JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned writ applications are more or less the same, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the Special Civil Application No. 2912 of 2008 is treated as the lead matter. 3. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant No. 1, an association of the retired agricultural employees and the other writ applicants, have prayed for the following reliefs; "(A) To hold and declare that the decision of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, not accepting and acting upon the revised option for receiving monthly pension submitted by the petitioner No. 2 to 19 and other similarly situated retired employees, is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (AA) To quash and set aside the reasoning and decision of the respondent No. 1 as contained in letter dtd. 19.6.2007 issued under signature of the Section Officer, Agricultural and Cooperation Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, (Annexure A) and further be pleased to hold that by issuing resolution dated 27.12.1990 (Annexure A) the option received from the petitioners under Resolution dated 23.7.1990 has become redundant and further be pleased to direct the respondents, subordinate officer their servants to offer consequential benefits to the petitioners including by inviting fresh option from the petitioners. (B) To quash and set aside the Government Resolution dated 27.12.1990 (Annexure A) so far as and to the extent it modifies para-2(viii) of the G.R. dated 23.07.1990 issued by the respondent No. 1 and further be pleased to direct the respondents, their co-ordinate authorities in the State Government, subordinate officers, servants etc. to extend the benefit of family pension scheme to the families of all those employees who are similarly situated to the petitioners and permanently absorb in the respondent No. 3 Cooperation by G.R. dated 23.07.1990 issued by the respondent No. 1. (C) To direct the respondents, their co-ordinate authorities in the State Government, subordinate officers to accept and to act upon revised option for receiving monthly pension as per the G.R. dated 23.07.1990 issued by the respondent No. 1 (Annexure D) and to give all consequential benefits thereto on such terms and conditions prescribed by this Honourable Court. (C) To direct the respondents, their co-ordinate authorities in the State Government, subordinate officers to accept and to act upon revised option for receiving monthly pension as per the G.R. dated 23.07.1990 issued by the respondent No. 1 (Annexure D) and to give all consequential benefits thereto on such terms and conditions prescribed by this Honourable Court. (D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, further implementation, operation and execution of G.R. dated 27.12.1990 issued by the respondent No. 1 (at Annexure A) be suspended and stayed. (E) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, the respondents, their co-ordinates, authorities in the State Government, subordinate officers and servants be directed to call for fresh option from the petitioner and consider such option for receiving monthly pension as per G.R. Dated 23.07.1990 provisionally and to give all consequential benefits thereto to the petitioner Nos. 2 to 19. (F) Any further relief which may deem just and proper in the interest of justice." 4. The case of the writ applicants may be summarized as under; 4.1 The writ applicants Nos. 2 to 19 joined the services of the State Government in the year 1959. On 1st June, 1978, the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Ltd. was constituted. The writ applicants were transferred on deputation to the Corporation on or after 1st July, 1982. The Government took a policy decision, offering option to all those State Government employees who were transferred on deputation for being permanently absorbed in the services of the Corporation. 4.2 The State Government issued a resolution dated 4th July, 1988, offering option to the employees working on deputation with the respondent-Corporation and also laid down the terms and conditions in that regard. It was declared that such option should be exercised within one month from the date of the resolution. It was also made clear that after being permanently absorbed in the Corporation, the employee would be given an option with regard to the pensionary benefits in respect of the service put in by such employee in the State Government. Such pensionary benefits were to be in accordance with the resolutions dated 17th February, 1974 and 15th July, 1975 respectively issued by the Finance Department of the State Government. 4.3 The writ applicants Nos. 2 to 19 submitted their option forms for being permanently absorbed in the Corporation. Such pensionary benefits were to be in accordance with the resolutions dated 17th February, 1974 and 15th July, 1975 respectively issued by the Finance Department of the State Government. 4.3 The writ applicants Nos. 2 to 19 submitted their option forms for being permanently absorbed in the Corporation. 4.4 On 1st April, 1989, the State Government issued a resolution laying down the terms and conditions regulating the admissibility of the pensionary benefits of the Government employees who opted for being permanently absorbed in an Autonomous Body/Public Undertaking. The said resolution expressly provided for the admissibility of the benefit of the family pension to those in receipt of the pension after absorption in the P.S.Us. in terms of Clause-11 of the said resolution. Clause 11(V) and (VI) of the said resolution reads as under; "(V) The family pension to the eligible family members of the P.S.Us. absorbed Government servants will be given from one source only i.e., either from the Government or from the Public Sector Undertaking/Autonomous bodies if such organization has any scheme for grant of family pension. The eligible member may be allowed to choose either of the two schemes. (VI) It will be responsibility of the pension sanctioning authority to process the claim for family pension. He should forward the claim of family pension after verifying that there exists no scheme for grant of family pension to the families of Government servant already absorbed in the P.S.Us./Autonomous bodies." 4.5 On 23rd July, 1990, the Government of Gujarat issued a resolution, sanctioning the permanent absorption of the employees in the Corporation. The Government Resolution reads as under; "GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT Agriculture Co-Operation and Rural Department, Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-203-K-1 Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar. READ: (1) Letter No. Prash/5/option/1123-24 dated 4.5.88 from M.G., G.L.D.C., Ahmedabad. (2) Govt. Resolution, Agriculture & Rural Department No. JVN-1287-M. 203-K.4/K.1 dated 4.7.88. (3) G.R.F.C. No. SMV-3786-GOI-71 dt. 1.4.89. RESOLUTION The State Government had established the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Ltd. At Ahmedabad with effect from 1.6.1978. The gazetted as well as non-gazetted employees of the Department of Agriculture were working on deputation basis to the Corporation with the activities of the different schemes transferred to the corporation from different dates. (3) G.R.F.C. No. SMV-3786-GOI-71 dt. 1.4.89. RESOLUTION The State Government had established the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Ltd. At Ahmedabad with effect from 1.6.1978. The gazetted as well as non-gazetted