JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. These revision petitions under Section 24(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short ‘Act’) have been filed against the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla, on 04.12.2007 whereby it partly reversed the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller, Court No.3, Shimla and ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground that the predecessor-in-interest of the tenant/respondent had acquired vacant possession of part of his property No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla, on 01.09.1997 within the same urban area and sufficient for his requirement and since he did not occupy the same, he rendered himself liable to be evicted under the provisions of Section 14(3) (a) (iv) of the Act. The facts, in brief, can be summed up thus. 2. The respondent-landlord (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) filed an application under Section 14 of the Act for eviction of the petitioner on the following grounds:- “(i) The premises were rented out as a shop to the respondent/tenant. It is submitted that the respondent was using premises for his medical practice. It may be further submitted that respondent is now more than 100 years old and has stopped his medical practice more than 10 years back. Since the shop was lying vacant for more than a year, a case No.62-202/98-97 was filed and is being adjudicated upon before the Hon’ble Rent Controller III. In his pleadings the respondent has stated that he and his family members are using the premises for residential purposes. As such the respondent has used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. This act of the respondent has impaired the utility and commercial value of the premises. The act of using the premises for residential purposes has been done without the consent of the landlord, as such this petition. (ii) That tenant/respondent whenever in Shimla, lives in the IInd floor which is below shop floor which is a residential flat and has been rented by him for residential use. The tenant/respondent has after the termination of this lease in 1995 acquired vacant possession of a part of his property No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla on 1.9.97 and premises have been let out by him to one Shri Bhag Singh at a rent of Rs.800/- per month. The tenant/respondent has after the termination of this lease in 1995 acquired vacant possession of a part of his property No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla on 1.9.97 and premises have been let out by him to one Shri Bhag Singh at a rent of Rs.800/- per month. As shop flat is being also used for residential purpose as stated by him in his reply referred to above, his requirement in addition to IInd floor could be met by the accommodation which he has rented to Shri Bhag Singh. (iii) The tenant/respondent has admitted in his written reply in case 62-2 of 98/97 before Rent Controller No.3, Shimla, that in winter he goes to Faridabad and stays there with his son. His son, Brig. R.S.Verma with whom respondent lives in Faridabad, has acquired from two tenants vacant possession of Building No.12, Glue Moon Cottage, Boileauganj, Shimla under the orders of Rent Controller IV, Shimla, dated 20.4.1992 (copy enclosed) for his personal use. As his son Dr.R.S.Verma is residing with him when he is in Shimla, there is no reason why respondent and his son cannot live in Glue Moon Cottage and vacate the premises under consideration. The two properties available to the tenant and his son are adequate for meeting their requirements.” 3. The tenant Dr.Kharak Singh Atrishi was though served but before filing written reply he unfortunately died and was substituted by Brigadier R.S.Verma (who hereinafter shall be referred as the contesting tenant). 4. In the reply filed by the contesting tenant, a number of preliminary objections regarding petition being not maintainable in its present form, lacking material particular, landlord having no locusstandi, non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties, petition being malafide, there being no cause of action in favour of the landlord etc. etc. were raised. 5. On merits, it was averred that the premises were not nonresidential as is claimed but were being used for residence since the father of the contesting tenant was a doctor, who used to attend his patients as and when required in the front room of the premises facing the road. While, the user of the premises right from the inception of the tenancy had remained unchanged and whatever the contesting respondent was doing in the premises was with the consent and knowledge of the landlord. While, the user of the premises right from the inception of the tenancy had remained unchanged and whatever the contesting respondent was doing in the premises was with the consent and knowledge of the landlord. It was averred that the premises were not taken for medical practice alone and that the original tenant till his death was living in the premises in question alongwith his family consisting of two sons, daughter-in-laws, daughters and grand children. It was only when he grew old (about 100 years) that he on account of old age and poor health was not in a position to attend any of his patients. 6. It was denied that the tenant had used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. 7. It was further denied that the utility or the commercial value of the premises had been impaired and the user of the premises remained residential one which was never changed. 8. Similarly, the averments regarding the tenant having acquired vacant possession of property No.23, Boileauganj and having let out the same to one Bhag Singh at the rent of Rs.800/- per month were denied and it was averred that the tenant as well as his family members have been using both the floors as both the floors form one compact single unit and it was denied that the respondent had acquired any such possession of the said premises. 