to sell dated 13.02.2014 respondent No. 1 (original plaintiff) filed Special Civil Suit No. 685 of 2014 against respondent No. 2 on 29.09.2014 for specific performance of the said agreement to sell dated 13.02.2014. That respondent No. 2 herein appeared in the said suit and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original plaintiff and original defendant submitted the consent pursis at Exh.14 whereby they have settled the Special Civil Suit No. 685 of 2014. That on the basis of said consent terms by impugned consent judgment and decree, the learned trial Court drawn the decree in terms of the consent terms. 2.2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned consent judgment and decree dated 17.04.2015 passed by learned 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad in Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, the applicant herein has preferred present application for leave to appeal along with the First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2.3. Having apprehending that the said consent decree impugned in the accompanying First Appeal shall affect their rights in the pending Civil Suit No. 178 of 2012 and in that suit considering the subsequent development, more particularly, consent decree passed in the present Special Civil Suit No. 685 of 2014 thereafter Court may not grant decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell in favour of applicant and therefore, the applicant has preferred present application for leave to appeal permitting him to prefer appeal against the impugned consent judgment and decree. 2.4. 2.4. In response to the notice issued by this Court Shri S.P. Majmudar, learned Advocate has appeared for respondent No. 1 and Shri Sanjay Prajapati, learned Advocate has appeared for respondent No. 2 and 4." 3. Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 herein, original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, has raised a preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of the accompanying First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC against the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that in view of the bar under sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, the First Appeal against the impugned consent judgment and decree would not be maintainable. 3.1. Now so far as apprehension on behalf of the applicant herein that the impugned consent decree shall affect the rights of the applicant in Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 and in view of the consent decree and the subsequent sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein-original plaintiff in that suit the court may not pass order for specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the applicant is concerned, Shri Majmudar, learned advocate, has vehemently submitted that the aforesaid apprehension is not well-founded. He has submitted that as such by the impugned consent decree it cannot be said that any of the rights of the applicant is in any manner can be said to have been affected. Relying upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Deep Chand & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 75 , (more particularly Paragraph No. 40-45 thereof) still the Court in the suit instituted by the applicants can, despite the subsequent sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, pass a decree for specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the applicant in the suit instituted by them, provided a case is made out for passing a decree of specific performance under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He has also relied upon the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. He has also relied upon the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223 , more particularly Paragraph No. 56 thereof and has pointed out that as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 56 of the said decision relying upon the decision of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra) and taking note of Paragraph No. 42 of the said decision, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in such a case the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff buyer and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. It is submitted that therefore the apprehension on the part of the applicant that because of the impugned consent decree, which has been passed between the parties to Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 and the consequential sale deed executed in favour of respondent No. 1, either shall bind to the applicant and/or the same shall affect the rights of the applicant in the pending suit, is not well-founded and has no substance. However, has submitted that against the impugned consent judgment and decree in view of the bar in sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, the accompanying First Appeal shall not be maintainable. 4. Shri D.K. Puj, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant herein, has submitted that if proper and suitable observations are made in light of the submissions made by Shri Majmudar, learned counsel, in that case the applicant shall be satisfied. However, he has requested to make suitable observations that it will be open for the applicant herein to amend the suit instituted by the applicant for appropriate reliefs in view of the subsequent development and passing of the impugned consent decree and the subsequent execution of the sale deed by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1-original plaintiff Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 and it will be open for the applicant to submit an appropriate application for interim injunction in view of the subsequent development. To the aforesaid, Shri Majmudar, learned counsel, has requested to make suitable observations that as and when such applications are made the same be considered in accordance with law and on merits and all the contentions/defence, which may be available to the respective parties are kept open, including the contention on behalf of the defendants in the suit instituted by the applicant being Special Civil Suit No. 178/2012 that the applicant is not entitled to the decree for specific relief to the agreement to sell in his favour and the same may be directed to be considered by the learned trial Court in accordance with law and on merits. 5. Heard learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. 6. At the outset it is not in dispute that the present application has been preferred by the applicant herein-third party to Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 for leave to appeal against the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by learned 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), by which, on submitting the consent terms by the respondents herein, parties to the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, learned Judge has passed the consent decree in favour of respondent No. 1 herein and in favour of the original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, by which, on submitting the consent terms the learned Judge has passed the consent decree of specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of respondent No. 1 herein, original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014. It is an admitted position that as such the applicant is not party to the said consent terms and/or even Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014. Therefore, as such, when the applicant is not the party to Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 and is not the party to the consent terms between the parties of Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, it goes without saying that the same shall not bind the applicant and any consent terms shall bind only to the parties to the civil suit and the parties to the consent terms only. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicant that by the impugned consent judgment and decree any of the rights of the applicant shall be affected and/or the said consent decree shall bind the applicant is not well-founded. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicant that by the impugned consent judgment and decree any of the rights of the applicant shall be affected and/or the said consent decree shall bind the applicant is not well-founded. At this stage, it is required to be noted that even the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein-parties to Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 have conceded that as the applicant herein is not the party to the consent terms and to Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, the impugned consent judgment and decree shall not bind the applicant. 7. Now so far as apprehension on the part of the applicant that in view of the consent decree obtained in Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014 and in view of the subsequent execution of sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein-original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 685/2014, which has been executed pursuant to the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court the same shall affect the rights of the applicant in their suit being Special Civil Suit No. 178/2012 and in the said suit subsequently the Court may refuse to pass decree of specific performance of their agreement to sell under Section20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the apprehension has also no substance and the same is not well-founded. 8. Identical question came to be considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra), more particularly in Paragraph No. 42 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held that in such a suit proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff buyer and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. The subsequent transferee does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. After considering the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra) in the recent decision also in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. The subsequent transferee does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. After considering the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra) in the recent decision also in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that in such a situation the subsequent purchaser has a right to get back the money from the original vendor/original owner, and the original vendor/original owner cannot refuse to return the amount to the subsequent transferee. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicant recorded herein are not well-founded. 9. Now the question paused for the consideration of this Court is:- "Whether in light of the aforesaid observations and considering the provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, the appeal at the instance of the applicants under Section 96 of the CPC against the impugned consent judgment and decree would be maintainable or not?" 10. As such the aforesaid question has now become academic in view of the statement made by Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent. 11. Even otherwise considering the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, against the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur in Special Civil Suit No. 658/2014, to which the applicant is not the party, either to the suit and/or even to the consent terms and as the same shall not bind them and the same shall not affect the rights in the pending suit, the appeal preferred by the applicant herein under Section 96 of the CPC, shall not be maintainable and, therefore, the present application for leave to appeal deserves to be dismissed with the above observations. However, it will be open for the applicant to submit an appropriate application for amendment, amending the plaint and/or for appropriate interim injunction, in the pending suit instituted by the applicant and as and when such amendment application and/or injunction application are preferred, the same shall be considered in accordance with law and on merits, for which we have not expressed anything on merits of the pending suit instituted by the applicant in favour of the either party and all the contentions and defence, which would be available to the parties, are open which may be considered by the learned trial Court in accordance with law, on merits and on the basis of the evidence that may be led before the learned trial Court. 12. With the above observations and in view of the above, the present application for leave to appeal stands disposed of/dismissed. Consequently, the connected first appeal (stamp) and civil application (for stay) (stamp) are also stand disposed of. No costs.