employees of the Department of Agriculture were working on deputation basis to the Corporation with the activities of the different schemes transferred to the corporation from different dates. Such employees were allowed to exercise the option either to come over to the State Services or for absorption in the services of the corporation vide G.R. Agriculture & Rural Development Department dated 4.7.88 referred to in the preamble. After considering the options exercised by employees for absorption in the corporation, the question of absorbing them in the services of the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation was under consideration of Government since long. 2. Government is now pleased to convey the sanction to the permanent absorption of the employees shown in the appended statements I and II in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Ltd. On their own volition in the public interest on the terms and conditions envisaged in the G.R.F.D. No. SMV-3186-GOI-71-P, dt. 1.4.89, as amended from time to time, with effect from the dates as shown against their names in column No. 8 of the appended statements I and II and on the principles terms and conditions as indicated hereinafter:- (i) Date of the effect The permanent absorption shall have effect as shown from the date against each of them in the statement I and II. (ii) Pension/Gratuity On their permanent absorption in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, they shall be eligible for prorata pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity based on the length of their qualifying services under the Govt. of Gujarat till the date of their permanent absorption in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation as admissible under the rules. (iii) Calculation of pro-rata retirement benefits; The Pro-rata death-cum-retirement gratuity and pension will be calculated respectively on the basis of pension able pay as defined in rule 46 of the Revised Pension Rules 1950 as amended from time to time but upto the date of their absorption. (iii) Calculation of pro-rata retirement benefits; The Pro-rata death-cum-retirement gratuity and pension will be calculated respectively on the basis of pension able pay as defined in rule 46 of the Revised Pension Rules 1950 as amended from time to time but upto the date of their absorption. (iv) D ate of payment of Pro-rata Retirement benefits; The mount of Pro-rata pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity which will be worked out and intimated to the concerned employee as well as to Gujarat State Land Development Corporation would be disbursable to the employee from the date of their permanent absorption in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. (v) Option The employees will exercise an option within 6 months of the date of issue of this G.R. For either of the alternatives indicated below; (a) Receiving the Pro-rata monthly and death-cum-retirement gratuity as admissible under clause (ii), (iii) and (vi) above. (b) Receiving the Pro-rata gratuity and lump-sum amount in lieu of pension worked out with reference to the commutation tables obtaining on the date from which pension will be admissible and the commuted value become payable. Where no option is exercised within the prescribed period of six months, the employees will automatically be governed by alternative (b) above. Option once exercised shall be final. The option shall be exercise in writing. (vi) Commutation: In case employees opt to receive pension as in para (v)(a) above but wish to commute a portion of their pension such commutation will be regulated in accordance with the State Government Rules in force at the time of their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. (vii) Limitation as to the total amount of gratuity The total gratuity admissible in respect of the services rendered under the Govt. of Gujarat and that under the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation shall not exceed the amount that would have been admissible had the employees continued in Govt. services and retired on the same pay which they drew on retirement from Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. (viii) Family Pension admissibility from one source only: 1. On their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, their family will be eligible for family pension as admissible under the State Govt., if there is no family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation or if the employees do not become eligible to join family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. On their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, their family will be eligible for family pension as admissible under the State Govt., if there is no family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation or if the employees do not become eligible to join family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. 2. Family pension will be admissible only from one source i.e. either from the State Govt. or from Gujarat State Land Development Corporation in case Gujarat State Land Development Corporation has a scheme for payment of family pension. (ix) Effect of liberalization of Pension/Gratuity Rules after absorption: Any further liberalization of Pension/Gratuity Rules decided upon by Govt. of Gujarat in respect of the employees of the State Govt. after the permanent absorption of these employees in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation will not be extended to them. (x) Fixation of Pay on absorption The pay of these employees will be fixed on absorption as per pre-employed pensioner with effect from the date they become entitled to draw pro-rata retirement benefits as per the terms of G.R.F.D. No. NVT-3286-GOI-95-P, 17.5.88 as amended from time to time. (xi) Effect of Resignation If any resigns from Gujarat State Land Development Corporation his/her resignation for purpose of this orders will be treated as resignation from Govt. service entailing forfeiture of earlier services under Govt. and loss of benefits including gratuity under this order. An undertaking in two copies to this effect will have to be obtained from the employee so absorbed and same will be retained in the office of the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation. (xii) Leave The carry forward of leave on average pay/earned leave in cases of these employees on their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation will be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the paragraph (b) of G.R.F.D. No. NVN-1074-UO-352 dt. 17.2.74. Accordingly, the benefit available only if the employee is absorbed in public interest. The earned leave/leave on average pay to the credit of the employee as on the date of their permanent absorption will be communicated separately. 