JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S.Rajeetchandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Th. Vashum, learned GA appearing for the State respondents. 2. This application has been filed for quashing of the order dated 13.7.2016 passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, respondent No.1, whereby and whereunder the respondent No1, in exercise of power conferred under sub section (3) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, passed the order of detention in Cril. /NSA/No.11 of 2016 against the detenu namely Naoroibam Joyshankar after being satisfied that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, it has become necessary to do so. 3. The grounds on which order of detention was passed are that the detenu in the year 2009 joined an armed insurgent organization namely Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak- Progressive faction (PREPAK-Pro.) as a member. Thereupon, the detenu was imparted with basic military training along with others at Myanmar. In the month of October, 2011, he also got training for assembling IEDs/Bombs and remote control detonation. In the year 2013 the detenu came to Imphal where he along with others exploded bomb at the western side of the CM Bungalow and also at other places. The detenu was arrested in connection with one case lodged by Singjamei Police Station. He was also remanded in two other cases and even detention order was passed against him in the year 2013. However, the detenu was released on bail in the month of March, 2015. Thereafter, he again resumed work for PREPAK-Pro whereby he started assembling IEDs at his house which was being planted by members of the cadre at different places. The detenu was again arrested on 18.11.2015 in connection with Lamphel PS case. However, he was released on bail subsequently. The detenu again resumed his old activities of assembling IEDs and also indulging himself in the activities of serving demand letters, transportation of arms and ammunitions from one place to another within the area of Imphal East and Imphal West. On 27.5.2016, when a police team raided the house of the detenu, several explosive items were found which were seized and the detenu was apprehended from a place disclosed by her mother. On 27.5.2016, when a police team raided the house of the detenu, several explosive items were found which were seized and the detenu was apprehended from a place disclosed by her mother. The police handed over the seized materials and also the custody of the petitioner to Lamphel police who registered the case as Lamphal PS Case No.98(5)/16 u/s 20/38 UA(P)A Act, 25(1-C) of the Arms Act and also u/s 5 of the Expl.Subs Act. 4. While the detenu was in custody, order of detention was passed on 30.7.2016 by the respondent No.1 after recording that the detenu is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The said order of detention was approved on 24.7.2016. 5. The said order of detention and its approval have been challenged on several grounds. However, Mr. Rajeetchandra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner did confine his argument with respect to only one ground with regard to materials being absent for recording the satisfaction by the detaining authority that there is every possibility of detenu being released on bail. In this regard, the learned counsel did point it out that the detaining authority has passed the order of detention recording satisfaction that there is possibility of accused being released on bail on completion of the period stipulated for submitting charge sheet as in some cases accused has been released on completion of statutory period of submission of charge sheet. But that cannot be a general proposition of release of accused as each case of grant of bail depends upon the fact of that case and therefore any recording of such satisfaction can be said to be a figment of imagination and thereby order of detention being based on such satisfaction is quite untenable and is fit to be set aside. 6. As against this Mr.Vashum, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that from the order of detention it would appear that the detaining authority after having taken notice of the fact recorded in the ground of detention, did satisfy himself that detenu after being released on bail, would indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and only after recording such satisfaction the order of detention has been passed which never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. 7. 7. It goes without saying that in a case of preventive detention no offence is proved and justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. There is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence; whereas Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by a law. In such situation a machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of lawful detention with utmost promptitude. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to be released by the High Court and Supreme Court upon issuance of writ of habeas corpus. 8. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) & clause (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer and the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this deterrent law, the law of preventive detention is to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh –v- State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: “4......... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenu.” In this context, we may refer to another decision rendered in the case of Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh-Vrs – B.K. Jha, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC(Cri) 244 wherein it has been held: “5.. . . . . The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” 9. Keeping in view of the said principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently in the case of Union of India –Vs- Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC(Cri) 239 recorded requirements to be made by the Detaining Authority passing order of detention when the detenu is in custody, which reads as follows: “14........Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.” 10. In that event at the cost of repetition, we may record that Detaining Authority while passing order of detention in a case of detenu being in custody, needs to observe following safeguards meticulously: (i) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) If there is reason to believe on the basis of available materials placed before him – (a) that there is every possibility of being released; and (b) that on being so released he would be in all probability to indulge in prejudicial activities; (iii) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. 11. Thus, in the context of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have to examine as to whether aforesaid safeguards have been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority who has passed the order of detention when the detenu was in custody. 12. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. 12. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. There has been no denial of the proposition of law that the order of detention can be passed in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of a criminal case. However, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Huidrom Konungjao Vs. State of Manipur & Ors (2012) 7 SCC 181 , it was held that if such detention order is challenged, detaining authority ought to satisfy the court following facts: (i) the authority was fully aware of the fact that detenu was actually in custody; (ii) there was reliable materials before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there is reliable possibility of release on bail and further on being released, he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to the public order. Further, it has been observed that in cases where this fact does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated. 13. In the light of the decision, if we examine the legality of the detention order, we would find that the detaining authority, on the presumption that the detenu would be released on bail as in similar cases bails are being granted, on completion of statutory period of submission of charge sheet but that cannot be a general proposition as granting of bail depends upon the facts of each case. It has never been the case that other accused in the said case, in which the detenu was taken in custody, has been released on bail; rather reference of other cases have been given in which the accused persons have been released. As such it can easily be said that such satisfaction is not based on any material; rather it can be said to be imaginary and thereby order of detention and its approval are not sustainable in the eye of law. 14. Thus, we do find that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority of likelihood of accused being released on bail is not based on any factual aspect and thereby order of detention being bad, is hereby quashed. Consequently the detenu namely Naoroibam Joyshankar s/o Smt. Naoroibam (O) Shanta Devi of Khurai Lairikyengbam Makha Leikai, PS- Heingang be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. Consequently the detenu namely Naoroibam Joyshankar s/o Smt. Naoroibam (O) Shanta Devi of Khurai Lairikyengbam Makha Leikai, PS- Heingang be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. This writ petition stands disposed of.