JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- (i) That the order dated 6.11.2006 passed by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Case No. 69 of 2006 at Annexure P-9, may very kindly be quashed and set-aside. (ii) That the order dated 23.8.2005 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Hamirpur in Case No. 1 of 2003 may very kindly be upheld. (iii) That the respondents may kindly be directed to produce the entire record pertaining to the case of the petitioner for the kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. (iv) Any other order as this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.” 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that the petitioner is aggrieved with order dated 6.11.2006 passed by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings under Section 54 of H.P. Consolidation of Holdings (Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (in short the Act), whereby revision petition preferred on behalf of the respondents was allowed after setting aside the order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) Hamirpur, in case No. 1 of 2003 dated 23.8.2005 further upheld by the Additional Director, in case No. 15/2005 dated 27.4.2006. 3. Pleadings as well as documents on record suggest that in year 1960-61, consolidation took place in Mouza Ladher, Pargna Tiun, Teshil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP. The land comprising khasra No.311 on the Musavi prior to consolidation was jointly owned by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner and respondents but after consolidation, the said khasra was allotted to the petitioner and he has been in actual physical possession of the said khasra since 1961-62. He also developed his ‘Abadi’ i.e. house, cattle shed etc. on this khasra number. But after 40 years of consolidation, respondent No. 2 preferred a revision petition under Section 54 of the Act on 8.4.2002 averring therein that during consolidation proceedings, very dimension of khasra No. 303 i.e. Abadi Deh, has been changed, whereas the dimensions of said khasra prior to consolidation proceedings has been shown as 7-4-4-4 and after consolidation, dimensions have been changed to 7-3-4-2, which has resulted in wrongly showing khasra No. 311 in favour of the present petitioner. Respondent No.2 also prayed that fresh demarcation is required to be carried out at the spot and revenue papers/records be prepared keeping in view the factual position at the spot as well as long outstanding entries existing in favour of (applicant) respondent No.1 herein. He also stated that same may also be shown in the ownership and possession of the applicant as he is in actual possession of the same and was also duly recorded as owner of the same before consolidation operation. In nutshell respondent No.2 by way of revision prayed that revenue entries may be ordered to be corrected and fresh demarcation be carried out on the spot so that he is recorded as owner in possession of the same with corresponding dimension. Respondent No.1 vide order dated 20.8.2002 decided the revision petition and remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer, Hamirpur, who registered the same as Revenue Appeal No. 107 of 2002, and ordered that one biswa of land would be kept as joint between the petitioner and respondent No.2. Present petitioner being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order (supra), preferred an appeal under Section 30/3 of the Act, before the Settlement Officer, Hamirpur.However, present respondent being satisfied with the passing of order dated 6.12.2002 never laid any challenge, whatsoever, to the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. The appeal of present petitioner was allowed and land comprising khasra No. 17/1was partitioned and allotted to both the parties vide order dated 23.8.2005. Being not satisfied with the order ibid, respondent No.2 filed an appeal under Section 30(4) of the Act before Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Shimla, which came to be registered as Case No. 15 of 2005 and vide order dated 27.4.2006, same was dismissed. Since respondent No. 2 was not satisfied with the aforesaid order, he preferred revision petition bearing No. 69 of 2006, under Section 54 of the Act before the Director Consolidation of Holding, exercising powers of the State Government under Section 54 of the Act vide order dated 6.11.2006 quashed and set-aside the orders passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation of Holdings, in case No. 1 of 2003 dated 23.8.2005 and 27.4.2006 passed by the Addl. Director in Case No. 15/2005 and allotted the whole of the khasra No. 17/1 to respondent No. 2 to the complete exclusion of present petitioner. Director in Case No. 15/2005 and allotted the whole of the khasra No. 17/1 to respondent No. 2 to the complete exclusion of present petitioner. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner by way of writ petition approached this Court. 