ORDER : Pratap Krishna Lohra, J. 1. Accused-petitioners, by the instant misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., have assailed FIR No. 36 of 2014 dated 11th of February 2014, registered at Police Station Bichhwal, District Bikaner. In the impugned FIR, respondent-complainant has castigated accused-petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120-B IPC. 2. Succinctly stated, facts of the case are that respondent-complainant laid a criminal complaint against petitioners and six others, inter-alia, with the allegation that Late Jawahara Ram was co-sharer of agricultural land bearing old Khasra No. 62/16 admeasuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas of village Raghunathsar, Tehsil & District Bikaner, with one half share in it. The complaint further reveals that the land in question was subsequently renumbered as new Khasra Nos. 15, 23, 24, 71/3 and 72/14 respectively. It is also asserted in the complaint that Jawahara Ram was in cultivatory possession of one half of the land out of total land of 9.16 hectares with Khatedari rights. Complainant has divulged with clarity and precision that Jawahara Ram took his last breath on 1st of April 1990 and complaint being power of attorney of his legal heir lodging this complaint. Making specific allegation in the complaint that both the petitioners and other accused persons, in order to grab agricultural land owned by Jawahara Ram, prepared a spurious power of attorney of Jawahara Ram and got it registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Bikaner on 30th of September 1990 and subsequently on the strength of that forged power of attorney of Jawahara Ram alienated the share of Jawahara Ram to accused Omprakash Siyag and one unknown person. The sale-deed in this behalf was registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Bikaner on 25th of October 2005. Attributing criminal delinquency for offences under Section 420, 120-B, 467, 468, 471 and 472 IPC, the complaint further unfurls that execution of power of attorney of Jawahara Ram and subsequent sale transaction was carried out by petitioners and other accused persons inspite of the fact that they were in know of the fact that Jawahara Ram had expired as early as on 1st of April 1990. The fact that pursuant to sale-deed the land was also converted by Urban Improvement Trust for developing a colony in the form of plots also finds mention in the complaint. The fact that pursuant to sale-deed the land was also converted by Urban Improvement Trust for developing a colony in the form of plots also finds mention in the complaint. The complainant has also specifically averred in the complaint that when the proceedings were going on before the UIT/objected, he interjected but the same has not yielded any result, inasmuch as, the accused persons having political backing utilized their resources for columniation of conversion proceedings in favour of respective purchasers. Thus, the entire edifice of the complaint was precisely the fact that execution of power of attorney of Jawahara Ram and sale-deed on the strength of same were executed after death of Jawahara Ram and as such both the petitioners and other accused persons are guilty of committing the aforesaid offences. 3. The complaint was lodged by the second respondent being power of attorney of complainant before Special Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, PCPNDT Act Cases, Bikaner and the Court thereupon sent it for investigation to Police Station Bichhwal, District Bikaner. On receipt of the complaint for investigation, police registered impugned FIR against petitioners and other accused persons and commenced investigation. GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE TO F.I.R.: 4. It is submitted by the petitioners that out of total land of 31 bighas 17 biswas, both Maga Ram and Jawahara Ram each had one half share and on 13-14 September 1990 on the strength of registered power of attorney of Maga Ram s/o. Battu Ram in favour of Jalu Ram - petitioner No. 2, and registered power of attorney of Jawahara Ram s/o. Fata Ram in the name of Govind Ram - petitioner No. 1, both the petitioners as well as their other relatives purchased total land measuring 142 bighas from the recorded Khatedars, which was followed by conversion proceedings in accordance with law. Assailing the impugned FIR, it is pleaded in the petition that the same is founded on absolutely bogus grounds. Petitioners have also urged in the petition that at the time of sale transaction, Maga Ram and Jawahara Ram were present and both of them were duly identified by the witnesses, therefore, no offence as such is committed by petitioners and other accused persons. Petitioners have also urged in the petition that at the time of sale transaction, Maga Ram and Jawahara Ram were present and both of them were duly identified by the witnesses, therefore, no offence as such is committed by petitioners and other accused persons. It is also urged in the petition that Maga Ram has signed several documents and identified Jawahara Ram and therefore the petitioners were left with no option but to rely on the version of Maga Ram and as such registration of FIR against the petitioners in absence of any culpability is not sustainable. In the petition, a ground is also set out that for the documents which were registered way back in the year 1990 an FIR is lodged after a lapse of 24 years by the power of attorney of complainant, which is per se frivolous and therefore investigation against the petitioners and other persons pursuant to the FIR is not desirable and the same merits annulment. A specific ground is also set out in the petition that by afflux of time third party rights are also created in the land in question and in absence of any semblance of proof about commission of offence by the petitioners, it is worthwhile to exercise inherent jurisdiction for quashment of the FIR. To support their various contentions, petitioners have also placed on record certain documents including Power of Attorney of Maga Ram in favour of second petitioner and Power of Attorney of Jawahara Ram in favour of first petitioner. Interestingly, the Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Maga Ram in favour of petitioner Jalu Ram bears signatures of Jawahara Ram as witness whereas Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Jawahara Ram in favour of petitioner Govind Ram bears signatures of Maga Ram as witness. 