JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal stands directed against the impugned judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, whereby he affirmed the rendition of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kandaghat. The plaintiffs standing aggrieved by the concurrently recorded renditions against them by both the learned Courts below concert through the instant appeal constituted before this Court, to reverse the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below. 2. The facts necessary for rendering a decision on the instant appeal are that plaintiffs claimed to be owner in possession of 2 biswas of land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No. 179 min 314, old khasra No. 1500/1186/2 and new Khasra No. 1053 situated in Mauja Sirinagar, Pargana Baguri-khurd, Tehsil Kandaghat being part of the land measuring 6 bighas 5 biswas recorded as Abadi Deh in the revenue record. The respondents/defendants who claimed to be owner of this land on account of having escheated to it as its owner Tara Chuhru Tailor had died issueless initiated ejectment proceedings under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act alleging that predecessor in interest of the appellants/plaintiffs had encroached upon this land, the Collector Kandaghat who ordered the ejectment of the predecessor in interest of the appellants from this land. It was also alleged that he land was being auctioned and predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs had also made a bid in the year 1970 but his bid being lost was not accepted and it was leased out to Pritam Singh. The appeal by the predecessor in interest of the appellants against this order had been dismissed up to the level of Financial Commissioner, consequently a suit was filed by the present appellants who in the alternative claimed to be owner by adverse possession and that the suit land was not a Nazul land was coming in possession of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs since long and provisions of Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act are not applicable to the suit land being Abadi Deh and Financial Commissioner having no jurisdiction to declare the revenue entries being wrong. Consequently, the suit for declaration and injunction. 3. The suit of the plaintiffs was resisted by defendants whereby they have taken preliminary objections that the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit due to their own act and conduct. Consequently, the suit for declaration and injunction. 3. The suit of the plaintiffs was resisted by defendants whereby they have taken preliminary objections that the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit due to their own act and conduct. On merits, the defendants have denied the averments made by the plaintiffs in their plaint and specifically pleaded that the defendants have every right to evict the unauthorized occupants from the Government land under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. It is averred that the plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest had never been in its possession and they have grabbed the possession of the suit land being the adjoining land owner in possession. The State has every right to initiate the proceedings under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act against the plaintiffs. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties in contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land, as claimed? OPP. 2. Whether the provisions of Section 163 of the Land Revenue Act are not applicable to the suit land and as such the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaration that the order passed by the Revenue Authorities is illegal and inoperative, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiffs have are estopped from filing the present suit due to their own acts and deeds, as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action, as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether late Shri Duni Chand has filed a suit in the year 1986 having suit No. 51 of 1986, if so, its effect? OPD. 7. Relief. 5. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs besides the learned First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred therefrom before it by the plaintiffs. 6. Now the plaintiffs have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, assailing the findings in its impugned judgment and decree recorded by the learned first Appellate Court. 6. Now the plaintiffs have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, assailing the findings in its impugned judgment and decree recorded by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission on 26.4.2006, this Court admitted the appeal on the hereinafter extracted substantial question of law:- “Whether the first appellate Court has erred in dismissing the appeal when it has specifically been observed in para 11 of its judgment that the land in question is not shown to have belonged to Tara Chuhra, on whose death the respondent-defendant claimed that it escheated to the State and became Wazud Land?” Substantial question of law 7. The predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs/appellants had purchased the ‘Abadi’ of one Dharam Dutt. Tersely the lawful possession of the plaintiffs of the contentious portion of two biswas of land adjoining the ‘Abadi land’ of the plaintiffs as stood purchased by their predecessor in interest from one Dharam Dutt, is the nerve centre of the controversy engaging the parties at lis. Proven lawful possession of Abadi land by Abadi holders vests in the latter an indefeasible right qua continuance of possession thereof also preempts any onslaught qua usurpation of its possession standing constituted either by the State or by any holder of Abadi land adjoining it. PW-1 had concerted to establish theirs provenly holding possession qua the contentious parcel of two biswas of land by testifying qua a portion of their residential house beside their saw mill standing installed thereon. However, the aforesaid assertion made by the plaintiffs qua theirs holding possession thereof per se stands ingrained with a vice of falsity, falsity whereof emanates from theirs in a previous suit in contradiction besides in variance with the afore referred manner of espousal by them qua theirs holding its lawful possession, theirs therein ventilating, of, the aforesaid contentious parcel of two biswas of land which adjoins their Abadi standing used by them as an orchard. The effect of the aforesaid loud contradiction is of an inference standing garnered qua the espousal by the plaintiffs qua theirs holding possession of the suit land standing whittled. Contrarily, the propagation of the defendants/respondents qua the suit land constituting the Abadi of one Tara who died issueless hence on his demise it standing escheated to them appears to hold vigour. Contrarily, the propagation of the defendants/respondents qua the suit land constituting the Abadi of one Tara who died issueless hence on his demise it standing escheated to them appears to hold vigour. Significantly, the plaintiffs have not even adduced any cogent evidence in display of their predecessor in interest while purchasing ‘Abadi land’ from one Dharam Dutt his also purchasing from the latter the contentious tract of two biswas of land for hence theirs holding a leverage to espouse of theirs holding its lawful possession. However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants has contended of the propagation aforesaid of the defendants of the suit land being construable to be Nazul land is unamenable to its holding any legally vigorous clout arousable from non existence any cogent evidence comprised in the Revenue Officer concerned on demise of Tara attesting mutation qua its standing vested by escheat in the defendants. The aforesaid submission holds legal worth only to a limited extent of the defendants not producing the relevant mutation attested qua the suit land by the Revenue Officer concerned with manifestations therein of on the demise of one Tara who purportedly held it as ‘Abadi’ it standing escheated to the defendants. However, the non adduction of the relevant mutation would not in its entirety disrobe the efficacy of the propagation of the defendants of given the plaintiffs provenly not ever holding its lawful possession theirs yet holding a right to stake a claim for ousting the defendants to seek their eviction therefrom. The reason for this Court proceeding to with invincible vigour conclude of dehors the defendants not adducing the relevant mutation attested on demise of Tara by the Revenue Officer concerned personificatory of the suit land hence standing escheated to them, theirs hence proving the aforesaid factum probandum stands harbored upon the acquiescence made by their predecessor in interest qua his not holding its lawful possession whereas with lawful possession of ‘Abadi land’ constituting the indispensable sine qua non for a ‘Abadi’ holder standing entitled to repulse the defendants from dislodging his possession thereto, acquiescence whereof contrarily belies the espousal of the plaintiffs qua theirs holding its lawful possession rendering open an inference of hence theirs not holding any right to restrain the defendants from seeking their eviction therefrom. The inference of acquiescence made by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs stands constituted in Ext.DW-1/A embodying a communication made to the authorities concerned by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs wherein an articulation exists qua the suit land standing located in vicinity to his ‘Ara machine’ qua whose allotment to him by way of lease he made a request therein to the authority concerned. Furthermore the defendants had put to auction the contentious parcel of two biswas of land. On conclusion of the relevant auction proceedings of the suit land as stood conducted by the authority concerned one Pritam Singh as manifested by Ext.DW-1/D stood declared to be the successful bidder whereupon it stood allotted to him on lease. An order for its allotment to him by lease was made by the authority concerned. Moreover in the aforesaid proceedings as divulged by Ext.DE comprising a copy of an order rendered by Sub Judge Ist Class, Kandaghat, in an application preferred therebefore by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, a communication occurs of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs participating in the auction held qua the suit land by the authority concerned, reiteratedly the effect of the aforesaid acquiescence is of (a) neither the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs ever holding lawful possession of the contentious suit land; (b) with