4. Before proceeding on merit in the instant case, it would be profitable to reproduce the relevant para of the impugned order passed by the Director, Consolidation herein below:- “Both the parties were heard and the relevant record perused/inspected. In this case the report of the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur was also sought which is added to the case file. After passing this report, it has been found that the major portion of Khasra No. 17/1 is under the possession of the petitioner. This apart, a passage leads to the Abadi of the petitioner through this very Khasra Number. Even before the consolidation, this Khasra number was under the ownership and possession of the petitioner. The objection raised by the petitioner appears to be genuine and correct after hearing the arguments of the parties and perusal of the record and report of the Consolidation Officer. Hence the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation of Holdings in Case No.1/2003, dt. 23.8.2005 and the Addl. Director in case No.15/2005, dt. 27.4.2006 are set aside and the following modification/ corrections are hereby ordered:- Sl. No Name of owner Excluded Included Khasra No(s) Area Khasra No(s) Area 1. As per mutation No._________of ownership.Total Shares: 4328 Kuldeep-Son 102/shares; Km. Pushpa and Km. Nisha- daughters 1082 shares in equal proportion, Smt. Sushma Devi, Wd/o Amar Nah son of Dandu, Son of Saparu-2164 shares. Local residents as mentioned in jamabandi for the year 2000-2001 17/1 0-1 chati Without compensation 2. 2 Lalman, S/o Mst Ram, S/o Ghungar-local residents as mentioned in Khewat No.2, Jamabandi for the year 2000-2001 - - 17/1/2 0-1 chati The amendment/correction be got prepared and added to the file. The revision petition of the petitioner is allowed in terms of the aforesaid amendment. A copy of this order be supplied to the Consolidation of Holdings Officer, Bilaspur for compliance alongwith the amendment/correct.” 5. Perusal of grounds taken in the present petition assailing impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation suggests that the petitioner has laid challenge to the aforesaid orders on the various grounds, which are not being produced here for the sake of brevity. 6. Mr. Perusal of grounds taken in the present petition assailing impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation suggests that the petitioner has laid challenge to the aforesaid orders on the various grounds, which are not being produced here for the sake of brevity. 6. Mr. Mohit Thakur, Advocate, representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation exercising powers under Section 54 of the Act is not sustainable in the eye of law and same deserves to be quashed and set-aside. He vehemently contended that Director while passing impugned order has exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and as such, same cannot be allowed to be sustained being illegal. During the arguments having been made by Mr. Mohit, he invited attention of this Court to the impugned order to demonstrate that Director while exercising powers instead of determining the illegality and infirmity, if any, in the order passed by the Additional Director as well all Settlement Collector, called for a fresh report of the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur, and on the basis of same, passed the impugned order and as such, exercised its jurisdiction while exercising revisionary powers under Section 54 of the Act. Mr. Thakur strenuously argued that while exercising revisionary powers under Section 54 of the Act, Director had no powers to reexamine/ re-appreciate the evidence available on record and he could only examine whether authorities below have committed illegality and irregularities, if any, while passing the order in revenue appeal. Apart from above, Mr. Thakur also pleaded that respondents miserably failed to consider the material fact that there was an inordinate delay of more than 40 years in filing revision petition by respondent No.2 and as such, action of authorities in allowing the revision petition filed under Section 54 of the Act after 40 years of consolidation of holding is not sustainable. He also contended on behalf of the petitioner that land comprised of khasra No. 17/1 carved out of khasra No. 17 was kept joint by the Consolidation Officer, Hamirpur, vide order dated 6.11.2002 (Annexure P-5) and same was accepted by respondent No.2 and since he had not preferred any appeal against the said order, it attained finality qua the respondent. He also contended on behalf of the petitioner that land comprised of khasra No. 17/1 carved out of khasra No. 17 was kept joint by the Consolidation Officer, Hamirpur, vide order dated 6.11.2002 (Annexure P-5) and same was accepted by respondent No.2 and since he had not preferred any appeal against the said order, it attained finality qua the respondent. Counsel for the petitioner also made this Court to travel through the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer, Hamirpur, wherein he ordered to keep one biswa of land as joint between the petitioner and respondent No.2. He also invited attention of this Court to the order passed by the settlement officer, Hamirpur in the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 30 (3) of the Consolidation Act, wherein, while allowing the appeal, land comprising khasra No. 17/1 was partitioned and was allotted to both the parties i.e. petitioner and respondent No.2. Mr. Thakur, also contended that since the petitioner was already allotted less land by two biswas, petitioner has been put to loss as his land has been substantially reduced, whereas respondent No.2 who was already in excess of the land beyond his domain/entitlement has been given land without any reason or justification that too after 42 years of the consolidation of holdings. While concluding his arguments Mr. Thakur, contended that very purpose of consolidation policy has been defeated in the present case, moreover the petitioner has developed abadi on the adjoining land to khasra No. 17/1. He also stated that the report of consolidation Officer showing possession of respondent is false and fabricated and since same was not supplied to the petitioner, he had no occasion, whatsoever, to file objections to the same and as such, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside. 7. Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, representing respondent No.1 and Mr. B.M Chauhan, counsel representing respondent No.2 supported the impugned order passed by the Director. He stated that there is no illegality whatsoever, in the impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation as the same is based upon the correct appreciation of the report furnished by the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur. B.M Chauhan, counsel representing respondent No.2 supported the impugned order passed by the Director. He stated that there is no illegality whatsoever, in the impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation as the same is based upon the correct appreciation of the report furnished by the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur. Aforesaid counsel contended that present revision is not maintainable at all because writ petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands, rather, stated that an attempt has been made to procure the relief by mis-stating the facts, which could not be otherwise granted to him. Aforesaid counsel with a view to substantiate their aforesaid submissions made this Court to peruse impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation, wherein he has recorded that both the parties were heard and records were perused and inspected. Mr. Chauhan, contended that before passing the impugned order, due opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by Director Consolidation and as such, it cannot be said that petitioner was not heard and afforded opportunity of being heard at the time of passing of impugned order. Mr. Chauhan, forcefully contended that report of Consolidation Officer Bilaspur filed by him pursuant to the direction issued by the Director Consolidation, clearly suggests that major portion of land comprising khasra No.17/1 was under the possession of respondent and passage leads to abadi of the respondents through this khasra number. He also contended that it is clear from the report that even before consolidation, aforesaid khasra number was under the ownership and possession of the respondents and as such, there is no illegality and infirmity in the order passed by the Director Consolidation in the revision petition preferred by him. He strenuously argued that Director was well within its powers to call for the report of the consolidation Officer, Bilaspur while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Act. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record. 9. After perusing the averments contained in the petition as well as impugned order, this Court needs to determine “whether the impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation exercising power under Section 54 of the Act is legal and in accordance with the provisions of the Act or not.” At this juncture, it would be apt to reproduce Section 54 of the Act:- 54. Powers of the State Government to call for proceedings- The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such orders in reference thereto as it things fit: Provided that no order, scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration. 10. In the present case, respondents being aggrieved with orders dated 23.8.2005 and 27.4.2006 passed by Settlement Officer, Consolidation of Holdings further upheld by Additional Director filed application under Section 54 of the Act, praying therein that revenue entries be ordered to be corrected on the basis of actual possession on the spot so that the applicant who is in possession of the land is recorded as owner of the same with corresponding dimensions. Respondents also claimed that petitioner has no right to claim khasra No. 17/1 and the allotment of 10 biswansis of land by creating Khasra No. 17/1/2 is illegal. He also claimed that he is entitled to take back the land since he is absolute owner in possession of the same. Respondents approached the Director under Section 54 on the ground that Settlement Officer by dividing one biswa of land and creating a new khasra number has prejudiced his right, who was owner in possession of the same, as is evident from jamabandi 1954-55. He also stated that it forms the courtyard of his house and the path leading to their residential house also exists upon the same and there is no justification legal or otherwise to give part of this land to the petitioner, whereas settlement officer concluded that during the course of southern dimension of land bearing khasra No.04 was recorded as 11, 3, 8, 8,2,4,3,7, whereas south-eastern dimensions after 8 karam were recorded 4,4,4,7. Similarly, the south dimensions in respect of khasra No. 0.8 were correctly recorded as 4,4,4,7 as per Aks settlement instead of 2,4,3,7. Similarly, the south dimensions in respect of khasra No. 0.8 were correctly recorded as 4,4,4,7 as per Aks settlement instead of 2,4,3,7. Accordingly, he ordered for correction of old sajra and ordered that 0-1 biswa shall remain common to both Bishan Dass and others and Lalman. He also observed that earlier Lalman and Jita Ram were recorded as joint owners of half share in each in jamabadi for the year 1954-55, khewat No. 3/4 prior to consolidation but during the course of consolidation, entire old khasra No. 311 was allotted to the petitioner, whereas the cattle shed and house of the respondent was to be kept as common to both the parties. Accordingly, he allotted 0-1 marla of land comprising ld khasra No. 311 and 17/1 (current) to both the parties remain as common. 