JUDGMENT : This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 25-2-2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 5, Agartala, West Tripura (“learned Magistrate” for short) in C.R. No. 192 of 2013 U/s 258 Cr.P.C stopping the criminal proceeding against the respondents No. 2 and 3, who were sought to be prosecuted for commission of the offences punishable U/s 181, 182, 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC on the ground that such prosecution is barred by Section 195 Cr.P.C. 2. The case of the petitioner is that on 12-9-2012, the petitioner filed Title Suit No. 141/2012 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No. 1, Agartala over property dispute. On 26-3-2013, the respondents 2 and 3 filed a counter-claim in T.S. (CC) No. 34 of 2013, for which the respondent 2 filed a sworn affidavit dated 23-3-2013 before the Notary Public, Agartala falsely declaring his profession to be a businessman even though he is a Government servant; he is in fact, presently holding the post of Superintendent (EIRET) in the Office of the District Industries Centre, Gomati. In their written statement by the respondents in T.S. No. 141/12 filed on 12-4-2013, the respondent 2 filed a sworn affidavit dated 23-3-2013 falsely declaring himself to be a businessman. Again, on 22-6-2013, in their written objection filed in connection with Misc. Case No. 62(Inj)/2013 against the application for injunction filed by the petitioner, the respondent no. 2 prepared another affidavit before the Notary Public falsely claiming that his profession was a businessman instead of a Government employee. Contending that these false declarations constitute the offences punishable U/s 181, 182, 193, 419, 420 r/w Section 34 IPC and the provisions of Oaths Act, 1969, the petitioner filed a complaint petition before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura against the respondent No. 2 and 3 for proceeding against in accordance with law. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and made over the case to the learned Magistrate for disposal according to law. On 3-1-2014, the petitioner was examined U/s 200 Cr.P.C and the learned Magistrate, having found sufficient grounds for proceeding, issued summons to the respondents 2 and 3 and fixed 5-2-2014 for further proceeding. On 5-2-2014, the respondents appeared before the learned Magistrate and were released on bail and fixed another date for explanation of the substance of the accusations. On 3-1-2014, the petitioner was examined U/s 200 Cr.P.C and the learned Magistrate, having found sufficient grounds for proceeding, issued summons to the respondents 2 and 3 and fixed 5-2-2014 for further proceeding. On 5-2-2014, the respondents appeared before the learned Magistrate and were released on bail and fixed another date for explanation of the substance of the accusations. One thing led to another till 22-2-2014, when the learned Magistrate instead of proceeding U/s 251, Cr.P.C fixed another. According to the petitioner, without the application of the respondents, the learned Magistrate proceeded to hear the question of maintainability of the complaint, which was barred by Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. After hearing the parties, the impugned order was passed by the learned Magistrate whereupon this revision has been preferred by the petitioner. 3. Mr. N. Das, the learned counsel for the petitioner, makes two-fold contentions, namely, (i) the learned Magistrate acted illegally in dropping the proceeding when cognizance of the offences had already been taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by issuing process and (ii) the learned Magistrate has also grossly erred in law in holding that the offences charged against the respondent 2 and 3 could not be tried without a complaint in writing to that effect lodged by the Court U/s 195(1)(a)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C. According to the learned counsel, when the documents were already alleged to have been forged before the Notary Public prior to their production in the trial court, the embargo placed by Section 195 against prosecution without the complaint in writing of the authority/court concerned does not apply, and the decision to the contrary rendered by the trial court is an improper exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court and is, therefore, not sustainable in law. To buttress his contentions, he places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Igbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : AIR 2005 SC 2119 . On the other hand, both Mr. A. Ghosh, the learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. To buttress his contentions, he places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Igbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : AIR 2005 SC 2119 . On the other hand, both Mr. A. Ghosh, the learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. A. Sengupta, the learned counsel for the private respondents, support the impugned order and submit that the trial court is right in holding that the offence alleged by the petitioner fell U/s 181 IPC i.e. of giving false statement under oath before a Notary Public, who is a public servant, and no cognizance of offences punishable U/s 172 to 188 (both inclusive) IPC could be taken except on a complaint in writing of the public servant and did not commit any illegality in holding that the case could not proceeded any further since the proceeding was based on wrong cognizance.: Clause (b)(ii) of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C also contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court and, as such, the trial against the private respondents could not proceed further without a complaint in writing is lodged by the court in that behalf. As there is no merit in this criminal revision, the learned counsel submit that no case for revision is made out by the petitioner, and the impugned order does not call for the interference of this Court. 