JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. The frantic effort of a daughter to prevent her father's mortgaged property being auctioned has led to presentation of this writ petition dated October 13, 2015 before this Court. It is noted that this litigation has been preceded by several previous rounds of litigation before various fora in Hyderabad not only at her instance but also at the instance of others (which includes her father and brother). 2. The petitioner has questioned the authority of the first respondent (hereafter the "Bank") to initiate proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (hereafter the SARFAESI Act) on the ground that the "Bank" being a cooperative bank, is not entitled to take recourse to the SARFAESI Act for recovery of its secured debt, and that the recovery process, if any, that has been initiated is without jurisdiction. 3. The litigation has a long and chequered history which, however, need not be discussed in any great detail here, since each and every proceeding at the instance of the petitioner (except me) and others has been noted with meticulous care in the decision dated April 24, 2015 passed in W.P. 7769 of 2015 (between Mr. Inder Raj Agarwal and Union of India and others) by an Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereafter the High Court at Hyderabad). This Bench proposes to refer to such decision at a later part of this judgment. 4. For the present, it would be useful if the case run in the writ petition is traced first. It is pleaded in the writ petition that there was a loan transaction between the "Bank" and the second respondent (hereafter the partnership firm), of which the third to fifth respondents were the partners; that, the sixth respondent stood as guarantor for such loan; that, the "Bank" had sanctioned a loan of Rs. 45 lakhs in favour of the partnership firm and a property measuring 200 sq. 45 lakhs in favour of the partnership firm and a property measuring 200 sq. yards situated at Fatehnagar, Balanagar Mandal, Hyderabad (hereafter the said property) was mortgaged as the security for such loan; that, the petitioner was not a party to the loan transaction between the "Bank" and the partnership firm, despite being a joint owner in respect thereof; and that, the said property was put up for sale by the "Bank", although it is an ancestral and joint family property over which no mortgage could have been created, without the petitioner's consent, being a co-owner. It is further pleaded that the "Bank" having initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act by issuing notices dated November 11, 2010 and December 14, 2013, the petitioner had approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Hyderabad (hereafter the DRT) by filing an application under section 17 (S.A. No. 185 of 2013) whereupon a conditional interim order was passed, inter alia, requiring her to make periodical deposits for having a stay of the proceedings. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner had approached the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkata (hereafter the DRAT), being the seventh respondent, with an appeal under section 18 of the SARFAESI Act (Appeal No. 71 of 2013) together with an application for waiver of pre-deposit. It was claimed therein that since the "Bank" could not have invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the petitioner had no obligation to make any pre-deposit for having the appeal heard. The DRAT while disbelieving the averments of the petitioner that she is "one of the coparceners of the joint family" and holding that the petitioner should not be exempted from making pre-deposit, passed an order dated July 15, 2014 overruling her claim and directed her to deposit Rs. 57 lakhs towards pre-deposit by the end of the month failing which the appeal would stand deregistered. 5. Based on such pleadings, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief: "a. A writ in the nature of certiorari setting aside the notices dated 11/11/2010 and 13/8/2015 issued by the respondent bank. b. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18/3/2013 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the order dated 15/7/2014 passed by Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. b. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18/3/2013 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the order dated 15/7/2014 passed by Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. c. A writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 not to initiate any proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as the said Act is not applicable to the respondent bank. d. A writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondent authorities to act in accordance with law." 6. It would now be profitable to note the version of the "Bank" from its counter affidavit. It has been pleaded therein that Mr. Inder Raj Agarwal, the father of the petitioner and the third respondent herein, was an employee of Hyderabad Allwyn Industries Limited and a member of the Hyderabad Allwyn Employees Industrial Cooperative Housing Society Limited (hereafter AEICHSL); that, by virtue of such membership, the third respondent became entitled to allotment of a plot of land; that, the said property was allotted in his favour and a