17.2.74. Accordingly, the benefit available only if the employee is absorbed in public interest. The earned leave/leave on average pay to the credit of the employee as on the date of their permanent absorption will be communicated separately. (xiii) Benefit after permanent absorption; For the period of services rendered by these employees in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation from the date of permanent absorption they will be entitled to all the benefits admissible to the corresponding employees of the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation and continue to be governed by its rules in all respects. (xiv) Provident Fund: The amount of subscription together with interest thereon standing to credit to these employees in the General Provident Fund Account will be transferred to their new Provident Fund Account under Gujarat State Land Development Corporation with its consent. Once such a transfer of provident fund balance has taken place, the concerned employees will be subject to the provident fund rules of the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation and not to the Provident Fund of the Govt. of Gujarat. (xv) Interpretation: In case any doubt or difference of opinion arises regarding interpretation of the terms and conditions, set out in this G.R., the matter shall be referred to the Finance Department, through the, Agriculture, Cooperation and Rural Development Department, whose decision shall be final. 3. The seniority of the concerned employee will be considered in the respective post of absorption from the date his regular appointment in the post/cadre as well as his seniority in the Department of Agriculture. 4. The Gujarat State Land Development Corporation had given promotion/appointments to higher posts by direct selection to some of the employees who were on deputation to Corporation as shown in the appended statement II. However, the Govt. has not agreed to such promotions/appointments given by the Corporation. Such employees have been absorbed in the Corporation on their original post/cadre for which they were eligible in accordance wit their due seniority in Govt. The absorption in respect of such employee is subject to the final judgments of the Honourable Court in respective petitions filed by such employee. 5. Once the absorption orders are issued, the concerned employee will have no right for seniority/promotions and other allied matters in Government even if the judgments in respect of pending petitions in Hon. Courts are delivered in their favour. 6. 5. Once the absorption orders are issued, the concerned employee will have no right for seniority/promotions and other allied matters in Government even if the judgments in respect of pending petitions in Hon. Courts are delivered in their favour. 6. The preliminary enquiries/departmental enquiries will be continued and conducted by Gujarat State Land Development Corporation even after their absorption in Corporation. 7. The question of absorption of employees as shown in the appended statement III is kept open/pending and the decision in their cases will be taken in due course. 8. These orders are issued with the concurrence of General Administration Department dt. 6.6.90 and Finance Department dt. 21.7.1990 on this department file of even no. By order and in the name of Governor of Gujarat." 4.6 It is the case of the writ applicants that after the Government Resolution dated 23rd July, 1990, they all opted for receiving the DCRG and lump-sum amount in lieu of pension. It is the case of the writ applicants that within five months thereafter, i.e. on 27th December, 1990, the Government issued another government resolution unilaterally substituting para-2(viii) and para-2(x) of the Resolution dated 23rd July, 1990. The Government Resolution dated 27th December, 1990, which has been impugned in all the writ applications, reads as under; "GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT Agriculture Co-Operation and Rural Department, Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-203-K-1 Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar. Dated 27.12.90 READ: (1) Govt. Resolution, Agriculture, Co-operation and Rural Department of even No. dt. 23.7.90. (2) Letter No. PRASHA/5/23538/29 DATED 10.8.90 from Managing Director, Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, Ahmedabad (3) Govt. Resolution, Agriculture & Rural Department, No. JVN-1287-M.203-K.4/K.1 dated 4.7.88. RESOLUTION CORRIGENDUM The State Government has conveyed the sanction to the permanent absorption in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, Ahmedabad vide G.R. Dated 23.7.90 referred to in preamble. The gazetted/non gazetted employees of the Department of Agriculture were working on deputation basis to the Corporation, were allowed to exercise the option either to come over to the State Service or for absorption in the services of the Corporation vide G.R. Agriculture & Rural Development Depart. Dated 4.7.88 referred to in the preamble. According to GR dated 4.7.88, some conditions of the G.R. Dated 23.7.90 are required to be modified and for that the G.I.D.C., has requested to clarify vide its letter dated 10.8.90. 2. After careful consideration, the Govt. Dated 4.7.88 referred to in the preamble. According to GR dated 4.7.88, some conditions of the G.R. Dated 23.7.90 are required to be modified and for that the G.I.D.C., has requested to clarify vide its letter dated 10.8.90. 2. After careful consideration, the Govt. is pleased to substitute the para 2(viii) and para 2(x) of G.R. Dated 23.7.90 referred to in preamble as follows; (A) Para 2(viii): Family pension admissibility from one source only-On their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation their family will not be entitled for family pension as admissible under the State Govt. (B) Para 2(x): On their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation, the pay of those employed will be protected by the Corporation. 3. In para (5) of G.R. Dated 23.7.90 the words, "even if the judgments in respect of pending petitions in Honourable Courts are delivered in their favour" shall be deleted. 4. Other terms and conditions will remain as per G.R. dated 23.7.90 referred to in preamble. 5. These orders are issued with the concurrence of General Administration Department's letter dated 23.8.90 and Finance Department's note dt. 12.12.90 on this department file or even number. By this order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat." 4.7 The grievance of the writ applicants is that they had opted for being absorbed permanently in the Corporation considering that they would be getting the family pension as well as the lump-sum amount in lieu of the regular pension. However, without giving any opportunity of hearing, the State Government took the decision that the family pension would not be paid and only the lump-sum amount would be paid. 4.8 The grievance of the writ applicants is that if they would have known from the beginning, then they would not have opted for the lump-sum amount and would have opted for the pension. 4.9 It is also the case of the writ applicants that the Government issued the Resolution dated 4th November, 1991 for those employees on deputation with the Corporation and who had not availed of the chance of submitting option for absorption in the services of the Corporation under the earlier resolution. 4.9 It is also the case of the writ applicants that the Government issued the Resolution dated 4th November, 1991 for those employees on deputation with the Corporation and who had not availed of the chance of submitting option for absorption in the services of the Corporation under the earlier resolution. In the said resolution, it has been stated that the employees working on deputation with the Corporation and/or the employees working with the State Government would be given the opportunity to submit the options with regard to the permanent absorption in the Corporation. In the said resolution, there is no provision for exercising option with regard to the pensionary benefits after being absorbed in the Corporation. 