9. As regards “Glue Moon Cottage”, it was averred that the respondent had not acquired any such accommodation which was sufficient for his family needs. Though, Glue Moon Cottage had been got vacated, but it was not fit for habitation and being an old building had out-lived its life and required reconstruction involving heavy amount of expenses and at present tenant was not in a position to carry out the same on account of paucity of funds being a retired person. 10. On 08.11.2005, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:- “(1) Whether the respondent has changed the user of the premises without permission of landlord, as alleged? …OPP. (2) Whether the respondent has committed such acts which have impaired the value and utility of the premises as alleged? …OPP. (3) Whether the respondent has acquired vacant possession of his property No.23 at Boileauganj, Shimla, as alleged? …OPP. (4) Whether the petition is not maintainable in present form as alleged? …OPR. …OPP. (2) Whether the respondent has committed such acts which have impaired the value and utility of the premises as alleged? …OPP. (3) Whether the respondent has acquired vacant possession of his property No.23 at Boileauganj, Shimla, as alleged? …OPP. (4) Whether the petition is not maintainable in present form as alleged? …OPR. (5) Whether the petition lacks material particulars, as alleged? …OPR. (6) Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition as alleged? …OPR. (7) Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of the legal heirs of Dr.Kharak Singh, as alleged? …OPR. (8) Relief.” 11. The learned Rent Controller decided issues No.1 to 3 in favour of the landlord and allowed the petition and ordered the eviction of the contesting tenant. 12. Aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, the contesting tenant filed an appeal before the learned first Appellate Authority, who reversed the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller qua issues No.1 and 2, however, the findings recorded on issue No.3 were affirmed. Consequently, the orders of eviction of the tenant were maintained. 13. The contesting tenant has assailed the findings of the learned first Appellate Authority qua issue No.3 by filing Civil Revision No.4 of 2008, titled “Brig (Retd.) R.S.Verma versus Shri Abhijit Rai”, whereas, landlord has filed Civil Revision No.39 of 2008, titled “Sh.Abhijit Rai versus Brig (Retd.) R.S.Verma” and assailed therein the findings rendered by the learned first Appellate Authority on issues No.1 and 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 14. It is vehemently argued by Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, for the current tenant that though the learned Appellate Authority has rightly reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issues No.1 and 2, but has gravely erred in law by affirming the eviction order on issue No.3 concluding thereby that the tenant-petitioner had acquired vacant possession of residential accommodation. 15. On the other hand, Shri Vinay Kuthiala, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Suneet Goel, Advocate, for the landlord has argued that the findings recorded by the learned lower appellate Court reversing the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on issues No.1 and 2 are perverse and are, therefore, required to be set aside. 16. 15. On the other hand, Shri Vinay Kuthiala, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Suneet Goel, Advocate, for the landlord has argued that the findings recorded by the learned lower appellate Court reversing the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on issues No.1 and 2 are perverse and are, therefore, required to be set aside. 16. Having considered the rival contentions, it would be necessary to have a glance over the evidence led by the parties. 17. PW-1, V.R.Vaish, is the Special Power of Attorney of the landlord and stated that property No.25, Boileauganj, Shimla was given to him and his brother Dr.Tara Chand in family settlement mark P-1. He stated that demised premises were given to Dr.Kharak Singh in 1935 vide lease agreement Mark P-2. He stated that tenancy was terminated in the year 1995 vide letter Mark P-3 sent on the address of Boileauganj and Faridabad address of the current tenant. He stated that letters were sent through registered AD covers Mark P-4, Mark P-5 and postal receipt is Mark P-6. He stated that the demised premises were given to the tenant as shop. He further stated that a case had been filed against the tenant before the learned Rent Controller (3), Shimla and in reply the tenant had stated that the premises is being used for residential purposes, copy of the reply is Mark P-7. He further deposed that the tenant was having his own house at Boileauganj known as “Moon House” (should be ‘Glue Moon”) and after his retirement had got two sets vacated from two tenants. 18. In cross-examination, the witness stated that the tenancy was terminated by him in the capacity of ‘Karta’ in the year 1995. He denied the suggestion that original tenant Kharak Singh had been residing alongwith his family in the demised premises comprised of four rooms, one glazed verandah, kitchen and toilet in the third floor. He admitted that lateron Kharak Singh had taken on rent a floor of the demised premises in the year 1950. The rental of the building Rs.1958/- was not disputed, however, it was denied that the “Moon House” was in a dilapidated condition. 19. PW-2, P.M.Pardeshi, is the erstwhile tenant of “Glue Moon Cottage” and stated that he had been tenant under Dr. The rental of the building Rs.1958/- was not disputed, however, it was denied that the “Moon House” was in a dilapidated condition. 19. PW-2, P.M.Pardeshi, is the erstwhile tenant of “Glue Moon Cottage” and stated that he had been tenant under Dr. Kharak Singh from April 13, 1961 to March 31, 1996 and further stated that he had vacated the premises in the year 1996 after the eviction orders had been passed against him in a petition filed by Dr.Kharak Singh on the ground of personal requirement. 