5. Mr. A.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, has strenuously urged that the allegations made in the FIR/complaint are per se absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach to just conclusion for proceeding against petitioners, itself is sufficient to exercise inherent jurisdiction for annulment of the impugned FIR. Learned counsel would contend that at the time of registration of sale-deed, Maga Ram was present and he identified Jawahara Ram, therefore, the petitioners have acted bona fide, is clearly apparent and same is sufficient to clog further proceedings in the matter. Mr. Learned counsel would contend that at the time of registration of sale-deed, Maga Ram was present and he identified Jawahara Ram, therefore, the petitioners have acted bona fide, is clearly apparent and same is sufficient to clog further proceedings in the matter. Mr. Singh has argued that a civil suit for cancellation of sale-deed is also pending, therefore, simultaneous criminal prosecution of the petitioners founded on the same facts and circumstances is not tenable. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, learned counsel has contended that essentially it is a dispute of civil nature and as the complainant has already availed the civil remedy, it would be in the interest of justice to quash criminal proceedings for preventing abuse of the process of the Court. Lastly, learned counsel submits that inordinate delay in lodging FIR is a significant mitigating factor and so also the subsequent sale transactions creating third party's right over the land in question which warrant exercise of inherent jurisdiction in the matter for quashment of entire proceedings. In support of his various contentions, Mr. Singh has placed reliance on following legal precedents: 1. Mohd. Ibrahim and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 751 2. Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 673 3. Mohanlal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2016 (2) WLC (Raj.) UC 61 6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. V.S. Rajpurohit, submits that the contention of petitioners that allegations made in the FIR/Complaint are absurd and inherently improbable, not satisfying the test of prudency for proceeding against them, is per se alluring but bereft of any substance. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that a bare reading of FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offence by the petitioners and therefore apparently there is no reason to exercise inherent jurisdiction in the matter for annulment of FIR. Mr. Rajpurohit has urged that investigating agency has conducted thorough investigation in the matter and at the behest of petitioners and other accused petitioners time and again investigation was changed but even after changing investigation five times, prima facie, incriminating evidence and materials is collected against the accused-petitioners, is a fact of vital significance for non-suiting the petitioners. For substantiating his arguments, learned Public Prosecutor has also produced the case diary in the matter. 7. Mr. For substantiating his arguments, learned Public Prosecutor has also produced the case diary in the matter. 7. Mr. Suneel Purohit, learned counsel for the complainant, has vehemently argued that the impugned FIR discloses commission of cognizable offence by the accused-petitioners and the facts narrated in the FIR are sufficient to show prima facie criminal delinquency of the petitioners. Mr. Purohit submits that petitioner No. 1 has executed sale-deed of the land in question on the strength of alleged Power of Attorney dated 13th of September 1990, which is apparently five months posterior to the death of Jawahara Ram, itself is sufficient to show his criminal delinquency for the aforesaid offences and so also of the second petitioner. Elaborating his submission, Mr. Purohit has submitted that an incumbent claiming to be Power of Attorney of someone cannot be allowed to take a plea that he does not know the principal (executant of Power of Attorney). Learned counsel, therefore, contended that looking to the seriousness of the allegations against the petitioners, mere pendency of civil litigation cannot be set out as a ground for quashment of FIR. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the complainant has placed reliance on following decision of this Court. Yashwant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2010 (3) WLC (Raj.) 167. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record and thoroughly scanned the case diary. 