4.10. The grievance of the writ applicants is that they all remained in dark for years together as regards the unilateral change in the policy. To put it in other words, none of the writ applicants had any idea about the resolution dated 27th December, 1990. They learnt about the same for the first time in the year 2003 when the authorities concerned declined to accept the application for the family pension of a widow of a employee who had opted for receiving the pro-rata gratuity and lump-sum amount in lieu of pension by exercising the option in terms of the resolution dated 23rd July, 1990. 4.11 The writ applicants, thereafter, preferred many representations complaining of the injustice said to have been done with them, but those representations didn't find favour with the Government. Hence, these writ applications. 5. The statement indicating the status/claim of entitlement as on the date of absorption in the Corporation is as under; Sr. No. Name & Add. of petitioners Designation Pay scale in Rs. Total years of Govt. Service. Up to 22.7.90 Pension amount fixed per month Rs. Date of receiving Lump sum amount in lieu of monthly pension Date of retirement from Corp. Service A B C D E F G H 1 Shri Amarsingh Bhupatsinh Gharia, 13-E Harinagar Society, Chaudhari Road, Vadodara Dy. Director of Agril 3000-4500 27 1581 20-5-92 31-5-98 2 Shri Rajeshbhai Amarabhai Zinia, 109, Savgun Naga, Near Nari Circle, PO; Vartej, Tal: and Dist: Bhavnagar Sr. clerk 1200-2040 26 672 06/06/91 31.1.99 3 Shri Rajendrakumar Damodar Bhatt, Plot No.635-A, Deri Road, Krishna Nagar Bhavnagar Sr. Director of Agril 3000-4500 27 1581 20-5-92 31-5-98 2 Shri Rajeshbhai Amarabhai Zinia, 109, Savgun Naga, Near Nari Circle, PO; Vartej, Tal: and Dist: Bhavnagar Sr. clerk 1200-2040 26 672 06/06/91 31.1.99 3 Shri Rajendrakumar Damodar Bhatt, Plot No.635-A, Deri Road, Krishna Nagar Bhavnagar Sr. Clerk 1200-2040 28 716 09/08/91 28.2.98 4 Shri Bhailal Ravjibhai Solanki, Block No.D, Rangmilan Plots, Opp D.K. Patel Hall, Naranpra, Amdavad. Sr. Clerk 1200-2040 26 957 19.7.91 31.8.98 5 Shri Vinayak Kalidas Joshi, SA-28, Tirupati Bungalow, Abu Highway,Hanuman Tekri,B/h. Dharti Resot, Palanpur (B.K.) Agril Officer 1600-2900 19 622 06/12/91 31.3.207 6 Shri Bhagvanbhai Prabhudas Prajapati, A/11, New Umang Tenements, B/Madhavbag Society, Nirnaynagar, Ahmedabad Agril Assistant 1200-2040 31 804 27.12.92 30.4.97 7 Shri Kapurji Punjaji Thakar, Ta: Davada, Dist: Mehsana, Via: Bhandhu Agril Assistant 1200-2040 27 673 01/02/92 28.2.99 8 Smt. Minaxi Raghunath Kalkar 56/A, Lokmanya Society, Varsiya Road, Fatepura, Vadodara-390006 Sr.Clerk 1200-2040 25 604 02/07/92 30.6.2001 9 Shri Mahendrasinh Chhatrasinh Rajput, To: Timbariya, Tal: Sinor, Dist: Vadodara Sr. Clerk 1200-2040 24 551 19.9.91 30.11.00 10 Shri Mahiudin Fajludin Saiyed, To: Godhara, Ta: Savai, Dist: Vadodara Jr. Clerk 950-1500 25 575 17.3.93 20.2.2005 11 Shri Prajulchandra Mohanlal Valand, C-3, Yogi Society, Mahesh Complex, Op. Vaghodiya Road, Vadodara. Sr. Clerk 1200-2040 24 578 03/03/92 31.3.03 12 Shri Ramanbhai Ravjibhai Patel, A-51, Meghdhanush Society, Juna Padara Road, Near Vikasnagar, Vadodara Agril Assistant 330-560 Old Scale 31 Pension not fixed 02/01/93 31.1.00 13 Shri Vithalbhai Manibhai Patel 40-B, Omnagar Society, Opp. Govind Rav Park, Pani Gate, Vadodara Agril Officer 1600-2900 23 806 09/03/91 30.9.02 14 Shri Vinayak Shanker Mahajani 302, Rangotu Flat, Near Darbar Chokadi, Sun City, Manjalpur, Vadodara Agril Assistant 1200-2040 19 469 07/07/92 31.10.06 15 Shri Maeshbhai Sanabhai Patel, 20, Mangal Jyot Society, Near Jyoti Park, Karolibag, Vadodara Agril Assistant 1200-2040 31 375 23.7.91 Not Received 16 Shri Usafbhai Esmailbhai Patalia, To: PO: Sasarod, Tal: Karjan, Dist: Vadodara Agril Assistant 1200-2040 27 684 06/03/91 03/06/99 17 Shri Ambalal Jagjivan Mochi, 423, Anandnagar, G.H. Board, Karelibag, Opp. Sargam Apartment, Vadodara Jr. Clerk 900-1500 24 533 24.1.92 30.6.2006 18 Shri Rambhai Tribhovandas Parmar, PO: Brahmanvadi, Tal: Padra, Dist: Vadodara. Agril Assistant 1200-2040 26 671 08/02/91 30.6.98 6. Mr. Oza, the learned senior advocate appearing for the writ applicants vehemently submitted that it was not proper on the part of the State Government to have issued the impugned resolution, keeping the writ applicants in the dark. Agril Assistant 1200-2040 26 671 08/02/91 30.6.98 6. Mr. Oza, the learned senior advocate appearing for the writ applicants vehemently submitted that it was not proper on the part of the State Government to have issued the impugned resolution, keeping the writ applicants in the dark. According to him, all his clients were absorbed in the Corporation in accordance with the resolution dated 23rd July, 1990. All his clients had completed the pensionable service as on the date of their absorption in the Corporation. They were eligible for pension and, therefore, were required to exercise option as to whether they desired to receive the monthly pension or lump-sum amount in lieu of the pension worked out with reference to the commutation table with the death cum retirement gratuity. 7. According to Mr. Oza, the pension was admissible to all his clients after absorption in the Corporation. The lump-sum amount in lieu of pension had been worked out considering the span of 15 years from the date of absorption in the Corporation. He submits that while his clients were called upon to exercise option with respect to the pensionary benefits, they were told that they would be entitled for the family pension scheme benefits. After his clients exercised the necessary option pursuant to the resolution dated 23rd July, 1990, the State Government issued the impugned resolution dated 27th December, 1990. 8. Mr. Oza submitted that the decision of the State Government could be termed as arbitrary as the same deprived his clients to seek the benefits under the family pension scheme. The service conditions of his clients were altered unilaterally much detrimental to their interest. According to Mr. Oza, the impugned resolution dated 27th December, 1990 nullified the effect of calling for the option under the resolution dated 23rd July, 1990. 9. Mr. The service conditions of his clients were altered unilaterally much detrimental to their interest. According to Mr. Oza, the impugned resolution dated 27th December, 1990 nullified the effect of calling for the option under the resolution dated 23rd July, 1990. 9. Mr. Oza pointed out that the State Government tried to justify its policy decision of issuing the Government Resolution dated 27th December, 1990 before the permanent Loc Adalat, High Court of Gujarat, Ahmedabad by submitting that after receiving the options on the terms and conditions specified in the resolution dated 4th July, 1988, the employees were absorbed in the Corporation vide resolution dated 23rd July, 1990 and Clause-8(gh) of the terms and conditions of the resolution dated 4th July, 1988 provides that the State Government or the Corporation would not be responsible for the family pension to the absorbed employees. Clause-8(chh) provided that after the absorption in the Corporation, whatever benevolent pension rules may be made by the Government, the same would not be available to them and, therefore, it was found necessary to make an amendment in Clause-2(viii) of the Government Resolution dated 23rd July, 1990 by issuing the Government Resolution dated 27th December, 1990. 