11. Careful perusal of Section 54 suggests that State Government may at any point of time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and pass order as it may think fit but with the rider that no order, scheme or re-partition would be varied or reversed without giving the parties notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in case where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration. 12. If the impugned order passed by the Director Consolidation is seen in light of the provision contained in Section 54 of the Act, it clearly emerges that Director Consolidation instead of determining whether order under challenge before him is illegal or result of irregular exercisem, called for reports of Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur, and came to conclusion that major portion of khasra No. 17/1 is under possession of the respondent and passage leads to abadi of the respondent/petitioner. He also concluded that before consolidation, this khasra number was under ownership and possession of the respondent/petitioner. Careful perusal of the Section 54 of the Act, nowhere suggests that Director while exercising powers under Section 54 could vary or reverse any order passed by any office under this Act save and except, when he was satisfied that proceedings were vitiated by unlawful consideration. Careful perusal of the Section 54 of the Act, nowhere suggests that Director while exercising powers under Section 54 could vary or reverse any order passed by any office under this Act save and except, when he was satisfied that proceedings were vitiated by unlawful consideration. But in the present case, bare perusal of impugned order suggests that by calling report of Consolidation Bilsapur and thereafter relying upon the same, while accepting the revision of respondent/petitioner, Director exceeded its jurisdiction vested in him/her under Section 54 of the Act. While exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 54, Director had no occasion whatsoever, to look into the factual aspect of the matter and was supposed to examine whether order under challenge is illegal or has been passed in irregular exercise or non-exercise of powers conferred upon the said officer or not. Admittedly, while exercising revisionary jurisdiction Director, had no authority to call for report, if any, of the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur. In the present case, there is no finding of the Director that there is any illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the lower courts rather, order passed by the Director is based upon the report, which was called by him during the pendency of the revision petition. In this regard, it would be apt to reproduce the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Dular v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, dated 8.2.1994, herein below:- “3. The question, therefore, is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation was legally justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer. It is true that the finding whether Jokhu and Sampath are sons of Angan is a finding of fact and that the authorities are entitled to consider that question. But while exercising the revisional power under Section 48, what requires to be seen is, whether the Deputy Director has considered the question in its proper perspective or had ignored any material evidence on record in coming to the said conclusion. Section 48 reads thus: "48. But while exercising the revisional power under Section 48, what requires to be seen is, whether the Deputy Director has considered the question in its proper perspective or had ignored any material evidence on record in coming to the said conclusion. Section 48 reads thus: "48. Revision and Reference.- (1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit." It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the legality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings or correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the rest (sic root) of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding. In this case it is seen that admittedly all the parties have been residing in the same locality. It had been found by the Consolidation Officer that the appellant was in possession of the lands and he had produced revenue receipts for continuously 15 years from 1365 Fasli onwards and that finding was not disturbed by the Deputy Director. It is true that the record for the Fasli 1306 was found fabricated and the name of Sampath was not mutated and Jokhu alone was mutated in the revenue records for 1307 Fasli. It is true that the record for the Fasli 1306 was found fabricated and the name of Sampath was not mutated and Jokhu alone was mutated in the revenue records for 1307 Fasli. The Consolidation Officer recorded the genuineness of the entries for the year 1308 Fasli which was not even disputed by the respondents. In the entries for 1308 Fasli the name of Sampath was found as son of Angan and was mutated. This vital aspect was omitted to be taken into consideration by the Deputy Director. The Deputy Director on the other hand concluded that for the year 1308 Fasli also the name of Sampath was fabricated. It is an obvious error committed by the Deputy Director and the High Court refused to correct it on the plea that it is only a finding of fact. Once, from the entries it is seen that Sampath was also mentioned as son of Angan and the appellant had been continuously in possession for 15 years it would clearly indicate that he has been in joint possession in respect of land in the aforesaid Khata Nos. along with the respondents. As seen, there is no alternative genealogy filed by the respondents. The Deputy Director merely recorded the genealogy of the respondents and their ancestry, omitting the branch of the appellant. Thereby he practically omitted to consider the genealogy which was even undisputed by the respondents. Under these circumstances the Deputy Director has committed manifest error of law by reversing the orders of the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer. Accordingly the appeal is allowed, the order of the Settlement Officer is confirmed to the extent of half share in the ancestral property acquired by Angan as affirmed by the Settlement Officer on appeal. But in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.” 