9. In order to appreciate the afflictions of the petitioners against the impugned FIR in right perspective, it would be appropriate to thrash out each ground in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case. 10. The first ground set out in the petition, that FIR is founded on frivolous allegations and the insinuations hurled therein are inherently improbable, is per se a plausible ground, but for explicating the same in legal parlance, threadbare examination of FIR is essential. A bare perusal of FIR makes it abundantly clear that the complainant has castigated the accused persons for utilizing alleged power of attorney of Jawahara Ram five months posterior to his death. Unquestionably, the land measuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas or 9.16 hectares were jointly owned by Maga Ram and Jawahara Ram having equal shares. A bare perusal of FIR makes it abundantly clear that the complainant has castigated the accused persons for utilizing alleged power of attorney of Jawahara Ram five months posterior to his death. Unquestionably, the land measuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas or 9.16 hectares were jointly owned by Maga Ram and Jawahara Ram having equal shares. Therefore, preparation of power of attorney by the petitioners of a deceased person five months posterior to his death by no stretch of imagination can be categorized as bona fide act. More particularly, the incumbent, petitioner No. 1 Govind Ram, alleged power of attorney of Jawahara Ram, cannot claim any immunity from his criminal delinquency in the matter. In common parlance, it is beyond comprehension of any prudent man that no nexus exist between the principal and his power of attorney or that principal is unknown to a power of attorney. Therefore, on the strength of these specific allegations, it is difficult to fathom that FIR is based on frivolous grounds or the allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable to satisfy the test of prudency for reaching to a conclusion to proceed against the petitioners. Thus, the contention of the petitioners, in his behalf may be quite alluring but not of substance, merits outright rejection. 11. The second contention of the petitioners, that the FIR is not disclosing commission of cognizable offence, cannot be scrutinized in isolation to the allegations made in the FIR. If this ground is meticulously scrutinized on the touchstone of recitals contained in the FIR, then it would ipso facto reveal that complainant has narrated all the events meticulously to show criminal delinquency of the petitioners for the offences attributed against them. Admittedly, in the instant case, Power of Attorney of Jawahara Ram was registered on 13th of September 1990 whereas he left for heavenly abode as early as on 1st of April 1990. In common parlance, execution of power of attorney of a deceased pre-supposes that the incumbent who is named as a power of attorney is a beneficiary of this sort of dubious documentation. That apart, utilizing the said power of attorney for entering into sale transaction for the land belonging to the principal is prima facie sufficient to show involvement of the alleged power of attorney for commission of offence. That apart, utilizing the said power of attorney for entering into sale transaction for the land belonging to the principal is prima facie sufficient to show involvement of the alleged power of attorney for commission of offence. The legal position is no more res integra that even a genuine power of attorney cannot utilize the same after death of the principal inasmuch as the legal sanctity of a power of attorney automatically ceases on the death of the principal. The positive assertion of the petitioners that Maga Ram identified Jawahara Ram at the time of sale transaction further fortifies the criminal delinquency of the petitioners for the simple reason that a power of attorney is not expected to plead that principal is not known to him. Normally, an incumbent may appoint someone as power of attorney who is well known to him and trustworthy. Appointing an alien as power of attorney by the principal is unthinkable and more particularly when someone is illiterate or semi-literate and ruralite. Thus, a cumulative reading of the FIR and upon its meaningful construction, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same discloses commission of cognizable offence by the petitioners and as such this contention too is rejected. 12. The third ground for annulment of FIR is that it is a pure and simple civil dispute between the rival parties and civil suit for cancellation of sale deed is pending before a competent court requires threadbare examination in the light of legal precedents on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. In Mohd. Ibrahim and Ors. (supra), Supreme Court had the occasion to examine forgery of a document purporting to be a valuable security (Section 467 IPC) and using of forged document as genuine (Section 471 IPC). While considering the basic ingredients of both the offences, Court observed that there should be forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC and forgery in turn depends upon creation of a document as defined under Section 464 IPC. The Court further observed that mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant's property, did not amount to commission of offences under Section 467 and 471 IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant. The Court further observed that mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant's property, did not amount to commission of offences under Section 467 and 471 IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant. The Court held: "There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of `false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted." 