sale deed dated April 15, 1966 was executed, thereby transferring the said property in favour of the third respondent; that, the said property is the self-acquired property of the third respondent; that, the first respondent had sanctioned loan to the partnership firm and it was secured by mortgage of the said property; that, in view of default committed in repayment of loan by the partnership firm, the "Bank" had approached the designated authority under the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1964 whereupon the Divisional Cooperative Officer passed an award in favour of the "Bank" for a sum in excess of Rs. 54 lakhs with interest at 20%; that, the petitioner is not the owner of the said property and has no right therein because she was not even born on the date the AEICHSL conveyed the said property in favour of the third respondent; that, the "Bank" having initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, the petitioner had approached the DRT under section 17 thereof, followed by an approach to the DRAT under section 18; that, the petitioner failed and neglected to effect deposits in terms of the orders passed by the DRT and the DRAT and ultimately, the petitioner had withdrawn the appeal resulting in the order of the DRT becoming final; that, the petitioner had approached the High Court at Hyderabad by filing a writ petition (W.P. 21459/2014) and upon withdrawing the same has presented this writ petition; and that, the "Bank" having its registered office and branches only at Hyderabad and the loan having been sanctioned at Hyderabad, the said property being situate at Hyderabad, the award having been passed by the arbitrator at Hyderabad and the petitioner having approached the DRT under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act at Hyderabad, she has no right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court at this stage. 7. The "Bank" has also referred to the writ petition (W.P. 7769/2015) that the third respondent had filed before the High Court at Hyderabad questioning the notification dated January 28, 2003 issued by the Central Government [in exercise of power under section 2(1)(c)(v) of the SARFAESI Act] and a notice dated February 21, 2015 issued by the "Bank" (third respondent therein) under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court reported in (2013) 3 GLR 2337 (Administrator, Shri Dhadki Group Cooperative Cotton Seed v. Union of India) whereby the notification dated January 28, 2003 was quashed, it was contended in the writ petition that the "Bank" could not have invoked the SARFAESI Act for recovering its secured debt and it was prayed that the proceedings be set aside. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad, upon returning a finding that the petitioner before it had abused the process of court, dismissed such writ petition with costs of Rs. 25000/- to be paid by him to the "Bank" within 4 weeks. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad, upon returning a finding that the petitioner before it had abused the process of court, dismissed such writ petition with costs of Rs. 25000/- to be paid by him to the "Bank" within 4 weeks. Relying thereon, it has been contended by the "Bank" that this writ petition before this Court is not maintainable. 8. The petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply reiterating her stand that she is entitled to relief on this writ petition. 9. Upon exchange of affidavits, the writ petition was listed for hearing and it has been finally heard in the presence of Ms. Nag, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Murthy, learned counsel for the Bank. 10. Ms. Nag contended that a cooperative bank has no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Reliance in this connection was placed on an unreported decision dated March 09, 2015 passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in W.P. 104 of 2015 (Shri Dev Dass @ Diva Das & Anr. v. Andaman and Nicobar State Coop. Bank Limited and others). The coordinate bench had proceeded to hold as follows: "I have no hesitation to hold that the Cooperative Bank, namely, Andaman and Nicobar State Coop. Bank Limited, cannot be regarded as a 'Bank' and/or Banking Company within the meaning of the 'Bank' as defined under section 2-C of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002." According to her, the coordinate bench had ruled so upon consideration of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2007) 6 SCC 236 [Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd.] and the decision in Shri Dhadki Group Cooperative (supra). 11. It was the contention of Ms. Nag that since the very jurisdiction of the "Bank" to initiate proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had been questioned by the petitioner before the DRT and the DRAT under sections 17 and 18 respectively thereof, the relevant tribunals by insisting that the petitioner ought to make payment either in the form of an interim deposit or as a pre-deposit to have her application/appeal heard, committed gross illegality; and that, since the DRAT has its seat at Kolkata, this Court alone and no other court has the jurisdiction to examine the legality, correctness and/or otherwise of the order dated July 15, 2014. She submitted that based on the decision of the coordinate bench in Dev Dass (supra), this Bench may hold that the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act initiated by the "Bank" are without jurisdiction and that consequential orders, setting aside the proceedings, ought also be passed. 