13. Reliance is also placed on judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Avtar & Ors. v. Ram Dhani & Ors., 1997(2) SCC 263 , the relevant paras of which read as under:- “This Court in the case of Ramji Dixit & Anr. v. Bhrigunath & Ors. reported in (1968) 2 SCR 767 has considered the scope of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act in connection with a widow holding a life estate and has held that in view of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act she will be deemed to be Bhumidhar. v. Bhrigunath & Ors. reported in (1968) 2 SCR 767 has considered the scope of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act in connection with a widow holding a life estate and has held that in view of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act she will be deemed to be Bhumidhar. Learned counsel tried to distinguish the judgment by saying that in that case, the land had devolved on the widow from her husband directly and not on the basis of any compromise. According to us, the ratio of that judgment cannot be distinguished on this ground. The High Court has rightly rejected the stand of the appellants that as Smt. Phoola got the lands by way of maintenance it will be covered by Section 11 of the Act and after vesting she will be deemed to be the asami and not Bhumidhar. It appears Section 11 shall be applicable where the holder of sir or Khudkasht lands allots such lands to a person in lieu of maintenance allowance. In the present case, Smt. Phoola got the lands on the basis of a compromise entered into in the year 1932 and she was in possession thereof. We are surprised as to how the Deputy Director(6) while exercising the revisional power entered into all questions of fact and came to the conclusion on pure conjecture that the appellants before this Court shall be deemed to be in possession of the lands since 1932. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that howsoever wide the power under statutory revision may be in contrast to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still while exercising that power the authority concerned cannot act as court of appeal so as to reappreciate the evidence on record for recording findings on questions of fact. According to us, the High Court should have set aside the order of the Deputy Director, on this ground alone and should have restored the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). We are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.” 14. Reliance is also placed on judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, 2014 (9) SCC 78 , which reads as under:- “4. We are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.” 14. Reliance is also placed on judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, 2014 (9) SCC 78 , which reads as under:- “4. Section 15 of the Haryana Rent Control Act provides for appellate and revisional authorities. This provision in the Haryana Rent Control Act reads as under: “15. Appellate and revisional authorities.—(1) The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such officers and authorities as it may think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within thirty days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the period of thirty days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (3) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (4) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller. (5) The decisions of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (6) of this section. (6) The High Court as revisional authority, may at any time, on its own motion or on the application of any aggrieved party, made within a period of ninety days, call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. In computing the period of ninety days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order shall be excluded.” 5. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, Section 23 and Section 25 provide for appeal and revision, respectively. Since we are concerned with the scope of revisional power, it is not necessary to reproduce the appellate provision. Section 25, which deals with revisional power, reads as under: “25. Revision.—(1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. (2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant: Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this subsection.” 6. The provision for appeal is contained in the Kerala Rent Control Act in Section 18 while Section 20 of that Act deals with the revisional jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act reads as under: “20. (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a Subordinate judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion.” 7. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion.” 7. A careful reading of the text of the above three provisions will show that under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Rent Control Act, the High Court as revisional authority, may suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party, call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order as it may deem fit. The Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act provides that the High Court on the application of an aggrieved person may call for and examine the record of the appellate authority to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein. The High Court in exercise of its revisional power may modify, annul or reverse the order or decision impugned before it or remit the matter for re-consideration. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the High Court has no power to act suo motu. The Kerala Rent Control Act provides that the High Court on the application of an aggrieved party may call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and pass any order that it deems fit. Like the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the Kerala Rent Control Act also does not empower the High Court to act suo motu. Though, there is some difference in the language of the revisional provision in the above three statutes but, in our opinion, the revisional power of the High Court under the above Rent Control Acts is substantially similar and not significantly different. 8. Before we embark upon an inquiry to find out the ambit and scope of the revisional power of the High Court under these Rent Control Acts, we may quickly observe that in this reference, we have to really determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality, regularity or propriety”. Obviously, this will determine the extent of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective Rent Control statutes and will also include the consideration of the question whether the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can re-appreciate the evidence in order to find out the correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned order or decision. 26. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality, regularity or propriety” which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration. 27. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality’ is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. 28. The term ‘propriety’ means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 29. The terms ‘correctness’ and ‘propriety’ ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, ‘correctness’ is compounded of ‘legality’ and ‘propriety’ and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct’. 30. The expression “regularity” with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 31. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings. 32. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings. 32. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works that where both expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression “appeal”. The use of two expressions “appeal” and “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an ‘appeal’ and so also of a ‘revision’. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial Court or the subordinate Tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.” 39. Rukmini holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the 3- Judge Bench in Rukmini that the word “propriety” does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini. 45. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini. 45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 15. Careful perusal of the judgments referred herein above, clearly suggests that Director, while exercising revisionary power under Section 54 of the Act, can call for and examine the record of any case decided by the Subordinate authority for purpose of satisfying as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order. Careful perusal of the judgments referred herein above, clearly suggests that Director, while exercising revisionary power under Section 54 of the Act, can call for and examine the record of any case decided by the Subordinate authority for purpose of satisfying as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order. But certainly while examining correctness of the legality or propriety of the order, it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating facts de-novo. In the instant case, the Director while exercising revisionary power entered into question of facts and called for report of the Collector Holdings, Bilaspur and came to conclusion that even before the consolidation, Khasra number in question was under the ownership and possession of respondent No.2. This Court is of the view that the Director committed patent illegality while calling for the report of the Collector Bilaspur while deciding the appeal preferred on behalf of the present respondent because he could not assume the jurisdiction of original authority as a fact finding authority. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that howsoever wide the power under statutory revision may be in contrast to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still while exercising that power the authority concerned cannot act as court of appeal so as to re-appreciate the evidence on record for recording findings on questions of fact. 16. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down (supra), this Court has no hesitation to conclude that Director Consolidation while passing impugned order dated 6.11.2006 exceeded its jurisdiction by reverting to the facts of the case as well as returning finding of the factual aspect of the matter by calling report of the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur. Accordingly petition is allowed and impugned order is quashed and set-aside. Petition is disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.