10. Mr. Oza submitted that at the time of making such clarification, two vital aspects were missed. First, that in para-8(chh) of the resolution dated 4th July, 1988, it is stated that the pensionary benefits introduced by the Government after the date of absorption of the employees in the Corporation would not be extended to such absorbed employees, whereas the writ applicants were absorbed in the Corporation with effect from 23rd July, 1990 and, therefore, the pensionary benefits as prevalent on the date of the absorption of the writ applicants had to be extended to them and secondly, the State Government, in its Finance Department vide resolution dated 1st April, 1989, laid down that the benefit of the family pension would be admissible to the family members of the Government servants absorbed in the public sector undertakings and the benefits would be given from only one source, i.e., either from the Government or from the Public Sector undertaking. 11. Mr. Oza has invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation. According to Mr. Oza, the State Government should have acted fairly with its employees. 12. 11. Mr. Oza has invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation. According to Mr. Oza, the State Government should have acted fairly with its employees. 12. He submits that whatever benefits have been received by his clients, the same would be reverted to the State Government by adjusting the same with the arrears of the pension that may be fixed. 13. On the other hand, all the writ applications have been vehemently opposed by Mr. Parikh, the learned AGP appearing for the State Government. He submits that no case worth the name is made out by the writ applicants. He submits that the doctrine of legitimate expectation as well as the promissory estoppel has no application in the present case. According to Mr. Parikh, the learned AGP, nothing was promised at the time when the options were invited. In the Government Resolution dated 4th July, 1988, nothing was said about the entitlement to the family pension. According to Mr. Parikh, there is a basic fallacy in the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicants that they had acted on the resolution dated 4th July, 1988 considering that they would be receiving the family pension along with the lump-sum amount. On the contrary, in the Schedule-I attached to the Government Resolution dated 4th July, 1988, it has been made clear that it will not be the responsibility of the State Government nor of the Corporation regarding the family pension to be paid to the employees absorbed in the Corporation. 14. Mr. Parikh submitted that the Government Resolution dated 23rd July, 1990 was issued merely giving the sanction to the permanent absorption of the employees in the Corporation. 15. According to Mr. Parikh, it is always open for the State Government to take a policy decision having regard to the administrative exigencies and no fault could be found with such a policy decision. 16. The learned AGP has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the writ applications considering the gross delay and laches on the part of the writ applicants in approaching this Court. According to the learned AGP, the impugned government resolution is of the year 1990. Assuming for the moment that they learnt about the said government resolution in the year 2003, the writ applications were filed in the year 2008, i.e. five years after the knowledge of the impugned government resolution. According to the learned AGP, the impugned government resolution is of the year 1990. Assuming for the moment that they learnt about the said government resolution in the year 2003, the writ applications were filed in the year 2008, i.e. five years after the knowledge of the impugned government resolution. According to him, all the writ applications deserve to be rejected only on the ground of delay without going into the merit of the matters. 17. Mr. Parikh has also placed reliance on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State Government, more particularly, the following averments; "5.3 It is submitted that Agriculture & Co. operation Department had issued Government Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-203/K1 dated 23.7.1990 inviting the option from the employees shown in the appended statement I, II & III with the said G.R.. In the preamble of this Government Resolution, it was clearly stated that the gazetted as well as non gazetted employees of the Department of Agriculture were working on deputation basis to the corporation with the activities of the different schemes transferred to the corporation from different dates. Such employees were allowed to exercise the option either to come over to the State Service or for absorption in the services of the corporation vide G.R. Agriculture & Rural Development Department dated 4.7.1988 referred to in the preamble. After considering the options exercised by employees for absorption in the corporation, the question of absorbing them in the service of the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation was under consideration of the Govt. since long. By this preamble it was clearly stated that the absorption was going to be done with reference to Government Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-2003/(k.4) K.1 dated 4.7.1988 and under the terms and conditions mentioned in the said G.R. 5.3(a) It is submitted that on 23rd July, 1990, the Agriculture and Cooperation Department issued a Government Resolution stating therein that "on their permanent absorption in the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation their family will be eligible for family pension as admissible under the State Govt. if there is no family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation or if the employees do not become eligible to join family pension scheme in the Gujarat state Land Development Corporation. if there is no family pension scheme in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation or if the employees do not become eligible to join family pension scheme in the Gujarat state Land Development Corporation. 5.3(b) It is submitted that as the said condition regarding family pension made in G.R. dated 23.07.1990 is contradict to the terms and conditions made in G.R. Dated 4.7.1988 the Agriculture and Co. operation Department vide its Govt. Resolution dated 27.12.1990 made certain amendment in clause 2(A) to the effect that "family pension admissibility from one source only-On their permanent absorption in Gujarat State Land Development Corporation their family will not be entitled for family pension as admissible under the State Govt. 5.4 It is submitted that the amendment made vide Government Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-203-K.1 dated 27.12.1990 in clause 2(A) is as per the rule framed under Government Resolution dated 29.1.1983 and the terms and conditions framed vide Government Resolution No. JVN-1287-M-203/(k.4) K.1 dated 4.07.1988. It is further submitted that the persons who have given their option with the consideration of terms and conditions mentioned in Government Resolution dated 4.7.1988 were absorbed in the GLDC by Govt. Resolution dated 23.7.1990. So these people have given the option with consent with the terms and conditions made in the Government Resolution dated 4.7.1988 and as mentioned in earlier para that there is specific condition with regard to family pension. The amendment made for family pension in Govt. Resolution dated 27.12.90 is totally as per the condition specified in G.R. dated 4.7.1988. 