12. Per contra, Mr. Murthy by referring to the prayers made in this writ petition contended that the notices dated November 11, 2010 and August 13, 2010 were not issued to the petitioner and, therefore, any prayer for setting it aside is not maintainable at her instance without even the notices being on record. It was further argued by him that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court having regard to the fact that there is absolutely no cause of action for the petitioner to feel aggrieved. He referred to the order of the DRAT dated July 15, 2014 and invited the attention of this Bench to the following paragraph: "On hearing the order pronounced, the learned counsel for the petitioner made an extempore submission that in the meanwhile liberty might be given for the petitioner to move the lower forum by filing an application challenging the locus standi of the Bank to file S.A in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court cited supra. It is open for the petitioner to do so as per law and it is for the P.O, DRT to decide it independently." (bold font in original) Attention of this Bench was also drawn by Mr. Murthy to the subsequent order of the DRAT dated July 31, 2014 reading as follows: "Both sides are represented. Learned counsel for the appellant has enclosed (sic) as not pressed the appeal and no pre-deposit has been made also. Hence, this appeal is dismissed." 13. According to Mr. Murthy, the petitioner not having pursued the appeal and having allowed it to be dismissed as not pressed, this Court's jurisdiction cannot be invoked challenging the order dated July 15, 2014 based on a subsequent order passed by a coordinate bench of this Court opining that a cooperative bank is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. 14. It was further submitted by Mr. Murthy that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts and is not entitled to discretionary relief. 15. Mr. 14. It was further submitted by Mr. Murthy that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts and is not entitled to discretionary relief. 15. Mr. Murthy relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 [ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu] and (2004) 6 SCC 254 [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India] in support of his submission that this Bench in the wise exercise of its discretion ought not to entertain the writ petition. 16. The objection to the maintainability of this writ petition raised by Mr. Murthy ought to be addressed first, before the petitioner can urge this Bench to give a decision on the merits of her claim which, prima facie, seems to be covered by the decision in Dev Dass (supra). If the objection succeeds, it is axiomatic that the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief on this writ petition. 17. At the outset, it ought to be placed on record that the several paragraphs of the counter affidavit dated December 11, 2015 of the "Bank" are not properly verified and, therefore, it is no affidavit in the eye of law. It ought also to be placed on record that neither in the affidavit-in-reply nor in course of hearing did Ms. Nag, on behalf of the petitioner, advance any argument that the counter affidavit should not, for such reason, be looked into by this Bench. However, this Bench would proceed on the basis of the facts admitted by the petitioner, as would appear from the writ petition as well as the affidavit-in-reply, and also upon taking into consideration the Hon'ble Division Bench decision in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra), the photocopy of the certified copy whereof (produced by Mr. Murthy) has not been disputed by Ms. Nag. 18. It is elementary that exercise of power by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. Though no limits have been placed on the exercise of the discretion, there can be no doubt that the discretion is a judicial discretion which has to be exercised according to settled judicial principles and not in an arbitrary manner. It is also settled law that a party approaching the Court under Article 226 may be denied relief despite he/she having made out a sound legal point if interference would not advance public interest. It is also settled law that a party approaching the Court under Article 226 may be denied relief despite he/she having made out a sound legal point if interference would not advance public interest. A court of equity, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, must do so to promote good faith and equity, and in furtherance of public interest. If interference would result in public interest being rendered a casualty, it ought to be the duty of a High Court to refuse relief in an appropriate case though, prima facie, a party approaching it may have set up a strong case on merits. 19. It is found on perusal of the decision in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra) that the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad has considered the point of exercise of discretion elaborately while declining relief to the petitioner's father on the ground of abuse of process of court. The injury that is likely to be caused to public interest in case of interference in a given case cannot be allowed to pass in oblivion and these principles ought to be borne in mind while proceeding to adjudicate this writ petition. 