JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned consent judgment and decree dated 21.04.2016 passed by learned Judge, Court No. 2, City Civil & Sessions Court at Ahmedabad, passed in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, by which, on the basis of the consent terms between the original plaintiff and the defendant, opponent Nos. 1-2 herein respectively, recording the consent terms, the learned trial Court has decreed the said suit in terms of the consent terms, the applicants herein (third parties) have preferred the accompanying First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the CPC). 2. The facts leading to filing of the present application in nutshell are as under: 3. It is the case on behalf of the applicants that prior to the alleged agreement to sell in favour of the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, the original land owner executed agreement to sell in favour of the present applicants and, for which the applicants herein instituted Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 against the original land owner, in which even the plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 was a party to the said suit. It is the case on behalf of the applicants that respondent No. 1 herein alleged to be the subsequent agreement to sell holder instituted Civil Suit No. 2313/2008 against the land owner for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 21.04.2007 and the parties to the said civil suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 entered into a consent terms and obtained collusive consent decree and the original defendant of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008-original land owner agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein-original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, affecting the rights of the applicants herein in their Civil Suit No. 2251/2009. That on the basis of the consent terms produced before learned Judge, Court No. 2, City Civil & Sessions Court at Ahmedabad, in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, submitted by the parties to the said suit, the learned Judge recorded the consent terms and had passed a consent decree in favour of the original plaintiff-respondent No. 1 herein of decree for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 21.04.2007 and had decreed the said suit accordingly. It appears that on the basis of the said consent decree, the original land owner-defendant in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 has also subsequently executed the sale deed in favour of the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 i.e. respondent No. 1 herein. 4. Having apprehending that the said consent decree impugned in the accompanying first appeal shall affect their rights in the pending Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 and that in that suit considering the subsequent development, more particularly the consent decree passed in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 thereafter the Court may not grant decree of specific performance of the agreement to sell in favour of the applicants and, therefore, the applicants herein-original plaintiffs of Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 have filed the accompanying First Appeal with the present application for leave to appeal. 5. In response to the notice issued by this Court Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate, has appeared with Shri Amar Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for respondent No. 1-original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, and Shri Kamal Trivedi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared, with Shri M.R. Molavi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2-original defendant of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008. 6. Shri Thakore, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 herein, original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, has raised a preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of the accompanying First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC against the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that in view of the bar under sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, the First Appeal against the impugned consent judgment and decree would not be maintainable. 7. Now so far as apprehension on behalf of the applicants herein that the impugned consent decree shall affect the rights of the applicants in Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 and in view of the consent decree and the subsequent sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein-original plaintiff in that suit the court may not pass order for specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the applicants is concerned, Shri Thakore, learned counsel, has vehemently submitted that the aforesaid apprehension is not well-founded. He has submitted that as such by the impugned consent decree it cannot be said that any of the rights of the applicants are in any manner can be said to have been affected. Relying upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Deep Chand & Ors., AIR 1954 S.C. 75 , (more particularly Paragraph No. 40-45 thereof) still the Court in the suit instituted by the applicants can, despite the subsequent sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, pass a decree for specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the applicants in the suit instituted by them, provided a case is made out for passing a decree of specific performance under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He has also relied upon the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 223 , more particularly Paragraph No. 56 thereof and has pointed out that as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 56 of the said decision relying upon the decision of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra) and taking note of Paragraph No. 42 of the said decision, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in such a case the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff buyer and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. It is submitted that therefore the apprehension on the part of the applicants that because of the impugned consent decree, which has been passed between the parties to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 and the consequential sale deed executed in favour of respondent No. 1, either shall bind to the applicants and/or the same shall affect the rights of the applicants in the pending suit, is not well-founded and has no substance. However, has submitted that against the impugned consent judgment and decree in view of the bar in sub-section (3) of Section 93 of the CPC, the accompanying First Appeal shall not be maintainable. 8. However, has submitted that against the impugned consent judgment and decree in view of the bar in sub-section (3) of Section 93 of the CPC, the accompanying First Appeal shall not be maintainable. 8. Shri Kamal Trivedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2-original defendant in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, has supported the aforesaid submissions made by Shri Thakore, learned counsel, and has reiterated that against the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the appeal under Section 96 of the CPC shall not be maintainable. 