5.5 It is respectfully submitted that at the relevant point of time, the persons those who were opted to join in GLDC had taken all due benefits from the Government and they accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the Govt. Resolution with regard to 'No Family Pension' either from Govt. or from GLDC. 6. it is further submitted that after taking due benefits from the Govt. and also accepting the conditions imposed in the Govt. Resolution, now these people cannot seek any parity with State Govt., employees so far as Family Pension is concerned. 7. Being aggrieved by the amendment carried in the Govt. Resolution dated 27th December, 1990, the petitioners had many times approached before the Government authority and Government after due consideration rejected their representations. Resolution, now these people cannot seek any parity with State Govt., employees so far as Family Pension is concerned. 7. Being aggrieved by the amendment carried in the Govt. Resolution dated 27th December, 1990, the petitioners had many times approached before the Government authority and Government after due consideration rejected their representations. The authorities had suggested the Union to submit their representation and the same will be sent to General Administrative Department as well as Finance Department and decision thereof is binding to them. Accordingly, they had not submitted any representation. 12. In reply to para 2(d) of the petition. It submitted that as stated earlier the petitioner had already enjoyed the due benefits from the govt. and after a lapse of more than 17 years, they are seeking the benefits of Family Pension which cannot be acceptable because they had given sufficient opportunity to either remain in GLDC or go back to the Govt. 14. In reply to para 3(9) of the petition, it is submitted as per G.R. Dated 23rd July, 1990, the State Govt. had not protected pay and seniority and promotion cases pending before courts. But it is within the knowledge of the petitioners that later on vide G.R. dated 27.12.1990 the same were granted/amended." 18. Mr. Praikh, the learned AGP, invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.U. Joshi & Ors. vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and Ors., reported in 2003 (2) SCC 632. The Supreme Court has very categorically stated that; "There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service." 19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the writ applicants are entitled to any relief as prayed for in these writ applications. 20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the writ applicants are entitled to any relief as prayed for in these writ applications. 20. Since a preliminary objection has been raised as regards the delay, let me deal with the same first before going into the merit of the other submissions. In my view, whatever delay has occurred, has been well explained by the writ applicants. It is bit difficult to believe that the writ applicants had no idea of the impugned Government Resolution dated 27th December, 1990 till the year 2003, but at the same time, having come to know about the same, necessary action in that regard was taken, and upto 2007, the dispute was at large before the permanent Lok Adalat of the High Court of Gujarat. It is only when the issue could not be resolved amicably before the Lok Adalat that the writ applicants were left with no other option but to prefer the present writ applications. 21. In the aforesaid context, I may quote with profit a Five Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in AIR 1974 SC 259 . The issue before the Supreme Court was one relating to promotion to the post of Deputy Collector. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. Such objection was raised as the divisional cadres of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as 1st November 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select lists, which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years. It was pointed out by the respondents that there was a delay of more than ten to twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint and such delay was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. It was pointed out by the respondents that there was a delay of more than ten to twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint and such delay was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court negatived such preliminary objection by observing as under: "...We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilockchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 SCR 824 : ( AIR 1970 SC 898 ), is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose." 22. In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. M.I.D.C. and Others, reported in AIR 2013 SC 565 , His Lordship Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. reiterated the position of law on the issue of delay. What was assailed before the Supreme Court was the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Bombay by way of which the High Court had rejected the claim of the appellants for compensation due to them for the land taken by the respondent authorities, without resorting to any procedure prescribed by law. It was contended before the Court that the delay and laches on the part of the appellants had extinguished the right to put forth a claim. In such circumstances, His Lordship made the following observations in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, which, in our opinion, are very apt and helps the petitioners. "10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. "10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional imitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of the discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. and Ors. V. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (AIR 2008 SC (Suppl) 824);) 12. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. and Ors. V. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (AIR 2008 SC (Suppl) 824);) 12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. V. Mst. Katiji and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Delhi Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802 : (1992 AIR SCW 3181); Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1140 : (2003 AIR SCW 685); and Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2161 : (2011 AIR SCW 3033)" 23. Let me now consider whether the writ applicants are entitled to any relief applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 24. Legitimate in legal parlance means that which is lawful, legally recognized by law or according to law Expectation means the act or the instance of expecting or looking forward something expected or hoped for probability of an event and expectation is most often relatable to one prospect. 24. Legitimate in legal parlance means that which is lawful, legally recognized by law or according to law Expectation means the act or the instance of expecting or looking forward something expected or hoped for probability of an event and expectation is most often relatable to one prospect. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume-I(I) 151 legitimate expectations finds mention of the following: A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way of an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat persons legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for grant. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 has pointed out that the concept of legitimate expectation first stepped into the English Law in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch 149, wherein it was observed that an alien who had been given leave to enter the United Kingdom for a limited period had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time and if that permission was revoked before the time expires, that alien ought to be given an opportunity of making representations. Thereafter the concept has been considered in a number of cases. Thereafter the concept has been considered in a number of cases. In A.G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, (1983) 2 AC 629, Lord Fraser said that the principle that a public authority is bound by its undertakings as to the procedure it will follow, provided they do not conflict with its duty, is applicable to the undertaking given by the Government of Hong Kong to the respondent that each case would be considered on its merits. In Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, a question arose whether the decision of the Minister withdrawing the right to Trade Union membership without consulting the staff which according to the appellant was his legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation, was valid. It was contended that the Minister had a duty to consult the staff as per the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice would be followed. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. The Court held as under:- An aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given the opportunity of making representations against the withdrawal. Noticing, however, Of late the doctrine of legitimate expectation is being pressed into service in many cases particularly in contractual sphere while canvassing the implications underlying the administrative law, The Supreme Court has proceed to add, Since we have not come across any pronouncement of this Court on this subject explaining the meaning and scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, we would like to examine the same a little more elaborately at this stage, and put the questions, who is the expectant and what is the nature of the expectation? When does such an expectation become a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the same? What are the duties of the administrative authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The Supreme Court has thereafter answered the above as follows:- 28. Time is a three fold present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assert able expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law of custom or an establishment procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. 29. It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. 29. It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that Legitimate expectation is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes it place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionately. A passage in Administrative Law, Sixth Edition by H.W.R. Wade page 424 reads thus:-These are revealing decisions. They show that the courts now expect Government department to honour their published statements or else to treat the citizen with the fullest personal consideration. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is obvious, furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice, which tend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this seems likely to develop into an important general doctrine. Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus: It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that legitimate expectation was introduced into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where alien students of scientology were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary benefits would be granted to this sect. The court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. The court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a different context, where car-hire drivers had habitually offended against Airport Bye-laws, with many convictions and unpaid fines, it was held that they had not legitimate expectation of being heard before being banned by the Airport authority. There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing. 26. In some cases a question arose whether the concept of the legitimate expectations is an impact only on the procedure or whether it also can have a substantive impact and if so to what extent. Att. Gen. for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990) 64 Australian Law Journal Reports 327 is a case from Australia in which this aspect is dealt with. In that case the Local Courts Act abolished the Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced them by Local Courts. S. 12 of the Act empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified person to be a Magistrate in the new Courts system. Mr. Quin, who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old system applied for, but was refused, an appointment under the new System. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney General against that order before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. In the appeal by the Attorney General against that order before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. Coming to the nature of the substantive impact of the doctrine, Brennan, J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought not to unlock the gate which shuts the Court out of review on the merits and that the Courts should not trespass into the forbidden field of the merits by striking down the administrative acts or decisions which failed to fulfill the expectations. In the same case Mason, C.J., was of the view that if substantive protection is to be accorded to legitimate expectations that would encounter the objection of entailing crucial interference with administrative decisions on the merits by precluding the decision-maker from ultimately making the decision which he or she considers most appropriate in the circumstances. 27. In R.V. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Redudock, (1987) 2 All ER 518, Taylor, J. after referring to the ration laid down in some of the above cases held thus:- On these authorities I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesi there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking given by a Minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion. By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it could be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his duties. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it could be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his duties. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrain from doing so. He had even decided to keep the criteria but depart from them in this single case for national security reasons, no doubt those reasons would have afforded him a defence to judicial review as in the GCHQ case. 28. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971) 2 Queen Bench Division 175, Lord Denning observed as under: "If a man seeks a privilege to which he has no particular claim such as an appointment to some post or other then he can be turned away without a word. He need not to be heard. No explanation need be given; see the cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149, 170-171. But if he is a man whose property is at stake, or who is being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons should be given why he is being turned down, and he should be given a chance to be heard. I go further. If he is man who has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him without a hearing, or reasons given, then these should be afforded him, according as the case may demand." 