20. On consideration of the rival contentions, this Bench is of the considered view that the objection raised by Mr. Murthy is sound and that this writ petition ought to fail resting on four grounds. 21. In paragraph 8 of its counter affidavit, the "Bank" had pleaded that the petitioner had filed a writ petition (W.P. 21459 of 2014) before the High Court at Hyderabad and had withdrawn the same. While dealing with paragraph 8 of such counter affidavit, the petitioner has averred in paragraph 10 of the affidavit-in-reply as follows: "10. That the contents of paragraphs 6 to 8 of the affidavit in opposition filed by the respondent no. 1 are denied and disputed. In this connection, it is stated that when the SARFAESI ACT, 2002 itself is not applicable, the DRAT Kolkatta cannot ask the writ petitioner to deposit the amount. The core point is whether SARFAESI ACT, 2002 is applicable or not. Without deciding the same it appears that both the lower court and the appellate court started pressurising the petitioner who has actually not borrowed anything from the bank to deposit the amount. The orders of the Ld. DRT Hyderabad and Ld. The core point is whether SARFAESI ACT, 2002 is applicable or not. Without deciding the same it appears that both the lower court and the appellate court started pressurising the petitioner who has actually not borrowed anything from the bank to deposit the amount. The orders of the Ld. DRT Hyderabad and Ld. DRAT Kolkatta are in violation of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M/s. Maradia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2371 . Withdrawing of writ petition no. 21459/2014 cannot be detrimental to the interest of the petitioner. This is because the said withdrawal does not take away the right of the petitioner in approaching the correct forum. The Honourable High Court of Hyderabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the order passed by the DRAT, Kolkatta." 22. Upon noticing the said averments, this Bench perused the writ petition in between lines to ascertain whether the petitioner had complied with rule 11 of the Writ Rules framed by this Court requiring that in every application under Article 226 of the Constitution, there should be appended a paragraph containing a statement that on the self-same facts or cause of action, no application was moved earlier or at all before any Court and if so moved, the result thereof, must be indicated and further that the concerned application was not moved before any other Court. 23. There is no indication in this writ petition that the petitioner had approached the High Court at Hyderabad by presenting W.P. 21459 of 2014 or that W.P. 21459 of 2014 was withdrawn with or without leave. There is also no evidence to establish that while the petitioner was allowed to withdraw the writ petition, she was granted leave to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or any other appropriate forum. The decision in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra) has not referred to this writ petition (W.P. 21459 of 2014) and, thus, the order passed on such writ petition is not discernible. Be that as it may, not only is this writ petition vulnerable for non-compliance with rule 11 of the Writ Rules, absence of leave in tune with principles flowing from Order 23, Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is fatal to the maintainability of this writ petition. 24. Be that as it may, not only is this writ petition vulnerable for non-compliance with rule 11 of the Writ Rules, absence of leave in tune with principles flowing from Order 23, Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is fatal to the maintainability of this writ petition. 24. That apart, the petitioner is guilty of suppression of a material fact. Although there is dearth of details in relation to the subject matter of the writ petition (W.P. 21459 of 2014), her perception about the court having jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the order of the DRAT is clear from paragraph 10 of the affidavit-in-reply extracted supra. While observing that such perception is not at all correct (since the High Court at Hyderabad as the natural forum had the jurisdiction to try her claim), this Bench is also minded to hold that if withdrawal of W.P. 21459 of 2014 had been asked for because the order of the DRAT was under challenge therein and the petitioner wished to move this Court in its writ jurisdiction, she ought to have disclosed full particulars of such proceedings in this writ petition. By failing to so disclose, she must be held not to have approached this Court with clean hands and has made herself dis entitled to discretionary relief. 