9. Shri B.B. Naik, learned Senior Advocate has appeared, with Mr. Amrish Pandya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicants herein, has submitted that if proper and suitable observations are made in light of the submissions made by Shri Thakore, learned counsel, in that case the applicants shall be satisfied. However, he has requested to make suitable observations that it will be open for the applicants herein to amend the suit instituted by the applicants for appropriate reliefs in view of the subsequent development and passing of the impugned consent decree and the subsequent execution of the sale deed by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1-original plaintiff Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 and it will be open for the applicants to submit an appropriate application for interim injunction in view of the subsequent development. To the aforesaid, Shri Thakore, learned counsel, has requested to make suitable observations that as and when such applications are made the same be considered in accordance with law and on merits and all the contentions/defence, which may be available to the respective parties are kept open, including the contention on behalf of the defendants in the suit instituted by the applicants being Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 that the applicants are not entitled to the decree for specific relief to the agreement to sell in his favour and the same may be directed to be considered by the learned trial Court in accordance with law and on merits. 10. Heard learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. 11. 10. Heard learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. 11. At the outset it is not in dispute that the present application has been preferred by the applicants herein-third parties to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 for leave to appeal against the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by learned Judge, Court No. 2, City Civil & Sessions Court at Ahmedabad, by which, on submitting the consent terms by the respondents herein, parties to the aforesaid Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, learned Judge has passed the consent decree in favour of respondent No. 1 herein and in favour of the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, by which, on submitting the consent terms the learned Judge has passed the consent decree of specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of respondent No. 1 herein, original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008. It is an admitted position that as such the applicants are not parties to the said consent terms and/or even Civil Suit No. 2513/2008. Therefore, as such, when the applicants are not the parties to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 and are not the parties to the consent terms between the parties of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, it goes without saying that the same shall not bind the applicants and any consent terms shall bind only to the parties to the civil suit and the parties to the consent terms only. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicants that by the impugned consent judgment and decree any of the rights of the applicants shall be affected and/or the said consent decree shall bind the applicants is not well-founded. At this stage, it is required to be noted that even the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein-parties to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 have conceded that as the applicants herein are not the parties to the consent terms and to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, the impugned consent judgment and decree shall not bind the applicants. 12. 1 and 2 herein-parties to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 have conceded that as the applicants herein are not the parties to the consent terms and to Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, the impugned consent judgment and decree shall not bind the applicants. 12. Now so far as apprehension on the part of the applicants that in view of the consent decree obtained in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008 and in view of the subsequent execution of sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein-original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, which has been executed pursuant to the impugned consent judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court the same shall affect the rights of the applicants in their suit being Civil Suit No. 2251/2009 and in the said suit subsequently the Court may refuse to pass decree of specific performance of their agreement to sell under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the apprehension has also no substance and the same is not well-founded. 13. Identical question came to be considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra), more particularly in Paragraph No. 42 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held that in such a suit proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff buyer and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. The subsequent transferee does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. After considering the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Prasad & Anr. (supra) in the recent decision also in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that in such a situation the subsequent purchaser has a right to get back the money from the original vendor/original owner, and the original vendor/original owner cannot refuse to return the amount to the subsequent transferee. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicants recorded herein are not well-founded. 14. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that in such a situation the subsequent purchaser has a right to get back the money from the original vendor/original owner, and the original vendor/original owner cannot refuse to return the amount to the subsequent transferee. Therefore, apprehension on the part of the applicants recorded herein are not well-founded. 14. Now the question paused for the consideration of this Court is: "Whether in light of the aforesaid observations and considering the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, the appeal at the instance of the applicants under Section 96 of the CPC against the impugned consent judgment and decree would be maintainable or not?" 15. As such the aforesaid question has now become academic in view of the statement made by Shri Naik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, and the same would be satisfied with the aforesaid observations. 16. Even otherwise considering the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the CPC, against the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Judge, Court No. 2, City Civil & Sessions Court at Ahmedabad, passed in Civil Suit No. 2513/2008, to which the applicants are not the parties, either to the suit and/or even to the consent terms and as the same shall not bind them and the same shall not affect the rights in the pending suit, the appeal preferred by the applicants herein under Section 96 of the CPC, shall not be maintainable and, therefore, the present application for leave to appeal deserves to be dismissed with the above observations. However, it will be open for the applicants to submit an appropriate application for amendment, amending the plaint and/or for appropriate interim injunction, in the pending suit instituted by the applicants and as and when such amendment application and/or injunction application are preferred, the same shall be considered in accordance with law and on merits, for which we have not expressed anything on merits of the pending suit instituted by the applicants in favour of the either party and all the contentions and defence, which would be available to the parties, are open which may be considered by the learned trial Court in accordance with law, on merits and on the basis of the evidence that may be led before the learned trial Court. 17. 17. With the above observations and in view of the above, the present application for leave to appeal stands disposed of dismissed. Consequently, the connected first appeal (stamp) and civil application (for stay) (stamp) are also stand disposed of. No costs.