20. In cross-examination, the witness denied that the premises vacated by him were dilapidated and not in an habitable condition. 21. The current tenant, on the other hand, examined Prem Singh as RW-1, who stated that he was a frequent visitor to the house of Dr.Kharak Singh, who was having two storeyed building in Boileauganj known as “25, Tara Niwas”. He stated that Dr. Kharak Singh was using first room of shop floor as clinic and the remaining accommodation was being used for residential purpose. He stated that after the death of Kharak Singh, his two sons and three daughters were residing in the demised premises. He further stated that he had seen “Glue Moon Cottage” which was in a dilapidated condition. He also stated that Brigadier R.S.Verma son of Dr. Kharak Singh is also a doctor by profession and is using the clinic for attending patients. 22. In cross-examination, the witness stated that all the children of Kharak Singh are married. However, he feigned ignorance regarding the number of tenants in the building owned by Dr. Kharak Singh in House No.23, Boileauganj, but stated that the building was four storeyed and its rent was being received by Brigadier R.S.Verma. He further stated that Dr. Kharak Singh stopped his medical practice 1-2 years before his death. He denied that the demised premises were rented out only for medical practice. He further denied that except Brigadier R.S.Verma, no other family member was residing in the demised premises. 23. RW-2 is Brigadier R.S.Verma, current tenant, who has stated that House No.25 is a five storeyed building and known as “Tara Niwas”. The third floor of this building was taken on rent by his father in and around 1930 and stated that first room was being used as a clinic while the remaining was being used for residential purpose. 23. RW-2 is Brigadier R.S.Verma, current tenant, who has stated that House No.25 is a five storeyed building and known as “Tara Niwas”. The third floor of this building was taken on rent by his father in and around 1930 and stated that first room was being used as a clinic while the remaining was being used for residential purpose. The building was taken on rent from the father of V.S.Vaish. Thereafter, in the year 1950 on account of increase in the family, they had taken second floor below the floor in question on rent and the entrance of both the floors was common from the main gate. He stated that his father had died at the age of 100 years and at that time his brother and sisters were residing with him in the demised premises and there was no change of user and addition in the demised premises and the same was put to use for the purpose to which it had been taken on rent. He admitted in his cross-examination that his father had let out the premises to Bhag Singh, but then tried to explain that it was with the consent of other co-owners. He further stated that the landlord had not carried out the repairs. He also stated that the landlord intended to sell the entire building and had approached him for purchasing the same and he had offered Rs.17 lacs, but the landlord had not reverted back to him. He also stated that the property No.23 was their ancestral property in which there were 20-25 co-sharers. He stated that “Glue Moon Cottage” was got vacated from P.M.Pardeshi (PW-2) but the condition of the same at the time of its vacation was not habitable. 24. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that the agreement Mark P-2 was executed in between late Mithan Lal and late Dr. Kharak Singh. He did not dispute that the demised premises falls within the jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation. No records could be produced by the witness in support of his claim that except him, his family is also residing with him in the demised premises. He acknowledged that building No.23 Boileauganj was four storeyed building and he was not having any litigation with any of the tenants residing therein. He further admitted that he was not a professional doctor, but had been attending to “old cases”. He acknowledged that building No.23 Boileauganj was four storeyed building and he was not having any litigation with any of the tenants residing therein. He further admitted that he was not a professional doctor, but had been attending to “old cases”. He admitted that his sisters were married but would claim that younger sister was married at Shimla itself. He further denied that the accommodation in building No.23 was sufficient for his family members. He admitted that during the illness of his father, he shifted to Faridabad where his father ultimately died. He further stated that except for the shop portion, the demised premises was being used for residential purpose. 25. RW-3, K.C.Bhagra, has stated that he knows Dr.R.S. Verma for the last 20 years and his father had been running a clinic in the front room while remaining portion of the premises was being used for residence, the user of which has not been changed till date. He further stated that he had seen “Glue Moon Cottage”, which according to him, was in a dilapidated condition. 26. In cross-examination, he admitted that contesting tenant alongwith his family members was residing in the demised premises which was 50-60 years old. He further reiterated that “Glue Moon” building was not in a habitable condition. This in entirety is the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties. 27. As noticed above, the landlord has sought eviction of the contesting tenant on three distinct grounds as reproduced in para-2 (supra) and for each ground, distinct issues came to be framed by the learned Rent Controller on 08.11.2005. For the sake of convenience and clarity, each one of the grounds is taken separately and referred to as point No.1, 2 and 3. Point No.1. 