evidently neither the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs holding lawful possession of the ‘Abadi land’ theirs acquiescing to the propagation of the defendants of on the demise of one Tara who hitherto held it, it given the aforesaid Tara dying issueless, it standing escheated in the State besides benumbs the effect if any of non adduction by the defendants of the relevant attestation of mutation qua it by the revenue officer concerned on demise of Tara (c) the defendants proving the factum of the suit land on demise of Tara vesting by escheat vis-à-vis them; (d) defendants holding a right to evict the plaintiffs therefrom. The learned counsel appearing of the plaintiffs has contended that the vigour of the aforesaid acquiescence neither estopps the plaintiffs to stake a claim qua their entitlement to the suit land nor relieves the defendants from adducing the relevant mutation pronouncing the factum of its standing escheated to them. The learned counsel appearing of the plaintiffs has contended that the vigour of the aforesaid acquiescence neither estopps the plaintiffs to stake a claim qua their entitlement to the suit land nor relieves the defendants from adducing the relevant mutation pronouncing the factum of its standing escheated to them. In making the aforesaid submissions he relies upon a judgment of the Apex Court reported in A.C. Jose Vs. Sivan Pillai and others (1984) 2 SCC 656 , parapgraph 38 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “38. Lastly, it was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the appellant would be estopped from challenging the mechanical process because he did not oppose the introduction of this process although he was present in the meeting personally or though his agent. This arguments is wholly untenable because when we are considering a constitutional or statutory provision there can be no estoppel against a statute and where or not the appellant agreed or participated in the meeting which was held before introduction of the voting machines, if such a process is not permissible or authorized by law he cannot be estopped from challenging the same.“ He also places reliance upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) vs. B.N. Bhattacharjee and another (1979) 4 SCC 121 , relevant paragraphs No. 56 to 59 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “56. Now we came to the meat of the matter - the plea of estoppel or its variants. The C.I.T's objection to the jurisdiction of the Commission to proceed with the matter has been shot down by the artillery of estoppel. The order under appeal proceeds to hold that a conspectus of the circumstances of the case compels the conclusion that an understanding had been reached between the assessee and the C.I.T., evidenced by mutual withdrawal of their respective appeals before the I.T.A.T., that the Commission would be permitted to explore a settlement; and so, the statutory veto available to the C.I.T. to interdict the enquiry by the Commission could not be exercised because he was estopped from so doing, resiling from his earlier stand. The argument has an attractive veneer or cosmetic charm but law is more than skin-deep and courts peep beneath to see the principle of equity and justice thereby promoted. 57. What, in essence, is estoppel? The argument has an attractive veneer or cosmetic charm but law is more than skin-deep and courts peep beneath to see the principle of equity and justice thereby promoted. 57. What, in essence, is estoppel? Estopeel is a rule of equity which for bids truth being pleaded or representation, on which faith, another has acted to his detriment, being retracted. Even extending the rule into the newfangled empire of promissory estoppel, it cannot go beyond the limits of the Law Revision Committee in England which Lord Denning allowed to blossom in the High Trees case, 1947 (1) KB 130 - also see "Discipline of Law by Lord Denning" p. 202. "We therefore recommend that a promise which the promisor knows, or reasonably should know, will be relied upon by the promisee, shall be enforceable if the promisee has altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the promise." 58. The soul of estoppel is equity, not facility for inequity. Nor is estoppel against statute permissible because public policy animating a statutory provision may then become the casualty. Halsbury has noted this sensible nicety. "Where a statute, enacted for the benefit of a section of the public, imposes a duty of positive kind, the person charged with the performance of the duty, cannot by estoppel be prevented from exercising his statutory powers." [Maritime Elec. Co. Ltd. v. General Diaries Ltd., 1937 AC 610 and Halsburys Laws of England para 1515.] "A petitioner in a divorce suit cannot obtain relief simply because the respondent is estopped from denying the charges, as the court has a statutory duty to inquiry into the truth of a petition." [Hudson v. Hudson (1948) P. 292 and Halsburys Laws of England Para 1515]. The luminous footnote cites rulings and states that "This rule probably also applies where the statute bestows a discretion rather than imposing a duty." [Halsbury, 4th Edn. pp. 1019.] To sum up, where public duties cast by statute are involved, private parties cannot prevent performance by invoking estoppel. We do not discuss further since the facts here exclude estoppel. 