14. The fact situation in the instant case is entirely different inasmuch as a registered power of attorney is prepared by the petitioners five months after death of Jawahara Ram (principal) and as such inspite of the fact that it is a civil dispute, availability of ingredients of criminal offences are clearly apparent, and therefore, it is not desirable to clog investigation in the matter pursuant to impugned FIR. As a matter of fact, Supreme Court, in the said verdict, Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. (supra), has propounded the principle that if ingredients of criminal offences are available then despite civil nature of dispute trial of criminal offences is permissible. The Court held: "This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. (See: G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., and Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.). Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind." 15. In Paramjeet Batra (supra), Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle by observing that whether complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of fact alleged. Therefore, in this verdict also, Supreme Court has held that whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. Court further held that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may have a criminal texture. As such, this verdict also cannot render any assistance to the petitioners. 16. In Mohanlal (supra), the facts are entirely different inasmuch as in that case accused petitioner after receiving full consideration amount did not execute sale deed and therefore the Court held that there is no element of dishonest intention on the part of accused and the dispute being purely of civil nature, FIR merits annulment. The case in hand is having altogether different facts. If the ratio decidendi of this judgment is examined in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, then in the wake of availability of ingredients for criminal offence, this judgment too cannot come to the rescue of the petitioners. 17. The case in hand is having altogether different facts. If the ratio decidendi of this judgment is examined in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, then in the wake of availability of ingredients for criminal offence, this judgment too cannot come to the rescue of the petitioners. 17. In Yashwant Singh & Ors.(supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court had the occasion to examine the FIR containing allegations against accused persons for offences under Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and after considering a vital fact of alleged use of forged power of attorney, declined to quash the FIR solely on the ground of pendency of civil cases. The Court held: "39. By bare perusal of the FIR, it appears that in all the cases, the complainant-respondent alleged against the petitioners that they have prepared forged power of attorney and agreement to sell and with an ulterior motive and to deprive the complainant-respondent from his legitimate rights. Further power of attorney said to have been executed by late Maharaja Sawai Tej Singh, whereas as per the report of medical examination conducted by the Medical Board constituting of three doctors, Maharaja Sawai Tej Singh lost his mental and physical abilities to think, read, write and sign since he suffered the paralytic stroke in the year 1999. x x x 44. In the instant cases, the petitioners are utterly failed to make out their case as to how the FIRs' in question lodged against them are false at its face value. The impugned FIRs' cannot be quashed on the solitary ground that civil suit is pending between the parties and in such eventuality, criminal proceeding may not be allowed to continue, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah and Anr.(supra), has held that the complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. 45. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi and Ors. 45. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi and Ors. (supra), while reiterating the principles laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), held that "High Court is entitled to exercise its inherent jurisdiction for quashing a criminal proceeding/FIR when allegations made in the same do not disclose commission of an offence- Also, it depends upon facts and circumstances of each particular case." 46. Applying the ratio decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the instant case it appears that the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence as the complainant-respondent has alleged that mental and physical state of Maharaja Sawai Tej Singh was not fit so as to execute power of attorney and the Medical Board has also opined that Maharaja Sawai Tej Singh lost his mental and physical abilities to think, read, write and sign since he suffered the paralytic stroke in the year 1999. x x x 49. Upon careful perusal of the contents of the FIR which are under challenge in the present misc. petitions and the medical examination report of Maharaja Sawai Tej Singh given by the Medical Board, the allegations levelled against the petitioners that forged power of attorney has been prepared by them, can only be proved and established after completion of the investigation which is still pending. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that that FIRs' in question are false at its face value." 