4. In the instant case, the three affidavits in question were already sworn before the Notary Public even before the filing of the suit/written statement/written objection in question. The learned Magistrate is correct in holding that the complaint in respect of Section 181 IPC could not be entertained by him being barred by Section 195(a)(i) CrPC as no complaint in writing in that behalf has come from the Notary Public, who is also a public servant. Therefore, this part of the order does not call for my interference. The learned Magistrate is correct in holding that the complaint in respect of Section 181 IPC could not be entertained by him being barred by Section 195(a)(i) CrPC as no complaint in writing in that behalf has come from the Notary Public, who is also a public servant. Therefore, this part of the order does not call for my interference. However, in so far as the offences punishable U/s 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 are concerned, the core issue for my decision, therefore, pertains to the interpretation of the expression “when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in proceeding in any court occurring in clause (b)(ii) of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. In Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 , the Apex Court was confronted with this controversy, and held:- “10. It would thus be clear that for taking cognizance of an offence, the document, the foundation for forgery, if produced before the court or given in evidence, the bar of taking cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted and the criminal court is prohibited from taking cognizance of offence unless a complaint in writing is filed as per the procedure prescribed under Section 340 of the Code by or on behalf of the court. The object thereby is to preserve purity of the administration of justice and to allow the parties to adduce evidence in proof of certain documents without being compelled or intimidated to proceed with the judicial process. The bar of Section 195 is to take cognizance of the offences covered thereunder.” Disagreeing with the above decision, a co-ordinate bench of the Apex Court in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 held thus:- “11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 12. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the court and long before its production in the court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records. * * * 23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.” 5. In view of these two conflicting decisions, the issue was placed before the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah case (supra) and the same was discussed with reference to several authorities and the same was decided in favor of the views taken in Sachida Nand Singh case (supra). The relevant portions are found at paras 25, 26, 27, 28, 33 and 34 of the judgment, which are extensively reproduced below:- “25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 493 after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner:- “The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.” 27. The learned author has referred to Sheffield City Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd., (1991) 1 WLR 58 : (1991) 2 All ER 280 WLR at p. 71, where it was held as under:- “Parliament is taken not to intend the carrying out of its enactments to be unworkable or impracticable, so the court will be slow to find in favour of a construction that leads to these consequences. This follows the path taken by judges in developing the common law. ‘… the common law of England has not always developed on strictly logical lines, and where the logic leads down a path that is beset with practical difficulties the courts have not been frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution that will best serve the needs of society’.” 28. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commrs., (1979) 2 AL ER 91 : (1979) 1 WLR 239 while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commrs., (1979) 2 AL ER 91 : (1979) 1 WLR 239 while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii). 29. Dr. Singhvi has also urged that since we are dealing with a penal provision it should be strictly construed and in support of his proposition he has placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench decision in Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 158 : 14 CrLJ 1333 wherein it was held that it is well-settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty and it is not competent for the court to stretch out the meaning of expression used by the legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature. The contention is that since Section 195(1)(b)(ii) affords protection from private prosecution, it should not be given a restrictive interpretation to curtail its scope. We are unable to accept such broad proposition as has been sought to be urged. In Craies on Statute Law (1971 Edn., Chapter 21), the principle regarding penal provisions has been stated as under:- “But penal statutes must never be construed so as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary acceptation would comprehend. … ‘… But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair common-sense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument’.” * * * 33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 158 : 14 Cri LJ 1333 has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 34. In the present case, the Will has been produced in the court subsequently. It is nobody’s case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said Will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct and calls for no interference.” (Italics supplied) 6. What has been made crystal clear in the afore-mentioned decision is that the bar imposed by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would be applicable only when the offences referred to in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. Conversely, if such offence has been committed with respect to a document before it is produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, i.e. before the document has not been in custodia legis, the embargo placed by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C for proceeding against the accused charged with such offences would not come into