59. The luminous footnote cites rulings and states that "This rule probably also applies where the statute bestows a discretion rather than imposing a duty." [Halsbury, 4th Edn. pp. 1019.] To sum up, where public duties cast by statute are involved, private parties cannot prevent performance by invoking estoppel. We do not discuss further since the facts here exclude estoppel. 59. In the present statutory situation Section 245D by the 2nd Proviso, casts a public duty on the Commissioner of Income-tax to consider, in the light of the case made out in the assessee's application, whether "concealment of particulars of income on the part of the applicant or perpetration of fraud by him for evading any tax or other sum chargeable or imposable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under this Act, has been established or is likely to be established by any Income-tax authority, in relation to the case", and exercise his veto power to prevent escape of macro-criminals prima facie guilty of grave economic crimes. He cannot bargain over this interdict in advance or barter away a legal mandate in anticipation. He may permit or even assist the filing of a conciliation motion by the assessee but when the Commission intimates him under S. 245D(1) he shall, with statutory seriousness, exercise his discretion. He cannot enter into a 'deal' over this power without betraying the statutory trust. We cannot, therefore, accept the plea that the Commissioner of Income-tax, by conduct and 'understandings' has 'irredeemably, mortgaged' his statutory duty to object if the case deserves such objection. Estoppel then is both odious and ominous and discretion the door to corruption.” 8. However, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants herein upon the aforereferred verdicts, relevant portions whereof stands extracted hereinabove, do not confer any legal leverage upon him to contend of the aforesaid acquiescence if any not estopping the plaintiffs/appellants to claim possession qua the suit land nor relieving the defendants from adducing the relevant mutation magnifying the factum of its on demise of Tara standing escheated to them. The reason for forming the aforesaid conclusion stands founded upon the factum of acquiescences made by a litigant operating as an estoppel against him unless acquiescences are qua a fact or a procedure, adoption/ acquiescence whereof is impermissible or barred by law. The reason for forming the aforesaid conclusion stands founded upon the factum of acquiescences made by a litigant operating as an estoppel against him unless acquiescences are qua a fact or a procedure, adoption/ acquiescence whereof is impermissible or barred by law. Also any representation made by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs to the authority concerned qua the suit land would not operate as an estoppel vis-à-vis the plaintiffs for hence barring them to stake a right of retaining possession of the suit land unless they provenly by vigorous evidence establish the trite factum of theirs holding its lawful possession evidence whereof stood comprised in the factum of their predecessor in interest while acquiring the ‘Abadi land’ of one Dharam Dutt his also acquiring the contentious tract of two biswas of land. Since the relevant best evidence stands unadduced, the plaintiffs cannot claim the benefit of the renditions aforesaid nor obviously can contend of their acquiescences of their predecessor in interest not estopping them to claim possession of the suit land. Furthermore any acquiescence by a litigant in derogation of his inherent rights would also not estop him to subsequently stake a claim for their bestowment upon him. However, none of the aforesaid legal expostulations for excepting the plaintiffs from any attraction qua them the principle of estoppel awakened by the acquiescences made by their predecessor in interest occurring in the aforereferred exhibits is available to them, rendering hence inapt any reliance by the learned counsel for the appellants upon the citations aforesaid. The reason for this Court concluding of the counsel for the plaintiff making an inapt reliance upon the judicial verdicts aforesaid rest upon the trite factum of the suit land standing nomenclatured as ‘Abadi’ for continuance of possession whereof they stood enjoined to prove by forthright evidence qua theirs continuously since their predecessor in interest besides uptill now holding its lawful possession. However, the aforesaid trite factum for theirs thereupon concomitantly standing vested with a right to forestall the defendants in usurping their possession if any thereupon hence stands unestablished besides unproven by them, as a corollary when proof of the aforesaid factum probandum is imperative it remaining unsubstantiated, cannot bestow in them any right to contend of the acquiescences aforesaid qua the suit land made by their predecessor in interest not estopping them to oust the defendants to stake their eviction therefrom. 9. 9. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs is dismissed and the substantial question of law is answered against them. The judgments and decrees rendered by the both the Courts below are maintained and affirmed. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. The parties are left to bear their own costs. All pending applications also stand disposed of accordingly. Records be sent back forthwith.