28. This point is essentially required to be decided by falling back to the provisions of the Act so as to find out whether the premises in dispute are “non-residential” as averred by the landlord or are “residential” as is sought to be established by the contesting tenant. 29. Point No.1. 28. This point is essentially required to be decided by falling back to the provisions of the Act so as to find out whether the premises in dispute are “non-residential” as averred by the landlord or are “residential” as is sought to be established by the contesting tenant. 29. Residential building has been defined under Section 2 (h) of the Act in the following terms:- “2(h) “Residential building” means any building which is not non-residential building;” Whereas, “non-residential” building has been defined in Section 2(e) in the following terms:- “2 (e) “Non-residential building” means a building being used- (i) mainly for the purpose of business or trade; or (ii) partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence, subject to the condition that the person who carried on business or trade in the building resides therein; Provided that if a building is let out for residential and non-residential purposes, separately to more than one person, the portion thereof let out for the purpose of residence shall not be treated as non-residential building.” Explanation.-Where a building is used mainly for the purpose of business or trade, it shall be deemed to be a non-residential building even though a small portion thereof is used for the purpose of residence;” 30. It would be noticed that the word used to define nonresidential building is “mainly for the purpose of business or trade” which means ‘substantially’ in contradiction to the word ‘solely’ which means exclusively. Therefore, in such circumstances, it is the dominant user of the building which will serve as a guiding factor to determine the nature of the building. If the dominant user remains running of trade and business, then even if small portion is used as residence, it would remain non-residential building. Likewise, if the dominant user of the building is residential, then the mere fact that a small portion thereof is being used for non-residential purposes, the same would still remain residential. 31. Now, in case the pleadings are evaluated, then it would be seen that the landlord in para-4 of the petition has described the premises as non-residential and had rented out the premises to the tenant for commercial purpose to run his clinic whereas he had converted the same into residential premises. 31. Now, in case the pleadings are evaluated, then it would be seen that the landlord in para-4 of the petition has described the premises as non-residential and had rented out the premises to the tenant for commercial purpose to run his clinic whereas he had converted the same into residential premises. Whereas, in reply thereto, the contesting tenant has submitted that since his father was a doctor, he used to attend the patients as and when required in front room of the premises facing the road and the premises were never taken for medical practice alone. Apart from one room, the other rooms were being used as residence. 32. Adverting to the evidence led by the parties, it would be noticed that overwhelming evidence led by the respondent to prove that out of the entire premises, it was only the room alone facing the road that was being used as a clinic while the rest of the premises were being used only for residential purpose. This is so stated by RW-1 Prem Singh, RW-2 the current tenant himself and RW-3 K.C.Bhagra, as would be evident from the testimonies discussed in paras 21 to 26 (supra). On the other hand, save and except for the bald statement of PW-1, the petitioner has virtually led no evidence to show much less to prove that the entire premises had been given to the tenant as ‘shop’. Point No.2. 33. As regards point No.2 regarding the value and utility of the building being impaired, the learned Appellate Authority has rightly observed that the landlord has led no evidence to this effect and, therefore, these findings call for no interference. Point No.3. 34. Insofar as the third ground for eviction is concerned, it is not in dispute that the landlord had acquired vacant possession of one of the flat No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla, as this fact has been admitted by the current tenant while appearing as RW-2 though he qualified his statement that the same had been let out to Bhag Singh with the consent of other co-owners. 35. However, the larger question which arises for consideration is whether the accommodation in possession of current tenant can be said to be insufficient or does he only have a quest and insatiable desire to possess properties. 35. However, the larger question which arises for consideration is whether the accommodation in possession of current tenant can be said to be insufficient or does he only have a quest and insatiable desire to possess properties. These observations are being made on the basis of the proved facts on record which clearly establish that as of today the current tenant is possessed of the following properties:- (i) The disputed premises comprising of three rooms, one glazed verandah, one kitchen, one bathroom, W.C. and store in the third floor in 25, Boileauganj; (ii) Similar or equivalent accommodation in the second floor taken on rent by father of the current tenant in the year 1950 in 25, Boileauganj; (iii) Six rooms in “Glue Moon Cottage”; (iv) One building at Faridabad and; (v) At the same time he is also owner of the four storeyed Building No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla and is even receiving rent therefrom. 