29. When a challenge is made on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Supreme Court pointed out, that the same would not give scope to claim relief straight way from the administrative authorities in the absence of any crystallized right. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise or the position changes at the last minute e.g. change in the policy, amendment in the rules and regulations etc. In other words, where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. 30. In other words, where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. 30. A person who puts forward his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, most satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has the locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of the policy, the Court may refuse to interfere with such decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances, giving rise to the legitimate expectation, would be primarily a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether the failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision of affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which would be dependent on the several factors. 31. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra) has quoted from Schmidts case (1969 (2) Ch 149):- "..........If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of rights guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but of the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It can be one of the grounds to consider but of the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognized general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. If follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainity is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales case the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important." 32. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2006 (4) SCC 1 referred to the circumstances in which the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked thus: "The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." 33. Another Constitution Bench, referring to the doctrine, observed thus in the Confederation of Ex-servicemen Associations vs. Union of India 2006 (8) JT 547 : "No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the development of Administrative Law and particularly law relating to 'judicial review'. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests, he may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of the benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue." "In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or privilege exercised." 34. In the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 , the Supreme Court pointed out that if a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14of the Constitution of India, but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke those principles and that it can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of those principles warranting interference. The Court also held that it depends very much on the facts and the recognized general principles of the administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation, must be restricted to the general legal limitation applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. The court said (at p. 1021, para 36):- It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. 35. In the case of Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 , the Supreme Court made the following observations extracted hereunder:- "In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Art. 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfattered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is fairplay in action. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimants perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent." 36. I may set at rest the issue of legitimate expectation quoting the observations made in the case of the Attorney General for New South Wales case (1960) 64 Aus LJR 327. "To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power of violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles." 37. Thus, at least, one thing is clear that no relief should be granted solely on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be brought in aid with the other circumstances emerging from the record of the case including some right, if not indefeasible right. 38. In the course of the hearing of the matters, I gathered an impression that the option which was exercised by the writ applicants was on the basis that they would be receiving the family pension along with the lump-sum amount. Having altered their position keeping such a declaration made by the Government in mind, probably, thereafter, it would not be permissible for the State Government to act contrary. However, it is not so. The Government Resolution of the year 1988, on the basis of which the options were invited, didn't say anything regarding the family pension. On the contrary, it clarified that it would not be the responsibility of the State Government nor of the Corporation in that regard. The government resolution of July, 1990 merely gave a final sanction to the option which was exercised by the writ applicants on the basis of the government resolution of the year 1988, and the impugned government resolution made certain clarifications with which the writ applicants are dissatisfied. In this background, I find it extremely difficult to take the view that the Government acted in a very highhanded and arbitrary manner. I would rather say that it was a policy decision taken by the State Government having regard to the explanation which has been offered. It is very difficult for me to grant or dub such decision as arbitrary or contrary to law. All the writ applicants retired from the service years back and at this stage permitting them to alter the position will create a lot of hardship and difficulties for the State Government. I am conscious of the fact that if they would have opted for the pension, it would have much more beneficial since the amount of pension has been revised time to time in accordance with the recommendations of the pay commissions. However, this by itself, is not sufficient to grant the relief as prayed for after these many years. 39. I am conscious of the fact that if they would have opted for the pension, it would have much more beneficial since the amount of pension has been revised time to time in accordance with the recommendations of the pay commissions. However, this by itself, is not sufficient to grant the relief as prayed for after these many years. 39. Thus, in view of the case law discussed above, it is difficult for me to reject this writ application solely on the ground of delay and laches. I should be conscious of the fact that I am dealing with a matter wherein the issue is one of family pension. If that be so, then the Court ordinarily should not throw away a writ application on the ground of delay and laches rather than considering the matter on its own merit. 40. In the overall view of the matter, I hold that no case is made out for issue of any writ to the State Government. 41. For the foregoing reasons, all the writ applications fail and are hereby rejected. Rule is discharged.