25. The third ground for which this Bench is disinclined to grant the petitioner relief is because of her conduct. The DRAT had directed the petitioner to make predeposit as far back as on July 15, 2014. Immediately after pronouncement of the order, liberty was prayed on behalf of the petitioner to allow her raise her claim before the DRT which the DRAT granted. She did not pursue her remedy any further, as revealed from the writ petition till such time this writ petition was presented. However, perusal of the Division Bench decision in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra) reveals filing of "an out of order petition" by the petitioner "in I.A.No. 852 of 2013 in S.A. No.185 of 2013 questioning the sale notice issued by the 3rd respondent-bank dated 21.02.2015 fixing the auction date as 25.03.2015". What was the fate of such petition is, however, unknown since the petitioner has not disclosed it. What was the fate of such petition is, however, unknown since the petitioner has not disclosed it. Be that as it may, the DRAT having recorded on July 31, 2014 that the appeal stands dismissed as 'not pressed', the same resulted in the order dated July 15, 2014 merging in the subsequent final order whereby the appeal stood deregistered. Allowing the appeal to be dismissed as 'not pressed' and having acted in terms of the liberty granted by the order dated July 15, 2014 by presenting "an out of order petition" in I.A. No.852 of 2013 (an application seeking stay of all further proceedings pursuant to an auction notice dated February 14, 2013) before the DRT in connection with S.A. No.185 of 2013, the petitioner must be and is held to be precluded from subjecting the order of the DRAT dated July 15, 2014 to challenge not only based on the doctrine of merger, but because of delay and laches without offering any plausible explanation for the belated approach. 26. Finally, it is held that the writ petition has not been presented by the petitioner bona fide. She has taken recourse to 'forum shopping' and is, thus, not entitled to equitable relief. Assuming that there was no merger of the DRAT's order dated July 15, 2014 in its subsequent order recorded on July 31, 2014, it is clear that the petitioner has attempted to steal a march over the "Bank" by relying on the coordinate bench decision in Dev Dass (supra) which was delivered on March 09, 2015. This Bench is inclined to the view that the petitioner has presented this writ petition inspired by such decision and this is precisely the reason for the belated presentation of this writ petition. Since the Supreme Court has on more occasions than one cautioned that 'forum shopping' ought not to be encouraged, the petitioner deserves to be dealt with firmly. 27. As has been noted above, not only did the petitioner not comply with the order for pre-deposit, she did not pursue the appeal and had it dismissed as 'not pressed' as far back as on July 31, 2014. 27. As has been noted above, not only did the petitioner not comply with the order for pre-deposit, she did not pursue the appeal and had it dismissed as 'not pressed' as far back as on July 31, 2014. While dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner's father with exemplary costs upon a finding that the process of the court had been abused, the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad had taken pains to note the numerous proceedings that were initiated by the petitioner, her father, her brother and even an individual claiming to be a tenant in respect of the said property. It is considered necessary to extract an introductory passage from the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench regarding the conduct of the petitioner's father. It reads: "The manner in which the judicial process has been abused by the petitioner (either directly or through his daughter, son or a third party (allegedly his tenant), to avoid repayment of the debt due to the 3rd respondent-bank, and the subject property being put to sale for realisation of the amounts due, is a tale in itself." (underlining for emphasis) 28. It would now be worthwhile to extract below what was said of the petitioner's conduct. The relevant passages read as under: "After the appeal preferred by the 4th respondent and the petitioner was dismissed by the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, the petitioner's daughter Smt. Anjana filed Claim Petition No. 1 of 2007 in E.P. No. 66 of 2002 (which was renumbered as E.P. No. 1 of 2007) against, among others, the 3rd respondent-bank and her father (the petitioner herein) claiming ?th share in the mortgaged immovable property. The sale officer, by order dated 23.05.3007 (sic 2007), rejected the claim petition holding that no evidence was produced by Smt. Anjana that the subject property was purchased from joint family funds; her father (the petitioner herein) had created a mortgage in favour of the 3rd respondent-bank in his individual capacity, and had availed a loan facility from the bank; Smt. Anjana had not raised any objection, when the property was mortgaged by the petitioner while availing the loan or thereafter; her claim that she had ?th share in the subject property was not supported by any documentary evidence; and, hence, the claim petition was liable to be rejected. Aggrieved thereby Smt. Anjana filed C.T.A. No. 26 of 2009 before the A.P. Co-operative Tribunal which, in its order dated 11.02.2010, held that the claim was frivolous; her father (the petitioner herein) had bought the property while he was in service in the year 1966, and not while carrying on business with ancestral joint family funds; it was he alone who had mortgaged the property with the 3rd