play. In the case at hand, the indisputable fact is that the three affidavits in respect of which the offences U/s181, 182, 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC were alleged to have been committed were sworn before the Notary Public even before they were evidently produced or given in evidence in the proceeding before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 1, West Tripura in connection with T.S. No. 141/2012. In this view of the matter, it is not difficult to hold that the bar imposed by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C does not operate against the proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents No. 2 and 3 U/s 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC. It is true that the so-called mistakes of the said respondent in describing himself as a businessman when he is a Government servant was subsequently allowed to be corrected by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, but that was done only when it was pointed out by the petitioner. However, the disturbing fact remains that there is a tendency on the part of the public to liberally and recklessly swear false affidavit or give false evidence in this country to obtain favorable orders from court or to defeat the legitimate claims of a litigant and such reprehensible acts have reached an alarming proportion. Moreover, as observed by the Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah case (supra), courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint for these kinds of offences and such a course is rarely adopted. The time has now come for courts to initiate action against those who have no compunction to create false evidence or commit perjury in order to obtain unjust orders or defeat the legitimate claims of litigant public otherwise the very sanctity of judicial proceedings is being destroyed. As succinctly held by the Apex Court, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C. Though the decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah had been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner before him to fortify his contention, the learned Magistrate evidently did not apply his mind thereto, and has in the process fallen into grave error of law in passing the impugned order. As the offences charged against the respondents 2 and 3 were not committed when the affidavits in question were in custodio legis, there is no embargo placed by Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C against further proceeding in the case. As the offences charged against the respondents 2 and 3 were not committed when the affidavits in question were in custodio legis, there is no embargo placed by Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C against further proceeding in the case. The impugned order thus suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and jurisdictional error as can be seen from the following paragraphs of his order:- “(2) In the instant case, the complainant does not fall under the category mentioned above and the accused persons made the alleged false statement on oath before a Notary Public who is a public servant within the definition of Public Servant U/s 21 IPC [Twelfth (a)] and hence in the instant case cognizance is not taken correctly. (3) No other offence can be inferred to have been committed reading the materials on record. (4) The aforesaid judgment submitted by the Ld. Counsel of the Complainant in my opinion does not lay anything about S. 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C which bars the cognizance in the instant case. Hence the case cannot be proceeded any further since the same is based upon a wrong cognizance. Hence the proceeding in the case is stopped as U/s 258 Cr.P.C.” 7. That is not all. There remains some other issues to be decided. The next issue is whether the learned Magistrate is correct in stopping the proceeding against the respondents 2 and 3 under Section 258, Cr.P.C, which is in the following terms:- “258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases.—In any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the First Class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witness has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge.” 8. The legal position is no longer res integra in this behalf following the decision of the Apex Court in John Thomas v. Dr. K. Jagadeesan, (2001) 6 SCC 30 where it was held that Section 258 Cr.P.C does not apply to cases instituted upon a complaint. This is what the Apex Court said: “8. The legal position is no longer res integra in this behalf following the decision of the Apex Court in John Thomas v. Dr. K. Jagadeesan, (2001) 6 SCC 30 where it was held that Section 258 Cr.P.C does not apply to cases instituted upon a complaint. This is what the Apex Court said: “8. Summons cases are generally of two categories: those instituted upon complaints and those instituted otherwise than upon complaints. The latter category would include cases based on police reports. Section 258 of the Code is intended to cover those cases belonging to one category alone i.e. “summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints”. The segment separated at the last part of the section by the words “and in any other case” is only a sub-category or division consisting of “summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints”. That sub-category is not intended to cover all summons cases other than those instituted on police report. In fact, Section 258 vivisects only “summons cases instituted otherwise than on complaints” into two divisions. One division consists of cases in which no evidence of a material witness was recorded. The section permits the court to acquit the accused prematurely only in those summons cases instituted otherwise than on complaints wherein the evidence of material witnesses was recorded. But the power of the court to discharge an accused at midway stage is restricted to those cases instituted otherwise than on complaints wherein no material witness was examined at all. 9. The upshot of the above is that Section 258 of the Code has no application to cases instituted upon complaints. The present is a case which was instituted on a complaint. Hence the endeavour made by the accused to find help from Section 258 of the Code is of no avail.” 