18. Supreme Court in a later verdict, Lee Kun Hee & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2012) 3 SCC 132 , has observed that simultaneous filing of civil proceedings cannot be a ground to quash criminal complaint. The Court held: "We are of the considered view, that in offences of the nature contemplated under the summoning order, there can be civil liability coupled with criminal culpability. What a party has been deprived of by an act of cheating, can be claimed through a civil action. The same deprivation based on denial by way of deception, emerging from an act of cheating, would also attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal relief, for the actions of the accused. What a party has been deprived of by an act of cheating, can be claimed through a civil action. The same deprivation based on denial by way of deception, emerging from an act of cheating, would also attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal relief, for the actions of the accused. As in the instant case, the monetary consideration under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2001, cannot be claimed in the criminal proceedings, for that relief the remedy would be only through a civil suit. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that since a civil claim has been raised by the complainant-JCE Consultancy, based on the alleged breach of the agreement dated 1.12.2001, it can be prevented from initiating proceedings for penal consequences for the alleged offences committed by the accused under the Indian Penal Code. It would not be appropriate for us, to delve into the culpability of the appellants at the present juncture, on the basis of the factual position projected by the rival parties before us." Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, mere pendency of civil litigation cannot be construed as a plausible ground for quashment of impugned FIR and looking to the prima facie existence of ingredients for commission of offences aforesaid, I feel disinclined to entertain this ground for quashingment of criminal proceedings, Consequently, this ground is also outrightly rejected. 19. Lastly, the petitioners have vociferously canvassed the ground of delay in lodging FIR for its annulment. In this behalf, suffice it to observe that mere delay in lodging of FIR is no ground for quashing the same in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Delay in lodging the FIR is a relative term depending upon facts of each case. The allegations, appearing in the FIR, prima facie, constitute a cognizable offence against accused persons and therefore also FIR is not liable to be annulled on the jejune ground of delay. 20. Delay in lodging the FIR is a relative term depending upon facts of each case. The allegations, appearing in the FIR, prima facie, constitute a cognizable offence against accused persons and therefore also FIR is not liable to be annulled on the jejune ground of delay. 20. It is also noteworthy that the so called delay of 24 years in lodging FIR, projected by the petitioners, is per se illusory inasmuch as the alleged forged power of attorney was utilized by the petitioners as late as on 25th of October 2005 when land in question was alienated to third party by a registered sale deed followed by the proceedings for its conversion by the purchasers in connivance with the petitioners. A very vital fact is also clearly discernible from the FIR that complainant had objected before the Urban Improvement Trust against conversion of land and therefore the ground of delay is per se not tenable. 21. Apart from the grounds urged by the petitioners for annulment of FIR, a very significant fact, that investigation in the matter is in progress since last almost two years, cannot escape notice of this Court. It is also noteworthy that at the behest of accused-petitioners investigation was carried out on five occasions and the investigating agency has collected incriminating evidence constituting cognizable offences against them. A perusal of the case diary clearly and unequivocally reveals that the investigating agency has made sincere endeavour to unearth the truth and has collected requisite incriminating evidence against the petitioners, prima facie, constituting the offences. 22. It goes without saying that the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, and the investigation carried out so far further proves involvement of petitioners and other incumbents in the crime, is a relevant consideration for not exercising inherent jurisdiction in the matter. Inherent powers of this Court to interfere with investigation by the police can be exercised if there is non-disclosure of cognizable offence or the power of investigation is being exercised by the police mala fide. Investigation is the stage of crime detection and the role of Courts is not to interfere with the investigation unless there is miscarriage of justice. Thus, upon examining the matter in its entirety, in my considered opinion, no case for interference with the impugned FIR and investigation pursuant thereto is made out. Investigation is the stage of crime detection and the role of Courts is not to interfere with the investigation unless there is miscarriage of justice. Thus, upon examining the matter in its entirety, in my considered opinion, no case for interference with the impugned FIR and investigation pursuant thereto is made out. There is, apparently, no inkling to presume that investigation in the matter would result in abuse of the process of any Court so as to exercise inherent jurisdiction. Moreover, in substance, clogging investigation in the matter or quashing FIR is also not warranted to secure the ends of justice. 23. The upshot of above discussion is that the instant petition fails and same is hereby dismissed.