respondent-bank, and had committed defaults in payment of the loan; execution proceedings were, therefore, initiated for sale of the mortgaged property; the claimant had failed to make out any legal ground; and, hence, the appeal was liable to be dismissed. The order passed by the sale officer in Claim Petition No. 1 of 2007 in E.P. No. 1 of 2007 was confirmed. Aggrieved thereby, Smt. Anjana invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in C.R.P. No. 219 of 2011 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In its order, in C.R.P. No. 219 of 2011 dated 21.09.2011, this Court noted her claim that the property belonged to the joint family, it was purchased with joint family funds, and she had ?th share therein. This Court held that Smt. Anjana had not adduced any evidence before the sale officer to show that her father and paternal grandfather constituted a joint family, they migrated to Hyderabad in 1960 from Rajasthan for carrying on business, and there was a joint family business; on the other hand the sale deed, under which the claimant's father (the petitioner herein), had purchased the scheduled plot from Hyderabad Allwyn Employees Cooperative Housing Society showed that his occupation was service; in the absence of any evidence, showing the existence of a joint family or a joint family business or joint family funds, her claim that the schedule property was purchased from out of joint family funds, and she had ?th share therein, was baseless; the claimant had not filed any Suit demanding partition, or claiming any share in the property; the claim was frivolous and without any material in support thereof; and the order of the Tribunal did not necessitate interference." 29. The date on which the petitioner's writ petition (W.P. 21459 of 2014) was dismissed by the High Court at Hyderabad as withdrawn, is not available. The date on which the petitioner's writ petition (W.P. 21459 of 2014) was dismissed by the High Court at Hyderabad as withdrawn, is not available. Whatever be the date, - either prior to the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra) or thereafter, such decision with findings recorded against the petitioner (although she was not a party to the proceedings) obviously is a hurdle that is insurmountable for her if she were to approach the High Court at Hyderabad with any claim against the "Bank". 30. Then again, the subject matter of W.P. 21459 of 2014 not having been revealed, one has to proceed on certain assumptions. The first is, the order of the DRAT dated July 15, 2014 was under challenge therein. If so, the petitioner ought not to have withdrawn such challenge on the specious perception that the High Court at Hyderabad did not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Apart from the order of the DRAT, all antecedent incidents occurred in Hyderabad and, therefore, the High Court at Hyderabad could have decided all points that she may have wished to raise. The other assumption is, the order of the DRAT dated July 15, 2014 was not challenged. Obviously, the petitioner may not have approached the High Court at Hyderabad against the order dated July 15, 2014 of the DRAT because of the observations made in Inder Raj Agarwal (supra) in relation to her conduct as well as the conduct of her father and brother in seeking to stall the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act at any cost. It would not, therefore, be unreasonable to proceed on the basis that the petitioner, apprehending the same fate as met by her father (the third respondent herein), if she pursued her remedy before the High Court at Hyderabad, has purposely presented this writ petition before this Court to take advantage of the situation arising out of the decision in Dev Dass (supra) holding that a cooperative bank is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. True, being dominus litis, the petitioner can elect if two options are available to her. But she is not entitled to any relief having regard to her conduct referred to above. Her approach to this Court by presenting this writ petition is not faulted on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. True, being dominus litis, the petitioner can elect if two options are available to her. But she is not entitled to any relief having regard to her conduct referred to above. Her approach to this Court by presenting this writ petition is not faulted on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. If she were to approach the High Court at Hyderabad, she would run the risk of being told off at the gates in view of the several orders passed by such court in proceedings initiated at her instance or at the instance of her family members. She thus took a calculated chance by approaching this Court inspired by the decision of the coordinate bench in Dev Dass (supra), thereby indulging in 'forum shopping'. The petitioner's conduct being suspect, it is entirely at the discretion of this Bench as to whether the petitioner should be heard on the merits of her claim or not. 31. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, this Bench is unhesitatingly of the view that the petitioner does not deserve equitable relief. 32. This writ petition, accordingly, stands dismissed, without costs. Interim order stands vacated. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.