36. Though, the current tenant would claim that the property No.23, Boileauganj, is owned by various other co-owners, but there is not an iota of evidence led by him to prove this fact. In addition to this, it has been clearly established on record that the current tenant is mainly residing at Faridabad in the State of Haryana and not at Shimla and, therefore, if at all he requires any residence at Shimla i.e. only for his casual visits, he could have conveniently occupied the premises vacated by Laxmi Ram in property No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla. In such circumstances, the act of letting out these premises even after vacation to Bhag Singh and not occupying the same has rightly been taken into account by the learned authorities below while ordering the eviction of the tenant. 37. The learned lower Appellate Authority has erred in not taking into account the acquisition of vacant possession of “Glue Moon Cottage” which admittedly consists of six rooms only on the ground that it was father of the current tenant, who had obtained eviction orders against the tenant P.M.Pardeshi. The learned lower Appellate Authority appears to be totally oblivious of the grounds on which eviction order was sought by the tenant in those proceedings. The learned lower Appellate Authority appears to be totally oblivious of the grounds on which eviction order was sought by the tenant in those proceedings. It is borne out from the record that the eviction of the tenant was sought only on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord (tenant herein) and not on any other ground like the premises being in a dilapidated condition or being inhabitable or unsafe etc. which were otherwise available to him under the relevant statute prevailing at that time. Therefore, it is too late in the day for the tenant to say that he could not shift to the premises known as “Glue Moon Cottage” as they were dilapidated and were not fit for human habitation. Even otherwise, this stand of the current tenant stands completely demolished by the statement of erstwhile tenant P.M.Pardeshi, who has categorically stated that the condition of the premises is not at all dilapidated or not fit for human habitation. 38. Apart from this, the current tenant appears to have been caught in his own web when he categorically admitted that the “Glue Moon Cottage” and the premises in dispute are roughly of the same age i.e. having been constructed at the same time. 39. Even if, it is assumed that the premises comprised in “Glue Moon Cottage” were in a dilapidated condition, even then the same in itself could not be a ground for the current tenant to have not occupied the same, if not promptly, then within a reasonable time and it was no excuse to claim that he has no resources for the same, more particularly, when it has come on record that the current tenant has retired from Army that too from the post of Brigadier. The plea raised by the current tenant, to say the least, is not at all bonafide. 40. The reason for sticking on to the premises is but obvious as the current tenant is barely paying a sum of Rs.1958/- per annum for the palatial premises in his occupation. Whereas, he is receiving rental of Rs.800/- per month from Bhag Singh alone, apart from the other rentals which he is receiving from the tenants of the four storeyed building owned by him i.e. building No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla. 41. Whereas, he is receiving rental of Rs.800/- per month from Bhag Singh alone, apart from the other rentals which he is receiving from the tenants of the four storeyed building owned by him i.e. building No.23, Boileauganj, Shimla. 41. It would further be noticed that the current tenant has categorically stated in his examination before the Court that the landlord intended to sell the entire building and had approached him for purchasing the same and he had offered Rs.17 lacs, but the landlord had not reverted back. This clearly indicates that the current tenant made all out efforts to tire out the landlord, so that he would ultimately settle with him by paying a meagre amount of Rs.17 lacs for the entire premises. 42. The learned lower Appellate Authority has erred in not taking into consideration that the rent legislature could not be interpreted in a manner so as to lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of actually being unfair to the landlord. The learned lower Appellate Authority further erred in not taking into consideration that while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord, the same were required to be interpreted in a manner which lean in favour of the landlord. 43. Here, it would be apt to take note of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joginder Pal versus Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397 wherein it was held:- “9. The Rent Control Legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The Legislative intent has to be respected by the Courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to Legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The Legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords- both. The Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. The Legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords- both. The Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of landlord the Court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlord too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 32. We have already noticed that the purpose of the Act is to restrict increase of rent and the eviction of tenants in urban areas. Still the legislature has taken care to provide grounds for eviction, one of them being the requirement of the landlord. We have to strike a balance between the need of protecting the tenants from unjustified evictions and the need for eviction when ground for eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. If we do not meaningfully construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use' in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.” 44. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.” 