9. In the instant case also, the case was instituted upon a complaint filed by the petitioner before the learned Magistrate. In that circumstance, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to stop the proceeding against the respondents 2 and 3 by invoking Section 258, Cr.P.C. Thus, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law on this count also. Moreover, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala by his order dated 15-11-2013 had already taken cognizance of the offences U/s 181, 182, 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC and issued the process against the respondents 2 and 3. Moreover, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala by his order dated 15-11-2013 had already taken cognizance of the offences U/s 181, 182, 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC and issued the process against the respondents 2 and 3. By dropping the proceeding against the respondents 2 and 3 when cognizance of the offences was already taken and process issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala, who did not dismiss the complaint U/s 203, Cr.P.C, the learned Magistrate, to whom the case was subsequently made, has no alternative but to proceed further with the case under Section 204, Cr.P.C. In my judgment, dropping of the proceeding against the respondents 2 and 3 U/s 258, Cr.P.C is not only without jurisdiction but has also, by necessary implication, the effect of recalling the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences for which the respondents 2 and 3 were charged, and the same is without jurisdiction. If any authority is needed in this behalf, I may conveniently refer to paras 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Everest Advertising (P) Ltd. State Govt. of NCT, Delhi, (2007) 5 SCC 54 , which read thus:- “10. Summons were issued by the learned Magistrate by reason of an order dated 24-7-1999. He recalled the said order. He did not have any jurisdiction in that behalf. A Magistrate does not have and, thus, cannot exercise any inherent jurisdiction. 11. In Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338 : 2994 SCC (Cri) 1927 a three-Judge Bench of this Court while overruling an earlier decision of this Court in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 88 stated the law thus: (SCC p. 343, paras 14 & 16) 14. But after taking cognizance of the complaint and examining the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint he can issue process by way of summons under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore, what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under Section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint hence issue the process under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore, what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under Section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint hence issue the process under Section 204 of the Code. In none of these stages the Code has provided for hearing the summoned accused, for obvious reasons because this is only a preliminary stage and the stage of hearing of the accused would only arise at a subsequent stage provided for in the latter provision in the Code. It is true as held by this Court in Mathew case that before issuance of summons the Magistrate should be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the inquiry conducted by him as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of the complaint arises under Section 203 of the Code at which stage the accused has no role to play, therefore, the question of the accused on receipt of summons approaching the court and making an application for dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code on a reconsideration of the material available on record is impermissible because by then Section 203 is already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further to Section 204 stage. * * * 16. Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this Court in the case of Mathew that for recalling an erroneous order of issuance of process, no specific provision of law is required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew case that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law.” 12. The said ratio has been reiterated by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 242 : JT (2004) 8 SC 220 and N.K. Sharma v. Abhimanyu, (2005) 3 SCC 213 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 135. 13. The said ratio has been reiterated by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 242 : JT (2004) 8 SC 220 and N.K. Sharma v. Abhimanyu, (2005) 3 SCC 213 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 135. 13. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter was not considered by the High Court despite the aforementioned binding precedents. The High Court, however, for all intent and purport upheld the order passed by the learned Magistrate on the premise that allegations made in the complaint petition do not satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.” 10. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this criminal revision succeeds. The impugned order dated 25-2-2014, except for the offence pertaining to Section 181 IPC, passed by the learned Magistrate First Class (Court No. 5), Agartala in C.R. No. 192 of 2013 is hereby set aside. C.R. No. 192 of 2013 is, accordingly, restored to his file. The learned Magistrate is, therefore, directed to proceed with the criminal complaint in respect of the offences punishable U/s 193, 199, 419, 420, 34 IPC from the stage he had dropped the proceeding U/s 258, Cr.P.C and dispose of the same in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith. Both the parties shall appear before the trial court on 22-8-2016 for further proceedings. On their appearance, they shall be admitted to bail by executing fresh bail-bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court. The learned counsel for both the parties will inform their respective clients forthwith.