44. It cannot be disputed that the initial view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on rent legislation leaned entirely in favour of the tenants, but of late, it has been made clear that the object of the rent law is to balance the competing claims of the landlords on the one hand to recover possession of building let out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against the arbitrary increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage of accommodation. 45. This was so observed by the Hon’ble three Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sidhharth Viyas and another versus Ravi Nath Misra and others (2015) 2 SCC 701 wherein it has been held as follows:- “10. The object of rent law is to balance the competing claims of the landlord on the one hand to recover possession of building let out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage of accommodation. Though, it is for the legislature to resolve such competing claims in terms of statutory provisions, while interpreting the provisions the object of the Act has to be kept in view by the Court. Unless otherwise provided, a tenant who has already acquired alternative accommodation is not intended to be protected by the Rent Act. 11. In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397 this Court observed : (SCC pp. 402-05, paras 5-9) "5. It will be useful to state the principles relevant for interpretation of a provision contained in a rent control law like the one with which we are dealing. The spurt of provincial rent control legislations is a necessary consequence of population explosion. 402-05, paras 5-9) "5. It will be useful to state the principles relevant for interpretation of a provision contained in a rent control law like the one with which we are dealing. The spurt of provincial rent control legislations is a necessary consequence of population explosion. In Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. (1987) 4 SCC 238 the Court noticed craving for a home - a natural human instinct, intensified by post-war migration of human beings en bloc place to place, the partition of the country and uprooting of the people from their hearth and home as vital factors leading to acute housing shortage persuading the legislatures to act and enact rent control laws. The Court emphasized the need of making the landlord and tenant laws rational, humane, certain and capable of being quickly implemented. Benefit of society at large needs an equalistic balance being maintained between apparently conflicting interests of the owners of the property and the tenant by inducing and encouraging the landlords to part with available accommodation for reasonable length of time to accommodate tenants without unreasonably restricting their right to have the property being restored to them, more so, wh en they genuinely require it. Such limited safeguarding of landlords' interest ensures a boost to construction activity which in turn results in availability of more houses to accommodate more human souls with a roof on their heads. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as His Lordship then was, articulated the empty truism in such words as have become an oft-quoted quotation (SCC p. 262, para 36)- "36….Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants." 6. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1 this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. ‘The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society.’ (SCC p. 22, para 29) While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenants is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a short-sighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also result in constitutional invalidity. 7. In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani (1989) 4 SCC 612 this Court dealing with rent control legislation observed that provisions contained in such legislations are capable of being categorized into two: those beneficial to the tenants and those beneficial to the landlord. As to a legislative provision beneficial to the landlord, an assertion that even with regard to such provision an effort should be made to interpret it in favour of the tenant, is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of a beneficial legislation. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan. (1979) 1 SCC 273 Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble." 46. As is clear from the above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the rent Acts have been enacted not only to protect the tenants’ unjust eviction but have been enacted to clearly enforce the rights of the landlord to obtain possession of their own property in the event of their satisfying the grounds prescribed for eviction. To say the least, the defence set up by the current tenant in this case was not only false but is also cantankerous, more particularly, taking into consideration his stature and rank. 47. In view of the above discussion, both the revision petitions are dismissed. However, as observed earlier, the current tenant has illegally deprived the landlord of the possession of the property for all these years. 47. In view of the above discussion, both the revision petitions are dismissed. However, as observed earlier, the current tenant has illegally deprived the landlord of the possession of the property for all these years. Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to see that such wrong doers are discouraged at every step and even if the current tenant has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, then he must suffer the cost of the litigation and also bear the expenses of such unwarranted and otherwise avoidable litigation. Therefore, the current tenant is burdened with costs which are assessed at Rs.30,000/- to be paid to the landlord. However, it is clarified that this cost shall not prevent the landlord from seeking mesne profits on such rates as the competent authority may determine in this case. 48. Having said so, the petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. All pending applications, if any, stand dispose of. The Registry is directed to place a copy of this judgment on the file of Civil Revision No.39 of 2008.